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A TRADITION
Muslims I
SEEK knowledge from cradle
to grave, and search for it even
i you are bound to go to China.
Prophet Muhanimad.
(Peace be upon him )
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VABSTRACT
This study takes Cyril E Black's definition of modernization to denote
" the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the
rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's
knowledge, permitting control over his environment that accompanied the
scientific revolution", and, is an attempt at gauging auth an adaptation
and the problems involved in it in the educational sphere of three typical
Muslim countries. It follows Brian Holmes's "Problem Approach" by
identifying a 'problem' and studying 	 to it in comparative
perspective. The study is divided into four parts.
Part I is devoted to the 'intellectualization of the problem' in its
'ideal-typical' dimension. A rational construct of the normative order of
modernity, defining the nature of modern man, modern society and modern
knowledge, has been drawn in Chapter 2. A similar construct for the
normative order of Islam has been simulated in Chapter 3, and. a comparison
between the two drawn.
Part II assesses the development of the gaps that developed between
the normative and the institutional aspects of Muslim societies as a result
of their introduction of modern institutions, and examines 'solutions' to
eradicate them. Chapter 4 draws three parallel models of nationalisms that
developed in these countries as ideological bases for modernization, that las
Turkish secular nationalism; Erptian Arab nationalism and Pakistani Islamic
nationalism. Chapter 5 traces their respective implications and commitments
to the modernization of Muslim education.
Part III attempts to assess the actual development of modernization
in context along the lines of the 'proposed' policies. This has been done
in three case studies, one on each country, in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in a
systems approach as input-output functions of the educational system.
Part IV is devoted to the comparative analysis and conclusions.
In Chapter 9 a comparative quantitative analysis of the performance of the
three countries under study on the indexes of overall modernization, and
then educational modernization, has been made to corroborate findings in
the case studies. Chapter 10 draws broader conclusions for the prospects
and obstacles involved in the modernization of Muslim societies and the
role of education in the process.
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INTRODUCTION
PEE PROBLEM
In cultural encounters, asserts Professor Toynbee,
"One thing leads to another
If a splinter Is flaked off from one culture and is
introduced into a foreign body social, this isolated
splinter will tend to draw in after it, into the foreign
body in which it has lodged, the other component elements
of the social system in which this splinter is at home
and from which it has been forcibly and unnaturally
detached. The broken pattern tends to reconstitute itself
in a foreign environment 1nto which one of its components
has once found its way."
In line with Toynbee's thesis, by the turn of the present century,
nationalism emerged in the various then colonised societies, as the
ideological strand promising the subjugated peoples their liberation and
reformation. Modernist-nationalist leaders sought legitimacy for their
modernization programmes both from the colonial overlords and from their
backward compatriots. They took upon themselves the dual task of
achieving national independence and then of building up a modern, viable
society. Since then, most of the colonised countries all over the world
have become independent national states. Invariably they subscribe to
modern norms which have been included in their National Constitutions.
In the world of Islam, the first modern nation state tp emerge
on these lines was the Republic of Turkey under the forceful leadership
of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk departed from the Muslim tradition
by dislodging the historic ruling Muslim institutions of Khilafah (caliphate),
Shariah (the Islamic law), and the Ulina (guardians of the Faith). With
1. Arnold J. TOYKBEE,'The World and the West, The Psychology of
Encounters', B.B.C. Reith Lectures, O .U .P .l952, p.75
-2-
these vent traditional Muslim educational institutions; the Madrassahs
and the Mektaba; and thercontent, as veil as media of instruction, i.e.
Arabic and Persian, the hitherto accepted vehicles of Islamic culture.
In their place, he promised to give his people a modern democratic polity,
a modern self-regulating' economy, and modern systems of law and
education, which would make the Turkish nation to learn to be free,
progressive and rationalist in outlook.
Next, in 1947, an independent 'Islamic' State of Pakistan, was
created which confirmed Toynbee's view, and was motivated by the same
modernising ideals, albeit logically antithetical to Ataturk's. It ws
the next historic event in the World of Islam. 2 Other Muslim nations then
appeared on the world map, one after the other, interposing their
rationale for modernity in between these two ends of the spectrum, yet all
committed to the ideals of modernization. Whatever varying ideological
postures they have adopted to legitimise their proposed modes of
modernization, the common denominator among them has been that they all
rejected the traditional interpretations of Islam, particularly its
traditional Institutional arrangement, as vestiges of aedlevalism. They
all agreed on the need for urgent and. basic changes in the institutional
set-up to ensure the progress of their societies: indeed, they have
accepted modern and alien institutions as instruments of reform in their
own societies. With this acceptance there had also to follow,a gradual
change in their system of values. The important thing is that change
as such has now come to be regarded as desirable and beneficial.
But the urge to transform and modernize was not simply a
desideratum that gripped the Muslim leaders suddenly in the present
2. The makers of Pakistan seemed to reject, at least apparently, the
holism of cultural borrowing stressed by Ataturk.
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century. In fact it marks the tip of an iceberg. Beneath it lay the
colossal problem of the great socio-cu].tural lag that has beset Muslim
societies ever since the eighteenth century when alien modern technology
as well as institutions were introduced, either by the Muslim potentates
on their own or by the colonial powers. Holding fast to their own system
of values Muslims of course did not become ready converts to the new
order. With the passage of time and driven by necessity, however, they
latterly did begin to participate in It, and participation led to a degree
of normative change. Yet the underlying inconsistency between their
traditional values and modern norms remained unresolved. This study views
the problem in terms of the historical inconsistency that has been forth-
coming in the Muslim societies in modern history.
The questions examined in this study are (1) Assuming that modern-
ization of Muslim Societies is proving tedious, are the causes to be found
in the inconsistency between the traditional value-systems of the Muslims
and the norms of modernity? (2) And if so, are they to be traced back to
the ideological rationale that were devised by Muslim societies to justify
modernization? (3) To what extent were modern norms incorporated into
the national normative framework of constitutions, statutes, charters or
programmes? And (4) how was Muslim education involved in the modernization
programmes?
A comparative analysis is useful because a comparison of similar
features in a diagnosis of common problems would provide broad scope for
generalizations. Various approaches to the comparative study of education
have been suggested in the growing literature on comparative education
Holmes' 'Problem Approach' is considered most suitable for this study for
he urges on the comparativist the need to search for inconsistencies that
may Inhibit change in educational systems of societies. 3 Looking critically
3. Brian HOLMES, Problems in Education, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1965, pp.32-93.
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at the role education may play in a changing social system, he then
suggests that the researcher should analyse a selected problem by referring
to 'critical dualism' whereby both the normative and the institutional
patterns in the educational systems may be examined; to look for the 'fit'
or Ijfj• Holmes' approach requires the coinparativist, having once
identified the universal, vaguely perceived problem, to intellectualise
or analyse it in general terms and then to reveal its specific features in
selected context". 4 It would then be necessary to trace policy proposals
and. to identify factors relevant to the enquiry.5
Intellectualization of the Problem
Since the term "modernization" itself is still ambiguous and can be
interpreted variously, it is necessary first to define "modernization";
and secondly, to show how education has been employed as instrumental in
the modernization of the features of society to be compared.
Modernization: the concept
The term "modernization" seems to have come in vogue, after a process
of some refinements, only after World War II. Basically, it denotes
processes by which social arid cultural lags are removed in certain societies,
though scholars have tended to interpret it in different ways. A synoptic
view of the term, according to Professor Henry Bernstein, would suggest
two major assumptions: (i) "that modernization is a total social process
associated with (or subsuming) economic development in terms of the
preconditions, concomitants, and consequences of the latter, (2) that this
process constitutes a universal pattern". 6 But many scholars have wanted
4. ibid. p.35.
5. ibid.
6. Henry Bernstein, "Modernization Theory and. the Sociological Study of
Development", in the Journal of Development Studies, Vol 7,
No.2. Jan, 1971, pp.141-160.
-5-
to divest modernization of its economic determinism, and focus on the very
dynamic of change per se that has been recognised as desirable by
individuals and societies for their betterment. Following from an accept-
ance of change, and contrary to the suspicion and fear of it as found in
traditional thinking, it is the generic nature of change and its 	 r
concomitant attributes, 'rationality and positivism' 7 and not the economic
development alone, that have come to be acknowledged as the potent motive
force for producing social, economic and political changes for the
emancipation of mankind. Stressing the idea of change in modernization,
Weiner remarks:
"Because the term is so loosely used, it is tempting
to drop it entirely and to speak more precisely of
changes occuring In individual, attitudes, in social
behaviour, In economics, and in politics. But
scholars persist in using the term not only because
it is a part of popular speech, but also because they
recognize that these many changes are related to one
another - that many countries in the developing world
are today experiencing a comprehensive process of
change which Europe and America once experienced ad
which is more than the sum of many small changes."
Historical Sequence
The historical emergence of these basic norms of modernization: i.e.
change, rationality and positivism, has been traced back to the twelfth
century 'Renaissance' when throughout the world Greek learning returned
to Europe via the Muslims of Spain, and a new spirit of critical
thinking emerged. 9 Hitherto, throughout the recorded history, all over
7. See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society:
?!odernising the Middle East, Free Press of Glenooe,
Illinois, 1958 , pp.45-6.
8. Myron Weiner, (Ed) Modernization, the Dynamics of Growth,
Basic Books, London/N.Y. 1966, Preface, p.v.
9. Highlighting this diffusion of the Greek and Islamic learning remarks
Raskin, "When, in the twelfth century, the Latin world began to
absorb this oriental lore, the pioneers of the new learning turned
chiefly to Spain where one after another sought the key to knowledge
in mathematics and. astronomy, astrology and medicine and philosophy
which were there stored up; and throughout the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, Spain remained the land of mystery, of the unknown, yet
knowable, for enquiring minda beyond the Pyrenees. The great
adventure of the Eurèpean Scholar lay in the Peninsula"
Charles H. Raskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, Meriam Books,
Cleveland N.Y. 1970, pp.285-286.
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the world, change per se had been held in suspicion. Then the most
prized norm was that stability and the 'trodden path' ought to be
preserved. Innovators were persecuted. As La Pierre has asserted
"secular and sacred thought of the Western as well as the I8lamic Society
throughout the Middle Ages, was hardly more than a rationalization of the
status quo ... Not until Locke (1632-1704) did there appear a social
philosopher who directly and consistently sanctioned change •.. as a
desirable and justifiable process."1° To be sure, the process was slow,
and it was not until the close of the eighteenth century that the
crystallizations of a 'modernizing society' were discernible in England,
France and Holland. 1 Until the nineteenth century, the process of
modernization unfolded exclusively in the 'crucible' of Western Europe,
precipitated in the events of the Age of Exploration, the Renaissance, the
Reformation, the Counter Reformation, the French political Revolution and
the English Industrial Revolution. Each of these upheavals marked a step
forward towards the transformation of traditional , medieval lifestyles to
modernity. From this series of events, Europe emerged with a new vigour,
a new dynamic of change, which the Europeans have in turn, within the
12last two or so centuries, introduced into the rest of the world.
With this historical background, it was natural that the term
"modernization" was preceded by such terms as "Europeanization" and
"Westernization" which were indeed considered synonymous with it, but
which seem now to have lost their appeal mainly because of their
ethnocentric connotations. Modernization which apparently discounts ethno-
centrism appears to be gaining global recognition in its import, though
objectors still question its complete neutrality. A rather more refined
10. Richard Te La PIERRE, Social Change, McGraw Hill, N.L].965, pp.2-5
U. See Talcott PARSONS, The System of Modern Societies, Prentice
Hall Inc. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1970. 19.50.70.
12. See William WOODIWIr, The Impact of Western Man, Macmillan, N.Y.
1966, pp.2-3
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and somewhat seemingly un.iversatlistic definition of modernization devised
by Eisengtadt, for instance, runs like thisz
"Historically, modernization is the process of change
towards those typof social, economic, and political
systems that have developed in Western Europe and North
America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth
and twentieth centuriq to the South American, Asian and
African continents." '
Bernstein has criticised this mainly American style of defining
modernization, because of, among other things, its ethnocentrism. Yet
his own suggested mode of classification, which he suggests must be viewed
from the colonial perspective, is not far removed from ethnocentrism.14
Scholars looking at the process of change from the point of view of the
developing societies themselves, seem to want to eschew ethnocentric
theories of modernization completely. They appear to suggest that in the
long view of the history of human development, the European-colonial
impact, though the most powerful so far, should still be regarded as a
transitory phase: It should not, as Tipps protests, "be patterned after
a rather Utopian image of 'western society'. 15
 Now that the whole range
of societies, with variant cultural backgrounds, have decisively and
voluntarily ventured to march on to the road to modernization, and alter-
native paths and shortcuts are being explored, the process has become
13. S.N.Eisenstadt, Modernization, Protest and Change, Prentice Hall mc,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. p.1
14. LBernstein, op.cit. "This conceptualization, f the colonial
situation as a historical and total social phenomenonJ asserts
Prof. Bernstein, both substantively and as reflecting a
different tradition of sociological analysis, stands In direct
contrast to that derived from modernization theory which
is precluded from identifying the dynamics and contradictions
of the colonial situation as sui generis by a concomitant to
analysis in terms of 	 and 'modern' elements
which can pnly yield a dynamic in the concept of transition
or movement along a traditional-modernity continuum". pp.153-54.
15. See Dean C.Tippa, "Modernization Theory and the Study of
National Societies: A critical Perspective." in the Comparative
Studies in Society and History, Vol. 15, No.2. March, l973,pp.l99-226
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more universal and on-going. They therefore, want to see modernization
defined as an open-end concept.
Alberto G-Ramos, for instance, suggests a clear distinction to
be kept in mind between Theory N (Necessity) and Theory P (Possibility),
as each is implied within the understanding of modernization. "The
main assumption of Theory N; as far as modernization is concerned"
asserts Ramosz
"is that there is a law of historical necessity that
impels every society to try to attain the stage
odaupied by the so-called developed or modernized
societies. These societies reveal to the so-called
developing societies the image of their future ..."
"In contrast, Theory P has two main characteristics,
in relation to modernization: (i) it supposes that
modernity is not located in any specific part of the
world; that the process of modernization is not to
be oriented to any Platonic archetype; and. (2) it
holds that any nation, whatever it contemporary
configuration, always has its own possibilities of
modernization, the implementation of which can be
disturbed by the simple imposition of a frozen,
normative model, extrinsic to those possibilities."
Ethnocentrism manifests itself most keenly when modernity and
tradition are posed as polarities. As Tipps has pointed out,
"This dichotomisation of modern-traditional suggests
that traditional societies are essentially static ...
that from the perspective of tradition-modernity
contrast, history begins with the transition from
traditional to modern society. Since this transition
is generally assumed to have begun in non-western areas
as a result of contact with European Societies, this
amounts to an implicit denial of the relevance of the
pre-contact experience of those areas to their
subsequent developmen 	 17
16. Albert G-Ramos, "Modernization: Towards a Possibility Model",
in Beling ., and Totten (eds) Developing Nations: Quest for a
Model, Van Nostrand Reinhard, N.Y. 1966, pp.21-59.
17. Dean S. Tipps: op.cit. pp.212-13. A Marxist-socialist, in fact,
even goes further and stresses that
"a proper understanding of the cause of under-development
and the problem arising out of this under-development can
be arrived at only if it is fully understood in the context
of growth of the world-wide capitalist system from its
mercantilist, industrial, to its latest imperialist phase
of development where a few countries around the Atlantic
developed as the exploiting countries and the rest of the
colonial and semi-colonial countries as the under-developed
periphery ... According to scholars leaning towards the
Marxist approach, the entire rhetoric of development, aid
and modernization is evolved by the scholars of the
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But observations and fieldwork studies of the so-called 'traditional'
societies in the process of modernization show that, far from being
obstacles, certain traditions of such societies may even facilitate change
by providing the central integrative anchorage. To quote Tippa again:
"As knowledge of pre-contact history has increased, however,
such a static image of traditional societies has proven
untenable. In fact, traditional societies appeared changeless
because they were once defined in a manner that allowed no
difference between traditions and recognised no significan7
change save that in the direction of Western experience."
So, with such searching insight into the nature of modernization,
a continual refinement of the concept has become a major concern of
scholars. But whatever academic connotations may be associated with the
concept, the reality of the unprecedented and fantastic tempo of change
that oharacterises life today is not to be denied. This affects all
aspects of life today. It affects the beliefs, norms and. values as well as
the institutions and organisations. All are in a rapid process of all-
round change, and this change is being welcomed and planned. As an all-
embracing and multi-dimensional process, modernization is increasingly
attracting the indulgence and scrutiny of various social-science scholars
who try to pinpoint the most important aspect of it and to define the
order of priorities in the process. Each considers it from his own point
of view.
An economist sees it primarily as the increase in growth per head
of a nation's income enabling its citizens to enjoy a better standard of
17.	 'Western societies', is in reality the cloak to hide the fact
(contd.) of a new form of exploitation and as a subtle defence of the
policies which are not intended to overcome their backwardness
They assert that the capitalist class and the colonial
exploitation is the histori. course and the contemporary cause
of wider-development and. must be eliminated first to permit
such development.
See A.LDES.AI (ed) Essays on Modernization of Under-developed Societies,
Thacker and Co. Bombay, India, 1971, Vol.1, pp.v-xx.
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living. According to Rostow, for example, modernization is a watershed
which marks the 'take-off' into the 'self sustained growth' of traditional
economies which had up to then remained 'episodic, spasmodic and localised'.
The 'take-off' is then followed by a push towards industrial maturity,
leading towards an era of high mass-consumption made possible by high
average income and the resilience of the perfected industrial processes.18
Similarly, Levy, though he seems to reject the economic determinism of
Rostow, implicitly reinforces the production to this aspect of modernization
by stressing industrialisation and technology. Re measures the degree of
modernization in terms of the "uses of inanimate source of power and/or
the use of tools to multiply the effects 0f their efforts" and draws a
distinction on these lines between relatively modernized and relatively
non-modernized societies • 19
A political scientist equates modernization with the *processes of
differentiation of political structure and secularization of political
culture which enhances the capability --- the effectiveness and efficiency
of performance --- of a society's political system." 2° Within this broad
definition, certain features of change in the polity receive greater
importance. Shils for instance, emphasizes the 'progressive sharing' by
the generality of the public in the polity as the most outstanding feature
of politcal modernization. But he accepts variant types of deviant
political systems, such as 'tutelary democracy , modernizjng oligarchy,'
'totalitarian oligarchy", and 'traditional oligarchy' which emerge and
struggle for their survival before their final evolution into a viable system
of 'progressive sharing.' 21 According to Apter, modernization is a process
18. W.W.Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1960, pp.4-16, also in A & E.Etzioni (eds)
Social Change, Basic Books, N.Y. 1964, pp.275-290
19. Marion J. Levy Jr. Modernization and the Structures of Societies,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. Vol.1. 1966 , pp.9-i6
20. See Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol 10, s.v.'Nodernization' pp.395-6
21. E.A.Shils, Political Modernization in the New States, Mouton,
The Hague, 1962, p.7.
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'of increasing complexity in human affairs within which the polity must
act'. 22 Coleman stresses the element of competition in the polity as the
essential theme in political modernization. 23 Parsons, Smelser and
Eisenstadt stress the evolution of institutional differentiation as the
focal 'evolutionary universal' in the process of modernization.24
Psychologist McClellazid explains the 'rise and fall of civilizations'
he mentions the Greek city-states, the Romans, modern western civilization
and also Japan) in terms of a kind of 'mental virus' called 'n-ada' (short
for 'need for Achievement), "that is to say, a certain way of thinking that
was relatively rare but which, when it occurred in an individual, tended
25to make him behave in a particularly energetic way." 	 This
impulse among individuals, he argues, inspires and causes economic growth
and modernization. Similarly, Lerner has coined a psycho-dynamic concept
of 'empathy' which, though not causal to modernization, accelerates it by
helping individuals to adjust to change.26
To a sociologist, modernization is the kind of social change in which,
largely because of economic and. political mobilization, individuals and
groups reshape values, norms and institutions to adapt to an ever-changing
environment. Sociologists stress the processes of differentiation, social
control and integration as well as "massification of power, respect,
22. David Apter, The Politics of Modernization, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1965. p.3.
23. See the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, vol.Io. S.V. 'Modernization
PP.395-8.
24. ibid.
25. See David McClelland, "The Impulse to Modernization", in Myron
Weiner, (ed) Modernization, the Dynamics of Growth, op. cit.pp.28-39,
also, "The Achievement Motive in Economic Growth" in Industrialisation
and Society, (Eda) Hoselitz and Moore, UNESCO, Mouton, 1963, pp.74-115,
and The Achieving Society, Van Nosstrand, Princeton, N.J. 1961
26. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, op.cit.
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rectitude, affection, well-being, skill, enlightenment" emerging during
27
and as a result of modernization.
Corresponding to these conflicting viewpoints on the causal factors
of modernization, scholars also put different emphases on causal sequences
in modernization. Some argue that a dynamic change in the outlook and
behaviour of the individual is a prerequisite to modernization, particularly
if it is to become a self-sustaining process. Others contend that
strategic structural changes introduced in the institutional framework of
a society, in turn, generate new values, outlooks and behaviour.
Faced with these difficulties involved in an attempt to conceptualise
a consistent and universally acceptable theory of modernization, a student
is left with the only alternative of making a subjective choice from among
the various definitions. This study, therefore, accepts Cyril E.
definition as a starting point, mainly because of its universality, dynamic
nature and also because it recognises the importance of historical
evolution. Black considers modernization, in general terms, as
the dynamic form that the age-old process of
innovation has assumed as a result of the explosive
proliferation of knowledge In recent centuries. It
owes its special significance to its dynamic character
and to the universality of its impact on human affairs.
It stems initially from an attitude that society can 28
and should be transformed: that change is desirable.
To put it more succinctly, Black defines modernization as:
the process by which historically evolved institutions are
adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect
the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting
control over his environment, that accompanied. the
scientific revolution. 29
27. Although ' Social Change' and 'modernization' have been commonly
used in literature as synonyms, Bendix has differentiated between
the two by emphasizing the 'extrinsic origin' and the intensity
of speed of modernization contrasted with the 'intrinsic origin'
and slowness of social change. See Reinhard Bendix, 'WIaatIs
Modernization" in Beling and Totten, (Eds) Developing Societies,
op.cit. Chapter 1, pp.3-20.
28. Cyril E.Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, A Study in
parative Histoiy, Harper and Row, Torch Books, l967.p.7.
29. ibid.
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Apart from its explicit cultural neutrality, this definition
presents modernization as a multi-dimensional, rather than a reductive
process. 3° It, furthermore, lays stress on the transformation rather than
the transference of institutions, thereby allowing flexibility and room
for possible and diverse developments to take shape as various societies
and cultures set out to modernize themselves. Another important feature
of this definition is its overt rejection of any reductionism. Again it
does not pose modernity and tradition as antithetical. "Modernization,"
asserts Black, must be thought of not as a simple transition from
tradition to modernity, but as part of an infinite continuum from the
earliest times to the indefinite future. 31 Its special significance for
the students of education lies in the fact that It views modernization
basically as a 'sociology of knowledge' which in turn offers an impulse
for change and readjustment to all Other aspects of life. Hence its
implications for the cognitive aspect
How Modernization takeaplace
Black regards the following four phases as watersheds that mark,
though not abruptly, 'certain critical problems that all modernising
societies must face':
1. 'The Challenge of Modernity - the initial confrontation of a
society, within its traditional framework of knowledge, with
modern ideas and institutions, and the emergence of advocates
of modernity;
30. The multi-dimensional development of all aspects of social life
seem to be central to the concept modernization. Edita Vojas
looking at the concept from the viewpoint of under-developed
countries, observes,
"I consider modernization as a process of manifold interrelated
changes in the economic, social, political and cultural fields
through which less developed societies acquite the characteristics
of more developed societies".
Edita Vojas, "Problems connected with Modernization of
Under-developed societies" in A.R.Desai, Essays in Modernization
of Under-developed Societies. op. cit. pp.493-504
31. ibid. p.54.
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2. The Consolidation of Modernising Leadership - the transfer
of power from traditional to modernizing leaders in the course
of a normally bitter revolutionarl struggle often lasting
several generations.
3. Economic and. Social Transformation - the development of economic
growth and. social change to a point where a society is transformed
from a predominantly rural and agrarian way of life to one
predominantly urban and industrial; and,
4. the Integration of Society - the phase in which economic and
social transformation produces a fundamental re-organization of
the social structure throughout the society." (32)
He then describes the current types of innovations associated with
the concept 'modernization' as is understood in the present times in their
historical perspective. Taking the year 1789, the year of the French
Revolution, as the generally agreed 'milestone' in the development of
modernization, he ranks the 170 contemporary 'politically organised
societies' by seven distinguishable patterns measured chronologically from
the date when 'the consolidation of modernising leadership' started to
take place in them.33
Thus, pattern one applies to England (1649-1832) and France
(1789-1848), the earliest societies to modernize. 34 In pattern two falls
the 'New World' i.e. the offshoot countries of Britain and France, the
U.S.A., Canada, Australia and New Zealand where consolidation of
modernising leadership took place between 1776-1907.
32. ibid.pp.67-89. "The logic of these four successive phases" suggests
Black, "must be seen in the context of wide divergences of levels
of development, and the modernization of each society must be
understood in terms of its own traditional heritage, resources and
leadership. A comparison of many societies in terms of these
phases is useful as a means of visualising modernization as a
worldwide process, but this does not mean that any given society
can gauge its course by the experience of those that have preceded
it except in general terms." pp.88-89.
33. ibid. 89-128.
34. In regarding the year 1789 as the 'base year', although the English
Revolution preceded it, Prof. Black argues that,
"the subsequent restoration was so prolonged in Englan7 that
it is often lost to sight as a germinal stage of political
modernization ... French Revolution, on the other hand, contributed
both ideology and. institutions that were widely imitated.
Throughout Northern, Central arid Southern Europe, French ideas
and institutions were introduced directly by the arm.ies of
Napoleon. French republicanism was the model for modernizing
leaders in much of the Nusjim world as well as Latin America."
pp.107-108
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Pattern three applies to the rest of the European societies where
consolidation of modernizing leadership began indirectly, induced by the
French Revolution.
In pattern four are included the offshoots of these European societies
in the New World, i.e. the 22 Latin American countries. "These societies
differ from those in the second pattern also populated predominantly by
immigrants from the Old World, apart from differences in their bases of
resources and skills" - asserts :Black - "in that modernization came later,
was to a much greater degree under foreign influence, and was influenced
in particular by those societies of the third pattern that were inclined
to place the least emphasis on modernization".35
In the fifth pattern are listed societies that 'modernised without
direct outside intervention but under indirect influence of pattern one
societies e.g. Russia, Japan, China, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Ethiopia
and Thailand.'
Finally, in patterns	 and seven are included the rest of the
'Third World' countries.
The thirty-four newly independent countries of Asia and Africa,
and twenty-nine dependent countries with a sufficiently developed
traditional culture, are placed in the sixth pattern; while about thirty-
one independent and 20 dependent societies which "did not have religion,
or language or political institutions sufficiently developed at the time
they faced the challenge of modernity, to be readily adaptable to modern
conditions," 6
 are placed in the seventh pattern.
According to this historical classification, the three countries
studied are placed proximately, though Turkey, mainly because modernization
there was inspired by the French Revolution directly and not through
colonial rule, has gained priority over the other two. But they all lived
35. ibid. pp.106-128.
36. ibid.
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through the first phase, 'the challenge of modernity', almost
simultaneously as will be seen later.
	 F.iving gone through the
first two stages, all the three since their national independence,
(Turkey 1924, Pakistan 1947 and Egypt 1952) are now engaged in the processes
of the third phase, i.e. the phase of 'economic and social transformation'.
It would, therefore, be appropriate and revealing to trace the kind of
changes experienced in this phase in the hope that this would help, in a
general way, to construct a strategy for the modernization of the
societies under study.
It appears that, although with the creation of a nation-state,
consolidation of modernising leadership, by and large, is assured, yet
the struggle, in some situations, may still continue. However, the
'transformation' phase "represents the period between the accession of
political power of modernising leaders and the development of a society
to the point at which it is predominantly urban and the focus of
mobilization of the great majority of population is toward the society as
a whole rather than toward local communities and specialised groups."
Other focal changes that distingeish this phase can be summarised
as under:-
1. 'The changes in values and way of life of the average person' as
gauged from the experience of the advanced countries, during this
phase is greater than the previous ones.
2. A concomitant of this normative transformation ha been the dramatic
growth of science and technology.
3. "The concentration of effort required by economic and social
transformation is focused primarily at the level of the politically
organised society, the national state or polity, rather than at the
local or the international level." National integration and
solidarity are important.
37. ibid. p.37.
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4. "As a result of economic mobilization, a large-scale transfer of
work-force of a society from aiculture to manufacturing, transport,
commerce and. services takes effect."
5. "There is also a considerable broadening of the base of the ruling
group as the sources of recruitment change from landownership to
business, commerce, and. areas of activity requiring university-
trained specialists. The executive, managerial and service strata
may come to embrace as much as one-half ihe population of a society.8
Bow these changes are in fact introduced and achieved depends
largely on the policies of the leadership and the circumstances of each
country. The process can be slow, prolonged and liberal, as in the case
of the West-European countries; or it can be radical and controlled, as in
the communist countries. Black, for example, regards the 'liberal' and the
'controlled' strategies as alternative choices, each with its own priorities
and consequences. WThe tightly centralised direction of the Soviet State",
he emphasizes, "resulted in a rapid economic and social transformation,
but only at a high cost in human suffering". The choice, in the long
run, has to be made by each society in the context of its own idealogy,
socio-cultural priorities and the nature of its modernizing leadership.
Whatever method is employed, modernizing societies, in this phase,
must face certain common problems. In general, in such societies,
concludes Black,
"Value systems always seem to lag somewhat behind economic and
social developments 5.g. social mobilization, urbanization,
extension of universal literacy and equalization of opportunity,etc
and the assumptions and outlook of leaders in this phase remain
under the strong influence of the traditional agrarian and rural
frame of reference. Indeed, the work force itself, as it moves
from the countryside to the cities, retains many of its rural
modes of thought and life. Village traditions are carried over into
the cities, and the deference of peasant to landlord is transmuted
into
38. ibid. pp.76-8O
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the respect of the poorly educated for the technically trained.
Similarly minority groups retain many of their disabilities
throughout this phase despite the actual changes in their
status and the cosmopolitan goals of the society. A kind of
agrarian cushion protects the bulk of the population from the
hardships of urban life, but at the same time delays the
fulfilment of their expectations." (39)
In the light of these changes and problems, a possible valid
strategy for the modernization of such societies would be somewhat like
this:-
1. Directed changes in the normative and value systems by means of
ideological orientations committed to modernization and spelled
out in the national constitution,
2. Institutionalization of the processes of innovation in the context
of national needs, problems and ideology, to make modernization an
on-going and self-sustaining process.
3. Planned expansion and differentiation of the institutional structure
of the society matched with the construction of the necessary
infrastructure to accommodate a greater use of technology.
Modernization and Education
There seem to be two ways in which education and. modernization are
mutually involved. In the first place, education is seen as a variable of
modernization, and in the second, it becomes an object of modernization.
Both the implications are significant, when the modernization of a
traditional system such as the Muslim education is to be studied.4°
39. ibid. p.80.
40. The distinction between the concepts of 'Islamic' and 'Muslim'
institutions, though both terms are used indiscriminately by many authors,
has been drawn clearly in the Muslim world. An 'Islamic' state, for
example, is regarded as the State which commits itself by definition,
to continuing and developing the historical process of law as developed
by classical jurists; while a	 state can be a secular or
secularised state, "the majority of whose citizens are Muslims of
varying degrees of observance or non-observance, but attached to
Islamic culture and history, to the ethics of the Quran and the many
considerable achievements in all fields of human endeavour." See AZIZ AIIMADJ
Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan. (1857-1964),O.U.P.
London/Bombay/Karachi, 1967, p.267. A similar distinction can be drawn
between the Islamic and the Muslim Education. The former would mean the
classical-traditional system inherited from the past or the Islamic
Studies as introduced within the present-day Higher Education system.
Muslim Education is taken in this study to mean the total formally
organised educational effort of a Muslim society, for the Muslims,
rear1ng them as members of the Muslim community and citizens of a modern
us im country.
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Since modernization, as defined above, is a multi-dimensional,
complex process, education is an integral subsystem of this complex. As
Shipman has suggested, "education can only be meanngfuil studied as a part
of many social institutions ... and, in the light of the functions that
it serves during moderrn.zatxon.41
Basically, education in a modern, or modernizing society, serves to
provide the best possible link between the modernizing personality and
his surrounding socio-cultural environment. Here, education is consciously
employed by modern societies as an instrument of change in the political
and economic and social systems. For this reason, the priority assigned
to education in the programme of modernization is not out of place. In
fact, some scholars have gone as far as to assert that "Education is the
key that unlocks the door to modernization." 42 Others, however, are less
sanguine in considering education as the 'chief variable' of modernization.
Professor C.A.Anderson, for example, looking back at the earlier phases of
modernization of the pioneer modern societies, England and France and
others, points out that "in spite of the apparent economic superiority of
the best-education nations of the world, there is little direct evidence
of the contribution that education has made to their modernization."43
Similarly, with regard to the developing countries, particularly the
African, Professor P.J.Foster stresses that "schools are remarkable clumsy
instruments for inducing prompt large scale change in under-developed
countries."44
41. N.D.Shipman, Education and Modernization, Faber, London. 1972.
Preface. p.10, also cf.C.Arnold Anderson, "The Modernization
of Education", in LWeiner, Modernization, The Dynamics of Growth
op.cit. pp.68-80.
42. See F.Harbison and C.A.Myers, Education, Manpower and Growth
Strategies of Human Resources Development, McGraw Hill, 1964,p.18l,
also Almond and Coleman (Eds), Education and Political Development,
Princeton University Press, Princeton. N.J. 1964. p.3.
43. C.Anderson. op.cit. p.72.
44. Philip J.Foster, "A Rebuttal", in John W. Hanson and Cole S.Brembeck (Eds)
Education and the Development of Nations, Holt Rinehart & Winston, N.Y,
1966
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Without going into the question of the consumer vr8us', producer
values of formal education, or the debates on the economics of education,
concerning which a sizeable literature seems to be developing, it can
safely be assumed that there is a vital interaction between a social
system and its educational subsystem during the modernization programme.
The precise significance of education in the modernization of a particular
society depends very much upon its peculiar circumstances and the stage of
its development. Much also depends on how well education is organised
and harnessed to foster soclo-political integration, and to promote norms
of modernity. Ineptly handled, it can become regressional and dysfunctional
to the socio-political integration, or indeed a tool in the hands of
ideologues to perpetuate traditionalism in their own interests. As
Anderson has aptly concluded,
"The best assurance for a stimulating and constructive
educational system is to surround it with a society that
has vigorous impulses towards change and initiative.
Schools alone are weak instruments of modernization; but
when well-supported, they are powerful". (45)
The functions of education in a modern society have been subsumed
under three headings, described by Shipman as socialization, schooling
and education. 6
 As a socialising agency, education is the vehicle
for the integration of the young into the dominant national or group values.
Schooling preparee them for their social placement and equips them with
occupational and professional qualifications enabling them to perform their
'secondary roles' in the society. Education, in a broader sense, is regarded
as an agency for social and political control. In this last respect, it
is responsible for the creation of an elite force, the Modernizing Leadership
which spearheads innovations and sustains modernization. These functions
can equally be classified as economic, political, social and cultural.
45. C.A.Anderson, op.cit. p.80.
46. LD.Shipman, op.cit. pp 33-35.
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In order to perform these various functions, the educational system it8elf
must undergo structural, administrative and content transformations.
All the functional and intrasystem changes that education undergoes
during modernization can, as Mama and Coombe have suggested, be usefully
studied by using the 'systems approach' whose relevance in the social
science disciplines has been widely recognised by numerous social
scientists and research scholars. 47 According to Coombs, the indicators
of different studies vary, but the strategy can remain constant. Don Adams
uses the systei approach particularly in the study of education and
modernization in a comparative context. The following set of variables
appear relevant to this study:
Societal Features as Inputs into the Educational System
1. Ideological-Normative: Ideological orientations as expressed in
the national norms that put a demand on the
education system to broaden 'mental horizon'.
2. Political mobilization: Demand placed on the education system for
the creation of modernizing leadership - the
innovators.
3. Economic mobilization: Demand placed on the educational system for
the creation of trained manpower as the
problem-solving' force.
4. Social mobilization:
5. Cultural mobilization:
Demand placed on the educational system for
social and. national integration as well as
social mobility. Education is also an Item
of social welfare.
Demand placed on the education system for
cultural change and for stability.
Within Educational System Transformation
1. Administrative modernization: Differentiation of the educational system
to accommodate the various community,
technical and managerial interest in the
formulation, adoption and implementation
of educational policy at the national,
regional and local levels.
2. Structural Differentiation: The division and diversification of
the educational institutions according
the functions they are required to serve.
47. See Don Adams, Education and Modernization in Asia. Addison-Wesley,
London/Ontario, l97O.p.8. and Philip H.Coombs,The Wprld Educational
Crisis, A Systems Analysis, O.U.P. London/N.Y. 1968, pp.8-9
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3. Expansion of the Capacity: Expansion of the educational system
to provide education for the maximum
riuixibers according to the targets set
by the various input demands.
Educational Outputs as Inputs into the Society
1. Value-System Change:
2. Political outputs:
3. Economic Outputs:
4. Social Outputs:
5. Cultural Outputs:
By enlarging the 'cognitive map' of
those exposed to it, education Inculcates
values alternative to those of the
traditional value-system. It inspires
the Impulse for 'n	 and
mobility. This change is incorporated
in the new aims of education az4neasured
by the various indices of modernization.
Modernizing Leadership is directly produced
by the educational system and can be
measured by the strength of thecivil-military
bureaucracy, intellectuals and other cadres
of political administration, as recruited
from the University outputs.
The educational outputs to the economy can
be measured by the trained manpower either
of white-collar and/or blue-shirt workers.
Social integration and mobility is
created by the educational system into
society as a whole by the provision of
widespread or universal literacy.
Education output into culture is manifested
by the quest of the innoVative-rational
and scientific culture as well as the
integrative role of religious and language
education.
These input and output functions as well as the iritra system changes
are shown in the diagram opposite.
Assumptions and Hypothesis:
This study assumes that modernization in the Muslim Societies is
now an accepted fact. Even the traditionalist elements in Muslin societies
welcome modernization programmes. The success or failure of modernization
does not necessarily depend on traditionalism alone. A variety of factors
can contribute to the success or failure of modernization in the
developing societies.
Keeping in mind the degree of backwardness inherited by the
developing countries, the time-scale in which they have to eradicate socio-
cultural and economic lags, the diversities of their 'primordial groupings'
that need integration, the sheer dearth of resources and lack of expt,.tse-
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necessary for the development of modernization programmes and hosts of
other constraints, it is obvious that 'breakdowns' can occur in more
than one, if not all aspects, at the same time, and cause setbacks in the
48
modernization of education. It is, therefore, too early to pinpoint any
conclusive and leading causes of the failures of educational, or indeed
of socio-economic and political modernization of the developjng countries.
Any hypothesis in such a situation has to be a tentative one.
This study therefore, dwells upon the assumption that the success of
educational modernization in Muslim countries is relative to the success
of modernization of their overall economic, political and social
institutions. On its own, education cannot be the 'chief 	 of
modernization.
Bases of Comparison
Black staunchly advocates the use of comparative method in the study
of Modernization. Stressing the significance of a comparative approach to
knowledge in general, he asserts:
"It is interesting to note in this connection
that recent studies of the machinery of the
brain have demonstrated that the process by
which we store, organise and recall information
in our computers is based on a system of
association and inter-connection that is
essentially comparative in character. In one
form or another, comparison is the most widely
used method for organising the great diversity
of data presented by man and nature ... Whether
or not they realise it, even those most dedicated to
the unique would find it difficult to write a
sentence that is applicable to and based on the
observation of more than one case." (49)
48. From the worldwide review of the overall problems involved in
Modernization, Joseph Spenglar has deduced three leading lessons for
the pro8pect of modernization in the developing Societies: "First,
until a country attains the capability for self-sustaining modernization
and development Its progress is quite susceptible of interruption,
resulting in stagnation, and even decline. Second, even having
attained such capability, a country remains susceptible to
deeccerative influences, if only because any and every potential
source of progress is subject to exhaustion. Third, a country still
in process of attaining this capability will fail If it ceases to
emphasize the objective of growth or if it slackens unduly in its
efforts to supply the means."
See Joseph J. Spenglar, "Breakdown in Modernization" in Myron Weiner (Ed)
Modernization, op.cit. pp. 321-333, also see S.N.Ei8enstadt.
49, C.E.Black. Modernization. op.cit.p.35.
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In another context, he emphasizes the importance of both the
'diachronic' and 'synchronic' dimensions of comparison in modernization.50
A comparative study of the Muslim societies must, presumably, call
for a two dimensional comparison: In the first place, a diachronic
comparison aimed at an appraisal of the respective orientations of Islam
as a normative and social system vis a vis modernity, must be posed in
order to gauge compatibility or imcompatibility between the two. Secondly,
a synchronie comparison between some selected entities within Islam, such
as the nation states of Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan as in the present study,
with particular reference to an aspect of modernization e.g. education,
should demonstrate some leading directions of change and some of the
problems involved in it.
The three countries selected for this study have not been picked
haphazardly from the pool of some thirty-five contemporary Muslim societies
which are engaged in a process of modernization. The choice is based on
some very appropriate grounds.
In the first place, these three regions constitute the mainstay of
the Sunni Muslims who have a basic conformity of views and values with
regard to the verities of orthodox Islam, and the traditional Muslim
institutions of Khilafah, Shariah and Ummah. Secondly, these countries
are the inheritors of the two great Muslim Empires, the Ottoman in the West
and the Mugha]. in the East, whose ascendency has only faded with the
'challenge of modernity.' Thus they provide ample evidence for the study
of the traditionalism which Muslim countries have been beset by. Thirdly,
each of these countries has outlined a distinctly typical ideological
model, a basis of its nationalism: the Turkish nation-state secular
nationalism; the Egyptian ethnic-linguistic-regional, Arab socialist-
nationalism; and, the Pakistani ideological-Islamic nationalism.
50. C.E.Black. "Diachronlo and Synchronic Comparisons in the
Study of Modernization in Soithern Asia" in A.K.Desai,(Ed)
Essays on Modernization of Under-developed Societies,
Vol I, Thacker, Bombay, 1971, Chap. 2, pp.40-52.
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These approaches between them constitute almost all the choices
available at present to the whole range of Muslim countries on their
march towards modernization. They also provide a diversity of
orientations and hence a broader scope for arriving at generalizations
about their common problem; the problem of modernization of Muslim
societies.
PART I
IDEAL-TYPICAL DIMENSIONS OF MODERNIZATION
CHAPTER II
IDEAL-TYPES
OF
MODERNITY AND MOZERNIZATION
"MEN must form ideas about the material
universe and must embrace definite
convictions on the subject. No part
of the human race has ever been known
to exist without a system of such
convictions, and it is clear that
their absence would mean intellectual
annihilation. The public must choose,
therefore, either to believe in science
or else in some rival explanation of
nature, such as that offered by
Aristotle, the Bible, Astrology or
Magic.
Of all such alternatives, the public
of our times has in its majority
chosen science.N
Michael Polanyl
The Logic of Liberty
CHAPTER II
2,	 MODERNITY AND MODERNIZATION
2.].
Ideal-typical Modern Norms
Social scientists and scholars engaged in macro-social comparisons
either 'diachronic or synchronic', 1
 have deduced or used some ideal-
typical indexes for the purpose of analysing comparative behaviour. Typical
examples of such indexes are the Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft types
of TonnieB; the rational and traditional types of Max Weber (who also seems
to have given popularity to ideal-types methodology); the local and
cosmopolitan distinction drawn by Merton; the mechanical and organic types
of Durkheim; the sacred and secular types of Becker; the familistic
and contractual types of Sorokin; the empathetic and apathetic types of
Daniel Lerner; and others.
In all these typologies'ideal-typee' are seen as 'the virtual
tendencies of a system', 2
 and not as the empirically existing realities.
They are constructed, as Rogers has observed, by 'abstracting to a logical
extreme the characteristics of the behaviour under analysis' 3
 and serve
mainly as an instrument for detecting discrepancies of similarities
between differing systems.
Viewed in the light of this theoretical significance, the ideal-type
norms of modernity can directly be constructed from	 famous
'pattern-variables' which in turn seem to have been inspired by Weber,
Tonnies, Main and I)urkheim. 4 According to Parsons the following
1. See C.E.Black, "Diachronic and Synchroruc Comparison in the study
of Modernization in S.Asia", in Essays on the Modernization of
Underdeveloped Societies," Vol.I.pp.40-52
2. See the International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Free
Press and Collier Macmillan, N.Y. s.v."Pypologies", pp.179-180
3. E.M.Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, Free Press, N.Y. l969,p.60
4. See Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, Prentice-Hall,Inc.
Englewood, Cliffs, N.J. 1971, chapter 3.
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dichotomies show the contrasting variable tendencies of ideal modern and
traditional systems:
Modern
Universalism
Achievement
Specificity
iffec tivity-neutrality
Collectivity-orientation
Traditional
Particularism
Ascription
Diffuseness
Affectivity
Self-orientation
Social system and their sub-systems, according to these variables
would be amenable to modernity if their goals significantly reflect
general standards and criteria rather than particular cases; if they judge
and reward actors on the basis of their performance rather than for their
particular kinship, caBte, class, sex or locality; if they operate on
rationally defined, differentiated and. changeable laws instead of diffuse,
immutable and traditionally handed down canons; if they function to gratify
long-term rather than immediate objectives, and finally if they are
committed, In the last analysis, to the collective interest rather than to
self-interest. 5 Parsons furthermore, seems to believe that these
normative orientations, and the institutions and roles that they give
rise to, all interact in such a way as to produce a social system based
on integration, equilibrium and consensus.
As a supplement to 'pattern variables', Parsons further goes on to
trace and postulate 	 certain 'evolutionary universals' that emerge and
must form the watershed between primitive-traditional conditions and
modernity. In his view, oust as the use of hand, vision and brain as
organic universals distingnished the human development, in the same manner,
transition towards modernity has been marked by the development of a
5. See Talcott PARSONS, The Social System,Routledge and IC.Paul, London,1967
pp.101-112. See also Don Adams, Education and Modernization,
Addison-Wesley Publishers, Reading, Mass. 1970, pp.2-12.
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well-marked system of social stratification, a system of specialised
and explicit cultural legitimation; and, their inherent system of
differentiation. 6 Defining these Universals as the 'generalised adaptive
capacity' of social systems, Parsons advances the thesis that in the
ideal-typical systems of modernity, the normative framework based on the
'pattern variables', and the structural changes ensuing from the
'evolutionary universals' function to provide the ideal 'isomorphism'
between the personality, the cultural, and the social systems, affording
ultimum and necessary opportunities for 'need disposition' within a social
system based on equilibrium and integration.7
Applied to the various sub-systems of a social system, the norms
of modernity can further be deduced in relation to the nature of modern
man, the nature of modern knowledge and the nature of modern society.
2-1 • 1
The Norms of Man in Modernity
The 'pattern variables' clearly identify the rationale of modern man
by norms reflecting a combination of universalistic, achievement, affectivity-
neutral, collectivity and specificity orientations. The character traits
of modern man, ideally speaking, according to these variables, should stand
antithetical to those of the traditional man. Ideally, modern man ought
to be an open book, a mobile and empathetic individual. He would subscribe
to rational, changeable and universally acknowledged views of reality. His
'rationalist and positivist' belief-system would require him to give reasons
for doing certain things in scientifically defensible terms, as opposed to
saying, "we have always done it that way" or "it is the right way because
it was so done by our elders". Achievement versus ascription index of norms
would require him to believe in accomplishment and qualification as the
essential criteria for recruitment into the social roles and positions
6. See Talcott PARSONS, "Evolutionary Universals", in the American
Sociological Review, Vo.129, No.5. June, 1964, pp.339-357
7. ibid.
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obtaining in the society, rather than in belonging to a family, caste,
class, community or religion. As a corollary, achievement-accomplishment
and rationalist-positivist criteria would make him fundamentally a man of
this-world; ingenious, sophisticated and skill-oriented. Affectivity-
neutrality and specivity norms would make him to be less dogmatic, rather
sceptical, and committed, as Shipman has argued "not only to a new working
and social discipline, but to a less certain, less immutable view of his
"8
world - dynamic not static perspective.
As a derivative from these normative orientations, some scholars
have described an 'ideal-type' man by a list of qualities. Inkles,
for example, distinguishes between the external and internal attributes
of modern man. Externally, he points out modern man is identifiable with
such indicators of modernity as urbanisation, education, politicisation,
industrialisation and widespread communications. Modern man is sri agent
as well as the by-product of these modern indicators. For his internal
attributes, Inkles lists the following nine:
1. openness to innovations and new experiences;
2. capability to form and hold opinions over a large
number of problems and issues arising in his immediate
environment and outside it; and. as a corollary, a
willingness to accept the right of others to their opinions;
3. orientation to the present and the future rather than
the past;
4. reliance on planning and organization in individual and
communal life;
5. efficacy;
6. belief in calculability rather than fate;
7. awareness of own and other's dignity;
8. faith in science and technology;
9. belief in distributive justice, i.e. merit rather than
ascription as a criterion for reward. (9)
8. M.D.SEIPMAN, Education and Modernizations Faber, London, 1971. p.15
9. Alex INKLES, The Modernization o Man, in Modernization, ed.M.Weiner,
Basic Books, N.Y. 1966, chapter 10, pp.138-45.
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Gunnar Myrdal has drawn up a similar inventory of character-traits
10
of modern man. Psychologist McClelland defines modernity in terms of the
capacity for 'need-achievement' - a 'mental virus' as he calls it, which
modem man comes to possess as he moves towards modemity. A similar
psycho-dynamic model of modern personality has been advanced by Lerner
in the concept of 'empathy' which he defines as 'the inner-mechanism that
enables a modern man to move out of traditional settings and to operate
efficiently in a changing environment. Modern personality, according to
Lerner, has a 'mobile sensibility' so adaptable to change that re-arrangement
of the self-system is its distinctive mode. 12 Lerner goes on to advance
the thesis that high empathetic capacity is the predominant personal style,
only under modernity.13
Thus modernity, in terms of the nature of sian, according to Lerner,
is "primarily a state of mind, expectation of progress, propensity to
growth, and, readiness to adapt oneself to change". Its basic challenge
is the inculcation of a rationalist and positivist spirit which manifests
itself in the making of an empathetic personality.14
A copsensus of all these opinions and postulations on the nature of
modern personality has been summarised by Eisenstadt as below:
"This jodern cultural outlookj has been manifest in the
development of some new personality orientations, traits,
and characteristics - greater ability to adjust to the
broadening societal horizons; some ego-flexibility;
widening spheres of interest; growing potential empathy
with other people and situations; a growing evaluation
of self-advancement and mobility; and a growing emphasis
on the present as the meaningful temporal dimension of
human existence." (15)
1). Gunnar I4YRDAL, Asian Drama, An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations,
Vol.1, Allen Lane, London, 1968. pp.61-2
11. David McCLELLAND,"The Impulse to Modernization", in Modernization,
op.cit. pp.28-39.
12. Daniel LERNER, The Passing of a Traditional Society, Modernization
of the Middle East, Free Press and Collier Macmillan, N.Y/London,
1964, pp.45-51
13. ibid.
14. ibid.
15. S.N.EISENSTADT, Modernization: Protest and Change, op.cit. p.S.
2. 1.2.
The Norms of Knowledge in Modernity
In the realm of knowledge, Parsons in 'Pattern Variables' and
'Evolutionary Universals' necessarily iJnp]ies the rise of rationality,
empiricism and science as the bases of knowledge; and the differentiation
of the secular and religious culture.16 The emergence of these norms has
been traced from the twelfth century Renaissance, which gave rise to a
critical spirit that stood to question the uthority of traditionally
inherited metaphysics; and has culminated in the supremacy, in the
modern times, of scientific outlooks, and the resultant power of science
and technology. Modern man now regards science instead of metaphysics
as his ideological choice.17
The essential demarcation between science and metaphysics, as Popper
has pointed out, lies in the fact that "the generalizations of science are,
because of their very form, unverifiable, but they are falsifiable, whereas
the propositions of metaphysics are not." 18 From this assumption, Popper
has developed the now popular 'hypothetico-deductive' methodology of
knowledge which currently forms the guiding principle of study in all
science and social science disciplines. Popper asserts:
"The aim of science is to put forward bold
hypotheses, the deductive consequences of
which must be subjected to rigorous testing
and criticism ... This is the way in which
science progresses ..." (19)
The progress of science as an ideology in modernity has brought
colossal changes in the role of thought and ideas in the formation of
modern man, and the importance of knowledge in modern society. Three
schools of thought have been identified with the evaluation of the modern
sociology of knowledge:
16. T.PARSONS, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives,
Prentice Hall Inc.., Cliffs, N.J. 1966, p.24
17. See David APTER,The Politics of Modernization, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1965 . p.356.
18. See the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, VolIII.S.V. 'Epistomology'
pp.5.38
19. ibid.
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(1) The Materialist Sciool. This school puts no premium on thought per se.
One of its proponents, Vilfredo Pareto argues that "Men act first and
think of reasons for their actions only afterwards." 2° Pareto gives
cenbal importance to the "residues" or "quasi instincts" whidh determine
human conduct and thought. Reasons, he points out, are "derivations"
from the "residues".21
(2) The Idealist School. This school relates the formation of the
cultural mentality directly to the way in which individuals and societies
envision their 'Absolute'. Pitirim Sorokin, the propounder of this school
pinpoints three basic metaphysics that signify the prevalent cultural
systems. He asserts that if the Absolute is seen to encompass the realm
beyond space and time, (as in Ancient India) an "ideational" mentality
will transpire. If both heieand hereinafter are posited as the Absolute
(as in the Middle Ages), an "idealistic" mentality will crystallise, and
finally, if the Absolute is viewed within the limits of space arid time
(as in modernity) a "Sensate" mentality will emerge. Evidently modern
mentality is inclined more and more towards the sensate, this-worldly and
22
empirical values than either the "ideational" or "idealistic" ones.
(3) The Sociological School led by Karl Marx, Mannheim and W.G.Sumner.
This school views knowledge essentially as a question of human conditioning
which occurs through two dialectic factors: a primary or "conditioning"
factor and a secondary or "conditioned" factor, though views differ as to
what element in Society constitutes the former and what the latter. One
section considers "the social constitution as a whole as the substructure
of knowledge, thought and culture." 23 According to Karl Marx it is the
relations and
finstjtutioneof production and property that constitute the conditioning
20. See the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. VII. S.V. "Sociology of
Knowledge", pp.475-77
21. ibid.
22. ibid.
23. ibid.
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factor. W. G. Sumner regards the established habits of social action a
primary conditioners of habits of mind or	 generalised ethos that
permeates the mental life of the society concerned.' 24 "A Society is a
society", he maintains, "because, and insofar as, it is attuned to
certain selected and hierarchical ordered values. These values determine
what lines of endeavour will 'be pursued both in practice and in theory.25
The upshot of all these modern epistemologies is that modern
knowledge is regarded not in a superimposed or sacred, but a problem-
solving and practical perspective, related closely to the society that
perceives and applies it. According to John Dewey, who pioneers this
instrumentalist-pragmatic view, knowledge is "an activity, constantly
involved in the crucible of the experimental practices of testing
hypotheses and adjusting and revising goals in the light of experience.
It is seen as a particular evolutionary adaptation of intelligent organs
in the context of interaction with a changing and precarious environment.n26
To um up, modern knowledge relies upon a scientific, rational and
empirical understanding of reality with a view to gaining grearcontrol
of the forces of nature for the betterment of life in this world. It lays
stress on investigation, planning, calculation and prediction as guides to
social action. It remains mutable and subject to continuous changes as
a result of constant research and discovery of new factors. It is open-
ended.
2.1.3.
The Norms of Society in I1odernity
The 'rationalist and positivist' spirit that symbolises modernity
would in turn give rise to a new kind of society subscribing to norms and
values that run counter to traditionalism. The 'ideal-type' modern society
ought to put more positive emphasis on the normative syndrome of
24. ibid.
25. ibid.
26. See the "Bncyclopaedia of Education, vol III, S.E. "Epistemology",
p.42 5.
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universalism, achievement, specificity, affective-neutrality and
collectivity-orientation. It has been argued that the modern society
ought to contribute to these normative patterns not simply for their
ethical values but also because they are most supportive of the desired
equilibrium and growth.27
The application of these modern norms of society takes shape in
the form of three major 'evolutionary universals' that have been regarded
as fundamental to the rise of modern society viz: 'social mobilization,'
'social differentiation' and 'social integration.' 28
 Social mobilization
denotes the socio-demographic aspects of changes that distinguish modern
societies from the traditional ones. It has been defined as 'the process
in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological
commitments are eroded and broken, and people become available for new
patterns of socialization and behaviour.29
Social differentiation refers to the continuing process of the
separation of tradition-bound roles from their ascriptive moorings, and
the proliferation of the social organizations necessary to house them in
order to enable modernizing societies to adapt to the changes affecting
their environments. 30 Elaborating the underlying principles of
differentiation, Eisenstadt has specified two important aspects in which
a modernizing society is significantly affected by differentiation:
(1) the occupational sphere "where possession of a particular role does
not automatically entitle the holder to the incumbency of others such as
in the political and cultural spheres; and (2) the institutional sphere
where "within each institutional sphere e.g. (in the economy, polity and
social organisation etc.) there develop distinctive units organised
around the goals specific to each sphere, and not fused with other groups
27. Levy. ibid. p.53, also Eisenstadt. op.cit. p.5.
2. See S.N.Eisenstadt, Modernization, Protest and Change, op.cit, pp.2-5
also Encylopaedia of Social Sciences, op.cit. pp.395-6
29. Levy. ibid. pp.187-219
30. Eisenstadt. ibid. p.2. also T.Parsons, Structure and. Process in
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in a network based on family, kinship and territorial bases." 31
Social integration relates to the process whereby autonomous, self-
sufficient and. closed units of social action, such as kinship, tribe,
trade guilds and other organizations having been duly differentiated, are
then brought closer to form a part of a larger aggregate.32
Considering the term "integrated society" as the most satisfactory
of all the names given to the modern society, e.g. th 'achieving society',
the 'advanced society', the 'great society', the 'mass society', the
'new society', the 'organic society', the 'learning society', the
'civilized society' and so on Black describes social integration to
imply the phenomenon in which
"the individual's ties with local, regional, and other
intermediate structure are reduced at the same time that
his ties with the larger and more diffuse urban and
industrial network are strengthened." This shift in
relationships", he stresses, gives "the individual the
advantages of greater opportunities in a more flexible
society and a larger share in the distribution of resources
in terms of education, consumer goods, and a variety of
services..." (33)
The need for social integration seems particularly urgent in
newly independent societies, as Abernethy has rightly pointed out, because
of the vast 'vertical' gap that exists between their 'small, usually
Western-education leadership and the mass of the population', in addition
	
30.	 Modern Societies, Free Press of Glencoe, N.Y. 1959. Robert Marsh
(contd) has drawn a crucial distinction between differentiation and
segmentation. In segmentation, two or more structurally distinct
roles and. collectivitles essentially perform the same functIon."
So defined, segmentation was obviously prevalent in some pre-
modern societies as well. But differentiation is characterised
by the element of progressiveness which involves the establishment
of a unit having primary functions of a higher order, seen in
terms of the system in which it ope ates, than was the function
of the unit from which it differentiates." See Robert Marsh,
Comparative Sociology, Harcourt, Brace and World Inc.N.Y.1967,p.31
31. ibid. p.2.
32. Marsh. ibid.
33. C.E.BLACK. The Dynamics of Modernization. op.cit. pp 80-81, also
Howard Wriggins, in M.Weiner, Modernization, op.cit.Chap.13,
pp.181-191 and the International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences,
Vol.7. p.522
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to the various traditional 'horizontal' gaps defined in ethnic, racial,
religious or linguistic terms. 34 In his view, the expansion of education
relates directly to integrative efforts on both the vertical and horizontal
planes.
To sum up then, the following have been listed as the essential
features that uphold and sustain the normative thrientations of a modern
society: -
"1. A high degree of urbanization;
2. widespread literacy;
3. comparatively high per capita income;
4. extensive geographical and social mobility;
5. a relatively high degree of coinmercialisation and
industrialisation of the economy;
6. an extensive and penetrative network of mass-communication
media, and., in general
7. wide-spread participation and. involvement by members of
the society in modern social and economic process;
8. a relatively highly organised bureaucratic form of
government with widespread involvement by members of
the society; and,
9. an increasingly rational and secular orientation of the
individual to his environment based on the growth of
scientific knowledge." (36)
34. David B. ABERNETHY, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education,
An African Case, Stanford University Press, California. 1969. pp.8-9
35. ibid. p.9.
36. See C.A. ALMOND and J.S. COLEMAN, (ed), The Politics of Developing
Areas, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1960 p.532.
At the Hakone Conference in 1964, where various definitions of
'modernizatjon' came to be scrutinised, the Japanese scholars
particularly Ouchi seems to have questioned terms such as
'urbanization', 'commercia.].isation' or the phrase 'high per capita
income' which he objected were "heavily coloured by capitalistic
connotations". The Hakone Conference, therefore, modified these
terms In rather more general terms eschewing some terms used
originally by Almond and Coleman. See Marious B. Jansen,
Changing Japanese Attitudes towards Modernization, Princeton
University Press, Princeton N.J. 1965, p.18.
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2. 2
Inatutional Changes in Modernization
Institutional transformation is essential to the modernization
process. But the sociological view of institutions puts greater emphasis
on the study of the functions that institutions arise to perform 37
 in order
to understand the nature of the institutional complex. The functional
approach has, as Black points out, "an inherent bias in favour of
equilibrium while societies are never in equilibrium." Functionalism,
therefore, does not give due importance to change per Se. Black insists
that "the ultimate source of change [in societiesj is the growth of
knowledge, the immediate impact of which bears on the functions that
38
institutions perform." Re goes on to argue that "Functional change depends
on the £ew and may often be rapid and easy. Structural change depends
on the many, and is slow and painful. ... For this reason, the process
of modernization may within the foreseeable future lead to a convergence
and perhaps a universalization of functions, but not of institutions, as
long as the 175 societies in the world retain their relative discreetness
as system. 39
 So long as one appreciates these limitations of the functionaL
approach, Black is prepared to go along with it and sees no harm in the
study of institutional modernization in the context of systemic organism.40
The most significant characteristic of modernization affecting the
institutional structure of modernizing societies has been considered as
the continuous structural differentiation that manifests in each institutional
sphere such as the economy, polity and social organization.4'
37. See H.V. WISEMAN, Political System - Some Soaological Approaches,
Routledge and K.Paul, London 1966, pp.134-135
38. Black, ibid. pp.46-9
39. ibid.
40. ibid.
41. EISENSTADT: Modernization: Protest and Change, p.2.
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2. 2.1
The Political Aspect
The modern polity has been defined as
"an independent nation-state, composed of citizens who are
equal before the law and at least nominally able to
participate in the selection of a ruling elite; its
government is relatively centralised, accepts some
responsibility for the welfare of its citizens, and
efficiently deploys its human and material resources in
the solution of pressing policy problems." (42)
The major objectives of the modern society have been regarded
as the enhancement of 'capacity', 'equality' and. 'participation' of its
citizens within the social system. 43 In order to meet these objectives,
the modern polity demands a highly differentiated institutional set up.
Its multi-functional system has been described by Almond and. Coleman
in the following input-output schema:44
Input Functions (Political)
1. Political socialization arid recruitment,
2. Interest articulation,
3. Interest aggregation,
4. Political communication.
Output Functions (Governmental)
5. Rule - making,
6. Rule - application,
7. Rule adjudication.
These input-output demands of the modern polity clearly necessitate
the expansion of the institutional structure of the modern political system
to include not only the classical institutions of authority, law and civil
and military bureaucracy, but also various other types of political
organizations ranging from parliamentary cliques, and pressure groups to
'fully organised political, parties.'
42. David B. ABERNETHY, op. cit. p.1 also cf. Black op.cit. pp.13-18,
Marious B. Jansen. op.cit. pp.20,21 (f.n.) and International Encyclopaedia
of Social Sciences, vol. 10. s.v. 'Modernization', pp.397-402
43. ibid. In the relevant literature, 'participation' has been denoted by
'differentiation'.
44. ALMOI1D and COEEMAN. op.cit.p
45. EISENSTADT. op.cit. p.6.
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The State
The significance of the modern nation -state as a repository of
supreme sovereignty and power and the centralization of its authority has
grown only in modern conditions. In the pre-modern societies political
authority was shared by various segmented units and intermediary bodies
such as the family, the village, the landlord and the church
	
The
authority of the modern state is now consolidated into a central national
government and then extended on a 'functional basis' to various regional
and. local level units or functional. sub-divisions. The basis of
allocation of authority in a modern state is rationalised and enshrined
in the national coritution which ranks supreme as the most sovereign
instrument and a source of legitimation of authority. The functions of
policy making, policy implementation and policy adjudication in a modern
society are direetl differentiated into the institutions of the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary.
The Administration
A highly centralised and organised civil and military bureaucracy
is the bulwark of administration in a modern polity. Modern administration
has further been differentiated into the professional, technical and
managerial cadres and requires a highly qualified and trained elite class
to man these various cadres. Professionalised and dedicated elites are
the great modernizing force within all modern or modernizing societies,
though their relative importance has varied from society to society.47
The creation of such a high-level manpower is the prime necessity of modern
and modernising societies and their educational systems.
Modern Law
Equally important, perhaps pre-eminent in the order of priorities,
is the emergence of the 'rule of law' and a universalistic national
legal system. Modern law, ideally speaking, has been regarded as
46. BLACK. ibid. p.14.
47. EISENSPADT. ibid. p.10
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rationalist, positivist, enacted, transanctional and specific. Its
institutional arrangement is marked by the hierarchy of courts differentiated
into courts of application and appeal, and integrated into a network
operating at local, regional and national levels. The modern legal
system is run bureaucratically, i.e. by professionals who engage in it
on the basis of 'mundane qualifications' and the mastery of the technique
of the legal system itself rather than the possession of some special
talents or charisma. 48 Modern law is furthermore considered to be
political rather than sacramental, inasmuch as the state enjoys a
monopoly over disputes within its cognizance. 49 Above all, the separation
of the legislative and the judicial agencies is an essential hallmark
of the modern law.
48. See MA.RC GAL.ANTAR, The Modernizstion of Law, in Modernization,
Weiner, op.cit. pp.153-165.
49. ibid.
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2. 2.2.
THE ECONOMIC ASPECT
A modern and mobilized economy is regarded as showing the
following salient characteristics:-
1. "increasing application of technology, and of inanimate
energy, to enlarge and diversify the production of goods
and services per capita;
2. a growing specialization of labour and subdivision of
productive processes within and among firms, industries,
occupations, and territories, and an increasing inter-
dependence and mobility of individuals and groups within
a network of widening impersonal markets;
3. a concomitant improvement in human skills and economic
efficiency, especially at the higher technical and
managerial levels;
4. an accumulation of capital goods in more productive forms
and in growing amounts per worker, financed by a complex
of financial institutions that characteristically divorce
the savings from the investment process in order to pool
liquid resources for the growing stream of investment;
5. production, transport, marketing and finance organised
on an increasingly large-scale, with concomitant tendencies
to the concentration of decisions over economic life;
6. as the dynamic force behind the above processes, a society
increasingly oriented to the pursuit of innovation and
growth, infused (especially within the elite) by a
spirit of innovation and growth, and increasingly rational in
Its choice of techniques and allocations of resources
to achieve its economic goals;
7. as a result of these processes - and despite a characteristic
increase in population - a rise in the level of material
well-being, usually a widening of the range of personal
choice, and sooner or later, a reduction in the range of
economic and social ineq.ualities;
8. as incomes rise, a shift in the balance of employment and
production from the extractive industries to manufacturing
and the services, within a concomitant urbanization of
the labour force;
9. the spread of wage labour as the chief form of gainful
employment, and commonly the separation of ownership and
management; and,
-43-
10. the replacement of natural hazards (e.g. weather) as the
main source of insecurity by technological change, the
uncertainties of the market, and the bargaining
disadvantages of the individual in relation to his
employer and the state" (59
Pre-mobilized and subsistence level economies of the Traditional
societies as they set out to achieve modernity, imist go through phases
of structural differentiation in their institutional patterns. Their
economic institutions of production, consumption, capital, exchange
and labour force which had hitherto remained embedded in the self-sufficient
and. limited units of family, tribe, community, village or the guild,
are separated from these settings into autonomous and self-regulating
organizations.
In agriculture, for example, the main source of production of
such societies - cash crops giv rise to the separation of the units of
production and consumption. Wage labour replaces family, caste or
forced labour. In the same manner, the traditional 'household' or
cottage industry that originally provided for the needs of the family
or the community, develop into factory organization where division of
labour calls for specialization and occupational differentiation. Pre-
industrial exchange systems operating on 'reciprocal basis' die out in
the face of exchange markets. Exchange of goods and services is done
more by money than by payment in kind.51
With the introduction of science and technology for rapid
modernization, the process of mobilization of the economy and the
differentiation of its various organizations is accelerated. The
continually increasing stock of scientific and technological knowledge
50. See Black and others, statement contributed at the Hakone
Conference and reproduced in Mrious B.Jansen, Changing Japanese
Attitudes Towards Modernization, (ed) Princeton University Press,
Princeton, N.J. 1965, f.n. pp.20-23, also C.E.Black, The Dynamics
of Modernization, op.cit. pp.18-20.
51. For a fuller analysis of the changes in the economy during modernisation
see Bert F.HOSELITZ and W.E.MOORE, (Eds) Industrialization and Society,
UNESCO, Mouton, 1963, pp . 32-54; also Eisenstadt, Modernization:
Protest and Change, op.cit. pp.6-7, also M.Levy, Jr. op.cit.187-190,
Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, op.cit.pp.18-20.
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and the research into the technique of production and marketing give
rise to a still further complexity of economic organizations and market
structures. New categories or occupations arise as the economic develop-
ment proceeds from one stage to the next. The initial classifications
of manpower, such as skilled and unskilled manual occupations, middle-
class occupations such as trade and manufacture as well as professions
such as army, law, medicine, etc. become sub-divided into sub-categories.
New groups and service organizations emerge as contingent occupations.52
Many scholars of modernization have challenged the popularly held
belief in the economic determinism of modernization. According to
Black, for example, "economic development depends to a great extent on
the intellectual and political aspects of the process - the growth in
knowledge and the ability of political leaders to mobilize resources.53
Harbison and Myers who attach great importance to the 'human resources
development' distinguish modern economy essentially for its capability of
'making major scientific, technological and organizational discoveries
and innovations."54 "This" they argue
"is because it has a relatively large stock of
high-level manpower, particularly scientists,
engineers and managerial and administrative
personnel. It has made heavy commitment to
education especially to higher education and
to human resources development generally." (55)
Modernization of the economy, therefore, entails seminal
implications for the educational system. Economic mobilization and the
institutional, as well as occupational differentiation within the
economy, demand in the first place, a 'rationalist and positivist' spirit
to motivate individuals as well as societies. Schools, more than any
52. See EISENSTADT, Modernization: Protest and Change, op.cit. pp.5-7
53. C.E.Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, op.cit. pp.18-20
54. F.Harbison and C.A.Myers, Education, Manpower and Economic Growth,
McGraw Hill, N.Y./London, 1964, p.13.
55. ibid.
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other social institution , operate systematically to inculcate the
norms of modernity, and innovations; and, to raise innovators inspired
by a desire to break away from, and not to perpetuate, the inherited
systems of production, labour and commerce. Again the complexity of
occupational structure and the increasing enhancement of technological
skills demand greater professionalization and higher educational
cjualifications. Schools, Universities, technical and. vocational centres,
and the like, are also the major institutions that raise the necessary
expertise and manpower quickly and efficiently. 56
2. 2. 3.
TEE SOCIAL ASPECT
Modernization does not only introduce scientific knowledge and
technology and a network of complex industrial and commercial corporations,
legislative assemblies, law courts, and bureaucratic administrative offices
etc. into societies, it also brings unprecedented changesto their self-
sufficient social order. Social mobilization manifests itself in
geographical mobility, from villages to towns, and from farms to factories;
occupational mobility from local-level reciprocal labour to specialised,
wage-labour; psychic mobility in the shape of a growing empathic capacity
as a result of greater exposure to the means of cummunications; economic
mobility with the increase of earned income and the concomitant spending
capacity on consumer goods; political mobility with increased participation
into the polity, and cultural mobility with the participation in the
written culture by means of literacy.
Social differentiation brings separation of ascribed, basic roles
and the achieved, 'free-floating' roles outside the primary institutions.
It also brings transformation of the primary social institutions such as
family, caste and clan, village, community and. religious organization.
As a result the new social order becomes immensely different from the
56. See EISENSTADT, op.cit. pp.5-7
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traditional one and necessitates changes of attitudes, habitats and
disciplines among people.57
The Family:
The modern family, for example, tends to be a nuclear, conjugal
unit stressing freedom in the choice of the partner; there is reluctance
to accept parental control in everyday affairs; a separate household is
created upon marriage, independently of, and away from the family;
there is economic independence of the family, and consequently, an earlier
separation of the young from the parents. 58
 The increasing economic
freedom of women brought about by the extension of education and
equalization of occupational opportunities for both sexes, their engage-
ment outside the household, in skilled, professional or unskilled
odoupations has led to new problems, ones to which even the advanced
societies have only partially and recently given appropriate institutional
forms.59
The Urban Community
The Urban community is a haphazard, heterogenous and impersonal
configuration. Movement from village into urban settings demands
thustment with the 'scale and. tempo of life and work' by the migrants
in the new environment. "Traditional expectations, traditional beliefs
and traditional symbols handicap newcomers and create instability"
"Urban iife" continues Shipman, "is symbolised
by the clock, the traffic light, the hooter, the
time-table, the shift-system and the warning notice.
There is a precision, an urgency about urban life
that demands a personal and collective discipline
In early phases of urbanization this discipline
57. BLACK, op.cit. pp.20-24. also Neil J. Smelser, "The Modernization
of Social Relations", in 11. Weiner (Ed), Modernization, op.cit.
pp.110-121. also M.D. Shipman, Education and Modernization, Faber
London, 1971, pp.20-24.
58. See William J. GOODE, World Revolution and Family Patterns, The Free
Press of Glencoe, Collier Macmillan, N.Y/London, l963, pp.7-l0, also
ibid, The Family, Foundations of Modern Sociology, Prentice Hall,Inc.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964.
59. BLACK, op. cit. p.22.
60. M.D.SRIPMAN, Modernization and Education, op.cit.p.20
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is missing and has to be learned. Until people
know how to use available public services, use
leisure time wisely, spend money efficiently,
learn the new concepts of time and space and to
relate cause and effect in a rational way,
disorganization persists." (61)
Religion and Modernization:
Like all other social institutions, religions also become subject
to changes and. readjustment under modernization. The most crucial
aspect of this readjustment appears in the differentiation of socio-
economic and. politica.l roles from religion. As a result religion
tends to become	 a sub-system within a wider culture and. the total
social system instead of remaining the ruling institution. Whether
modern man is or will ever be, absolutely without religious beliefs and
systems; or whether religion has or has not a vital role to play in
modern life or indeed in the modernization process remain open questions.
What seems certain, as seen from the example of those religions that
appear to have become modernized such as Ctristianity, Judaism and, to
some extent Buddhism, is that the traditional. crystallisations and
medieval systems of all religions must undergo definite institutional
modifications in order to remain forceful. Religion itself, however,
may not be considered as an obstacle to modernization. As }tyrdal has
pointed out,
"No religions on the higher level need be in conflict
with the modernization ideals. But as religion is
part and parcel of the whole complex of people's
beliefs and valuations, their modes of living and
working, and. their institutions, it needs to be
reformed in order to break down inhibitions and
obstacles to development." (62)
6 1. ibid. p.21
62. Qunnar MYBDAL, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations,
Vol.1. Allen Lane, Penguin Press, London, 1968, pp.105-6
also of. J.M.Yinger, Religion, Society and the Individual: An
Introduction to the Sociolor of Religion,}Iethuen, London, 1967,
and K.W.Bolle, "Secularization as a Problem for the History of
Religions" in Comparative Studies in Society and History'. vol.XII,
No.3 .July 1970, pp.242-259. The question of modernization and.
religious beliefs is further discussed in Marc Gallanter,
"The Modernization of Religious Beliefs" in Weiner, op.cit.
Modernization • pp.55-67
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2. 2.4.
IDEOLOGY IN MODERNIZATION
From a purely pragnatic and neutral term, used originally by
Destuit de Tracy in his 'les elements d'ideologie' to denote rational
application of principles derived from scientific observations in the
fields of anthropology and psychology, to the cultural sciences, i.e.
ethics, epistomology and pedagogy, ideology later came to be associated
with idiosyncratic deception and/travesty. Karl Marx in particular
popularised the term 'ideology' in a derogatory sense to imply distortion
practised by the ruling classes in their argonients in defence of the
existing social system.62
Despite any such connotations of distortion the importance of
be
ideology for social cohesion during nioderniation cannoildenied. Ideology
helps a changing social system to achieve greater integrative and
adaptive eapacity. 6 With this vital integrative function, ideology is
usefully employed by politicians and modernizing leadership as an
instrument for obtaining greater social harmony during modernization.
Modernization because of its attack on old loyalties and habits, causes
certain disillusion with old beliefs. Here ideology by providing the
ljak between beliefs and the intended action, as Apter has pointed out,
helps "to make more explicit the moral basis of action during the upheaval
of modernization.
.Lpter has highlighted four ideological tendencies that apply to the
modernization of all societies whether advanced or developing, viz: science,
nationalism, socialism and national socialism. 6 Following what he regards
as the 'Polanyi choice' 6
 he has ut forward the hypothesis that the
62. For a thorough treatment of the concept of 'ideology' in its
historical perspective, see Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia,
Routledge and. Kegan Paul, London, 1954, Chapter II, pp.49-96.
63. See International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, vol.7. s.v.
"Ideologoy", The Free Press, N.Y. 1968, pp.66-85
64. D.APTER, The Politics of Modernization, op.cit. p.314
65. ibid. p.317
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advanced, industrial societies have chosen science with its norms of
rationality, planning, research and professionalism as their ideology.
Here the role of the scientist is paramount. By contrast, modernist
leaders of the developing countries,have of necessity, to o through an
ideological phase of nationalism or (national) socialism, before their
eventual acceptance of science as an ideology. Both Nationalism and
National Socialism basically provide the same ideological foundatlon5 for
modernization, with only a sli ht difference of emphasis on identity and
solidarity; the former appeaiiag more to the specific elements of
national tradition and. its historical culture; the latter to the more
universalistic elements of social justice and equality within the national
framework. In societies with a lively traditional past, nationalism seems
to have appeared more satisfying. The role of both is summed up by
Apter, as follows:
"Nationalism and socialism are ideaologies that,
better than most, provided the coherence
necessary for retraditionalizatlon during the
process of change. Nationalism, for example,
helps to centre authority on certain aspects of
tradition, asserts the continuity of society,
and links the present with the past, and, by so
doing, asserts the immortality of the society,
its on-going and life-giving characteristics.
The definition of membership in the society, the
sanity of the past, and the symbolism of political
forms are made explicit, reinforced and stipulated
as part of a modernizing culture. (67)
2, 2,5
HAZARDS OF MODERNIZATION
The foregoing syndrome of ideal-types tends to weave a matrix of
of
modernization entirely/rationality, scientism, secularism, technology
and material progress: that is to say, a view of life with externality
66. POLANTI maintains that of all the alternative beliefs, e.g. religion,
magic, philosophy etc. modern sian has chosen science to explain the
nature of universe.
Michael POLANTI, The Logic of Liberty, University of Chigago Press
Chicago 1958, pp.57-8. quoted in Apter, op.cit.p.316
67. ibid. p.34O
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as its dominant motif, and with little or no room for the non-rational,
spiritual/religious inclinations or needs of man, individually or
collectively. This idolization of scientism and technology,	 as archetypal
wizards with miraculous powers of solving all problems of mankind, is
however not accepted without misgivings and protests. There are many
warnings that scientisni and technology with their thing-centered, gadget-
ridden and competitive-materialistic culture, which J.B.Priestly has
described by the termAd1nasst,68 taken as ends, may doom the very mankind
that craves to employ them for its progress. Already,a modern 	 sense
of bewilderment and spiritual isolation, the breakdown of his primary ties,
the compartmentalization and atomization of corporate life as well as
ecological pollution, and socio-political violence are proving to be the
high cost of modernization.
Historian of the cyclical school like Wells, Spenglar, and others,
with their 'rise and fall' theory of civilizations have, in their time,
sounded their pessimistic notes about the fate of the scientism and
technology-oriented industrial (Western) civilization. 6
 With these
caveats and protests in mind, perhaps, social thinkers like Sorokin and
Toynbee, with a look ahead in to the distant future, have envisioned
that the salvation of the Western civilization lies in a return to an
ideational religious idealism rather than relying on materialism.70
68. See J.B.PRIESTLY,a'he English, Heineman, London, 1973, pp.241-42.
Pronouncing Admaaa7 the so-called "Good Life" as a threat to the
true'Englishness'of the English Priestley protests that 'while things
are important, states of mind are even more important"
Re gc5es on to warn:
"Now Englishnesa with its relation to the unconscious, its dependence
upon instinct and intuition, cannot break its links with the past;
it has deep long roots. Being itself a state of mind, it cannot
ignore other states of mind and cannot help feeling that Admass,
with its ruthless competitiveness, its idea of man simply as a
producer and consumer, its dependence upon dissatisfaction, greed
and envy must be responsible for bad and not goodstate of mind..."
p.242.
69. 1.0. SPENGLLR, The Decline of the West, 2 vols. Alfred A.Knopt,N.Y.1939.
70. See Richard T.LaPIER, Social Chan, McGraw Hill.N.Y/Toronto/London,
l965.p.2l
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The question however arises; is it possible, at the present stage
of human development or under-development, for any one to sit back and
shun modernization? Can there be modernia ion without the hazardous
and radical surgical operations that follow in its train?
It would appear that as things stand, it would be impossible for
any individual or society to remain in or to revert to, the stage of
development before the changes associated with modernization caine into
operation, or indeed, to ohoose to stay aloof from the rewards of the
scientific and technological progress. There is not a single socio-
political unit of society in the world today which remains unaffected by
the impact of modernization. Modernization, therefore, with all its
advantages and disadvantages, has come to stay.
CHAPTER III
MODERNITY AI]) ISLAM
GOD changeth not what is in a people,
until they change what 18 in themselves.
(Quran: 11:164.)
Reason and logic are the roots of my faith.
caliph	 ALl
The teachings of the Quran that life
is a process of progressive creation
necessitates that each generation,
guided but unhampered by the work of
Its predecessors, should be permitted
to solve its own problems.
Dr. Allaina Shaikh Muhammad Iqbal.
The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.
CHAPTER III
3.	 MODEBRITY AND ISLAM
3.1
IDEAL AN]) ACTUAL VARIATIONS
An examination of the current literature dealing with the
question of compatibility between modernity and Islam, and the prospects
of the latter to lend itself to modernization without losing identity,
reveals a marked divergence of emphasis which scholars place according
to their viewpoints on the dynamic and the historical manifestations of
Islam. The Muslim scholar, even of the modernist bent, is wont to
differentiate between the universal and the traditional aspects of Islam.
His desire to draw such distinctions seem to form a conviction that the
former are viable and universally beneficial, and ought to be adaptable
to all conditions, if skilfully and consistently expurgated from the
crusts of historical traditionalism. The purely secularist, reductive-
functionalist, non-Muslim scholar, on the other hand, does not see much
point in such a distinction, and is prepared readily to write the whole
'package' off as traditionalism and imcompatible with modernity.71
71. The latter type it appears, although presumably concerned with
the contemporary phenomenolor of cultures, is not free from the
historically handed down predispositions, reading Islam, as he
does, from the Westernlliterature. Highlighting his limitatiopa
and exhorting such a scholar to take up the study of Islam with
an open mind, Prof. Montgomery-Watt, has pointed out,
"The difficulty is that we are heirs of a deep-seated
prejudice which goes back to the 'war propaganda' of
the medieval times...From about the eighth century A.D.
Christian Europe began to be conscious of Islam as her
great enemy, threatening her in both military and the
spiritual spheres...The image created in the twelfth and
the thirteen centuries continued to dominate European
thinking about Islam and even the second half of the
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According to Lerner, for example, "Islam is absolutely defenceless
against modernization." 73
 Halpern asserts that the Islamic system that
'connected man, God and Society together, is falling apart in the teeth
of modernization which is tearing off its repetitive pattern of balanced
tensions. 74 Similarly, Parsons advances the following as the causes to
explain why Islam failed to develope itself into a modern system:
1. "the failure of the Ummah to become institutionalised as
a fully corporate societal community comprising essentially
the whole populations of the society;
2. the failure of Islam completely to Muslimize much of the
populations under its political control as Christianity
had done;
3. its inability to accept the rationalizing Greek culture;
4. certain features of the religious traditions itself for
example the Islamic monotheism became a major factor for
its evolutionary limitation;
5. its pnsystematized Koranic law;
6. its lack of phi]cnophica]. grounding for theology and law;
7. its inability to draw very clearly the line between this-
worldly and other.1,woridly spheres, and so,
8. its cultural tradition and societal normative order did
not undergo the crucial process of differentiation,
inclusion and upgrading that could have transformed the
tJmmah into a total society permeated by universalistic
norms." (7
71	 twentieth century has some vestigial influence. According
contd.	 to this image, Islam was a perversion of Christian
truth, even an idolatorous religion, it was a religion
of violence, spread by sword; it was a religion without
ascetism, gaining adherents by pandering to their sexual
appetites both in this world and in the world to come.
Mu.hammed was a deliberate propagator of false doctrine,
thinking only of increasing his own power...." (72)
72. See William MONTGONERY-WATT, What is Islam, Arab Background Series,
American University of Eeru.it, Longmans, London 1968.pp.l-2, also
Watt, Truth in Religions, A Sociological and Psychological Approach,
Edinburgh University Press, 1963. p.1. Cf also, Philip K.Hitti,
Islam and the West, Chapter 4 on "Islam in Western Literature",
Van Nostrand, N.J. 19 62 , pp.48-64. Also see A.L.Tibawi,
"English-Speaking Orientalists: A Critique of their Approach to Islam
and Arab Nationalism," for the Islamic Cultural Centre,Londori,
Luzac, 1964
73. D.LERNER, The Passing of a Traditional Society, pp.199-202.
74r ManI'red HALPERN, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East
and North Africa, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.1963.p.25
75.	 Ta1cottPARSONS, Societies. op.cit. pp.84-S6.
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On closer examination, it seems that even the purely secularist
agrees with the Muslim scholar, that of all the great religions of the
world, Islam emerged with the most rationalist, dynamic and comprehensive
76
outlook.	 It is also appreciated that Islam showed a remarkable capacity
and strength to cope with changes in time and space, and assimilated
diverse systems of thought and culture without abandoning its axiological
concepts. As Halpern has asserted;
"Traditional Islam survived for more than a millenium in a harsh
and uncertain environment because it was capable of converting
constant tensions and conflict into a force for constant political
renewal and social survival. This extraordinary political and
social system of action - mobile in all its parts yet static as
a whole - is rare in human annals for its endurance. This
resilient system has been one of traditional Islam's greatest,
yet least appreciated, achievements." 77)
What is not fully understood is the nature of conceptual constraints
which prevented the medieval Muslims from making compromises with the
'sensate', dichotomous imprints of the contemporary thought of the
Greek, Hindu or Buddhist cultures. It is true that the aslaf (forefathers)
in Islam, after a certain crystallization of orthodoxy had emerged,
branded all innovation as heretical and harmful. But, whether the
normative QLIranlc Islam itself stands opposed to the 'rationalist-
positivist' and scientific spirit, or indeed to the norms of universalism,
achievement, collectivity and affectivity neutrality is not much discussed.
The Muslim scholar of today, therefore, in his attempt to recapture the
dynamism that Islam showed in the first two centuries of its growth,
when it was faced with the impulse to meet outside challenges and success-
fully discovered formulae for keeping its normative order intact while
incorporating potential strands of diverse systems within its own
institutions, is keen to rediscover similar formulae.
76. See Clifford GEERPZ, Old Societies and New States, Free Press
of Glencoe, Collier Macmillan, London/NY. 1963, pp.199-202,
77. Manfred BALPEEN. op.cit. p.10. also Wilfred Canterwell Smith,
Islam in Modern History, Princeton University Press, Princeton,N.J.
1957. p.12.
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Typifying this approach, Professor Al-Faruqi, for example, asserts
that -
"There are two Islams in the world today. The first is the
Islam of the Qura.n and the example of the Prophet in so far
as it can be ascertained. The second is the Islam of the
masses of Muslims, their common beliefs and customs.
Of the two Islams, the first is scriptural, and normative; the
second is descriptive and empirical. The first is the Divine
pattern God has revealed and into the likeness of which the
Muslim is to knead and mould creation. it is the ideal ought
to be. The uran is its repository and final authority.
The second is the human, fallible, and often mistaken pattern
by-which the Muslim attempts to live up to the divine ideal.
This Islam has no single or final authority because while
basing itself on the thinking and deeds of ancestors specially
selected from the age of Muslim decline, it must depend on
living interpreters of contemporary society." (78)
Ideal Islam invoked rationality and castigated taqlid (traditionalism).
The Quran repeatedly exhorts its adherents to observe, to reflect, to
think, to ponder, to reason and to learn from the natural phenomena
that are patterned to change and alternate.
"The creation of heaven and earth, of night and day, the
vessels that cross the seas for the use of men, the fall
of rain which brings life to be a dead earth; the an.txnation
of the creatures, the orientation of the winds and subjection
of the clouds between heaven and earth - all are signs for
those who reason." (79)
The clearest exhortation to man to keep pace with the change comes in
the verse:
"God changes not what is in a people, until they change
what is in themselves." (80)
In a similar manner, the Q.uran while, underlining the nature of conflict
between his fellow Nakkans and Prophet Muhammad, states:
"The Nakkans said, 'We found our fathem following a certain
course and we shall follow in their footsteps.'
'What', said the Prophet, 'Will you still persist even if
I bring you a clearer guidance than your fathers had left
for you?' "So," affirms the Quran, "We punished them". (81)
78. Ismail R. AL FARUI. "Science and Traditional Values in Islamic
Society" in Science and the Human Condition in India and Pakistan
(ed) Ward Morehouse, Rockefeller University Press, N.Y. 1968,pp.12-38
79. The uran, Chapter II, verse 164
80. ibid. 13:11
81. op.cit. p.14
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Similar exhortative, even admonishing statements for not developing
critical faculties and for not questioning traditionalism, abound in the
Quran. To quote Al Faruqi again,
"To say of anyone that he is a blind follower of tradition,
that he does not weigh. his spiritual inheritance against
new knowledge and newly discovered truth-in short, to
impute to him stupidity and folly - is the strongest spiritual
rebuke. 'They do not reason,' 'they do not consider',
'they do not think' and the like, which can be found on
	 82
every page of the Quran, express this catigation of taqlid."
3.1.1.
REVELATION VERSUS REASON
It is evident that revelation remains the kernel of Islamic norms.
But Muslim thinkers have not regarded revelation and reason essentially
to oppose or supersede each other. On the contrary, they see them both
as striving towards the same objectives: the understanding of Reality.
up
Since Islam strictly/holds the unity of Reality, reason and revelation
are both aspects of Reality, or 'two eyes of the soul by which it knows.'
The central concept in Islam is Tawheed (monotheism) which rejects
any anthropomorphic association, or any dichotomization of Reality. It
was basically for their concern for Tawheed - the unity of Reality, that
the early Muslim savants rejected the dualistic nature of Greek thought
while still accepting the elements of their rationalism.83
In its sociological import the concept of Tawheed is seen by the
Muslims as the highest of all universalistic values by which human conduct
and the conduct of nations would be judged. Islam superordinates the
'Universal Ego' as the highest common goal, and then .dresses all human
bein individually and collectively to strive for the universal good. Idea].
Islam equates personal and social good with Divine good. Salvation, as
Islam sees it, comes from 'maarifa' (knowledge) and piety;and piety
includes prayer as well as knQwledge. The most pious Muslims have been
82. op.cit. p.14
83. See Basharat ALl, Muslim S cia]. Philoapphy, Jamiyat-ul-Falah
Publications, Karachi, 1967, pp.8i-.
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the most knowledgeable. So the quest of the Reality via piety and/or
knowledge; revelation or science, remains the highest bliss for a Muslim.
Thus ideally, a Muslim	 regards 'science as integral to Islam'
and equivalent to piety.84 In summarising Islam's position with regard
to rationality, Prof. Arberry observes, "Revelation in Islam is above
85
any reasoning but not above reason. Neither is reason above revelation?
A Muslin scientist, remarks Al Faruqi, does not conceive of the work of
scientists as an amoral, non-religious ques of a reality independent of
God...He can neither be dictated to by nature or be dominated by his
inventions. Above nature stands God; and above the machine stands the
Muslim's God-granted privilege of usufruct of the forces of nature. This
connection with divinity, with God's viii or values, spiritualizes his
quest and animates it. It even promises him greater achievement in the
fields of science and technology than has so far been ach1eved....186
3. 1.2.
THE NORMS OF MAN IN ISLAN
According to the foregoing perception of Reality, as revealed in
the uran, the following doctrines about the nature of the Universe,
have been estab1ished:
1. The Universe is a manifestation of God's Volition. It is not standing
in opposition to Him as an independent reality. Space, time and
matter are interpretations which thought puts on the free creative -
energy of God. They are not independent realities existing per se
but only intellectual modes of appr hending the life of God." 88
2. The Universe is designed to obey a certain order and a purpose;
nothing in the universe is meant to be in jest.
84. Al-FARUI. op.cit. p.26
85. AJ.ARBERRY, Revelation arid Reason in Islam, George Allen and
Unwin, London, 1957. p.34
86. ibid. pp.26-7
87. AL-AQ).D, Abasa Mabmud, Al-mean Fi'l Quran al Karim, (The Concept
of Man in curan), Arabic Text, Dar al Hilal, Cairo, 1960. pp.26-29.
88. MUHAN1ED IQBAL, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,
Shaikh Muhammd Ashraf, Lahore, 1958 p.62.
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"We have not created the Heavens and the earth and whatever
is between them in sport. We have not created them but for
a serious end, but the greater part of them understand. It not".(89)
"Surely, in the creation of the heavens and of the earth and in
the alternation of night and day, there are signs for men of
understanding who, standing and sitting and redlining, bear
God in mind and reflect on the creation of the Heavens and of
the earth; and say, Oh, our Lord, Thou has not created this in
vain." (90)
The position of man in this designed Creation, according to the Quran,
is highly significant - first as an embryo and then the Ego. The Ego
takes significance only when soul Is infused into it; until then it is
only matter - a germ cmli. Man has a twofold creation; 91 the physical
and the spiritual, both in one. As the Quran puts it:
"Mow, of fine clay have We created man. There We placed
him, a moist germ, in a safe above; then made We the moist
germ a clot of blood; then made We the piece of flesh into
bones; and We clothed bones with flesh; and then (finally)
We brought man yet another creation ... (92)
From these verses and other, the nature of man in the 'Ideal'
Islam has been summarised by Iqbal in the following points:
1. man is the chosen of God."
2. "That man, with all his faults, is meant to be the
representative of God on earth:
"And it is He who made you His representatives on the
Earth, and has raised some of you in rank above others,
that He may try you by (the test of) that which He
has given you..." (93)
3. That man is the trustee of Divine trust - a free personality and
individuality, with all the perils involved.
"Verily, We offered to the heavens and to the Earth,
and to the mountains to receive the 'trust', but they
refused the burden and they feared to receive it.
Man undertook to bear it, But hath proved aggressive
and ignorant." (94)
8. The Quran. 44:38
90. ibid.	 3:188
91. The Quranic description of the Fall of Man differs from the
Biblical account. "It has nothing to do with the first appearance
of man on this planet. Its purpose Is rather to indicate man's
rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the
conscious possession of free-self, capable of doubt and
disobedience. The Fall does not mean any moral depravity. it Is
man's transition from simple consciousness
92. Quran. 23: 12-14.
93. ibid.	 6: 165.
94. ibid. 33	 72.
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4. That with the acceptance of Divine Trust, man received from God
the knowledge of things and was fitted for his sojourn on the earth.95
5. That man's sublimation to spiritual proximity with God comes from
his carrying out of the responsibilities of the Divine Trust, by way
of knowledge and piety - all in submission, in the last analysis, to
the Divine Will (Islam).
Thus by the very onus of his free-choice and individuality, the
human being is constantly in search of the Reality that he is a part
of and from which he has been alienated. 'Naarfa' (quest for knowledge)
and 'ibada' (prayer) are the responses of his 'fitrah' (nature) to the
challenge of his tenure on earth. "Prayers' asserts Iqbal, is an
expression of man's inner yearning for a response in the awful silence
of the universe."
3. 1.3.
THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE IN ISLAN
Knowledge has been highly esteemed in Islam. In fact, the whole
purpose of Divine revelation and 'sending down' prophets has been
explained in the Quran as the communication of knowledge.
"The prophet recites unto people	 revelation;
causes them to grow and imparts them knowledge and
wisdom." (97)
Various other verses of the uran and sayings of the Prophet highly
emphasize learning and diffusion of knowledge, e.g.
"God bears witness that...men embued with knowledge maintain
His creation in justice..."(98)
"God will raise in rank those of you who believe as well
as those who are given knowledge." (99)
"Say, shall those who know be deemed equal with those who
do not " ( ioo)
95. Quran. 2: 31, 37.
96. Iqbal, Sir M'ih-mmid. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,
£xford University Press, 1934. pp.85-6.
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The Prophet has said
"To seek knowledge is the duty of every Muslim (man)
and. Nuslimah 'woman) (101)
"Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave, and acquire
it even though it be in Ch.i.na" (102)
"He dies not who seeks knowledge. Whosoever reveres the
learned, reveres me." (103)
"He who leaveth his home in search of knowledge,
walketh in the path of God." (104)
"Acquite knowledge: it enables the possessor to distinguish
right from wrong; it lighteth up the path to Heaven.
It is your friend in the desert, your society in
solitude, and your companion when friendless. It
guideth you to happiness; it sustaineth you in adversity.
It is an ornament among friends, and an armour against
enemies." (105)
Again there are a large number of verses of the uran bidding man to
observe the phenomena of nature, the alternation of day and night, the
mysteries of birth and death, growth and decay, the rise and fall of
nations and to disdover from them the nature of things and their
106
causes.	 The prophet also said, 'An 	 contemplation and study
,107
of God s creation is better than a year of adoration.
Knowledge is represented in the term 'urn' in Islam although
numerous other words such as 	 and	 etc. are also used
for the concept. But, the other terms are narrower in meaning
97. The uran, 3:164
98. ibid.	 3:18
99. ibid.	 58:2
100. ibid.	 2.269
101-105. Traditions of the Prophet quoted in Al Ghazali, Kitab al urn
op. cut. pp.10-19, also in M.M. Pickthall, "The Islamic Culture"
in Islamic Culture, I (1927) pp.151-163
106. of. Au, Ameer SAYYID, The Spirit of Islam, op.cit. pp.33.4; Iqbal
The Reconstruction of Religious Thought, op.cit.pp.12-3, Shaltout,
"Islam, the Religion of Mind and Knowledge" in the Majjillat,
iii, iv. 1960,
pp. 4 • U.
107. Kitab-al jim. p.19. The Prophet has also said, 'Knowledge is
like sealed treasure houses, the keys of which are inquiry.
Inquite, therefore, for therein lies reward for four: the
inquirer, the learned, the auditor, and their admirer.' p.18.
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denoting for example the activities of reflection and perception and the
like, whereas the term 'jim' js more comprehensive.108 The English
ecjuivalent, 'knowledge' observes Rosenthal:
"falls short of expressing all the factual and emotional
contents of 'jim'. For 'jim' is one of those concepts that
have donu.nated Islam and. given Muslim civilization its
distinctive shape and complexion. In fact, there is no other
concept that has been operative as a determinant of Muslim
civilization in all its aspects to the same extent as ' jim' (109)
To elaborate all the various dimensions of cognition, gnosis,
investigation, believing, acting and. other shades of meanings in which
the word 'jim' has been used by Muslim epistomologists, Rosenthal has
enlisted over a thousand. definitions of 'urn' and categorised. them into
110
a dozen typologies.	 These connotutions became crystalised as the
Muslim culture and civilization progressed. But the basic diviaon has
been ascribed to a saying of the Prophet who is recorded to have said,
"Knowledge is two-fold: knowledge of religions and knowledge of bodies."
This dictum has been interpreted to imply the knowledge of the abstract
and the concrete, or the religious and. the secular knowledge.111
The most comprehensive syncretisation of the nature of knowledge
in Islam was deduced. by the celebrated scholastic Al Ghazali. In his
renowned 'Book of Knowledge' (Ihya al Ulum al Din) 2 which has been
regarded as the Islamic Sociology of Knowledge and has formed the blue-
print of Muslim education all through the pre-modern times, he has
propounded all the norms and connotations of knowledge in Islam and.
how best it is acquired.
The fundamental thesis of All-Ghazali 'a sociology of knowledge'
is the unity of knowledge which corroborates the concept of monotheism
(Tawheed) in Islam. A]. Ghazali postulated that in Islam the individual
as a whole is the concern of knowledge as he is accountable to God for
all aspects of his life. "'an as a knower", asserts Al Ghazali,
108. Encyclopaedia of Islam. s.v. pp.469-70. For a detailed study in
English of the concept of 'jim' see F.Rosenthal's, Knowledge Triumphant,
The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Isiam,Brill, Leiden, 1970
109. ROSENTHAL. Know].ede Triumphant, pp. 1-2
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"is at the same time man as a being; and both aspects
are an Indissoluble wh1e. At any stage in his
development, the individual's depth of insight and
the degree to which he understands correspond to a
state of being within his total personality. What
are known as 'instruments of knowledge' including the
mind, are not independent of the whole personality,
and cannot be detached from other constitu.ents of the
personality as the 'faculties of knowledge' or the
only things that count in establishing contact with
reality. Every aspect of the personality besides
these 'faculties' of knowledge, i.e. the habits, desires,
emotions, personality traits, personal goals and
interests, etc. are all involved in the process of
knowledge." (113)
Al Ghazali. discovered that human beings have a natural disposition
(fitrab) to know and seek knowledge of Reality. The ultimate goal of
those who seek knowledge is to have a contact with Reality as absolute
certainty of Reality is possible only at this level. Contact with
Reality, which Al Ghazali has called 'immediate disclosure' (mukashafah)
is the highest stage of knowledge. }ukashafah is uncommunicable:
rds do not convey its real nature for words express conventionally
known concepts. Again Mukashafáh can not be learnt; it is experienced.
The Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet form the result of the
mukashafah of Prophet Muhanma1 as these have been expressed by God
Himself for all levels of understand.ing.14
Next to mukashafah are the stages of revelation (wahy) and
inspiration (ilhain) in which Reality conveys knowledge of Itself and
Its dimensions in the former to the Prophets and the latter to seekers
of Truth. All these higher levels of knowledge are a part of the
Divine knowledge (ilm ladduniya) and unless man achieves this knowledge,
he is not wise. According to the Quran, 'wahy' or the linguistic
110. ibid. pp.46-69
ill. R.LEVY, The Sociology of Islam, Vol.11, Cambridge University Press,
1931, p .343. Levy, however, ascribes to it the apparent literal
meanings, i.e. the knowledge of theology and medicine.
.iim
112. Translated Nabih .Amin Fans, Kitab.alAraf, Lahore 1956, also
see I.A.Othwan, The Concept of Nan in Islam, op.cit.axid W.M.Watt
Muslim Intellectual: A study of Al-Ghazali, University Press,
Edinburgh, 1963
113. OTEMAN, op.cit. p.4.
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expression of Reality by God directly, was sealed with Prophet
Muhammad's demise, but 'ilhazn' or the exposure of truth through
inspiration remains open; and Godly men in every age are inspired by
it.
Communicable knowledge defined as the 'practical knowledge'
(muamlah) is that knowledge which human beings can impart and receive
from other human beings or the systematised knowledge which again, in
its highest form, must conform to the verities of mukashafah. Muamlah
is divided into knowledge of the visible (zaiiir) and that of the
invisible ( batifl 	 ); or the religious and the intellectual, sciences.
Religious sciences have been divided into fundamental principles and
practices; intellectual sciences are either native principles (matbuh)
or acquired disciplines (masmuh).5
Ilm has also been divided into theoretical (urn nazari) and
practical (urn amli) and great emphasis has been placed on the practical
application of knowledge. A saying of the Prophet goes:
"Your knowledge is not complete until you have acted
upon it. He who acquires knowledge and acts upon
it has two acts of piety to his credit; if he knows
and does not act upon it he has obeyed God once and
disobeyed once; and he who neither knows nor acts
has transgressed twice." (116)
Al Ghazali's typology of knowlede had implicit within it the
notion that the essential knowledge that leads to the bliss (saadah) is
all there in the Quran and the Sunnah. It was only to the understanding
and acquisition of that knowledge that human effort was to be directed.
In other words, knowledge and Reality are permanent, and the changeable
aspects are only their understanding and re-statement. It was natural,
therefore, that the main importance was given to the religious sciences
as these were considered to be the short-cut to saadah and intellectual
114. OTRrIAN, op.cit. p.36
115. A graphic abstraction of the Scheme of knowledge can be seen on
the opposite page.
116. See the Encyclopaedia of Islam. s.v. 'Ilm' pp. 469-70

sciences remained only as an appendage to the former. Again, whether
the great teacher himself had designed it to be so oi not, the fact
remains that Islamic learning became mostly repetitive and stereotyped.
With its deterministic bent it was inherently inclined towards
conservation and corroboration of the known rather than experimentation
and innov.tion. The inspiration and desire to innovate stems from a
dissatisfaction from the prevalent and doubt of its efficacy. Muslim
scholarship though exhorted doubt 7
 yet paradoxically doubt into the
tradition had become a taboo whose violation was an exception, not
a norm.
3. 1.4.
THE NORMS OF SOCIETY IN ISLAM
In adherence to its central concept, the unity of Reality (Tawheed)
Islaind upholds the basic unity of mankind as one comniunity united in the
essential common bond of its humanity and spirituality. "Men were
created but one community; then they differed", declares the Quran.118
Having affirmed this common denominator of universalism, it also
recognizes the diversity of various cultural systems. The various ethnic
and national divisions among the peoples, according to the Quran, are
mere geographic arrangements, designed by God, for recognising and
distinguishing one from the other. The only distinction that God draws
between one man and another, affirms the Quran, is in the belief and
the right conduct.
" 0 mankind, Lo We have created you male and female;
and have made you nations and tribes that you may
know one another. Surely, the noblest of you, in the
sight of Allah is the best in conduct. Lo Allah
is all knowing; all-Aware." (119)
The ideals of Islam, as gleaned from the above Quranic verses
and numerous traditions of the Prophet undoubtedly uphold a criteria of
117. See A.S.TRIPTON, Materials on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages,
London, Luzac, 1957 . p.323
118. The Quran. 10:20
119. ibid.	 49:13
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universalisni and achievement, though belief in the Unity of God as
defined in Islam is imperative for Islamic society.
The Islamic concept of society is 'Ummah' which does not connote
a racial, geographical or kinship unit; lJmmah is an ideological community
'a brotherhood in the faith'. Belief in One God, therefore, forms the
essential core and. the axiologica]. basis for the Islamic society.
The ideal Islamic society was founded by the Prophet in Medina
after his migration (Hijra) from Makka where he left his kin, his home
and his traditional environment. In Medina, he established the first
Islamic society which 	 cqmprised the believers consisting of his
immigrant fo])lowers and the Muslims of Medina, as well as those non-
believers who crusaded with the former and owed allegiance to them. They
were accepted as the 'protected people'. (zimma)
The Constitution that the Prophet drew up for his Islamic society
decla red:
" ...the believers: Muslims of uresh (Nakka) and Yathrib
(Nedina) and those who follow them, and those that are
attached to them; and those who crusade along with them,
all constitute a single community, distinct from other
communities." (120)
So important was the founding of the Islamic Society: that to symbolise
it, the Islamic Era itself starts from the inauguration of the Ummah
in Nedina and not with the birth of the Prophet, nor indeed, witi the
initiation of the Quran at Makka.
The Prophet's model of the Islamic society was later
conceptionalised by Muslim philosophers and sociologists, and
institutionalised by the succeeding generations. The first four pious
Caliphs (Khulafa-i-Rashidun') so called for their personal piety and
their just conduct of the affairs of the Ummah, their adherence to the
rule of law and their striving for the upkeep of the norms of Islam,
120. See William MONTGONERY-WATT, Muhammad at Medina, The Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1956, p.21. All the 47 clauses of the
Constitution of Medina have been reproduced by Professor Watt.
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have been regarded as the closest upholders of the ideals of the Islamic
society. Whether the later generations of Caliphs, Sultans and
potentates in different parts of the Islamic world have striven for
the ideals of the Prophet and the Khulafa-i-Rashidun remain a matter for
history to judge, but as an ideal, the model Islamic society as establised
by them has never been lost sight of whenever the succeeding generations
aspired to reconstruct an Isla&ic society.
Ideally, the main objective of the Islamic society has always
remained the implementation of the norms of Islam as codified in the
Shariah for the welfare of the Ummah. Shariah is the collective code
of the laws of Islam as derived from the uran, the Prophetic Traditions
and the 6onsensus of the Ummaii and vouchsafed by the learned Ulama;
the scholars and custodians of the faith. The Shariah forms the main
societal norm of Islam and encompasses laws concerning all the political,
social, economic, BOoio-economic, cultural and religio-moral aspects
of the Ummah. Differentiation of the secular and the religious laws
was not possible or held desirable in Islam as the Shariah constituted
the single axiological core of norms for the Islamic society. It was
this all-pervasive, axiological nature of the Shariah that made Muslim
philosophers like Ibn Khuldun, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Al-Farabi,
Al-Nawardi and others to diverge from the Hellenic dichotomous ideals
121
of society when the latter were studied by the Muslims. 	 These
philosophers came out with a common assertion that Islamic society was
wh4t has been regarded as an 'idealistic' type of society because in
this system, the mind and body, the material and. supramaterial are
united into one.
121. Refuting the claim held by certain orientalists that Islamic
sociological philosophy merely developed out of the Eellenic thought
asserts Au, "Platonism is a philosophy based on sensation or the
negation of the suprasensate realities and hence it is absurd to
claim that either Platonism or Aristotalianism gave form or
charaeter to Muslim culture which is a psychological force to the
Muslim philosophy. No doubt the Muslims in their contact with
the Grecian philosophy, systems of knowledge and culture, got an
opportunity to study them with deep insight, critical vision and.
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Ibn Khaldun, the great Muslim historian and sociologist, for
example divides societies into those which only care for the material
needs of their subjects and those which also care for their happiness
in the future world. He was sanguine that an ideal society (for him
the Islamic society) is superior to the secular society as the former
has man's welfare, both in this world and the next, at heart whilst
the latter cares only for his material well-being in this wor].d)22
Al-Farabi also stresses that the ideal society must have a theological
and metaphysical superstructure. Similarly, .A.l-Ghazali, deducing the
purposes of society from the Q,uran and the Shariah, has maintained,
The human society arises inevitably as a result of
the individual's inability to live alone. That
its coming into existence is necessary reveals God's
wisdom, both in creating such needs in human being
on the one hand, and in making individuals
incapable of satisfying them alone on the other.
God has, in order to make the exiEtence of society
-	 inevitable, also created in each individual an
inescapable desire for human companionship. In
other words, in \fashioning human nature in the manner
He did, God has made human society a necessity.". (123)
This innate socialising trait of the human nature, asserts A1-Ghazali,
dictates the creation of social organization. Without social
organizations, man would not fulfil God's desire to settle the world
with human beings as His representatives on earch, This is how
civilization (Tamaddan) starts, Man needs 'tamaddan' in order to live,
to improve his destiny in this world and to perfect his soul for the
next.
L2]. comparison with the idealistically integrated thought and cultural
contd. patterns of Islam. But they never borrowed anything that
could clash with their own mentality."
See Basharat ALl, Muslim Social Philosophy. Jamiyat-ul-Falah
Publications, Karachi, l97. pp.81-2.
122. See E.I.J.ROSENTHAL, Ibn Khaldun; a North African Muslim Thinker
of the Fourteenth Century, Manchester University Press,l940,p.5
125. A.I.OTEMAN, The Concept of Man in Islam in the Writings of
Al Ghazali, Dar al Maaraf, Cairo,1960. p.l68
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According to Ibn Sina (Aviccena) the core of social organizations
is political. The same point has been stressed by Ibn Khaldun in his
famous edict that 'Nan is political by nature'. But an Islamic polity
as indeed the entire Islamic social system, they argue, must be based
upon social co-operation, and governed by the rule of law (Shariah).
Social competition and conflict would inspire a tendency among
individuals and groups to accumulate all the benefits for themselves,
and this greed would lead to exploitation, strife and grief in the
124
society.
The sole purpose of the Islamic society and its organizations is
to create conditions helpful for man, individually and collectively,
towards ego-perfection and the attainment of the bliss (saadah) of
journey towards the 'Ultimate Ego'. This bliss (Saadah) is attained
through knowledge and moral perfection and these, according to the
Muslim philosophers, are possible only in a society which is ruled by
the Divine law, and guided by the example of the Prophet.
As man is 'on trial' in this life, which he took upon himself as
a trust with the endowed gifts in turn of free will and creativity, in
order to invoke universal justice, to enjoin common good and forbid.
evil; so are societies and civilizations. The uran repeatedly stresses
the fact that the rise and. fall of civilizations has been due to their
success or failure in carrying o t this Divine trust of doing justice,
promoting good and warding off evil.
"Already before your time, have precedents been made.
Traverse the earth then and see what hath been the
end of those who falsify the sigus of God." (125)
It is in this sense too that the (uran exhorts the Islamic society to
be the most righteous society:
"You are the most righteous society that has been
created for mankind. You(ought to) enjoin right (maaruf);
and forbid evil (munkar); and You believe in God." (126)
124. ibid. also Ibn flrALDtJN, Muqaddimah, trans. F.Rosenthal, p.69
and Abn. Sina. Kitab al Shifa, quoted in Rosenthal op.cit.p.ixxv.
125. Quran 3:131
126. uran 3:110
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Authority in an ideal Islamic society ought to be exercised as
an act of worship in the interest of the universal good, and to further
both the material and spiritual welfare of the subject. Obedience to
authority has, therefore, been enjoined in the Quran as an act of duty
upon the Muslims: an act of co-operation and not QquicenceThe ideal
leader of such an Islamic society ought to be the person elected/selected
as the most suitable representative of the Prophet, i.e. his Khalifah
(Caliph), as the first four pious Caliphs were. He must regulate the
society in such a way that it promotes the common interest (musharikat),
the sanctity of family life (manakihat) and safeguards life and propert6
Muslims have been enjoined by the Quran, whenever they associate
together, to co-operate and take part only in righteousness and not in
sedition and criminality.
"And co-operate with one another in righteousness
and piety; Do not associate with one another
unto sin and transgression. Keep your duty to
Allah..." (127
To sum, the norms of an ideal Islamic society can be stated as below:
1. That the Islamic society ought to be an 'idealistic' society, a
unity in the Faith and a'universal brotherhood' whose prime
objective is to function to fulfil God's will and purpose, and to
uphold righteousness, justice and welfare for all mankind.
2. Divine will and purpose has been revealed in the Divine Law which
is universalistic and immutable. Man's role as law m&er is
restricted within the limits (Hadud) set by the Divine Law. He is
the interpreter, adjuster, implementer and adjudicator of the Law
but not the law-maker.
3. Social integration and co-operation between all sections of the
society are the best means of achieving the Divine purpose.'28
126. Quran.	 3:110.
127. Basharat Ali. op.cit. p.104
128. Muhammad EL-BMIAY, "Islam arid Social Development on the Naji11at
(Journal of the Al-Azhar University), Cairo. 32.iv (1960-61)pp.12-19.
also, LSharif, Islamic Social Framework, Ash.raf, Lahore. 1963
pp.47-53
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Islamic society allows for no elitism and stratification on the bases
kinship, class or caste. The leader and the led are all answerable
equally to the (Shariah) Divine Law. The only criteria for excellence
and social primacy are piety and right conduct.
4. Since belief and piety are the only criteria for excellence,
knowledge has to be strong determinant of social equilibrium in the
Islamic society. "Insistence upon knowledge," asserts Rosenthal,
"has no doubt made medieval Muslim civilization one of the great
129
scholarly and scientific productivity."
5. Since Islam remains a unitarian belief system par excellence,
unification of all aspects of social life has been stressed as against
their differentiation. In this sense, then the Islamic society would
ce4ntric
be regarded as a/segmented and not a differentiated society.
3, 1.5.
ENTRENCHMENT OF TRADITIONALISM (TAID) IN ISLAM
The	 Islam, with its universalistic achievement
and collectivity orientated 'vision' 130started to live itself out in an
environment, both at home and abroad, deeply entrenched in ascriptive,
particularistic values. It is only in the living that a vision is faced
with the classical lag that develops between the ideal and the actual.
Visionaries then essay to eradicate this lag by a continuous process of
assessment, reassessment and. reinterpretation of the vision. Once
however they see the vibn finalised and 'close the door' for change, it
starts getting fixated to a particular lime and a particular shape. As
time passes the vision itself gets crusted under layers of traditionalism.
Any change that then comes into it, is generally extraneous.
129. F.ROSENTHAL, Knowledge Triumphant, The Concept of Knowledge in
Medieval Islam, Brill, Leiden. 1970; also cf. M.Shaltout, "Islam
the Religion of Knowledge", in the Majjillat,op.cit. iii-iv, 1960
130. William Montgomery WATT, What is Islam, op.cit. The idea
Islamic vision is taken from Prof. Watt who writes, "Since a vision
is a way of both looking at the world and of dealing with it, it
also follows that a vision is always so ething that has to be lived
out. This means that it haB to be embodied in the life both of
individuals and of society as a whole, since man is a social animal"
p.11.
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Just as the Christian vision centred round the person of Jesus as
the unquestionable divine Logos, Islam emerged as a civilization of the
Book, Al-curan, which formed the tabula-rasa of the divine Logos.131
The 'Book' formed the source of belief, knowledge and the 'rule of Law'.
The Prophet was the living example of it in person, and the Islamic
community is its embodiment. Together, these three components became
the aiiological bases of the Islamic vision. But these were only the
rock bottom bases; they still had to develop structures and. systems.
Crucial events and diverse traditions throw up challenges for
ideologies and visions where legitimate conceptual guidelines have to
be provided. Fallible human beings, with all their frailities and
predi1ection do not always readily ti1eye	 a consensus. So appear
splits, factions and. controversies. And, if these become violent,
instability follows. In the face of instability and undertainty, people
and societies naturally tend to find anchorage in their traditions.MedjeVaI
Muslim traditionalism was more a result of fear of anarchy than a
lack of idealism.
The first split that emerged in Islam was over the question of
succession to the Prophet in his functions both as the spiritual guide
and the leader of the comunity. A section of the community which later
came to be known as the Shi'tes, held that the 'leader of the faithful'
cannot be chosen 'on the basis of men's capricious will and
13?temptation'	 but it should invariably be a divine appointment in the
Apostolic line, that is to say, an infallible descendent of the Prophet
through his daughter, Fatimah, and her husband Au, (the Prophet's
Cousin) who became the fourth Caliph. Those who insisted upon the
131 See M.Abd Allah DRAZ, 'The or i gin Of Islam' in Islam—the Straight Path op cIt•pp 21-37.
132. Mehmud SHEHABI in Islam, the Straight Path, (ed) K.W.Morgan,
The Ronald Press, N.Y. 1958. p.190
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electoral basis of the Caliphate, came to be known as the Sunnitea,
the followers of the Prophet's Sunnah (precept). The focal point of
variance between the factions lay in the importance given by the former
to the ideal leader as the source of authority as well as law; and by
the latter, to the consesus of the cornmuiuty as the basis of authority
and. the implementation of the Shariah (law). Thus, the Shi'ites, as
Professor Watt points out, believed in salvation through a'charisinatic'
133leader: the Sunnitea through a'charisniatic society)
The Shi'ites did not accept the election of the first three Caliphs
as lawful and regarded Au, as the rightful successor to the Prophet,
among other things for his lineage with the Prophet. After All, they
held, the leadership of the Muslims remained de jure vested in his
posterity until Imam Hasan al Askari, the 11th Iman who died in 874.
134
Upon his death, the Iminainate devolved upon his son Muhammad al Mandi,
who disappeared into a cavern and never returned. All religious and
political authority after Iman Muhainmaxi (the hidden) has to be held in
his name by proxy.
The Sunnites regarded the election of all the four Caliphs,
including Caliph Au, perfectly in order, and in line with the require-
ments of the Book and the 'rule of law'. But, then came the tragic
killing of Othinan, the third Caliph who was alleged to have assigned
public offices to his clansmen from Makka and thus given rise to
ascription and nepotism in the Islamic polity. So intense was the
reaction to the introduction of ascriptive criteria into body politics
of Islam, that it was considered as the gravest sin, which sparked off
133. W. Montgomery-Watt, Islam and the Integration of Society, op.cit.
also W,M.Watt, "The Conception of the Charismatic Community in
Islam", in NUMEN, vii (1960), pp.77-90. On the question of the
charismatic leadership of the Islamic Uinmah having Quranic support,
Prof. Watt remarks, that though the Prophet was in fact a
charismatic leader, marked out by the receiving of supernatural
communications, the conception of the charismatic leader had little
import In the Quranic system of ideas."
134. Immamate is the Sh.i'ate concept of leadership of the Muslims as
against the Sunni concept of Khilafah (Caliphate). Immamate
stresses the idea of h1eadership while the Khiafah of 'succession'.
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continual doctrinal controversy and violent aocio-politioal conflicts.
On the doctrinal side, a group of thinkers known as the Kharijites
(secessionists) who idealised the Islamic community as sinless, on the
sole criterion of its unadulterated following of the 'Book' and judged
all the events of the time as deviations from it. A Muslim, they argued,
who couimitted a grave sin, as Caliph Otbman in their view had, strictly
speaking forfeited his membership of the Islamic community and. was liable
to be killed. 135 This very extreme view had within it the seeds of an
uncontrolled violence, for anybody branded sinful was liable to lose his
life.136 A serious objection to this position was that legal jurisdiction
could only go as far as a man's external actions, and not to his
beliefs. The moderates known as Murji'ites advocated that the question
of sin and punishment should be left to God's will until the Day of
Judgement. Their line of argument helped the Omayyid. dynasty which,
taking advantage of the lack of a solid institutional structure of the
elective 'Khilifah' had established themselves as an autocratic monarchy.
Being de facto in power, they demanded obedience of the Uminah on the
grounds that the Q.uran enjoined upon believers to 'obey Allah, the Prophet
and those in authority.'
Thus, the idealistic elective Khifafah, before it could institution-
ise itself was misappropriated into a hereditary dynastic rule by the
powerful Oniayyids and has, ever since, remained only as an ideal. The
Omayyid. dynasty (660-750 A.D.) was followed by a more despotic,
Abbasid Caliphate which relied more firmly on an elaborate machinery of
state imperialism, on the model of the Persian and Byzantinean rule,
though it also encouraged. diversity of thought and beliefs, and
systemitised Islamic law and patroriised scholarship.
135. W.M.WATT, What is Islam, op.cit. pp.116-17
136. This stringent approach to the visualisation of human society
remarks Prof. Watt, was essentially a characteristic of the
pre-Islamic callous tribal way of looking at human affairs.
ibid. p.155
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It was in the Abbasid academies that the Greek philosophy came
under the study of the Muslim savants. Being a priori concerned with
uncompromising purity of monotheism, the Muslims remained highly
selective in borrowing from the Greek thought. Whatever the amount and
nature of their borrowing, however, the dialectic contact itself was
Culturally,
fruitful./ the Abbasid Caliphate has rightly been credited with the
honour and esteem of being the most liberal and. rationalist period of
Islamic history. Hellenic culture strengthened the philosophic and.
scientific thought in Islam. A direct product of this contact were the
Nu'tazilites - the Muslim rationalists - who rose to interpret the
Quranic norms in the light of reason.
The most heatedly debated question of the time was the metaphysical
position of the 'Book', the divine Logos, that is to say, whether the
Quran was an uncreated word of God, eternal and coeval with God Himself,
or creation in time. The Mu'tazalites held that it was a creation in
time on the premise that an uncreated, eternal and coeval-with-God
position of the Quran would have meant in the last analysis, the
association with God of another Divine entity, a position standing
contrary to Tawhee 7 Another off-shoot of the rationalist school, the
Ashari'ites, a splinter group of the Mutazilites, drew a distinction
between the esoteric and the exoteric speeci 8a distinction which accord-
ing to Affifi was a direct influence of the Stoics who spoke of the
139potential and actual or internal and external logoi.
One likely consequence of the controversy was seen by Caliph-Al-Mamun
that the Khilafa would be able to enact legislation on a
and positivist' basis as distinct from its sole source, the Quran and
Sunnah. Al-Mumun, therefore instituted an inquisition (mihna) requiring
137. MORGAN, Islama and the Straight Path, op.cit. p.64
138. AFFIFI, .A.E. The Rational and. Mystical Interpretations of Islam,
in Islam a Straight Path (ed) Morgan. op.cit. p.154
139. ibid.
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all the Qilzis, Muftis, saints and the Ulma of the realm to testify
to the doctrine of the uran's creation. This raised a storm of fury and
there were some executions. The overwhelming consensus of the learned
held the uncreatedness view of the uran, a position which has remained
intact as a basi.c norm in the Sunni Islam. In 847, Caliph al-Nutawakkal
abolished the inquisition (mihna) and restored the orthodox viewpoint.
On the philosophical side, the Muslim thinkers, in their attempt
to reconcile the Greek and the Islamic thoughts, were confronted with
four main theories of the Absolute: (i) the Aristotelian theory of a
Prime Mover who set the whole world in motion and then left it to its
own course; (2) the Platonic theory of God as the Supreme idea; (3) the
Stoic theory of pantheism, and (4) the Neoplatonic theory of emanation.
Stoical pantheism never appealed to the Muslim philosophers although a
distinctly Muslim theory of' pantheism was developed by Ibn al Arabi.
Of the other three, the Neoplatonic school absorbed the geniuses of
philosophers like Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Al-Farab, Al-Kindi and Ibn Rushd
(Averroes).
By the middle of the tenth century, four distinct approaches to
knowledge were discernible among the Muslims. In the first place, the
Nutakalimun (the scholastic theologians) who held that all knowledge is
from God without any intermediary. They stressed the unquestioned
following of the letter of the revealed Logos as interpreted by the
previous generations. They developed into a class of scholars adept in
the methods of argumentation, debating and defensive polemics. Then
there were the Batiniyah (the esoterists) who claimed that the charismatic
leader was the only source of all knowledge. A third group comprised
the rationalist philosophers with their leaning towards logi.ti.C.
and emanence, and finally there were the Suf is (mystics) to whom
knowledge meant the possession of reality through a mystical experience
which comes during the quest for a glimpse of Reality itself.
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These different approaches gave rise to unending debates on the
conflict between the rival theories and viewpoints. Each group traced
its authority from the Scriptures and the Prophet's aunnah. Not only
had there developed gross artifical disharmony between the learned classes
but excessive doctrinal wranglings threatened to disrupt society and to
misdirect activity. Socio-political stability was in danger; Islam
was considered to be in danger. It was at this stage that Al-hazali
(liii) intervened and produced a synthesis which became the
crystallization of the orthodox Sunni thought in Islam. In this synthesis,
observes Professor Arberry, "the three currents: theological,
Philosophical and mystical, made confluence to attempt an all embracing
harmony, an end to dispute Orthodox Islam, though suspicious of the
mystics ready to excommunicate even to execute the extremists, finally
accepted the Sulis as allies against the far more dangerous enemies,
the free-thinking frationalistJ philosophers; A1-Ghazali routed them
140from the field.
This was a turning point for the evolution of thought in Islam.
Although the great Iman Al-Ghazali, himself a critic of Taqlid
(traditionalism), did not intend his synthesis to become hardened as the
final word, yet the fact remains that the idea of finality did get
entrenched in the vision of Islam. From now on it was the 'completed
tradition', the consensus of the 3rd/9th century legalist-theologians
that came to be regarded as the 'right path'. Any deviation from that
crystallised synthesis, was labelled as 'heresy'. "Every Muslim child",
maintains Professor A1-Faruqi, "is exhorted to honour not only the faith
of the fathers but their definitions of that faith as well, and to avoid
14levery deviation from tradition. 	 Innovation is stiginatised as
140. A.J.ARBERRY, Aspects of Islamic Civilization as Depicted in
the Original Texts, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1964.p.16
141. Ismail E. AL-FARUQI, op.cit. p.12.
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anti-Islamic, and traditionalists support their faithful devotion to
the 'completed tradition' by referring to corroborating verses from
the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet. The most often quoted
tradition of the Prophet negating change is the report of the Prophet's
companion Jabir, who quotes the Prophet saying, "The best words of God
and the best guidance is that which Mahummad brought. The worst of all
things are the new;every innovation is an error and a misguidance."2
Some of the Quranic verses quoted against change are:-
"Some people acknowledge God but understand Him in
a peculiar way. Their faith is strong as long as
their fortune is good; but once they are put on
trial they give up their faith for something else,
thereby losing both this world and the next." (143)
and "It is He who revealed to you the Book some verses of
which are precise and their meaning unmistakable,
and others [of whic7 are equivocal. Those whose
faith is faulty follow the latter with a view to
innovate and to interpret as they wish." (144)
Howsoever these verses are interpreted, the crux of the matter
is that traditionalists do not give any significance to the overwhelming
number of verses that encourage rationalism, thought and change.
The great merit of A1-Ghazali's dissertation to syncretistslaxnic
thought was that it provided the politically unstable and socially
Muslim
disillusioned/societies of the time with a coherent, and powerful formula
for a harmonious compromise with the heterogeneous traditions that had
merged into the body social of Islam, and the de facto authoritarian
kind of polity that had settled for good, never to allow the ideal Khilafah
to take effect. But the transitory formula turned into a frozen norm
which became, after centuries of 'wear and tear' unmalleable and
uncreative. From the 9th/lOth to 13/19th centuries, Islamdom then
remained a changless and rigid world whose inertia was only shaken by the
Western impact.
142. ibid P.13.
143. The uran. 22:11
144. ibid.	 3:7
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Traditional (Folk) Muslim Value Systems
The fossilization of thought in Islam had a naturally degenerating
effect on the intellectual vitality of the Ummah. The traditionalist
Muslim values were gradually becoming akin to the folk culture as
distinct from the elite culture. Folk Islam had become an instrument in
the hands of the autocratic medieval and post-medieval rulers who feared
change and employed traditionalist ulaxna and suf is to preach obedience
as the most pious route to salvation. A common traditionalist Muslim
received his values either from the rigid, ascriptive-diffuse pattern of
environment in which he was born or from the guides, pirs, and maulvis,
either at the tombs of saints or at the mosques.
According to this view of the Universe, God, man and society,
"the world is composed of natural elements, which obey certain laws, and
of supernatural dependences, which often strike into the world of
nature and bring about change designed to satisfy unknown ends. Besides
God, at whose command everything in nature moves, there are angels and
jinn who can act efficiently in nature for a good or bad cause. Divines,
pirs and saints have been 'endowed with the supernatural power to over-
rule at will the workings of nature and perform karamat, or 'little
miracles'. Finally, the common Muslim believes that there are
instruments and mechanics (such as the talismans_Arabiltalism), by
means of which any proper administrator can effect breaches in the laws
145of nature to suit his purpose."
Continuing with the nature of man in the traditionalist-folk
version of Islam, Al-Farucji remarks, "we find that, in the view of taqlid,
the supernatural powers which interfere in nature - and interfere
equally in human life - are by definition beyond impediment or frustration.
What they decree will necessarily happen and, in fact, all that happens
does so because it is predetermined by them. The only attitude consonant
145 . ibid. p.19
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with this is passive acquiescence and surrender -to the flow of events.
Graver still, such flow is neither knowable nor predictable, for its
necessity is merely the invincibility of an arbitrary agency. Kismet,
or the silent acquiescence to the fait accompli, is only the ethical side
of the gnoseological principle... Forgetting that Islam attributes
transcendental knowledge to God exclusively, the Muslim implores, listens
to, believes without question; and in the process is milked of his land,
his wheat, his little wealth, his wife's jewellery - indeed even of his
freedom arid future earnings - by the charlaton magician, esoteric
Sufi Shaikh or pir, who has arrogated to himself the job of spiritual
146
mentor." -
Traditmal Muslim society was a loosely knit, segiiented pattern
with its division into town and village, tribe and guild. Each unit
tended to be self-contained, closed and self-governing; communication
with other groups was restricted and personal. However, a degree of
social mobility did. exist since rigid caste and class systems did not
prevail in Islamdom. People did move out of their hereditary moorings
and achieved better status, but this was exception rather than a rule.
Depicting the structure of the pre-modernization eastern
including Muslim societies, an early observer writes:
"Eastern society appears to us as earthbound, living with
the Rhythms of nature, and mainly consists of territorial
and geneological communities. These conmmnities are
rooted in thousands of more or less isolated centres,
mostly villages, which are autonomous units, almost self-
sufficient in their religious, social, political and
economic life. In many parts of the East great religions
Islam, have super-imposed a common veneer of general
religious culture upon these isolated little communities,
without, however, causing them to lose their peculiar
shade of mystical, magical feeling of their own particular
life. Within this circle human identity and human
consciousness feel merged into the community and. group
instinct. Tradition, status arid the interests of the group
determine the place and the functions of the individual,
and as a rule, heredity transfer them. Aptitude or
inclinations are not consulted, so that talent is rarely
given the chance of unfolding itself." (147)
146. ibid. pp.21-2
147. A.D.A.De Kat ANGELINO, Colonial Policy, Trns.G.J.Renier,
Martinus Nijhoff,The Hague, l93l.pp.67-8
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3.	 ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL ISLAM
3. 2.1
Political Aspect
As has been seen above, an elective Caliphate was held as the
ruling political institution in the Sunni Islam but 'asabiyya' later
turned this into a succession of autocratic Sultanates, some keeping
Shariah as their guideline; others guided only by self-interest. The
institution of Khilafah incorporated both religious and secular functions
under one authority; but it has never been a theocracy the Khalifah
has never been drawn from the class of the ecciesiastics. Ideally, the
Khilafah was elective. The Khalifah (Caliph) is required by Islam to
rule and decide policy matters after consultation with the 'Shura'
(consultative council), the body of the chosen representatives of the
people) 48 The Prophet is recorded as having equated the state to a
shepherd responsible for its flock in its protection, provision of its
needs and the inte ration of its formation and the direction of its
activities.' 49 Examples of selfless, Gpd-fearing, just and vigorous
leadership have been set by the Khulala—Rashdun, and others who followed
in their footsteps. On the other side, it has also been laid down for
the people as a duty to obey and co-operate with those in (legitimate)
authority,and those who exercise their authority for the welfare of the
150
community.
The essential duties of the Khalifah were to protect the Ummah
from outside aggression and internal strife, and to uphold the Shariah
which was binding on all Muslims without distinction. Various offices
and institutions within the Muslim polity functioned as delegatees
of the Khalifah such as Imamah (leadership of Prayer), Qadha (justice),
the Chief Multi (Juris consulate), the Anal (Revenue collector), the
Amir al Jaish (Commander of the Army) and others. The most influential
148. The Quran. 3:160
149. M.Zafrulla.h Ithan, Islam, op. cit. p.158
150. The Quran. 4:60
office was that responsible for the overall upkeep of the rule of law
(Hhariah) and the welfare of the Ummah was that of Shaikh al Islam whose
authority and fetwa (ruling), at times, even superseded that of the
Ruler.' 5' The office of the Shaikh al Islam held a pivotal position in
the Ottoman Caliphate. In the Mughal Empire, the title was known as
the Sadr al Sadur although the functions were the same. The Shaikh al
Islam or the Sadr al Sadur was also responsible for the administration
of educational institutions, pious foundations (awkaf) and grants to
students as well as financial support of the scholars.
Judiciary in Islam is regarded strictly independent of the
executive and in Shariah even the Khilifah is answerable to a court of
law. 152
 Among others, Muslim courts also comprised a Court of Justice
against the Executive (Diwan i Nuzalam). The Khalifah is also required
to appoint an authority (Muhtasib) to supervise public morality. The
Muhtasib s authorised to exhort, invite and even chastise those who
deliberately infringes, the moral and social order of the society.
The Islamic Law
The Islamic law includes the entire system of moral and
institutional laws ranging from the religious observances, the family
law, the law of inheritance, property, contracts and obligations,
criminal procedure, constitutional law as well as the law of the State
administration and conduct of war. The onus of obedience to the law
151. See Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. Shaikh al Islam, pp.275-279.
As late as 1807, the Ottoman Shaikh al Islam issued a fetwa that
Sultan Selim III by introducing foreign institutions into the
Ottoman society and by undermining the Islamic institutions was
not fit to remain as a Muslim ruler and Uo he was deposed.
152. It is recorded that the second Caliph Umar was once summoned to
court to answer a civil charge brought up against him. As he
entered the court, the Qadhi (judge) stood up to show respect;
but the Caliph objected that by so doing the Court had failed to
show iirpartiality since the Caliph had appeared there only as an
ordinary citizen and not as the Head of the State.
See N.Zafrullah Than. Islam. op.cit. p.170
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is placed, in the first place, on the individual conscience. Divine
Will is the ultimate sanction that operates through individual conscience,
and the enforcement of legal commands by the State agencies is only a
secondary sanction created by the society.153
Though ideally, Islam allows two 'positivistic' sources namely
the consensus (of the learned jima) and analogical deduction (qiyas)
to augment its primary sources of law viz the Q.uran and the Surmah,
the traditionalists strictly restrict these two functions to the
3rd/9th century crystallizations of the Islamic law whereby four
orthodox schools of jurisprudence completed the entire code of the
Islamic law. A consensus emerged in the 4th/lOth century among the
Ummah to the effect that all future activity with regard to legislation
would have to be confined to the explanation, interpretation and
application of the doctrines enunciated by these four schools, thus
closing the doors of positivism for all times to come. Until then
Islamic jurisprudence had remained adaptable, growing and progressive;
then it bdcaxne a closed book. The result of this rigid position,
writes Sobhi, was that "Islamic thought met a dead-end,and imitation
acjii7 and stagnation in jurisprudence as in other Islamic learning
eventually
became predominant."	 It also led/to a de facto differentiation of
the secular and the Islamic law although the jurists would not consider
such a differentiation as legitimate. The Sultans could always issue
rescripta which, in non religious matters, had been accepted by the
jurists as de facto binding. So'although in theory, the law of the
Shariah prevailed, in practice, the secular rulers had a way out to
administer their own secular laws. The rule of law was often flouted
in favour of particularistic inclinations.
The political system of the Mughal and the Ottoman Empires was
far from the ideal Islamic polity as envisaged in the Shariah.
153. See A.A.FYZEE, "Law and Religion in Islam", in Journal of the
Bombay B ranch of Royal Asiatic Society, 28 (1953) pp.29-48
154. M.SOBHI, "Muslim Decadence arid Renaissance: Adaptation of
Islamic Jurisprudence to Modern Social Needs" in the Muslim World
contd.
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Autocrat Sultans with the nobility, bureaucrats, feudal lords
(mansabdars and ayans) and the religious learned class of lIlama formed
the top oligarchic ruling classes. Power and authority were not
differentiated into institutional systems but segmented into various
sections of the society each constituting, more or less, a self-
sufficient unit.
The ulama, whose true role in a Muslim society was to guide
the ruler in the affairs of the state and society in accordancv with
the rule of law of the Shariah, had in fact acquiesced in accepting the
virtual mighty authority of the Sultans provided the barest minimum
conditions, i.e. the respect of the Shariah in principle, and the
protection of the Ummah vis a vis their own social status in the
various offices of the state remained intact. This was a kind of
equilibrium which had been forthcoming in the traditional Islamic polity
ever since the Sultan or the Sultan-Caliph usurped authority of the
tdeal Khalifah. In this system (Sultarte) the Ulama held the offices
of the Shaikh al Islam, the Chief Multi and the Chief Q,ax3.hi, but an
unjust or self-willed ruler (Sultan) could depose any of the holders
of these high offices at will rather than the other way round. The
Ulama had only a de jure authority, i.e. the power of persuasion against
the unjust ruler, but no de facto military power to resort to as an
ultimate sanction. As a result, the ulama for centuries had become
reconciled, as Nikki Keddie points out, "to the acceptance of almost any
nominally Muslim authority as preferable alternative to discord or
revolt."155
 Muslim education was equally geared towards maintaining
this equilibrium and traditional status quo.
154. 44 (1954, pp.186-201. also cf. T.Parsons, 'Islamic Law remained
contd.. legalistic in the sense true of the Jewish law especially in its
Talmudic phave'. Societies, op.cit. p.85
155. Nikki R. KEDDIE, (Ed), Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious
Institutions in the Middle East since 950 A.D. University of
California, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London. 1972. pp.1-14.
See also the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol.IV. s.v."Shariah",p.322
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So entrenched had this status quo become and been aocepted as 'the'
Muslim 80010-political order that when in 1923, the office of the Caliph-
Sultan was abolished by Kemal Ataturk, the whole world Muslim community felt
bitterly about his action. The Caliph-Sultan still remained a symbol of the
ideal Islamic IChilafah for the Muslims, and the attachment to this vestige
of the ideal even though it had become degenerated into a despotic rule,
carried great traditional weight with the Muslims.
To sum up then, as a result of the entrenchment of traditionalism in
Islam, the whole set of dominant Muslim value-systems was clearly pulling in
the opposite direction to the norms associated with modernity or indeed to
the ideal norms of Islam. The world of Islam in its pre-niodernization
outlook, as Watt concludes, was beset by three rigid tendencies:
I. The "isolationary attitudes" which made its contacts with the other
religious and social systems only superficial.
2. The "inflationary attitudes" which made Muslims to impute exaggerated
claims of traditional Islam's conclusiveness.
3. The "fixational attitudes" which compelled Muslinto look "doggedly
backwards to the old formulations for guidance in the present age." 156.
The nature of traditionalism has been smmR.rised by Professor
Bernard Lewis as follows:
"In the self-view of traditional society there is
no progress and no development; there can, however,
be change, and chang* is usually for the worse.
The ideal model is usually situated in the past, in
terms of a mythology, a revelation or a master
philosophy, or a semi-historical golden age. Given
this original perfection, all change isdeerioration-
a falling away from the sanctified past. Virtue, in
society, means the acceptance and observance of
tradition; departure from it is the major social
offence. The true path is the doctrine and practice
of the ancestors, as preserved and recorded by
tradition - in a word, the Sunna. Departure from it is
bid'a - innovation.., which is assumed to be bad unless
specifically accepted as good or permissible..." 157.
3.2.2.
Economic Aspect
Economic pursuit and progress has not been considered a taboo in
Islam; on the contrary, within the limits of certain moral principles,
Islam encourages it. As Lewis points out:
"The charge that the Islamic religion is innately
hostile to economic developmentIis difficult to
sustain; the social and cultural causes of economic
backwardness in Muslim countries must be sought in a
complex of factors, of which historic (traditional)
Islam is a part and, to some extent an expression." 158
156. W.Montgomery WATT. What is Islam. op. cit. pp.200-205.
157. For a synoptic comparisthn o rodernity and raditional Islam see pp.107-OS....
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The guiding principles of economic activity and pursuits In
Islam can be summarised as below:
1. The the absolute ownership of everything in the Universe belongs
to God. As God's viceregent on earth man holds the right to ownership
only in trust. God has subjected the entire wealth of the universe to
man's servace, as a trustee of God, to enable him to do God's will
and justice.
2. The economic wealth and all bounties of the universe must be spent
in promoting good of humanity.
3. That human beings have been created unequal in their innate
abilities including those of making fortune which is only a test of
sian's gratitude to the Giver, and a means towards an end; that is to
say, the fulfilment of God's trust in creating social justice and
harmony. As an end in itself, wealth has been regarded as the
Hell-fire.
4. That in spite of the inherent inequalities, the entire society,
including the inarticulate animals, have a right to share in the total
wealth of the society.
With these basic principles, Islam has aimed at an economic
system which places highest stress on the circulation and not the
hoarding of wealth. Wealth and capital are not allowed to become the
controlling force in the society. Therefore, monopolies, finance-houses,
ilimurance companies and gambling are strictly prohibited. Islam also
forbids loans on interest (Riba), for Riba 'tends to draw wealth into
the hands of a small circle and to restrict the exercise of beneficence
toward one's fellow beings'. 159 Instead Islam exhorts interest-free
loans; it even urges the lender to remit the loan altogether if the
debtor is unable to epay.60
159. See Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Islam, Its Meaning for Modern Man
Religious Perspectives, Vol.7. Routledge and K.Paul, London,
1962, p.153
160. The (juran, 2:281
158 . Ibid. p.291.
Although Islam places no restriction on the lawful acquisition
of wealth, it makes it obligatory for the wealthy to set aside a small
proportion, two and a half per cent of all capital and income, as the
share of the poor, the distressed and the needy of the society. This
poor-tax, called Zakat, has been utilized to raise a welfare society
.161in public health, public works, social, educational and medical service.
The first Khilifab, the Islamic State, was considered to be a welfare
state in which Zakat was paid into the Bait-al-Mal (public treasury)
from which regular allowances were given to the destitute, the aged
162
and the poor of the society.
To ensure equity and justice to all the rightful parties, the
Islamic sys em of inheritance allowsa person to dispose of his
inheritance by testamentary means only to the extent of a third of his
total legacy. The rest of the inheritance must be divided among the
rightful heirs in specified shares which are prescribed in the Quran+6
The purpose of the system is to make the wealth circulate among more
people rather than restricting it in the hands of a few.
Islam urges spending for charitable and beneficent purposes and
condemns miserliness and niggardliness. It equally condemns extra-
vagance and wasteful spending. The theory behind the encouragement of
spending "in the cause of Allah: in the service of humanity', seems to
be that by so doing prosperity and wealth increases.
Economic theorists who propound saving and investment as the two
essential functions that led to modern economic development would
question these Islamic economic ideals. They would regard the above
defined principles of the Islamic economic system as characterising a
161. The institution of Zakat is not a commendable act of charity, the
Prophet described it as "a levy imposed upon the well-to-day which
is returned to the poorer sections of the people," it is
obligatory and its place is not taken by charity which is equally
strongly urged In Islam. M.Z. Than, Islam, op.cit.pp.l50-7
162. ibid. p.16l
163. The Quran, 4:8, 12:13.
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a pre-modern economy which could hardly have resulted in a 'self-
regulating' economic system. The prolubition of interest (aiba) in
Islam did restrict Muslims in the past from saving capital for
investment as well as from participation in foreign trade. This was
perhaps one of the reasons why in all Muslim societies in the pre-
modernization times non-Musli communities such as Christian and Jews,
164Hindus, Parsis and others controlled most of the foreign trade. Again
the overall effect of Islamic economic constraints on the Musljm's
attitudes towards economic activities whether trade, industry or
agriculture, as Bans Kohn has pointed out, was that of lethargy and
165indifference.	 Describing the economic attitudes of the typical
Mediterranean man (including the Muslim) living still in the
pre-capitalistic world, Kohn has remarked:
"Timelessness is a part of the pre-capitalist attitude
towards trade and industry. Life still proceeds amid
a natural harmony, in which there is yet no dominance
of the impulse to push business at the cost of everybody
else, of the lust for the acquisition of material
possessions. Men still have a dignified indifference to
the chances of business success, they feel it as important
to satisfy the need for an easy-going and care-free existence
and for a simple and direct joy in life as to earn money.
Poverty is no disgrace, and in business life, irrational
considerations play an important part... Most of the
shop-keepers sit silently amid the treasures of their
stock in silence and scarecely betray any interest in
doing business. (166)
Modern Muslim scholars nevertheless insist that Islamic economic
ideals are not inhibitory to economic development. Chaudhri Zafrullah
Than for example asserts that Islam does not oppose Joint-stock
companies, co-operatives or other commercial institutions that promote
167trade and legitimate financial dealings.
164. See GATJDEFROY-DENENBROYNES, Muslim Institutions, George Allen &
Unwin, London, 1950, pp.177-91.
165. Hans KOHM, The Western Civilization in the Near East, George
Routledge, London, 1936, p.54.
166. ibid. p.71.
167. M.Zafrullah KHAN, op.cit. p.153
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It is equally significant to remember as Demonbynes has maintained
that in spite of the limitations imposed by the prohibition of
interest (Riba) in Islam the "banking institutions and commercial
customs which were to become those of Europe, developed in Muslim
168
societies during thex ninth and the tenth centuries. But the impact,
for a modern 'self-regulating' economy with its supportive network
of institutions to emerge in Muslim societies, was undeniably
extraneous.
3. a3.
THE SOCIAL ASPECT
As has been noted above, the fundamental basis of community
in Islam is belief. Traditional Muslim societies were there±'ore
basically divided on the lines of Muslims and non-Muslims. Next to
the Muslims were regarded the 'people of the Book', i.e. the Christians
and the Jews, and then the various other communities. All these
religious groups functioned autonomously under the overall protection
of the Sultan, and were responsible for the administration of their own
legal and socio-cultural systems. The Ottoman Empire had given this
social segmentation a highly institutionalised form by creating and
allowing the various millet (communal) systems autonomy to organise
t eir own cultural as well as educational systems. The Mughal Empire in
India allowed similar autonomy to the Hindu, Budhist, Parsi and other
communities although not in an institutionised way.
Within the Muslim community itself various factional divisions
such as the Shiah and Sunni, the four schools of thought within the
sunni. section, i.e. the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafee and Hanbali also formed
verticalgrcnpmgs. Again Muslim society was also segmented into
occupational groups and guilds. The only horizontal division was on
168. ibid. pp.190-91
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the basis of education, learning and piety. Institutionalised
stratification consisted of the ruling classes of the royalty, nobility,
landed aristocracy and the learned Ulaina. But the lines of
demarcation were not very rigid. One group that transcended the entire
society was that of the learned ulama who not only maimed all the
professional, administrative, legal, judicial and educational
instituions but also co-ordinated arid integrated all other strata of
society. Ulama could emerge from any stratum of society and their only
qualification to beloflg to the learned group was a thorough education
in the Islamic law and other religious sciences. Thus a Muslim society
allowed sufficient fluidity for the educated and the qualified to rise
to nigher social status. Education therefore formed a passport for
social mobility.
THE FAMILY IN ISLAM
The family in Islam is basically a socio-economic unit. In
general Muslim family, like traditional family structures elsewhere in
medieval societies, was an extended and patriarchal institution in which
the head of the family united in his household his wife (or wives), his
children and their children. The Head of the family enjoyed absolute
authority, although the relationship between him and. the members of his
family was based on mutual affection and respect. Parental respect is
highly commended in the uran.169
As an economic unit, the family is a pool of joint property which
remained intact during the life of the father; sons contributed their
labour and services into the pool and partook of its benefits. "Large
families", remarks Goode, "are able to 'nass the capital for an important
169. The (uran XVII:23,4; XXXI:l4; XLVI:l5
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economic enterprise whether it is obtaining enough cattle for
a marnage, buying land or a governmental office,
or paying for the education of a young man of
promise. As long as those who receive the
benefit of the investment also continue to
feel obliged to share that benefit with their
kinsmen, the group as a whole can function as
a kind of savings bank." (170)
The weaknesses of thoint family structure, however, outweighed
the benefits, which never existed in the first place in poor families.
The entire social structure of Muslim societies, submerged as they had
been in a top-heavy feudal system of government and autocratic rule,
worked to grind the masses to a life of pverty, inertia and subservience
while the aristocracy drained all the advantages, monopolizing the lands
and wealth as well as political and military appointments. Lacking the
dynamic of individual action and change, family members hardly could
afford to live independently. The sons more often than not learned the
trade of the father and never moved away from his abode.
Another feature of the joint family system was endogamy which took
several forms such as the 'hamula' (clan) end.ogamy to include patri-
lateral, parallel and cross cousin marriages; social-class endogamy;
and, in the case of Indo-Pakistan Muslims, also the caste (zat) endogainy.
Designed perhaps to foster kinship, sympathy and group solidarity, the
by
barriers created /endogaxny between the groups; castes and classes became
too rigid to cross71
Islam strongly enjoins marriage upon every Muslim and condemns
celibacy even for sainti2 But marriage is a civil contract not
req,uiring any religious ceremonial for validity. Marriage may be
repudiated by divorce (talaq.) which, although allowed, is not commended.
170. W. J. GOODE, The Family, Foundations of Modern Sociology Series,
N.Y. Prentice Hall Inc. 1964, p.51 cf.also R.N.Ashen, The Family:
Its Function and Destiny, Science and Culture Series, vol. V.N.Y.
Harper Bros. 1966, Chapter XII.
171. Cf. G.BAER, Population and Society in the Arab East, trans.
ifanna Szoke, Routledge & K.Paul, 1964, London, pp.64-9. Baer
has traced the following social causes that justify patrilateral
marriages among old societies: (1) The young couple do not face
the problem and expenditure of creating a new household unit;
(2) the dilemma of split loyalties does net arise; (3) parents
contd.
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Before Talaq becomes irrevocable, both parties, with the help of their
elders,influential and learned men, are required to try for a possible
redonciliation.
The Q.uran legitimises polygamy by allowing Muslims to marry up to
four wives, a practice which has aroused heated debate both within and
without the Muslim world for centuries. Modern Muslim jurists have tried
to prove that Muslims were not the only societies in which polygamy has
been practised; other eastern, as well as western, societies have resorted
to it. Furthermore, they maintain that polygamy was permitted mainly to
combat the evil of promiscuity arid to save man from abnorma1ity73
The Quraxi, they claim, by restricting polygamy to a definite number and
by subjecting it to a trict condition - that is, of doing full justice
among all wives ("if you fear you are unable to do justice then only
one") 174
 - brought about a great improvement over the pre-Islamic
conditions. 175 The argument has, however, failed to convince the critics
of the justification for plurality of wives. Turning to the actualities,
it would be true to say that polygamy was a luxury only the rich and the
leisurely classes have been able to indulge in, and that, in general,
polygamy has fairly helped in keeping Muslim societies relatively pure
of promiscuity. Standards of morality have not deteriorated because of
it, although harmony in family life has remained a dream in a polygamous
household.
171	 are sure of couple's social and familial background arid standing;
contd. (4) the marriage costs such as the dower are lower; (5) loyalty
of the couple toward their common kinship is inculcated to the
children, and (6) daughters' inheritance remains within the
family.	 p.66.
172. P.EUGHES, Dictionary of Islam, s.v. Marriage, pp.313-327
173. Shaltout Muhammad Shaikh H.E. "The Plurality of Wives" in
the Majjillat al Al Azher (Journal of the Azher University,
32 (1960-61) pp.4-13.
174. The uraii, IV:22
175. V.E.FLOY, "Women and Culture in Islam", in the Muslim World, 30
(1940) pp. 14-19, also Begum Saltana Ainir-ud-din, "Women's Status
in Islam", Muslim World, 28 (1938 ) pp.153-8
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Functionally, and in terms of social roles, man has been regarded
as superior and dominant over women whose societal role has primarily
been considered as the betterment of family life. The field of her
role, so defined, Islam then gives woman equal rights with men. There
is ample evidende to suggest that the respect for women as such has been
unquestionably high in Islam7
Another controversial feature of the Muslim society and the relation-
ship between the sexes, is the strict seclusion or purdah found in
Muslim societies. Strictly speaking the Q.uran does not enjoin
purdah in its commonly known form; it only requires women "to down upon
them their over garment" so that "they may be known and not given trou".
The rigid veiling existing generally among Muslims, asserts
Sayid Ameer Au,
"did not come into vogue until the reign of the
Oinayyid Walid II. Borrowed originally from the
Persians and the Byzantines, its practice became
common owing to the character and habit of the
sovereigns. It is an historical fact that the
custom of secluding women prevailed among most
nations of antiquity. The Athenians, certainly,
observed it in all its strictness. In later
times, it found its way among the Byzanties who
claimed to be inheritors of the Athenian culture.
From them it descended on to the Russians among
whom it was maintained with ludicrous rigour
until Peter I abolished it by his usual drastic
methods."
In spite of these refutations it is hard to deny that the orthodox
took over purdah as a strict rule and. have thereby tended to restrict
the freedom and even education of Muslim women.
176. "L et us not assume," writes Djebar," that this conception of
(Musli7 family is necessarily a sign of ascendency of man over
women. Does it not spring rather from the wish to safeguard
the security of women, to shelter her from too great
responsibilities? I feel, there is nothing offensive - quite
the contrary, her position is more prec ous."
Assia DJEBAR, Women of Islam, trs. J.MacGibbon, Andre Deutsch,
London, 19.. p.31
177. The uran, XXXIII:59. (Moulvi Nuihammad All in his translation
of the Quran states that in the early days of Islam, Muslim
women were insulted by non-Muslims, hence this verse.
178. S.A.HANID, "Purdah" in the Muslim World, 25 (1935) p.276,
also R.N.Anshen, op.cit. p.221
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3 . 4. MUSLIM EDUCATION
The history of Muslim education goes back to the Prophet himself,
who taught his companions the Quran and its meanings as well as the
foundations of Islamic jurisprudence 79
 Even before he inaugurated his
conimuiuty and the Islamic State at Medina, he enjoined the literate
among the proners of war captured at the battle of BasIr to teach the
children of Medina to read and write 8° At Medina, his own mosque became
a centre of Muslim learning and religio-social activities, and the
Prophet therein established a circle of learned men to study and. teach
the Quran. 18' Later, mosques were opened in every locality and have
remained ever since the primary centres of educational activities among
the Muslim 2 The Prophet also sent missions of preachers to various
parts of the country and abroad to teach and preach Islam. The main
concern, in this age, and for some time to come, writes Ahmad, was
simply to learn the Q,uran
"by heart or to preserve its verses by writing
them on palm leaves, bones or stones. The
so-called sciences of the Q,uran were not
existent in those days." (183)
The Prophet's example as an educator and teacher inevitably became
the most pious act for his followers ,  and his Khalifahs and. rulers after
them regarded it their sacred duty to build mosques and schools in
their domain, to open pious trusts (awkaf) for the maintenance of
teachers and scholars, and to associate themselves with the learned and
184teachers.	 In the course of time, the simple model of the Prophet's
school was developed into a stratified and co-ordinated system of
education well integrated with the social arid economic pattern of life.
179. See Munir-ud-din Ahinad, Muslim Education and the Scholars' Status,
Verlag, Zurich, 1968, p.30. "The Prophet used to teach his
companions as children are taught in primary schools."
180. M.Hamidullah, "Educational System in the time of the Prophet, in
the Islamic Culture, 13. (1939) pp.48-49
181. ibid.
182. Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. Mosque
183. Abmad, op.cit. p.30.
184. A.L.TIBAWI, "The Muslim Education in the Golden Age of the Khilifah
in the Islamic Culture, 28 (1954) pp.418-438
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3. 4.1. THE STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF MUSLIN EDUCATION
Muslim educational institutions could be divided into a three-tier
system according to the functional outputs of socialization, schooling
and education.
1. Socialization
Socialization of the child started at home where fundamentals of
the faith were taught even before the child started his formal education.
Parents were naturally keen to see a toddler start accompanying his/her
father to the mosque and perform the ritual. The first school for all
Muslim children, even today, remains the mosque, where he learns to
read and inemorise portions of the Quran and the tenets of the creed)85
In some Muslim countries when a child is four years, four months and
four days old, the family celebrates the ceremony of 'Bismillah Khawani'
an occasion marked with jubilation and blessings for the child at entry
into the mosque school (Kuttab or Maktab), cnn the care of a tutor for
formal education.
2. Elementary Education
The widespread schools for elementary education were known as the
Kuttabs or Maktabs (Mektab, as in Turkish) which have come down to the
present times as primary schools. The idea of the Kuttab as an
institution for reading and writing, and the teaching of the Q.ura.n
started with the second Caliph Umar, who appointed teachers in all major
186
cities of the Caliphate, e.g. Medina, Kufa, Basra and Damascus.
Caliph Umar is also quoted as having proclaimed that apart from the
reading of the Q.uran and writing, children should be taught swimming,
horsemanship, good proverbs and poetry. To this list of subjects,
arithmetic was later added to finalise the curriculum of the kuttab.
185. In some Muslim countries, the abilty to read the Quran is still
accepted as a qualification for literacy.
186. Seyyed Hossein NASR, Science and Civilization in Islam, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1968. p.65.
For a detailed study on the history of the evolution of the
kuttab see, Ahmad Shallaby, History of Muslim Education,
Dar-al Kashshaf, Beruit. 1954.
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No uniform age for entry or leaving the Kuttabs seems to be on
record; pupils entered sporadically from four years onwardsjto ten years.
What seems clear is the fact that not only were the Kuttabs centres of
basic education but they also formed the preparatory stage for higher
studies. So widespread were the Kuttabs all over the Muslim world that
Ibn Khldun has furnished an enlightening comparative analysis of the
methods employed and. the emphases on the curriculum as applied in various
countries of the time. The gist of his findings was that although the
Q,uran was the common factor, in the Maghreb and other North African
countries, no other subject was introduced until the pupil had. full
mastery of the uran. In the Spanish schools, as well as in the East,
poetry, grammar and calligraphy were given equal, importance with the
uran.
"The fact that the people of Afriqya and the Maghreb
restrict themselves to the Quran" remarks Khfllduri,
makes them altogether incapable of mastering the
linguistic habits... As for the Spaniards, their
varied curriculum with its great amount of instruction
in poetry, composition, and the Arabic philology gave
them, from the early years on, a habit providing for
a better acquaintance with the Arabic language... They
had a literary education either excellent or deficient
depending on the secondary education they received after
their childhood education." (187)
It is recorded that girls were admitted into the Kuttabs, probably
until they reached the age of puberty when they were segregated and.
188taught at home.
Kuttab education was free and teachers called 'Nu'allim' were
held in great €esteem, although modestly remunerated. Describing the
Kuttabs of the Ottoman Empire, Kazamias, has pointed out that they were
free but not compulsory. "The Maktabs constituted one of' the most
important avenues throuji which the values of the Ottoman Islamic
society were tranem tted to the youn9
187. Ibn KEtJLDIJN, The Muqaddimah, op.cit. VI.38.pp.300-303.,
also in Nasr. op. cit. pp.66-9, and Shalaby, p.23.
188. SHALABY, op.cit. p.191; also Khuda Baksh, "The Educational
System of the Muslims in the Middle Ages, in Islamic Culture, I.
( 1927), pp .442-472 , and J.Heyworth Dunne, An introduction to
the History of Modern Education in Egypt, op.cit.p.l4
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The nobility and. the wealthy classes engaged private tutors called
(Mu'addib) for their children. The term Mu'addib, implying both
moral and intellectual coaching, a Mu'addib was naturally held higher
190in esteem and rewarded more befittingly than a Mu a1lim.
3. Schooling and Hither Education
Higher learning progressed gradually as Muslim society became more
complex and established. The earliest institution again was, of course,
the mosque, where various groups or circles of students (halq.a)
assembled around a scholar and learnt the Quran, the Sunnah and the
Fikh, subjects which later became the religious sciences. When a scholar
gained excellence in his subject and established his reputation as an
authority, he held his haiqa either at the mosque or at his house. With
the further spread of knowledge bookshops also emerged as centres of
educational activity. The rulers and nobility and the rich built
special chambers where scholars and students and the learned among the
people would gather and hold meetings (najalis) for lectures, debates
191
and literary discussions. These were the informal, privately-sponsored
places of higher learning as founded in the Abbasid Caliphate of
Baghdad before Caliph al Mamun founded his celebrated academy, the
House of Wisdom (Bait al Hikivan) in 815. Supported by the State
Treasury, this Academy was founded by the Caliph specifically for the
study and translation of the Greek philoshy and sciences. An
observatory called (al-Shamsiyya) and a library were also constructed
along with the academy, which became the alma mater for scholars,
189. Andrew N. KAZANIAS, Education and the Q.uest for Modernity in Turkey,
George Allen and Unwin, 1966, p.32.
190. Abmad. Muslim Education, op.cit. pp.46-51, also Shalaby, op.cit.
p.24.
191. Nasr, op. cit. pp.69-70
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philosophers, scientists as well as translators and commentators; and
eventually gave rise to the so called rationalist school of thought in
192Islam.
All these institutions, however, still did not constitute a system
until in 1055 the Saljuq. Vizier NiZ] Mu1k inaugurated his archetypal
Nizazniyya Madrassai93in Baghdad and other similar cities such as
Nishapur, Harat, Isphan, Basrah, Balkh, Merw, .Amul and Mawsil. Religious
as well as secular studies formed the curriculum of the Madrassah. The
celebrated Al-Ghazali taught in the Nizazniyyah. Madrassah thus
became the prototype institution of higher Muslim learning which then
spread across all Muslim countries: some of them flourished with a
continued tradition of eminence for centuries.
Nadrassahs were founded by the rulers, the nobility, the
wealthy classes and the community. In Egypt, under the Ayubide
Rule alone, seven Madrassahs were opened by the Sultans, twelve by
people of high rank and thirteen by the communit? 4 Some Madrassahs
were monumental in architecture, in the number of faculties they housed,
the size of the libraries attached to them and the distinction of
their scholars and. the specialization of subjects. Prominent among
them were the Nuriyyah-al-Kubra of Damascus, the Nizamiyyah and. the
Mustansiriyya of Baghda?5
192. SHAL&BY, History of Muslim Education, op. cit. p.58.
193. SHALA:BY, pp .16-54 . For a critical and historical study of the
origin of the Madrassah see A.L.Tibawi, "Origin and Character
of Al-Nadrassah" in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental
and African Studies, London, 25 (1962) pp.225-238.
194. SIIAL&BY, op. cit. pp.60-63 for a list of the famous Madrassabs
with their founders. Na.kosteen furnishes a similar list for
the Eastern part of the Caliphate, see M.Nakosteen,
History of Islamic Origins of Western Education,(A.D.800-1350)
Colaraxio University Press, 1964, pp.43-4.
195. Contemporary historians have given the following description
of the Nustansiriyyah: "In outward appearance, in stateliness
or ornament and sumptiousness of furniture, in spaciousness
and the wealth of its pious foundations, the Mustansirriyyah
surpassed everything that had previously been seen in Islam.
It contained four separate law schools, one for each of the
orthodox sects of the Sunnis with a Professor at the head of
each, who had seventy-five students (fakih) in his charge,
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The Mughal Emperors of India and their preceding Sultans of Delhi
and. other dynasties built numerous colleges in various cities of the
sub-continent. One s ch built in Delhi by Sultan Firoze Pugh1a in
the fourteenth century was as magnificent as the Mustansirriyyah, if
not more	 In the Ottoman Empire, the role of the Madrassah was
even more significant since the Ottomans had a rather more organised
hierarchy of social classes based on meritocracy than other Muslim
countries. The Medrese (Turkish spelling) write Kazamias,
"Occupied a pivotal position in Ottoman society.
It trained the teachers including those in the
palace schools and all the Ulema of the Ottoman
society. In so far as the Ulema performed functions
other than purely religious ones in the ludiciary,
public administration, diplomacy and politics, the
role of the Medrese was at least as important as
that of the Enderun in the Ottoman body politics." (197)
195. contd.
to whom he gave tuition gratis. The four professors each received
a monthly salary and to each of the three hundred students one
gold dinar a month was assigned. The great kitchen of the college
further provided daily rations of bread and meat. There was a
library (dar al Kuttab), with rare books treating of the various
sciences, so arranged that students could easily copy from the
manuscripts; pens and paper being supplied by the establishment...
Inside the College, a bathroom (hainan) was erected for the
special use of the students and a hospital (Bimaristan), to
which a physician was appointed."
Quoted in Nasr. op. cit. pp.50-51
196. The Madrassah was originally built in 1220 by Sultan Altamush
of Delhi. Contemporary historian Barni wrote that:
"the Madrassah was a very commodious building, embellished with
lofty domes and situated in an extensive garden adorned with
alleys and avenues, and all that human art combined with nature
could contribute to make the place fit for meditation. An
adjacent tank mirrored in its shiny and placid breast the high
and massive house of study standing on its brink. What a
charming sight it was when the Madrassah hummed with hundreds
of busy students walking on its clean and smooth floors,
diverting themselves on the side of the tank or listening in
attentive masses to the learned lectures of the professors from
their respective seats. See S.M.Ikram, Aab-i-Kauser, (Urdu Text)
Ferozesons Lahore, 1936, pp.494-5, also Y.H.Khan, 'The Educational
System in Medieval India' in the Islamic Culture, 30 (1956)
pp.106-125. A brilliant history of the Muslim Educational. System
in India is given inN.N. Law, Promotion of Learning in India
by Muhainrnadans, Calcutta, 1916
197. KAZANIAS, Education and the Quest for Modernity, op.cit. p.33
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Besides the Madrassah where teaching was more theoretical
there were a number of observatories and hospitals, some functioning
independently as institutions of scientific learning arid experimentation,
others appended to the Colleges. Caliph Mamun's famous Shamsiyyah
observatory was copied in many other cities. In Muslim India, the
Mughal Emperior Humayun seems to have been a regular visitor to his
observatory, for it was there that he slipped and met his death98
At the apex of the Muslim education system stood the University
(Jami or Dar el Uluin):the most famous is the Al-Azhar of Cairo, which
has recently completed its first millenium, while that of araawiyin
in Moroco, built in 859 is the oldest university in Is1a 9 Originally
built by the Shiite Fatmi Caliphs in 972, the Dar al Uluni al Azher later
came under the Sunni influence which it has promoted, being the
leading and the highest institution of Islamic studies, until Its
modernization in the last decade when various modern faculties were
incorporated into it arid some administrative changes were introduced.
CONTENTS OF TEE TRADITIONAL MUSLIM EDUCATION
Although local variations existed, depending on the availability
of specialised professors, in general, the curriculum for the higher
Muslim learning was divided, following Al-Ghazali's scheme of learning,
into the Religious sciences and the Worldly sciences. The chief
subjects of study comprised the uran, Hadith, Fikh (Islamic
Jurisprudence), scholasticism, philosophy, Arabia etymology, syntax,
200
rhetoric, literature, logic, mathematics and chemistry. 	 In Egypt,
according to James, subjects like astronomy, medicine, mathematics and
198. See N.N.LAW, The Promotion of Learning during Muslim India,
Lonmans, 1936.
For a concerted study of the growth and importance of the
observatory in Islam see Aydin Sayili, The Observatory In Islam
and its place In the General History of the Oservatory. Publica-
tion of the Turkish Historical Societies, Series II, No.30,
Ankara, 1960. Aydin in fact has established that "it was first
in Islam that the observatory came into existence."
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metaphysics gradually passed out of the curriculum and instruction in
these subjects was obtained only through a private teache9 1 In the
Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, Persian occupied an equally important position
with Arabic, although the basic scheme of knowledge remained the same°2
In the Ottoman Empire, Madrassaha attached to the Sulemaniyah
Foundation were devoted to special studies: the Dar a]. Hadith for the
study of the Prophetic Traditions, the Dar a]. Tibb for the study of
medicine; wh le those attached to the mosque of Bayezid were devoted
exclusively to the study of jurisprudence°3
Scholarship standards and techniques were quite advanced.
Research, specialization, experimentation and observation were known
methods of learning although there seems to have been a great emphasis
on an encyclopaedic approach to knowledge°4
3. 4.2.
FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OF TIlE TRADITIONAL MUSLIM EDUCATION
1. Muslim education was clearly the most developed, articulated and
differentiated system of its time.
2. Education was free and relatively well spread. Education was
valued both for its religious significance as well as for its
socio-economic demand. All classes of society, royalty,
199. See Nulamnad el-Bahay, "Al-arawiyin University, how far it has
participated in the Preservation of the characteristics of Past
Culture of Islam", in the Majillat a]. Azher (Journal of the
Azhe.r University, III. 1 (1961) pp.7-16.
200. For a detailed description of the Muslim Curriculum, see
J. Reyworth-Dunne, op.cit. pp 41-95. Scientific studies are
beat dealt with by Nasr. op.cit. pp 92-304. For the Muslim
India see G.M.D.Sufi, Al-Minhaj, being the Evolution of
Curricula in the Muslim Educational Institutions of India.
Ashraf, Lahore, 1941, also LA. Nuid Khan "Muslim Theories of
Education during the Middle Ages, Islamic Culture, 18 (1944)
pp.418-433
201. William James, Education in Egypt before the British Control,
1939, p.49
202. Sufi, op.cit. p.
203. Gibb and Bowen, op.cit. p.145.
204. Frank Rosenthal, The Techniques and Approach of Muslim Scholarship,
Analecta Orientalia, Romo., 1947.
-103-
businessmen and the community at large were involved in the promotion
of learning. An important supplementary to the academic learning was
travel, and students were given assistance to make journeys to various
countries in order to complete t eir education.205
3. Educational institilions occupied key societal positions. They
furnished the society with its elite, intellectual leaders and bureau-
crats as well as socio-political thin.kers. They reflected the aims
of society in their curricula and were thus closely integrated with
the society of which they were an integral and dynamic subsystem.
4. Education and teachers were held in high esteem. Academic freedom
was the rule and those engaged in education were held next to prophets.
"Except insofar as custom and convention imposed some limits", remark
Gibb and Bowen, "there seems to have been a good deal of freedom in
colleges... During the lessons, the auditors were at liberty to question
or argue with the teachers; it was, in fact, very largely by their
success in such sessions of questions and arguments that prospective
teachers made their reputation06
5. Libraries and other ancillary services formed an important
complement of the educational system and free service and facilities
were providJ?7
6. The most vital societal role of the Muslim education was the creation
of an elite corps of a 'broad and affluent middle-class 208the ulma,
who were well-versed in the verities of Islam and acted, on many
occasions and in many ways, as the guardians of the rights of the
205. GIBB and BOWEN, op.cit. p.16l. Also F.Rahman, Islam, op.cit.p.l85
206. ibid. p.158
207. Nekosteen, pp.65-74. Shalaby, pp.73-ill
208. S.D.Goite Studies in Islamic History and Institutions,
E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1968, p.64, 217
/
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community. "They could", asserts Waardenberg, "counterbalance an
arbitrary exercise of power and defend, to a certain extent, the masses
against unlimited despotism by making known certain norms of Islam to
any Muslim rule?9
2107. Defined as it has been as the Intermediate Civilization',	 Islam,
by means of its Madrassahs and universities, very successfully
preserved the ancient Greek and Eastern learning and transmitted it to
the Latin West. On the basis of this process, certain Muslim scholars
have tended to claim that the Muslim institutions of higher learning
were"the forerunners of the Modern European universities, having
established hundreds of colleges in advance of Eu.rop 1 Such claims
have, however, been denied by Western historians and educationists2
3. 4.3.	 TRADITIONALISM OF THE MtJSLIN EDUCATION
Although rising on a fairly universalistic normative framework,
the Muslim educational system and its underlying ideology had, in the
course of time, crystallized itself into a dogmatic and rigid structure.
Oriented exclusively towards the religiously constructed norms, it
mainly catered for the other-worldly interests of the individual.
Inevitably,therefore, Muslim societies were beset by a basic dualism which
education remained unable to transcend. As T. Parsons has observed:
"On the one hand, legitimized by the re.igious mission of
Islam, was a continual drive to u ify all the faithful
politically; but on the other hand, was the lasting
anchorage of the Islamic masses in traditional agrarian
or nomadic societies, organised about kinship and
209. J. WALRDEIThERG, "Sone Institutional Aspects of Muslim Higher
Education and their relation to Islam" in Nuinen 12 (l965)pp.96-138
210. GOITEN. Studies, op.cit. pp.54-70, also Parsons, Societies,
op.cit. pp.82-86
211. NAKOSTEEN, op.cit. p.62, also M.M. PICTHALL, "Muslim Education"
in the Islamic Culture, 1 (1927) pp.100-lOB
212. RASBDALL for example refu such an influence although he too
accepts contacts with Islamic learning and its influence on
philosophy and medicine. The origin of the Universities of
Europe are traced by him exclusively from the European Schools.
See H.Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages
vol. I. p.xxxix .nd 70.
	 Oxford University Press, 1936
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particularistic local solidarities which were never
thoroughly structured to match the religious universalism -
or even that attained, at times, by the highest political
authorities and the law, indeed, the particularistfl often
penetrated the higher echelons. Religiously, this basic
duality was especially clear. On the one hand, orthdox
Islam adhered to a theological rigourism which could not
legitimise any mediation with the diversity of human
interests and motives. On the other hand, these human
elements gave rise to the widespread and popular sufist
movements which fostered an extreme emotionalism,
mysticism and magic that undermined the institutionalization
of any distinctly Islamic pattern in large-scale Societies." (213)
In this diffuse cultural milieu, the scholastic elites - the
ulema, consolidated themselves into a ruling caste with self-
perpetuating tendencies that lay hidden behind their veneer of a
sacred view of knowledge and education, instead of promoting a
'self-generating' concept of culture. Faced with any real or supposed
threat by way of rationality, critical analysis or comparative
philosophical scrutiny, the only safe course they deemed fit for the
Ummah in safeguarding its solidarity was in a recourse to orthodoxy
or orthpraxy and traditionality which,inter aliaguaranteed their
own primacy.
As if a dead-end had been reached, for centuries there does not
seem to have appeared any significant change in the contents, methods
and functions of Muslim education. The Nizamiyyah curriculum devised
in the eleventh century was followed, preserved and faithfully passed
on to the next generations. Education, therefore, had become an
exercise in pedantry. The best method of learning had been reduced
in the main, to memorization of the texts at the expense of
intellectualization; and there was more emphasis on transmission rather
than creativity. As Gibbs and Bowen have pointed out,
"Education had ceased to set before itself even the hope
of moulding society in the direction of i s ideals,
and had sunken to the level of merely holdin society
together by the Inculcation of tradition." I214)
213. T.PARSONS, Societies, op.cit. p.85, cf. also Clifford Geertz,
Old Societies and New States, Free Press of Glencoe,NY./London,
1963, pp.199-202.
214. GIBB and. BOWEN, op.cit. p.l6O.
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The traditionalism of Muslim education has further been described by
Lewis who asserts:
"The literary and authoritarian character of traditional
pedagogy, as well as the attitudes of traditional
society, made it very difficult to assimilate either
the physical and natural sciences, or the practical and
technical skills associated with them. Society despised
manual skills, and rejected as inferior those who taught,
acquired or exercised them. A good illustration of this
is the low rating and limited attention given to artists
in traditional Islamic society, as contrasted with the
high respect accorded to poets and scholars-artists of the
word, not the hand. The only exception was the architect
who, as an officer concerned with bridges and
fortifications, and as a director of building operations
rather than a mere builder, qualified as a gentleman.
The position of the scientist was somewhat higher than
that of the artist, but in post-classical times, with
little justification. The once great Muslim tradition
of scientific research and experiment had long since
withered and died, leaving a society strongly resistent
to the scientific spirit. (215)
To sum up, a comparative map of the normative and institutional
orientations of modernity a.nd Islam is posited in Chart ' ' overleaf.
215 . BERNARD LEWIS, op.cit. p.187. One might argue that the lower
status given to the artist was not perhaps so much because of
the despising of manual labour but because of the taboo against
pictorial representation of the human face.
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sovereignty belongs
to the nation
Nationalism basis
of state
democratic
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FEATURES	 MODERN	 TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC
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sovereignty belongs to
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oligarchic
meritocratic participation
constrained by religious
norms
ralical-competi tive
capital accumulation
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conventional-non
competitive
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Societal
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Famiiy nucleur
equality of sexes
in social respons-
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independent status
of child after
adolescence
patriarch.icai (extended)
Man held dominant in
social responsibility
independent status of
child after marriage
Religion	 a sub-system in a	 religion permeates the
secular system	 total social system
Education	 aims at the develop-	 aims at socialisation
went of individuality	 into Islam
curricula changing with curricula unchaged since
time	 medieval configurations
practical and	 theoretical and elite
integrated with the 	 forming
manpower needs of
society.
PART II
CHAPTER IV
Subjected to the test of conformity with nature,
the principles of Ialm, when rigitly understood,
do stand this test and are therefore in harmony
with science and progress.
Sir Sayyid Abmad }wi
The Nualims have neither opposed science, nor
been opposed by science except from the dly they
alienated themselves from their religion and.
opposed the study of it.
Shaikh Nphmad Abd.uh
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CHAPTER IV
4.	 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
ThE CHALLENGE OF MODERNITY
Modernization started in the Muslim world in the aftermath of
its defeats at the hands of the expanding European powers. Military
setbacks and reversals Bet in motion chain reactions which brought home
to the hitherto self-assured Muslim rulers the immense superiority of
modern European weapons, techniques of warfare, discipline and training.
Defenoe].ess and outinanoeuvred, they had no choice but to emulate the
victors in their manners, styles and techniques, in order to defend
their lands, peoples and culture. The early modernization of Muslim
societies, because of the over-riding motive of defence, has been
described as	 modernization'.
Up until the eighteenth century, the Dar-al-Islais (House of
Islam) was well-set in its power and repose. Consolidated into two
imposing empires: the Mughal in the East and the Ottoman in the Vest,
which shared between them the bulk of Muslim lands, Islamdom had.
remained invincible ever since its decisive victories in the crusades.
This invincibility however, was soon to shatter. For the Ottomans, the
turning point came with the lifting of their siege of Vienna in 1683,
and the subsequent treaties of Carlowitz (1699) and. Passorwit (1718).
This was followed by more serious repulses ending in the fateful treaty
with Russia at Eutuch Quinarji in 1774, which finally set the seal on
their advances towards Europe. Henceforth, theirs was the retreat and
appeasement: far from being the once 'terror of Europe', the House of
Uthman was now to become its 'aicnn'.
Even more catastrophic in impact and. iconoclastic in consequences
was the well-mobilized Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 which left
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no doubt whatsoever of the obsole8cence of the Muslim defences,
disciplines and ideas. So confounded and awe-stricken were the
E rptiaug
 by the roaring cannonry of Bonaparte that they really took it
as the doomsday.1
In a similar manner, although far removed from the Middle
Eastern scene, was the baffling defeat at Plassey in 1757 of the
50,000 strong Muslim army of Nawab Siraj-ud-Dawla by Robert Clive of
the English East India Company. Though here chicanery played a part,
yet the symptoms of disorder, indiscipline and weakness that accompany
decline were clearly visible on the Muslim side.
The purpose in talking of these disastrous events is to underline
the fact that these Muslim defeats in various parts of the world were
not isolated phenomenon. Like most military defeats, they marked the
symptoms of decline, the collapsing of a house that had decayed from
within. Although its foundations were still firm enough to withstand
and to survive some more storms and provide shelter, yet the'House of
Islam' evidently could not remain intact much longer without
renovation. In Turkey and Egypt, where sovereignty was not lost, the
Sultana immediately started reform programmes to re-shape their defence
forces by providing them with European training and discipline. Sultan
Selim III (1789-1807) and Sultan Mabmud II (1807-1839) in the Ottoman
Empire, and Pasha Muhammad All (1803-1849) in Egypt, for the first time
in recent Muslim history willingly embarked upon a massive programme of
innovation and thus became the harbingers of modernization by introducing
alien institutions into the social structure of Islam. Their 'defensive
modernization', by virtue of the very dynamics of the new institutions
marked the beginnthg of ana11-round modernization in the social,
economic, educational and political aspects as well as the normative
1 • N. RIPPAT BEY, The Awakening of Modern Egypt, Longnans & Green & Co.
London, 1947 . p.5.
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order of their societies: the dawn of a new era: 'the Njzam_j_jedid.
The immediate objectives of the Nlzam-i-jedid of Sultan Selim III were
to raise a new army trained on modern lines and to establish institutions
necessary for its training. It would, however, be wrong to assume, in
spite of the declared utilitarian purpose of the innovations, that their
sponsors were unaffected. by the intellectual and. eocio-politica]. changes
taking place in contemporary Europe.2
In Egypt, no sooner was the victory complete, than Napoleon with
the help of a hundred. learned men - teachers, scientists and. technicians
whom he had. selected. to accompany the expedition - started. his comprehen-
sive reform projects comprising constitutional, ieg4 judicial and.
technological changes. His modern institutions such as the Central
Administrative Council established in Cairo and its subordinate provincial
ad.ministrative councils with native and. French counciflors; his
inauguration of the Institut d'Egypte for the advancement of science and.
learning, and his Printing Press were not surprisingly more radical and
impressive than the franentary and. precipitous Nizani-i-Jedid. of the
Ottoman Sultan Selim. The French institutions and ideas unquestionably
made a very deep and lasting impact on Psalm Muhammad. All who rose as
the strongman of Egypt after the French retreat, and. on some of the
Shikhs ofAl-Azher whom Napolean had tried to harness for his New Order.
It was perhaps this impetus and. the brilliant leadership of )Yuhmmsd All
that had put Egypt ahead of all eastern countries by the mid-nineteenth
century, far ahead of Turkey itself
2. In fact, the Ottoman Sultans had watched with interest the changes
brought about by the French Revolution. Sultan Scum III himself
initiated his reforms after Ebu Bekir Efendi whom he had. appointed.
his special envoy to study and report on the European thought and.
systems, had presented him a detailed report. For a fuller treatment
of the subject see Bernard. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey,
op. cit. pp.45-72
3. P.J.VATIKISTIS, The Modern History of Egypt, Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, London, 1969, Chapter 4, '}hjnd All, the Modernising
Autocrat' pp.49-73.
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The casO of Muslim India, however, presented a sharp contrast
to those of Egypt and Turkey. Here the sovereignty of the Muslims was
lost to a trading company whose dominant motive at the time was no more
than profiteering and sheer economic erploitation. Reform programmes
were neither warranted by their interests nor vouchsafed by their
charter. Nevertheless, their agricultural, commercial and economic
ventures did set in motion the dynamics of mobility and modernization,
particularly in commerce, agriculture and industry. In education,
because of the 1aissez-faire policy of the Company, it
	
the
missionaries who took the lead in introducing new institutions.
Missionary societies opened the first elementary schools, installed the
first Printing Press, and published the first modern newspaper in the
subcontinent. Missionaries, however, because of their proselytising
zeal, their crude methods, and their attacks against Islam failed to
draw Muslims towards their new institutions . The opening of the
Calcutta ?Iadrassah in 1782 as a result of a Muslim petition to the
Governor General, Warren Hastings, beseeching some educational provision
for the Muslims, resulted more from a personal interest of Hastings than
from a policy of the Company. 5
 Isolated and tmco-ordinated as the
Madrasaah was it soon plunged into administrative and policy problems.
It failed to train a sizeable number of Muslim youths for entry into
the employment of the Company but it did assume pivotal importance by
4. See ISHTIA H. (iTRESHI, The Muslim Community of Indo-Pakistan
Subcontinent, Mouton & Co. The Hague, 1962, pp.225-7
5. Hastings was opposed to the idea of leaving education in the hands
of missionaries alone. He is also recorded to have taken
interest in Persian literature. He himself contributed Rs.58,000
towards the building cost of the Madrassah.
EncvcloDae'Britannic, Vol.11, pp.249- 7
of. E.H.Cutts, 'The Background of Macaulay's Minutes' in the
American Historical Review, Vol.LVIII, 1952-3, pp. 824-56. Hastings
maintained that the Company' a government ought to do as much or more
than the pre-British Muslim governments had done to encourage the
learned classes of the Hindu and Muslim society along the lines of
Eastern scholarship; and that such educational efforts would result
in greater efficiency and economy in British Administration and
promote Indian loyalty to British Rule in India
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virtue of the Anglicist-orientaliat controversy that resulted in
Lord Macaulay'e famous minutes which opened up a new chapter in the
educational modernization of the subcontinent.
The introduction of these modern institutions into the Muslim
societies was generally met with severe resistance. Modernization was
regarded by the orthodox Muslim leaders as an encroachment upon Islamic
values aM the social order. In Turkey, although (and perhaps because),
the Nizain-i-Jedid was very cautiously cast in the old. mould and modern
institutions did not, at least overtly, challenge the ruling position of
the traditional ones, the influential classes, I.e. the Janissariee,
the Ayans aM the Ulema jointly reacted against them and secured a fetwa
from the Shaikh-ul-Islam for the abolition of the Nizam-i-Jedid, and
the deposition of the ambitious Sultan. 6 Similarly, though the
Egyptians were inspired and thrilled by the Printing Press aM Bonaparte's
demonstrations of scientific experiments at the Institut d'Egypte, and
by the new factories, casinos, hospitals, water-works and other modern
systems set up by the French, yet twice during the three-year period of
the French occupation they furiously revolted against the 'infidels' and
inflicted serious losses. In the Indian subcontinent, reaction was even
more bitter though it was internalised at the time and appeared moat
violently in the shape of the 1857 mutiny which both India and Pakistan
have commemorated as their first War of Independence.
The importance of these initial reforms, however, must not be
under-rated. They were fraientary, isolated and unwelcome but they
paved the way for a more decisive, articulated and lasting phase of
modernization.
6. Shaw considers two main reasons why these initial Ottoman attempts
at modernization met a violent resistence: (a) modern institutions
failed to replace the old ones even when the latter had become
obsolete, (b) no attempt was made to reform the traditional
institutions. S.J.Shaw, NSome Aspects of the Aims and. Achievements
of the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reformers, in the Beginnings of
Modernization in the Middle East, Ed.William Polk and. P.L.Ckiambere.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1968,pp.29-30
cf. also I.R.Sinai,The Challenge of Modernization, end. The West's
Impact on the Ion-Western World, Chatto aM Windus, London,l964.
pp.o9-7u
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4.2.	 INSPITuIONAL CHANGES
4. 2.1. TURKEY
After Sultan Selim, Nabmud. II (1808-1839) and. his SOfl
Abdul Najid (1839-61), carried, on the modernization movement still more
undauntedly. Sultan ?Iahmud proceeded more systematically and ruth-
leesly by first striking a fatal blow at the obstructionist groups. He
then inaugurated the famous series of Tanzimat reforms with his
celebrated Ratt-i-Sharif (Noble Rescript) of 1839, to be followed by
the Ratt-i-Humayan (Illustrious Rescript), 1856, of Sultan Abdul Najid
and ending in the code of Civil Procedure of 1879. The TanziAat
cumulatively replaced almost all Ottoman traditional institutions and
gave rise to a new class of Ottomans more forward-looking and amenable
to change. Whatever motives historians have tended to ascribe to their
designers: whether they were prompted by a genuine desire to change
their state and society, or were obligated to adopt them as a
'window-dressing' to placate the European powers who had strongly
pressurized them, the fact remains that the Tanzimat marked the first
thoroughgoing attempt at modernization of the Ottoman society.
For the first time, 'rationalist and positivist' norms were
introduced into the Ottoman society. Equality before law was conceded
f or all citizens of the empire irrespective of their race or religion.
For the first time too, secular legal codes, based on the French legal
system, and lay courts were set up to deal with matters of a non-religious
nature. A measure of constitutional representation was also introduced
into the Ottoman government by the institution of a High Council of
Notables (Nej11a_i_Va1_i_ 1rhim_1_adliya) 8 Modern communications such
as post (1834), telegraph (1855), railways (1866) and. new roads were
7. For a fuller account of the Tanzimat see Encyclopaedia of Islam,
Vol. IV, 1934. s.v. Tanzimat, also B.Lewis, Emergence, op.cit.-'
pp.73-125.
8. RODEBICX H. DAVISON, "The Advent of the Principles of Representation
in the Government of the Ottoman Empire' in the Beginnings of
Modernization, op.cit. pp.93-108.
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built, and the first public newspaper, the Takvim-i-Vekayi - the
Turkish version of Ottoman Monitor, also appeared in 1831(9)
In Education, the initiative taken by Selim and Mahmud II in
opening secular schools, was extended further by the appointment in 1845
of a Commission to investigate the existing educational system and to
propose new measures to improve it to suit the requirements of the
society. The Commission recommended (a) the creation of an articulated
system of primary, secondary and higher education, (b) the formation
of a permanent department of Public Instruction and (c) the establish-
ment of an Ottoman State University.
By 1847, the foundations of the University had been laid; the
Department of Public Instruction had already been upgraded to the
Ministry of Education; free, compulsory primary education had been
accepted in principle, although a network of schools needed for the task
had. yet to be built: a new type of secondary school, the Rushdiya, had
been created alongside the existing Madrassah system; and by 1850, six
such schools with 870 pupils were already functioning in the Empire.1°
All these measures marked the beginning of the state responsibility in
education, a domain hitherto exclusively in the hands of the Diama.
The Organic Act of 1869, carried the impetus of modernization in
education still further by decentralizing educational administration;
by increasing the number of institutions for scientific studies; by
introducing modern pedagogic methods, and. above all, by the opening of
the first lise,(the Mekteb-i-Suleinaniya) or popularly known Galatasaray
based on the model of French lycee, which has come down to the present
11times as the prototype secular e1itist schooL. The use as an
9. B.LEWIS. Fmergence, op. cit. pp.93-4
10. ibid. pp.111-2
11. A.LKAZAMIAS, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey,
George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, 1966, pp.64-71.
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institution occupied a pivotal role in restratification of Ottoman
society. It was in these and other similar secular institutions, such
as the Translation Chamber (Teriuman Od.aei), the civil service school,
the law schools, the scribe schools, etc. that training was provided.
for the new leaders - officers, diplomats, civil servants, tranaibtora,
secretaries and others. All future classes of modernists, whether they
were the liberal Young Ottomans (1865-76), the radical Young Turks
(1908-18) or the revolutionary lemalists (1923), who successively
transformed an autocratic, monolithic Ottoman np ire into a modern nation-
state,12were products of these modern institutions.
Equally significant for the modernization of Ottoman society and
education were the selected Ottoman young men who were sent abroad,
mainly to France, to study European languages, legal systems and other
subjects. It is recorded that between 1857-74, a special Turkish School
known as the ?Iektebi Osmani was functioning in Paris to house these
Ottoman scholare. 13 The Mekteb was established in direct pursuance of
the modernizing policy of the Tanzimat which had expressedly declared
the intention of the Tanzimatji Sultans for cultural borrowing from
Europe. A knowledge of European languages, particularly French, had
become almost a sine qua non for entry into the modernist elite class.
4. 2.2. EG!PT
Raving courageously rescued Egypt from anarchy following the
departure of the French, Pasha Nuhanad lii (1803-49) began his
distinguished reign of progress in the footsteps, but, in many ways,
far ahead of his Ottoman master, Sultan Mahmud II. The modernizing
12. For the role of Bureaucracy in the modernization of the Ottoman
society, see LL.Chambers 'Civil Bureaucracy' in Political
Modernization in Jaan and Turkey, ed. Robert E.Ward and D.W.Rustow,
Princeton University Press, 1964 pp.301-2.
13. R,L.CHAMBERS, TMNotes on the Mektebi Osmani in Pa.rb 1857-74 in
the Beginnings of Modernization, op.cit. pp.313-329
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policies of the Pasha were decisive, co-ordinated. and resolutely
executed. Not only did he raise a well-trained army and navy and open
schools for their training, but he also created a viable economic system
with the supporting systems of irrigation, arketing and transport. He
was the first Muslim ruler to import machinery from Europe and he
initiated the industrialisation of Egypt by opening cotton and sugar
factories, and copper, iron and steel foundries. Though his industrial
enterprises failed because of the peculiar political position of his
country and the pressures exerted by the expanding European powers through
the Porte, and though he could not realise his ambition of creating a
modern complex economy, yet he did succeed in giving it an export-
oriented economy, which was no mean an achievemen
	For his brilliant
projects, aimed at an all-round transformation of his country into a
strong, self-sustaining and progressive as well as independent nation,
he has been rightly hailed as the father of E'ptian nationalism.15
He had no qualms about borrowing from Europe its sciences, skills
and techniques or about employing European instructors and technicians.
His various government departments such as Health, Public Works, Post
and Telegraph, Printing and Publications were in the hands of Europeans.
Although he kept all effective control of the country in his own hands,
he nevertheless allowed a measure of constitutionalism to develop in the
country by creating consultative councils that in turn became Ministries:
the Interior, Justice, Commerce and Education. His renowned Printing
Press established at Bulaq in 1821 not only issued a bilingual official
14. Charles ISSAWI, Egypt in Revolution, an Economic Analysis,
O.U.P. London, 1963, pp.18-30, also P.J.Vatikiotis, op.cit.pp
and R.Bey, op.cit. pp.41-5. So productive was Erpt under the Pasha
that in 1820, the Port of Alexandria had 35 Corimercial Rouses; and
nearly every state in Europe as well as the United States had. a
Consul General resident at the port.
See Enc. Britt. Vol. 8. p.67.
15. Because of his superb leadership, the Pasha has been acclaimed as
'the highest administrative genious that the East had known since
the days of the First Caliphs'. Bey op.cit.p.92
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gazette in Turkish and Arabic, the Al-Waqai —al-Misriya, but also works
of learning in Arabic, Turkish and Persian.
His educational policy was primarily directed towards fitting young
men for government employment. He started his educational
modernization by sending student missions to Europe as early as 1809,
at first to various Italian centres of learning but later exclusively
to France. In these educational missions he was certainly a pace-setter
for the Ottoman government which followed his example in opening the
Mektebi Osmani in Paris. Between 1813 and 1949, eight missions were
sent to France. So keen was the Pasha himself to digest the modern
Western learning that he personally interviewed each scholar after his
return from Europe and charged him to translate into Arabic and Turkish
all the important works he had studied, sometimes isolating him from
other activities for this purpose.l6 The Pasha's objectives in cultural
borrowing were scrupulously utilitarian. Egyptian students abroad had
to learn sciences and were subjected to stringent discipline: they were
not permitted socially to mix with their hosts lest they should
(politically or ideologically) be influenced.17
Muhammad. All Pasha's first two schools, a Cadet school (1816)
and a School of Mathematics (1821), were built in the citadel. But later,
as need arose and. Europe-returned instructors and technicians became
available, a whole range of modern military, technical, professional
and vocational as well as art schools spread into the cities of Egypt.18
These tertiary level institutions in turn created a demand for the
establishment of primary and secondary schools. Dy the mid-nineteenth
16. The Pasha's personal interest in these missions can be gauged from
the fact that he used to study all progress reports sent to him on
each student and issued instructions "exhorting them to complete
studies as soon as possible and rebuking them for their slackness,
carelessness and bad. results." J.Heyworth-Dunn.,
An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt,
Luzac, London, 1935, p.l65
17. The story is told of one student who, when interviewed by the
Pasha explained that he had been studying 'government affairs'.
"What" exclaimed the Pasha, "you are not to get mixed up
contd.
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century, Egypt coi4d boast of having one of the most differentiated
and articulated system of public schools under the administration of
a central department of education. Besides elementary, preparatory
and technical schools, a polytechnic on the French model to teach
science subjects and a school of languages were special features of
modern institutions introduced in the Pasha' a time. The Pasha also
gave great impetus to private enterprise in education and all the
various local denominations such as Jews, Greek, Catholic and Methodist
Christians, as well as British, German and American missionary societies,
were encouraged to open schools. These schools, as Landau has pointed
out, through their diverse curricula, their European teachers and. their
aocio-cultu.ral milieu played a specially vital role in the modernization
18
of education in Egypt.
The traditional system of ?Iektabs and Madrassahs and the Azhar
university were left alone, as the Pasha's Nizam-i-Jedid would not have
been created through them. Nevertheless, the Pasha did not hesitate
to recruit the scholars of Al-Azhar into the foreign missions or to
employ some of its Shaikha for guardianship of students abroad.
Distinguished among these Azharite Uleina was Shaikh Rifa's Badawi Ra.fi
a]. Tahawi (1801-73) who spent five years in Paris as a tutor. There he
acquired mastery of French and delved into the works of Montesquieu
and Rosaeaa and made acquaintance with orientalists like Silvatre de
Sacy. On his return, he was thrilled with a desire to publicise his
views about modern French life. In 1841, he was appointed Director of
the newly created Bureau of Translation where he himself translated
17. admlMstration of Government. It is I who govern. Go to
Cairo and. translate th. military works". Dunne, op.cit.p.168
18. J.M.L&JDAU, "The Beginnings of Modernization in Education, The
Jewish Community in Egypt, A case study" in the
op.cit. pp.299-313.
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not less than twenty great works. But his monumental work entitled
Taichils a). Ibriz ha Takh.ts Bans, has remained a pioneer insight into
the modernization movement of Egypt and the impressions of an
Azhanite of the West9
For fifteen years after ?hArnmRd All Pasha'a death in 1849, Egypt
was ruled by three feeble descendants of his who failed to keep the
country on the road to progress, although not all this period was
without reforms. The systems created by Muhammad iii Pasha, dependent
as they entirely were on the army, proved ephemeral as a consequence of
the retrenchment ordered by the Porte. However, if the great Pasha was
selective in borrowing from Europe, his grandson Ihedive Ismail, who
came to power in 1863, turned out to be an impatient imitator. Himself
a devout Europhile he embarked unreservedly on Europeanising the
country° His obsession was to r8nk equal to the European monarchs and
he wanted his capital to look like a dazzling European city. His lavish
construction programmes and grandiose sprees won him the appelation of
Ismail 'the Magnificent' but they also put him under enormous debt to
European Finance Houses and brought about not only his own downfall but n the
end also the loss of independence for Egypt: 	 independence so bravely
22defended by lus grandfather.
The development projects of the Thedive, whatever their motives,
were extensive. They comprised 112 canals covering over 8,400 miles,
railways and telegraph over 1,100 miles, the governmental postal service.
19. See HOtJBANI, op.cit. pp.67-102
20. 'Ny country' declared the Khedive, 'is no longer in Africa, it is
in Europe'. P.J.Vatikiotis. History, op.cit. p.74
21. ibid. pp.129-33
22. "Even what Louis XIV had achieved for Paris could not surpass what
Ismail achieved for Cairo and Alexandria. Go wherever you like
in Cairo, you are sure to have your eyes attracted by some grand
building, garden or statue, fountain or road or a whole quarter
planned and executed by Ismail the Magnificent. ibid. pp.84-5
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By creating a Consultative assembly in i86, he also became the promotor
of constitutionalism in Egypt 3 To crown all these there was, however,
the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.
His educational modernization was equally very impressive. No
public works, irrigation4 projects and agricultural progress was
possible without a sound education system. With the advice of two
able educationalists, Dor (Swiss) and Rogers (English), he re-organized
the educational system by creating a ?Iinistry of Education and
separating the military and navy schools from general education. He
allocated £50,000 from his own private estate of El-Wadi, thereby raising
th total money for education to £150,000. Student missions to Europe
were revived during his reign and the number of schools rose
spectacularly from 185 in ]462 to 5,820 in 1878. In 1868, he promulgated
the Organic Law of Public Instruction thereby creating a graded system,
For the first time, Kuttab (Maktab) schools were integrated into the
state system. Regulations f or school administration, teaching, discipline
and medical inspection were devised. For the first time too, two girls'
schools were established, in 1873 and. 1874. A Teachers Training
College, the Dar-al-Ulum was set up. The Thedive's regime took
initiative also in attracting the Azharite students to enter State
24education by training at the Dar-al-Ulum. There was an unusa]. flow of
Europeans into Egypt during Ismail's reign, i.e. from 3,000 in 1836 to
68,653 in 1878,25 an influx which vexed Egyptians and became one of the
reasons for the national revolt. In 1862, the British finally took over
the country to save it from economic collapse. The forty years of British
ru.]. made great impact especially in eradicating corruption and other
23. ibid. p.129
24. See J.HEYWORTH-DUNNE, An Introduction to the History of Education
op.cit pp.362-73 for all these educational measures.
25. ibid. p.343
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social maladies. Educational expansion and reform, however, remained
lower down on the list of priorities under the British.
4 . 2 .3. MUSLIM flJDIA
The modernizing reforms introduced by the East India Company were
through and through secular, rationalist and, perhaps more collectivity-
orientated than those of Egypt and Turkey. But the Muslim community
did not readily partake of them for a long time. Their loss of political
power, and. deposition from the economic and social superiority which
they had been enjoying for centuries kept plaguing them and they
remained aloof. The problem of their participation in modern institutions
was made more difficult by the fact that the policies adopted by the
British Raj for the consolidation of their power, whether consciously
or otherwise, were designed to hit the Muslims harder than the Hindus.
The disbandment of the Muslim armies, the Permanent Settlement of 1845,
the abolition of Persian as Court language in 1837, the abrogation of
Shariah courts etc. all dislodged the Muslim community from lucrative
and elite positions. The appropriation of rent-free awkaf lands, granted
by the Muslim rulers for the learned claBses and educational institutions,
26directly deprived the latter from all financial support.
The modern, 'rationalist and positivist norms of the British Baj
were arguably universalistic and bound to benefit the willing (Hindu)
majority more than an unwilling and sullen (Muslim) minority; so by
choosing to remain aloof, the Muslims allowed to develop a serious
cu].tura]. lag for themselves. It needed the crusading efforts of
Sir Sayyid Ahmth Than to remove these inhibitions and prejudices from
among his co-religionists as well as to convince the British of the
Muslims' willingness to co-operate and take advantage of the new order
26. See A.R.MALLICK, British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal,
The Asiatic Society of Pakistan*Dacca, 1966, pp.27-65, and
ureshi, op.cit. pp.225-7
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to modernise themselves. The lag was, however, too wide to bridge soon.
Despite the assurances given in the post-mutiny Royal Proclamation of
1858 of complete religious neutrality and equality in matters of
participation in administration and rights of protection, welfare and
employment, the Muslim community still remained comparatively backward.
Their participation in the education institutions and the concession
offered in the Wood Despatch of 1854 or the new universities opened in
1859, was negligible. The more they disassociated themselves from the
modernization impulse of the Raj, the more they were suspected of
disloyalty and the more they were disengaged. Their nostalgic attach-
ment to traditionalism might have led to their irreversible regression,
subservience and eclipse had it not been to Sir Sayyid's vision.
Sir Sayyid etarted by breaking down the mutual barriers and
inhibitions. The foremost barrier at the time was the prejudice against
the Muslims. In a convincing pamphlet entitled "The Loyal Muhanimadans
of India" he successfully argued for a change of heart by the British
towards the Muslims. At the same time he undertook laboriously to convince
his community that modernization was not antithetical to Islam. By the
1870's both endeavours were bearing fruit. The Government of India had
come to accept that special action was needed to improve the conditions
of the Muslims. In 1871, it issued instructions to the Provincial
government to take special measures to promote education among the Muslims,
to earmark funds to raise modern Urdu-English schools, to encourage the
appointment of Muslim teachers, and to increase the amount of teaching
of Arabic and Persian in the Universities. 27
 In the same spirit, a
special education Commission under the chairmanship of Sir William Hunter
was appointed to consider the question of Muslim education. The
27. Sir William liuNTiR, Indian Musalmanns, are they bound by conscience
to rebel against the queen, Thbner, London, 1911.
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Commission investigated all the ideological, psychological and communal
aspects of the Muslims' reluotance to participate in the modern systems,
and recommended some special measures to satisfy their cultural,religioua
28
and social requirements. These met, the Muslims were, albeit belatedly,
ready to march ahead with modernization. By the turn of the century,
nationalism had become the over-riding socio-politica]. movement. Lord
Curzon' s dynamic vieeroyalty had brought impetus to all aspects of Indian
life. Modernization was now in full swing. Muslims participated fully
in the modernization and. the liberal reform programmes. A sizeable
- middle class of modernists was emerging as the new leaders of the community
to spearhead the modernization movement in an organised manner.
4.3. NORM&TIVE CHANGE - ThE RISE OF LIBERALISM
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the entire Muslim world,
with the exception of Afganistan, the Arabian Peninsula, Persia and
Turkey, had been subjugated by the expansive tid. of European colonialism.
With political subjugation began the cultural denigration. The Muslim.
World have, with ample justification perhaps, seen in Europe's partic-
ularly hostile and corrosive attack on Islam, the return of the spirit
of the crusades. If the missionary had hated the Muslim more for his
refusal readily to become a convert, he could be excused. But pronounce-
ments, unsupported by reason or historical evidence hurled at Islam by
eminent western liberal thinkers like Renaxi, Sir William Muir, R.G.Welle,
Hinotaux, etc. aimed as they were at the mere humiliation of Islam, were
bound to create bitter reaction among the Muslims. Renan and Muir
essayed to prove that Islam was inferior and unsound as a religion, and
that its Beduin origin mad.s it inherently opposed to the verities of
reason and civilised culture. Rpnotaux, with Lii sthnocentric appeal,
contended that though Islam and Christianity converged in their semetic
28. ibid. p.150
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origin and Eellenic cultural contacts, Islam represented more than
semetic mentality with its contempt for man and glorification of the
Deity; whereas, Christianity reflected Aryan humanism that raised man's
dignity to that of God. According to Eonotanx, the Christian concept
of the Trinity gives man a more central position in life than the
Islamic concept of 'Divine Absolutism': that is to say, 'an all powerful
God and. an
 all dependent man' •29
In the same vein, Macaulay's disparagement of the entire eaaterii
cultures appears far-fetched and unwarranted. What Nacaulay did., in
essence, was perhaps not much different from what Mahaud II and
Nuhad All Pasha had done in their own domains. But the iconoclasm
that the former had emp]oyed was surely irrelevant.
It was natural for the orthodox - the custodians of the Faith -
in the teeth of such attacks against Islam and the subjugation of the
Unnnah, to suspect and shun the European-sponsored modernization. But
the offensive and arrogant attitudes even coloured the reformists. In
fact, so acute has remained the sensibility of the 'save Islam' outlook
that the whole range of liberal thought in Islam and the modernists
themselves, epting, (and until) Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, have remained
entrenched in a defensive attitude. So, the normative change and
liberalism that took place among the Muslim thinkers at the time, boil
down to the following four objectives:
1. the expurgation of Islam from its medieval accretions
and from the corrupt practices that had crept into
Islam incident to contacts with other cultures;
2. the defence of Islam against Christian attacks and the
preparation of the Muslim communities through
independence to modernilation;
29. HONOTAIJX, then a Minister in the French government, while writing
about the problem of the French relationship with the Muslim
subjects stated that two contending viewpoints on Islam existed
among the French One view considered Islam as a disease, called
for the extermination of one-fifth of the Muslim populations and
the enslavement of the rest in labour camps; destruction of the
Ka'aba, and the exhibition of the Prophe'e remains in the Louvre.
The other view regarded Islam as a higher religion, bridging a gap
between paganism and Christianity.
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3. the modernization of Muslim eduation;and
4. the re-interpretation of Islam in the light of modern
thought and social condition. (30)
All these four objectives were conspicuous in the vehemently
persuasive programme of Islamic reformation launched by one leading
Muslim personality, Sayyid Jamal-ud-din .A].-.ktghani (1839-1897).
Kis pan-Islanilsia, his refutation of Renan's thesis 'L'Islam.tame et
la science'his attack on the orthodox Ulama and Sufi mal-practices
and distortions of Islam that had turned it into a fatalistic way of
life; his criticism of the autocratic regime of Sultan Abdul Kainid, and
his preaching for constitutionalism, were all steps in this direction.
Al-Afghani's Pan-Islamic appeal, his staunch opposition to the British
colonialism as the chief threat to Islam, and his overall revolutionary
activities were all bound to antagonise the colonial powers, and so his
dream of seeing within his lifetime, all Muslim countries free from
colonialism and in unity, could not be achieved. Nevertheless, he
provided an unswerving guideline for the next generation of reformists
in all Muslim lands. His influence was most strongly felt in the three
couhtriea in this study, where he spent several years of his life. In
Egypt he left a coterie of eminent disciples such as Shikh 1qiihin
Abthzh (1849-1905), Muhammad Bashid Bida (1849-1905) and the A].-M-nar
party. 32
 All these liberal thinkers strongly advocated religious reform
in order to achieve the total social reform and modernization of Muslim
societies. They stressed, in various degrees, the necessity for the
Muslims of free inquiry and reasoning, that is to say, the re-opening
of the gates of ijtihad (positivism), as allowed in the Shariah,
3. LA.R.GLBB, Modern Tremds in Islam, Chicago, 1947, p.33.
31. Charles C. ADAMS, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, 0.U.P.1933, p.8.
The Sayyida, "Al Radd. ala al dahriyyiu" Reply to the Materialists
was translated from Persian into Arabic in 1886, in Beirut.
32. C.C.ADAMS, op. cit. pp.205-247. While in Paris, Saryid Al-Afghan!
and Shaikh MuhRm na4 Abdnh published the first international pan-
Islamic journal, the famous 'Al-Urwah wa'l Wuthga' (The Indissoluble
Bond) in 1884, 'with the object of arousing Muslim peoples to the
contd
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They debated the questions of the faith and science, and held that
Islam has an essential capacity to adapt to modern conditions. Their
concerted efforts were directed towards the search for a rationale; the
formation of an ideology aimed,in the first place, at delivering the
Muslim countries from foreign rule and exploitation; and in the second,
at cleansing Islam of its dogmatic rigidity and leading the Muslims
towards moral and material vitality.33
An account of the emergence of liberal thought in Islam,
particularly in the Arab world, cannot possibly be attempted without
considering the immense effort, scholarship and practical insight of
Shaikh }1,hmmad Abduh who, more than anyone else, in the Arab world,
undertook the task of defining the principles of moderni*ation in Islam,
its social systems and. education, under the impact of the West. With
a profound insight gained through his variegated experiences of
academic activities and public offices held over the years: as a
scholar and teacher at Al-Azhex, as an editor of the official gazette
of the government, as a founder of a literary and a benevolent society,
as a judge, as a member of the National Legislative Council and to
crown all, as the Chief Mufti (june consult) of Egypt, the Shjafleh was
the most qualified intellectual to speak for Islam and modernization.
Although, he shared with Al-Afghani his idealism and inspiration, he
eschewed his mentors activism and political militancy. The Shaikh was
convinced that in the political circumstances of the time, the only way
for the Muslims' regeneration was through intellectual, social and
economic jihad, and not a political one.	 -
The starting point of his jihad for modernization of Islam was the
distinction he drew between the normative or 'real' Islam and the glosses
32.contd.
need of uniting their forces against Western agresalon and
exploitation'. ibid. p.9.
33. For a fuller account of Shaikh al-A.tghani, Shaikh Abduh and
their disciples see Albert Bounani, Arabic Thought in the
Liberal Age, 1798-1939 . O.U.P. 1967.
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of tradional interpretations as popularly practised. Traditional
Islam, he argued, faced serious challenge by the modern, rational and
scientific thought. But he did. not believe that the faith of Islam in
its pure and permanent core of norms clashed with science. Instead he
asserted that the faith and. scientific reason operate at different
levels. The real Islam, he asIntained,
"had a simple doctrinal structure: it consisted of
certain beliefs about the greatest questions of
human life, and certain general principles of human
conduct. To enable us to reach these beliefs and.
embody them in our lives both reason and revelation
are essential. They neither possess separate spheres
nor conflict with each other in the same sphere...(34)
Shaikh Abduh was thus the chief exponent of what has been termed.
as the 'Two-Book' school of thought which, though it basically holds the
unity of God inseparable from the unity of truth, recognizes two open
ways to it; the way of revelation and that of natural science. 35 He
contended. that since God's purpose in making His revelation was to promote
human welfare, a true interpretation of the Quran and the Shariah should.
essentially be the one which best fulfils this purpose 6 He himself
'ook the lead in this direction. As the chief Mufti of Egypt, he issued
fetwas ranging from the questions of law to those of social morality and
employed. the same measure of innovation and rationality in his inter-
pretations, assessments and judgements.
The pioneer of Indian Muslim reform, Sir Sayyid., basically
subscribed to the same ideas of Islamic reform as Shaikh Abduh. Both
agreed to the point of the necessity to hazinonise Islam with modern
science and rationalism. Sir Sayyid, however, viewed revelation by the
criterion of its conformity to Nature. To him, Islam was the religion
34. S1ATT(1 MUHAMMAD ABDUH, Risalat al Tawhid. (Lectures on Theology)
p
.42 , quoted in A.flourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, op. cit.
p.145
35. ISNAIL R.AL-FARUQI, "Science and Traditional Values of Islamic
Society", in Science and. the Human Condition in India and. Pakistan,
ed. W. Norehouse, Rockefeller University Press, N.Y.City, 1968.
36. EOURANI, Arabic Thought, p.l52
	
pp.12-28.
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most akin to Nature. Himself profoundly impressed by the nineteenth
century European rationalism and natural philosophy during his stay in
England from 1867-70, his vas an apologistic approach, i.e. 'an attempt
at integrating a given set of ideas into Islam rather than a reformulation
of it. Reason and 'conformity to Nature' according to Sir Sayyid was
the essence of Islam. For his over-wheliing bent towards Nature and.
natural law, Sir Sayyid met severe criticism from the orthodox, including
Sayyid h]-Lfghani, who stigmatised his line of thou&k- the'nechariya'
as misguided and misleading.37
Sir Sayyid'a approach has been regarded as the 'One-Book' school,
inasmuch as it regards Islam and the Qiran as the sole fountainhead of
all knowledge, human or divine, scientific or religious) 'whether in
his laboratory, in the sky or under the earth, the scientist with all
his discoveries is only writing a footnote to the Holy Book.'38
The Turkish group of Islamic liberals, the Young Ottomans, were
far more conversant with the contemporary European ideas of liberalism
and socio-enonomic changes than their counterparts in E'pt or India.
Their ideas, as Professor Bernard Lewis has pointed out, were clearly
derivatives of the jurisprudence of Montesquieu, the politics of Rosseau,
the economics of Smith and Ricardo 9 They had even used the European
capitals as a forum for their literacy, intellectual and political
movements directed against the despotic and reactionary regime at home.
They admired. modern Western ideas and institutions, yet they too,
like ShMkh Abduh and Sir Sayyid, 'set high value on the social morality
of Islam, and tried to justify the adoption of Western institutions in
37. SATYID AL AFGHANI wrote about Sir Sayyid's school of thought
'Nechariya. is the root of corruption, the source of uncountable
evils and the ruin of the community...They present themselves
before the eyes of fools as the standard-bearers of science, but
only give a wider range to treachery. They are deluded by catch-
words, call themselves guides and leaders, when they stand in the
lowest grades of ignorance and lack intelligence.'The Refutation,
quoted in Gibb, Nodern Trends in Islam, p.58
38. AL-FARUQI, op.cit. pp.24-5
39. B.LEWIS, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, op.cit. p.169
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Islamic terms, as not being the introduction of something new but a
return to the true spirit of Ialam° The chief exponent of the Young
Ottoman thought, Nanik Kemal (1840-88), a product of Sultan Mahmud's
Njzam-i-Jedid and well-versed in àrabic and Persian as well as in
French, began his career as a Civil Servant at the Translation Office
at the Sublime Porte and. developed into an impassioned political
journalist under the influence of the famous Ibrahim Sinasi (1826-71),
founder of the literary reform movement in Turkey. Bis criticism of
the Ottoman regime resulted in his own and other liberalists' - such as
Ziya Pasha - exile to Europe where he spent three years staying period-
ically in London, Paris and Vienna. From there be launched his programme
of reformation by means of his liberal views expressed in a series of
articles, essays, novels, plays and poems.
According to Namik, Islam's backwardness was acquired. and not
inherent. Like Abduli he was of the conviction that modernise itself
Islam must; but 'in doing so it should not slavishly imitate Europe and.
abandon its own laws, beliefs and traditions'. On the contrary, he
argued,
"all that is best in European civilization derived
from, or could be paralleled in, classical Islamic
civilization; and the Muslim, in adopting these things,
was returning to what was deepest and most authentic
in his own tradition.' (41)
To conclude then, liberalism that became crystallised in Islam
as a result of the impact of the west, was applied by its upholders,
in the main, to religion. Their best efforts were spent in ascertaining
and proving whether Islam and. science, Islam and reason, Islam arid
modernization were compatible. Little effort was spent on the objective
the
understanding of the dynamics of modernization. Where 'human
40. HOtTR.&NI, op.cit. p.68, also B.Kewis, ibid. Chapter V.pp.126-70
41. B.LEWIS, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, op.cit. p.139
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seemed to have been more manifest than the 'Divine hand' in modern
thought or achievement, the Muslim liberalista appear to have ascribed
it to the proponderance of materialism; and warned both the East and the
West against its evil consequences. Liberal thought in Islam, therefore,
addressed itself mostly to the 'revivalism 42rather than to modernization;
and can best be described as a transitional stage. It became popular
only among lay Muslims with a liberal education. Largely because of
it, however, there was a definite change in norms and values. The
rationalist and positivist spirit slowly started manifesting itself.
In general, liberalism seemed to emphasise social uplift, a fact, which,
as Professor Faziur Rehman points out, 'gave a decisively this-worldly,
positive turn to their thought: the faith in the transcendental truth
of Islam is asserted with vigour but its effect is seen not so much as
a betterment of the next world (which is certainly accepted but not
emphasized) but of the socio-moral life in this world.'43
The nature of man, society and knowledge also received revised
emphases. Greater significance was attached to the numerous verses in
the uran exhorting man to think, observe, learn and improve himself and
his environment: 'to be up and doing'. The doctrine of God as found in
popular belief and practice with a disproportionate view of an 'all-
powerful God and all-dependent man' gets a new (uranic explanation, i.e,
in terms of 'a chain of causes which affirm a final First Cause, which
is self-existent Necessary Being, existing from all eternity, which is
the cause of all things. 44To quote Professor Gibb's analysis, "the
Divine tranedendentalism of classical Islamic belief begins to entertain
the immanentist tendencies of Western thought."45
42. See FAZEUB BAHMAN, Islam, op.cit. Chapter 13 'Modern Developments'
pp.212-34, also Gibb, Modern Trends, op.cit. Chap.III, pp.39-62
'The Principles of Modernism'.
43. LRABMAN, Islam, op.cit. p.216
44. SBAIKH MUHAMMAD ABDUK, Bisalah, pp.29. quoted in C.C.&dains,
Islam and. Modernism, op.cit. p.145
45. H.A.R.GIBB, Modern Trends in Islam, p.51
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Blind faith in 'qismat' as the true Islamic belief is refuted. Shaikh
Abduh writing on the question asserts:
• ...Musliis (of all) sects believe that they have a
share of free choice in their actions which they call
'acquisition' (kasb), and this is the basis of reward
and punishment in the opinion of all of them.
We do not deny that in the thought of the common people
in Muslimianda this article has been contaminated with
traces of the belief in compulsion, and this perhaps
has been the cause of some of the misfortunes that have
befallen them in past generations." (46)
The nature of knowledge in Islam as conceived in the medieval
times, i.e."'given, 'known' and 'eternal' not changing, not expanding47
ut there to be digested", gradually gives way to induction, analysis
and enquiry. Society as a whole is visualised. as resting on positivistic
laws; revealed law is accepted more as a religious cornniandment than as
the civic code. Secular national laws and civil courts replace the
Shariah ones 8 Traditional concepts and values of family, the status
of women, the status of children, are reviewed in the light of modern
thought. Veiling and seclusion of women, in the stringent form prevail-
ing in Muslim societies, is looked upon as a protective measure rather
than one ordained by the uran. Female education comes to be recognised
as highly desirable although the best place for an educated woman is
still considered to be the home; hence an emphasis in the curriculum
on subjects aimed at making a good wife and a good mother. Polygamy is
held. to be permissible but as an exception rather than a rule. In
general, there is a demand to regula.rise marriage, divorce and other
social and family practices by means of law instead of convention.
46. C.C.A]DAMS Islam and Modernism.op. cit. p.146.
47. F.RAEMAN. ISLAM. () cit. Chapter 13.
48. See Majid Khuddari,"From Religious to National Law" in Modernization
of the Arab World. Van Nostrand. New York/London/TorQnto. 1966. pp.
3(-51.
-134-
4 .4. CONSOLIDATION OF MODERNIZING LRADERSEIP A!D TEE ACCEPTANCE
OF NATIONALISM AS THE IDEOLOGY OF MODERNIZATION
Nationalism with its dominant norms of national particularism,
specificity, rationality and secularism, has been described, as 'a state
of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be
due to the nation-state' 9 Modern nationalism arose in the eighteenth
century Western Europe, manifesting itself in the American and the
French Revolutions as the most powerful ideology of political modern-
ization. By the nineteenth century, it had. penetrated. into Central
Europe, the Latin American countries, and by the beginning of the
twentieth, into the rest of the world including the Muslim lands. Its
evolution has been ascribed to many factors; the most important being
the reaction against the monolithic structure, centralised. control and
absolutist rule of the great empires which undermined regional or local
cultures and. languages. The freedom-inspired, rationalistic and
secularistic ideals of the Renaissance that defined nations by rather
more visible and narrow criteria such as territory, race and language,
stood to challenge the hitherto religiously-determined bases of civiliz-
ation. By the end of the eighteenth century, European intellectuals were
inspired by the passion for nationalism, and devoted their thought to
the development of the nation state, national economy, national education
and national linguistic culture°
49. See the Encyclopaedia Brittanica. S.v. 'Nationalism.
50. ibid. Anthony D SMITH, however, questions this generally accepted
historical view of nationalism.which makes it "a product of the
peculiar European experience; that it is deeply embedded and. marked
with that experience, and that inbther areas of the world, it must
be und4rstood. as a largdly alien importation". He urges that
instead of 'superficiality of historicism', we must employ a longer
and broader perspective--- the concept of the 	 to exain
the rise of nationalistic movements in non-European areas. See
A.D.SMITH, "Ethnocentricism, Nationalism and Social Change", in
International Journal of Comparative Sociology. Vol. XIII,No.I.
March, 1972, pp.1-20.
-135-
In the Muslim World, the Ottoman Empire with its over-sized multi-
racial and polyglottal community - and a religiously legitixnised. socio-
political system - was the first to face the challenge of nationalism.
In other parts of the Muslim world, the Colonial rule itself hastened
the demand for nationalism and national reconstruction.
Ideally, the orthodox political philosophy of Islam with its
universalistic and diffuse central concepts of khilifah and. Ummah
(Brotherhood in Faith) and the Shariah law, demands socio-political
unity on the basis of a religious identity. The ideals of nationalism
on the other hand, centre round the basic principle of separation of
religion and. politics. Ideal-type Islamic siyasa and nationalism there-
fore, stand mutually opposed. Kistorically, however, dynasties and
Sultanates had arisen quite early in Islam, though not entirely as nation-
states, but paralle' to the central Khilifah; in some cases recognised
and. blessed by the latter, in others, without regard to this formality.
This inconsistency between the ideal and the actual, the normative
and the deviational aspects of Islamic politics has occupied the thought
of most Muslim thinkers. The great Muslim historian and. political
thinker, Ibn Khuldun, who seems to have visualised the rise of
nationalism, had explained it away in the usual dyadic terms, i.e. the
'slyasa dinya' (state system founded upon the Divine Law) and 'siyasa
aqliya' (state system based on human reason); the former being the Khilifah
and the latter, Mulk. The decline of the Khilafah into Mulk during
the Ummayad and the Abbasid caliphates, was due according to Thuldun
to the 'asabiya' which he defined as "a corporate feeling; a common bond,
due in the first place to the ties of blood and family tradition,
creating a sense of solidarity: it inspires common action and is an
indispensible driving force in the formation of states and dynasties;
its aim is mulk; dominion."51
51. E.I.J.ROSENThAL. Islam in the Modern National State, O.LP.
1965, p.18
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ibn Thuldun had however justified this transformation and the
rise of muik a the sole criterion of itB obedience to the Shariah;
and its intention of caring for the welfare of the Ummah. Although
the niulk too, he argued, is capable of looking after the welfare of
man in this world, this is achieved even more perfectly with the aid of
the laws of the Shariah, since the prophetic law-giver knows best what
is to man's advantage, in both mundane and religious matters. There-
fore, if the mulk is Islamic, it comes second. in rank to the Thilifah;
and they are linked together. But the mulk is isolated if it is
outside the religious community (milla)52
This preponderence of the Divinely-guided system over the secular
law and polity clearly dominated the thought of 19th century liberal
Muslim thinkers of Islam as well as their more radical successors in
the three countries under study, such as Zia Gokalp (Turkey),
Mustafa aniil (Egypt) and. N,hmmad Iqbal (Pakistan), who hare directly
provided the intellectual framework for the rise of their respective
n ationalis tic movements.
The fundamental problem that confronted Muslims everywhere by the
end of the 19th century was identical, i.e. how to remove backwardness
from among the Muslim peoples and raise their standard of living; and
also, how to reinterpret Islam and make it a viable system capable of
tackling the complex problems of modernization. Bigheat among the
priorities was the demand for national independence, for without
national independence, the objectives of modernization and reconstruction
could not have been achieved. Basically it was these exigencies that
necessitated the resort to nationalism. "Nationalism arose among the
Muslim countries", as Ealpern argues, "because there is social change,
52. ibid. p.21
53. Manfred. KALPERN, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East
and North Africa, Princeton university Press, Princeton,N.J. 1965,
p.197
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and hencs the basic problem confronting the nationalists is not
nationalism but social change"3
Contemporary world politce and the influences that weighed on the
three countries in this study, forced each to adopt a distinct
orientation towards its particular nationalism; the Turkish nation-state,
a secular concept; the Egyptian, a regional, religious and. linguistic,
pan-Arabic concept; and, the Pakistani Islamic , an ideological state
concept. Each type has an expressed commitment to modernization through
its nationalism and the modernization of its educational system; each
type has a distinct position with regard to Islamic culture and
institutions. The success or failure of each, therefore, depends on the
internal consistency of the concept itself as indeed upon the will of
each nation to realise its stated. objectives.
4. 4.1. TURKISH SECULAR NATIONALISM
The Turks have made the boldest attempt in modern times to divorce
religion and politics in Islam - a unity which hitherto remained intact.
A variety of socio-political problems faced the Turks as a result of
their introduction of modern institutions into their society; among
these was foreign pressure and. the failure of their own systems to
modernize themselves. This forced them to look inwards to re-exmnlne
their beliefs and values, to search for solutions: the building of a
powerful modern state and a nation with a 'rationalist and positivist'
culture. The Tanzimat reforms, na!ve as they had been in their
objectives, failed to achieve these for the simple reason that they
remained too close to the traditional ruling institutions. The discrep-
ancies created by this duality of the institutional set up had. in fact,
created disharmony and. rift among the Turkish people instead of fostering
unity and progress.54
54. See Isaac R.SINAI. The Challenge of Modernization: The West's Impact
on the Non-Western World. Chatto-Windus. ondon. 1964. p.25. also
B.Lewia. The Emergence of Modern Purkey.oj. cit. pp.73-125., and
End: Islam: S.V.Tanzimat.
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In
The moat hazardous problem/fostering national solidarity was
created by the presence of large numbers of non-Muslim minorities: the
Armenians, Greeks, Macedonian axid. other Christians, and the Jews. Early
Ottoman potentates, in accordance with the teachings of Islam, had
given their Christian and Jewish subjects - the Ahi-al-kitab (people
of the Book) - special status by creating 'the millet systems', allowing
them freedom in ecclesiastical and judicial matters. The Capitulations
had allowed theni sufficient autonomy in matters of law, taxation, security,
arrest, deportation etc. in which their own courts, or the courts of the
countries of their origin, had been allowed jurisdiction. But these
very concessions given to the minorities in good faith, had now become
an easy excuse for the surrounding European nations to interfere in and
dictate to Ottoman affairs. The modernists in their desire to introduce
liberal political and social norms had wanted to allow increased freedom,
equality and opportunities of participation to the minorities; but the
latter had their loyalties outside the Ottoman society: and so tended to
undermine the Ottoman 8tate. This was the strangest dilemma the Turks
had faced by opening their house to external influences. 55 It was due,
among other things, to this dilemma that the constitutional movement of
1876 had foundered; and the new Sultan Abdu]. Hamid II (1876-1908) had
embarked upon his thirty-year reactionary regime, in spite of the fact
that the Sultan had favoured modernization. Kis pan-Islamic appeal was
only a desperate effort to defend the Ottoman society against foreign
incursions. A reactionary course of action is attractive when the very
faith and the structure based upon that faith fear extinction.
The Young Turks' Revolution of 1868, which deposed the despotic
Sultan, instituted. its socio-political modernization movement by enlist-
ing Christians and Jews into its ranks and motivated by a desire to
55. B.LEWIS, The Emergence, op.cit. pp.349-50
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create national solidarity on rational and universalistic bases. The
problem was formidable. It has been suggested that had the Young Turks
been left to themselves to create a really democratic, national state,
they would have succeeded; but foreign intrigue and intervention
frustrated all such chances of harmonious moderizatio 	 The story
of massive annexations by Russia and the Balkan States, Austria and Italy,
of the Ottoman territories on the slightesta pretexts and the concerted
pressures of the Great Powers up until the First World War to break up
the Ottoman Empire is too familiar to reiterate. Suffice it to say that
a declining Empire had little wish, or aptitude, to reconstruct itself
upon outgrown bases • For a new Turkey to emerge, the old order had
first to face complete destruction so that a new idealogy of
modernization, i.e. modern nationalism could take shape.
The fundamental question that this realisation and the bid to
modernize Turkey posed was that of identity and loyalty: that is, to
which civilization should modern Turkey belong? Three contending move-
ments, the Islamists, the Westernists and. the Turkists, which arose at the
time tackled the question in their own way. In spite of their outward
differences, all the three agreed on the point of Islamic revivalism.
None suggested that the separation of religion and politics as the basis
of future action. The vital question of civilizational reorientation
was squarely dealt with, first by Zia Gokaip (1875-1923) who has been
considered as 'the one and perhaps the most influential spiritual
founder of Turkish nationalisia.7
Gokaip's central theme was the concept of 'nation' and he utilized
all his socio-political and literary acumen, gained through his
understanding of Islam as well as the Western thought, to cut free the
56. See B.LEWIS, ibid. pp.206-233
57. For translation of his selected works and the critical study of his
ideas see Niyazi Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western
Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya, Gokaip, George Allen and Unwin,
London, 1959; also Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism,
the Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokaip, Luzac and Co.Ltd. and Harwell
Press Ltd.. 1950
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nation-state from its theocratie moorings. Himself a student of
Durkheiin, be employed popular sociological concepts; mainly evolution,
as his tool to analyse the axiological foundations of the Ottoman-
Islamic civilization. Gokaip agreed with Durkheim in his theory that:
"collective ideas, and. with them, ideals, are born
grow, decline and perish as the result of structural
changes in society affecting its size, density,
homogeneity, division of labour etc. and that the key
to the explanation of the ideals lies in the
morphology of society." (58)
Gokalp essayed to draw a distinction between civilization and
culture; the former referring to 'collectivity of traditions created
by different ethnic groups', the latter, to the mores of a particular
nation. "Civilizational elements", asserted Gokalp, "assume meaning
and function in the life of men only when they enter into the service
of culture."59 It was mainly due to the merging of these two elements
that the Ottoman systems had grown defunct and dysfunctional. It was
vital, therefore, according to Gokaip, to rediscover the course of
these collective ideas and ideals; this would revitalize Turkish life
and culture. To him that source, the elan vital, was to be found in
the concept of society based on the ideals of nationalism. He defined
a modern nation as an independent unit within the confines of
contemporary cjviuzation.60 "We have to be" he asserts, "the disciples
of it in culture."
On the question of the principles of modernization of Islamic
systems, he affirmed that Islam had been equipped with an adequate
framework to accommodate and adapt to morpholigica]. changes in time and
space. The injunctions of the uran (nasa) stay eternal and unchangeable
while 'u.rf' or the collective ideas - the esperit publique - and 'jima' -
58. BETh, op.cit. pp.50-51
59. BERKES, op.cit. pp.104-9
60. ibid. p.250
61. ibid.
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the consensus of the scholars - allow enough room for the dogma to
adapt itself to changing necessities of life. According to Gokaip, the
Islamic law has a two-fold source: the traditional Shariah and the
Social Shariah. The Social Shariah is continually changing in accord-
62
ance with social evolution. 	 The stagnation of the world of Islam is
due to the failure of the Muslims to relate the 'nasa' to the 'urf'
by means of 'ijtihad'. Gokalp has no doubt that Islam is the only
religion that exhorts ohange.6
Gokalp traces his justification for the rise of nationalism in
Islam by the already accepted distinction between the concepts of Ummáh
and Millet. The overall concept of civilization is denoted by the
term Uminah. Religion is the core of an Ummah; and so there is the
Christian Ummah, the Jewish Ummah and so on. Within a certain Ummah,
there may be different languages, moral standards, legal and political
institutions, aesthetic tastes, economic and educational institutions.
The smaller units with varying internal autonomies are "the millets"
or the nation states. Ummah is the collection of several "millets"
or nations. 6
 Gokaip's theory of the modernization of the Islamic
systems through the evaluation of 'urf', by means of Ii tihad had seminal
religious importance for Turkey. As Heyd has pointed out, Gokalp's
theory should have helped (a) to separate religion and state, that is,
to put an end to the domination of Islam over the political and social
life of the Turkish nation, and (b) to separate religion and oriental
civilization and. thus make the maintenance of the fundamental values
of Islam side by side with European civilization and Turkish culture
62. N. BERKES, Turkish Nationalism, op.cit. p.196
63. GOKALP believed that the rise of protestantism in Christianity was
due to a movement that rose in Europe in the aftermath of the
Crusades and aimed at emulating the Islamic civilization because of
the failure of Catholicism. See Berkee, op.cit. pp.22-3.
64. ibid. p.224, also Reyd, op.cit. p.6O
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POS5ible 5 Social evolution demands the differentiation of piety,
morality, justice and the functions of state and religion, lie found
Quranic sanction for the secular authorities to assume legislative
functions in Islam in the verse: 'Obey God and the Prophet', and those
in authority among you'. 66
 Those 'in authority' are surely to exercise
their authority in the secular-mundane sphere. For this differentiation,
he demanded the transfer of the judiciary functions of the Shaikh-al.
Islam to the legislature and urged that the office of the Shaikh- .al-
Islam should be more of a scholar, devoid of political authority.
Another of his demands was the abolition of the Ministry of awkaf and.
a ban on the various Dervish orders who had misued. the pious endowments
for Beif-perpetuation and the propagation of their exaggerated belief
in fatalism. 6 Heyd. remarks that Gokaip dared not demand the abolition
of the Caliphate during the Young Turks regime; but in his
'Fundamentals of Turkism', he clearly demanded the abolition of all
theocratic rule, defined as "law-making by Caliphs and Sultans who are
regarded as God's shadows on earth*8 He wanted the Caliphate to remain
only as a spiritual head of the international Ummh of Islam and. the
Caliph to preside over a Dar-al-Hikmah al-Islazn.iyya (international
Islamic Academy), to which all member Muslim states (mullets) should
refer matters of Islamic reinterpretation, research and seholarship.6
Gokaip also advocated the modernization of Muslim family life and urged
the complete abandonment of purdali and the unqualified recognition of
equality of the sexes.7°
In education, Gokaip wanted Muslim education in Turkey fully to
discharge the functions of a modern, national education system. He
6 HEYD, pp.88-92
66. uran, IV:59
67. HEYD, pp.90-i
68. BE!D, p.92.
69. EBKES, op.cit. pp.223-33
70. ibid. pp.247-55
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maintained "if we achieve this (make our education thoroughly nationa7
if our society in structure and type, becomes a modern society, our
education in the long run will acquire a modern character.... 71
It is conjectured that Ziya Gokaip's ideas on modernization of
Islamic systems from within, had they been allowed to be tried, were
likely to lead on to a harmon.ious evolutionary process of reforms in
Islam; but Ghazi Mustaf Kemal Ataturk,by the disestablishment of all
Islamic institutions from society and a thoroughgoing importation of
the European systems, closed the door for any such synthesis.72
National independence was won in Turkey in 1922 from the brink
of total extinction threatened by the Allied Forces and Greek invasion.
Ghazi Kemal emerged victorious only to face the Sultan's government as
his rival at the Peace Conference at Lausanne. For Mustafa Kemal, this
was the decisive point in his resolve to dislodge the traditirnAL
Ottoman via a vis Islamic authority from all socio-political institutions.
He proceeded ruthlessly in his programme of national reconstruction and.
modernization by separating the Sultanate and the Caliphate in 1922 -
to be completely abolished in 1923 - an action which met with strong
protest from all over the Muslim world. 73 Along with the Caliphate went
also the office of Shaikh-al-Islam; the rule of the Shariah, and Shariah
courts, in place of which secular-national courts were established by
the Grand National Assembly. The Law of Unification of Instruction of
1924, gave the Ministry of Public Instruction control over all educational
institutions within the Republic, and the Ministry of Awkaf was abolished.
71. ibid. p.246
72. ROSE1THAL, op.cit.52
73. The strongest protest came from the Muslims of the Indian sub-
continent 4ose two distinguished leaders, H.E.the Agha 1(hn and
Sayyid Amir Au, wrote to the Ismet Pasha government begging them
to restore the Caliphate somewhat on the 1ine suggested by Ziya
Gokaip, which was acceptable to Muslims In general. But it appears
that Ataturk suspected. the move of a British complicity aimed at
installing the Agha Rhm as a Caliph. So be wanted no room to be
left for any ambiguity and manouvering by outside influence.Lewis.
p.256
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From then on, Mustafa Kemal struck, oe by one, at all traditional
institutions, customs and symbols which had distinguished the Turkish
people as Muslims. By 1929, he had. put Turkey on the road to a modern
nation- tqte with total adoption of modern norms of eeCUlaXiBlI,
rationality and positivism, constitutionalism; populism and
-	 74
stat ism.
In 1928, the Grand National Assembly acted to adopt the
resolution of the People's Party of Mustafa Kema]. to delete the clause
that "the religion of the Turkish State is Islam". In November of the
same year, it adopted the Latin alphabet as the Turkish script to
replace the Arabic and Persian. Kemalism or Ataturkism was thus
expressly committed to the ideals of modernization. "The aim of the
revolutionary measures, we have been and are taking", declared Ataturk,
"is to bring the people of the Turkish Republic into
a state of society which is entirely modern and
civilised, in every sense and in every way... This
is the central pillar of our Revolution and. it is
essential that we bring about the utter rout of
mentalities incapable of accepting this fact." (75)
The Constitutions, originally restored in 1908, had already been
re-enacted in 1920 by the Grand National Assembly under the leadership
of Ataturk in 1920 as the Provisional Constitution of the new nation,
declaring sovereignty of the nation to belong to the people; Grand
National Assembly to be the sole repository of the executive, and.
legislative authority; and elections as the only method of democratic
representation in the Grand National Assembly.
In 1925, a law was promulgated making it compulsory to wear hats
instead of the fez which was declared illegal. An attack on the veiling
76
of women was severely made, although ban was not imposed until 1935.
74. See Sydney Nettleton FISHER, The Middle East, A History, Alfred
A. Knopf, N.Y. 1968, pp.390-405, also B.Lewis, The Emergence
pp. 356-394.
75. G.LEWIS, Turkey, op.cit. p.91
76. LEWIS, The Emergence, pp.265-6
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Next came the iconoclastic criticism of the 'brotherhoods' (tarikat)
about whom Ataturk declared:
NI flatly refuse to believe that today, in the luminoUs
presence of science, knowledge and civilization in all
its aspects, there exist, in the civilized community of
Turkey, men so primitive as to speak their material and
moral well-being from the guidance of one or another
ShLikh. Gentlemen, you and the whole nation must know,
and know well, that the Republic of Turkey cannot be the
the land of Sh.I1chR, dervishes, disciples and iay brothers.
The straightest, truest way (tarikat) is the way of
civilization. To be a man, it is enough to do what
civilization requires. .?(77)
In November 1925, the Grand National Assembly enacted to ban all
the Tarikats, confiscated their assets, closed their sanctuaries and
prohibited their meetings. In 1937, the Tarikats were declared an
'evil legacy from the past, distracting the Turks from the true way,
that of nationalism, resting on the true knowledge, that of the
positive sciences. This was the way of the greatest benefit for the
material and moral life of the Turks.'78
4. 4.2. EGYPTIAN-ARAB NATIONALISM
The rise of Arab nationalism has, in fact, been associated with
Pasha Muhammad Ali and his son, lbrahim Pasha. Ibrablin is recorded to
have pronounced quite early the founding of an entirely Arab state as
his aim in order to 'give back to the Arab race its nationality and
political exi.stnnce'. 79
 The modernization policies of Pasha Muhzunnd
AU and his descendants undoubtedly exalted Egypt's place in the world
of Islam. Kis successful military campaign against the Ottomans,
threatening Istanbul itself, naturally inspired Egyptian sentiments of
national independence. To these must be added the socio-political
changes emerging in the Ottoman society itself. With the British
occupation of Egypt in 1882, Arab nationalism turned into an anti-colonial
movement which achieved complete national independence only in the
1952 Revolution.
77. ibid. pp.404-5
7 . ibid. pp.405-6
79. Albert HOtIBANI, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, op.cit.p.26l
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Events in Turkey had their immediate effect in the Arab lands.
Turkish nationalism with its secular, pan-Turanic, ethnic and
linguistic orientations tended to reduce the status of the Arabs to a
secondary race in the Empire. In return, the Arabs started suspecting
the Turks of disloyalty to the cause of Islam and wanted to move the
centre of gravity back to Arabia. It was openly argued that the reform
of Islam could not effectively be achieved unless the Caliphate was
restored to the Arabs. 8° Foreseeing the disintegration of the Ottoman
Empire by the Great Powers, the Arab intellectuals had hopes of
re-establishing the Caliphate in the heart of the Arab Islamic world,
with its seat in }1L<ka or Medina; the holy cities. Sharif Hussain of
Mkka, with his claim of lineage with the Prophet and his authority over
the Hijaz, apparently allowed himself to be persuaded by these aspir-
ations when he negotiated with the British for their help in struggle
for Arab independence; negotiations which led to the 1916 Arab
Rebellion, and the final severing of the Arab-Ottoman links. The Arab
hopes of an Arab Caliphate were not to be fulfilled;but with the
breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the European colonization of the
Arab lands, nationalism emerged as an idealogy of modernization with its
81
secular, rationalistic and positivistic criteria.
On the intellectual level, the ideals of nationalism did not find
much popularity in Egypt where the Azbar University had enjoyed profound
intellectual and religious influence. Eminent scholars like Muhammad
80. Aniir AM Allah of Transjorden (later King of Jordan), stated in
his memoirs, wso long as the Ottoman Sultan's accepted this (the
safeguard of the rule of Shariah), Arabs were content to be ruled
by them even though they were not themselves Arabs. But in the
19th century, they abandoned the principles of Islam and adopted a
Western form of government, which they themselves did not understand..
From that moment, the bond of Arab loyalty was loosened and Arabs
began to think of an Arab government which would be more faithful
to Islam. Hourani, op.oit. p.297.
81. See S.N.FISHER, The Middle East History, chapter 27, pp.350-7.
also L. Binder, 'Ideological Foundations of Egyptian-Arab
Nationalism in Ideo10 and. Discontent ed. D.Apter, pp.128-154.
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Rashid Rida, Muhammad al-Ghazali and others, following Al-Afghan! and
Shaikh Abduh strongly opposed nationalism and secularism. 82 Even non-
Azharite scholars like Mustafa Kamil, who wanted a scientific outlook
and rationalism to be employed in the reinterpretation of Islam, did
not see eye to eye with nationa].isni and wariied that nationalism with
its particularistic aims was a Christian West's device to break the
unity of the World of Islam. 83 Kamil argued that Islam is for the East
what Christianity is for the West, and preached 'hubb a]. Watan mm a].
iman' (the love of fatherland based on the Faith). To this effect,
Muatafa Kamil was even pro-Ottoman, since for him the preservation of
the Caliphate, even with the Turks, was better than the European
imperialism that was to follow.
The abolition of the institution of Khilifah by Ataturk stirred
the world Muslim community who assembled in Cairo in 1926 to discuss all
aspects of the question. Though the restoration of the Caliphate, it
was concluded was not possible in the circumstances, the vitality of
the institution itself was strongly upheld. The Second Islamic Congress
held in Mecca in the same year ended with a resolution urging all
Muslims 'not to abandon the question of the Khilifah and try to restore
it whenever this should be feasible.'84
During the inter-war years, the nationalist movements were
geared to free the Arab lands from the in.flu&kee of European imperialism
were marshalled chiefly by westernised modernists - the urban
bourgeoisie, the younger generation of aristocrats, bureaucrats and
professionals - whose ideas were influenced by norms of modernity, that
is to say: secularism, rationality and positivism. These nationaliste
82. ROSENTHAL, op. cit. pp.103-124
83. ibid.pll8-l20
84. C.PJA1RIS, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt, op.cit. pp.134-5
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employed nationalism more as 'an ideology of vitalism than
85
remanticism' unlike their 'reformist' or revivalist brethren.
It is significant to note that while modern Egyptian-Arab
nationalism in its search for identity and an ideological formulation
still upholds Islam as the strong binding force of ll social values,
at the same time it tends to differentiate between values and cultur.
stemming from Islam proper and those that were in existence before
Islam. In this quest, some nationalists have even sought to revive
the ancient Pharoanic symbols.86 Others, like Taha Hussain, asserted
that Egypt formed a part of a greater Mediterranean civilization.87
Taha Eussain was certain that the only way for Egypt to modernize was
to merge itself into Western civilization whose leadership, as he saw
it, rested upon three things: humane culture, the civic virtues and
88democracy. The result of all these tendencies was to reduce Islam to
the position of sub-culture under a modern, secular Arabism. Thus,
Genera]. Muhammad Neguib, Chairman of the B.C. unequivocally declared:
'it is ou.t unanimous desire to make Egypt a secular
republic ... This does not mean that my colleagues
and I have chosen to turn our backs on the Islamic
faith. On the contrary we hope to strengthen the faith
by applying its teachings judiciously rather than
blindly. The injunctions of the Quran have as much
meaning in Egypt today, as they ever did, provided they
are interpreted with due regard to the great changes that
have occurred in human society since the Prophet preached.
his message.' (89)
85. BINDER, op. cit p.146.
86. ibid. p.138
87. HOURANI, op.cit.pp.324-340, also C.C.Adams, Islam and Modernism
in Egypt, op.cit. 253-259. Dr. TMha Hussain showed special interest
in the research into the pre-Islamic literature. Some of his
findings, e.g. his denial of the legend of the founding of the
Ka'aba by Abr-hani and Ishmael; his thesis that pre-Islamic Arabic
literature was a rich enough source from which 'support for the
doctrines of Islam or the granunatica]. correctness and rhetorical
elegance of the language of the (uran was drawn' • pp.255-6. He
exhorts, "When we undertake to investigation of Arabic literature
and its history, we must forget our national feelings and all their
specialising tendencies. We must forget our religious feelings
and all that is connected with them... We must follow the course
followed by modern scientists and philosophers in their treatment of
science and. philosophy. I propose to apply to literature the
philosophical method originated by Descartes.' ibid. pp.257-8.
88. HOURANI. Op. Cit. pp.324-40.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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Disconcerted by these purely linguistic and ancient Pharaonio
accretions of Arabism, some other scholars have attached more importance
to its underlying theological beliefs such as monotheism and.
revelation. The civiliaing role of Arabism, according to al Faruqi,
lay in its monotheistic belief which is inherent in the three great
Arab religions and their civilizations, viz. Judaism, Christianity and
Islani. 9° So viewed, Arabism is regarded as an integral part of Islam:
nationalism is only a transitional phase; and ought to remain subservient
91to Islam.
Nasser's three-circle Arab nationalism (i.e. the Arabic, the
African and the Islamic) had eventually to restrict itself to Arabism,
composed of nationalism and Islam. His pan-Arabisxn was designed as
an ideology aimed at achieving the unity of the Arab peoples and to
liberate the Arab lands which had artificially been divided by the
colonial powers. His socialism was another off-shoot of the same
integrative-modernizing ideology. On the one hand, it reacted against
the Western economic system which allowed excesses of individual economic
power to be in the hands of Shaikhs and Amirs; and on the other, as a
92
moral system drawing its egalitarian principles from Islam and modernity.
Thus, Nasser built into nationalism as an ideology for modernization
a further dynamic of socialism based on economic development, planning
and statism?3 He utilized Islamic institutions as a source of inspiration
for his modernizing ideology. As Karpat points out, 'without challenging
MtJBANMAD NEGUIB, Egypt's Destiny, V.Gollanze, London, 1955,
pp. 150-i, also in Harris, op.cit. p.232 On Arabism.
Ismail Ragi. al PARUQI, Urabah and Religion, A Study of the
Fundamental Ideas of Arabism and Islam as its Highest Moment
of Consciousness, Djambatan, Amsterdam, 1962.
ibid., chapter 4, pp.12]., 17].
Gamal Abdel NSSER, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Public Affairs
Press, Washin°.fl.C. 1955; also A. Hourani, "the Theoretical
Structure of Nasser's Socialism in Middle Eastern Affairs (4), o.u.P,
1965, and G. Lenczowski, "The Objectives and Methods of Nasserism"
in Journal of International Affairs.Xfl (i), 1965, pp . 63-76 , also
see Ralpern, op.oit. Chapter 12, pp.235-250
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the existence of the religious establishments, he tried to invest them
with some modern functions on behalf of Arab nationalism which came to
be synonymous with the religious definition of Arabism.'94
The remarkable point about the acceptance of the Islamic
institutions and values as a suppvrt of modernization through Arabism
and. Socialism in Egypt is that it thereby involved all sections of the
society in the process of modernization including, particularly, the
Ulama and scholars of Al-Azhar. 95 Without the participation of the
latter Gibb has asserted, effective and. penetrating modernization of
Muslim societies was not possib1e.6
4. 4.3. PAKISTANI ISLAMIC-NATIONALISM
The demand for the creation of Pakistan was symptomatic of the
Indian Muslims' ideology of national independence and modernization.
Its roots go back to the socio-political backwardness to which they had
succumbed during the British Raj. The liberal and democratically
orientated norms and institutions of the Raj, even when applied most
judiciously, implicitly favoured the Hindu majority. Reduced from the
position of a ruling nation, to the status of a permanent minority in
the subcontinent, the Muslims were beset with the fear of further
encroachments on their religion, culture and languages from a hostile
Hindu majority community in an Independent India. These fears were
based, as Rosenthal has stressed, 'on fact, not fictiont.97 Both
Sir Sayyxd Lhmad fhn and Muhammad Au Jinnah, who successively diagnosed
the 'twoPflatL1.on' theory, and advocated the creation of an incendent
Muslim state of Pakistan as the only feasible future for the Muslims, had
in vaifl
come to this conclusion only after having/laboured for a Hindu-Muslim
accord.
93. For the ideological importance of socialism in modernization,
see D.Apter, The Politics of Modernization, op.cit.p.3l4
94. KARPAT, op.cit. p.13.
95. ibid. pp.115-132. See Shailch Muhammad Shaltout, Rector of A1-Azhar
since 1958 on "Socialism and Islam", pp.126-32
96. H.A.R.GIBB. Modern Trends, op.cit. p.122
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For their part, the Hindu community, which was four times larger,
had through communal clashes on numerous occasions made no secret of
their militant Hindu revivalism, which stood 'as a culture and
religion combined, wholly inmcal to everything Musiim'? 8 Already
under the British Rule, they had monopolized the key Institutions such
as banking, finance, administration, education, industry-, commerce and
communications: and had vigilantly kept the Muslims out. 99 In this
plight the Indian Muslims, although they many times out-numbered their
brethren in Egypt and Turkey put together, stood in glaring contrast to
the latter and were plagued with the agony and fear of loss of their
identity. Here the very Islamic values and systems were under threat,
100
not to speak of the question of their modernization.
If the growth of the idea of an independent Muslim state and the
movement for Muslim national independence should be viewed in the
context of the communal situation in India, the modernization aspect of
Pakistani-Islamic nationalism, as an ideology, has essentially to be
related to the events and processes taking place in the Muslim world
outside the subcontinent, mainly in Turkey and Egypt. The Kemalist
secular approach to modernization - the abolition of the Caliphate -
brought the strongest protest from the Indian Nuslims.' The Khilafah
Movement which rose in the wake of these developments gathered such
momentum that the British rule itself faced massive non-co-operation
of the Muslim community.
97. E.I.J. ROSENTHAL, op.cit. p.182
98. IAN STEPHEN, Pakistan, Ernest Benn, London, 1963, p.27.
99. L.F. RUSEBROOK-WILLIANS, The State of Pakistan, Faber, London,1962,
pp.2].-2
100. The secularism and democratic rule preached by the Indian National
Congress was seen as the Muslims to work against their interests
and. culture. Ian Stephen, Pakistan, op.cit. p.27
101. See above. p.l44f'n
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The a.rchiteet of the ideology of Pakistani-Islamic nationalism
was Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938) in whom an unrivalled spokesman
for modernization of Islam and Muslim education was to be found.102
He was himself the rare, enlightened combination of orthodox and
modernist thought and gathered the best from both. To crown his poetic
and philosophical gen.ious, Iqba.]. had in the first place mastered the
classical Muslim education and then experienced Western education at
Cambridge, Munich and Heidelbu.rg. He was as staunch a preacher for the
modernization of Islam as he was its savant. He exhorted Muslims to
reinterpret rathan than reject the Islamic norms. Through his persuasive
poetry, which inspired and enlightened all Muslims, traditionalists
as well as modernists, to a dynamic activism, he preached for the
reconstruction of Islamic civilization on modern lines. His modernizing
philosophy is found succinctly in a collection of his six lectures
titled, 'The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam'.
Iqba]. was basically opposed to nationalism based on geography,
race or language. According to him ideology formed the basis of the
community. He wrote:
"Let the Muslim of today...reconstruct his social
life in the light of ultimate principles, and
evolve, out of the hitherto partially revealed
purposes of Islam, that spiritual democracy which
is the ultimate aim of Islam" (103)
Iqbal had no doubt that the normative order of the (uran is
based on a dynamic faith and social system. He invites the entire
world to benefit from the universal teachings of the Quran and warns
it of the dangers of moder1uzation or progress based on non-religious,
102. See W.C.SMITH, Modern Islam in India, V.Go].lancz, 1946, also
Ar!! Hussain, Pakistan, its Ideology and Forei Policy,
Frank Cass, London. 1965
103. See ROSENTHAL, p.206
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material and purely secular ideals. He is critical of the ulania
for their thesis that the door of ijtihad. is closed in Islam for ever,
and asserts:
"I see no reason why tins attitude should be
maintained any longer.. .The claim of the
present generation of Muslim liberals to
re-interpret the fundamental legal principles
in the light of their own experience and the
altered conditions of social life, is, in my
opinion, perfectly justified. The teachings
of the Quran that life is a process of
progressive creation necessitates that each
generation guided but unhampered by the work
f its predecessors should be permitted, to
solve its own problems." (104)
Thus, Iq,baJ. is againsttaqlid. He wants to employ the basic
values of Islam to inculcate the 'rationalist and positivist spirit'
among the Muslims. He refui the assertion that religion is an
opiate: it could equally be called a stimulant, for without it, he
maintains, man could never have carried on through thousands of years
of non-achievement. Secularism, and. socio-politica3. systems based on
irreligious and materialistic capitalism or socialism, are morally
unsound. The Orient he preaches, must acquire the science of Europe,
and a dynamic discontent; but all the rest of Westernism it must
religiously shun 105
104. ibid. p.l59
105. ibid.
CRART 'E'
A COMPARATIVE SYEDRO}IE OF
NATIONAL NORMS - CONSTITUTIONAL ThEALS
TURKEY
STATE
Republic, nationalist
secular and socialist
SOVEREIGNTY
Vested in the nation
without reservation
or condition
LEGISLATURE
Absolute legislative
powers vested in the
Grand National
Assembly. No law to
be in contradiction
with the Constitution
EXECUTIVE
President and his
Government
JUDICIARY
Judicial power to
be exercised by
independent secular
courts
CITIZENSRIP - LIBERTIES
Equality before law
and basic human rights
guaranteed irrespect-
ive of race, language,
sex or political,
religious or
philosophical opinion
EGYPT
Republic, democratic
socialist; based on
the alliance of the
working powers of the
people
Vested in the will
of the people
Legislative powers
vested in the
National Assembly
President and his
Government
Judicial powers to
be exercised by
independent national
courts - Shariah
courts abolished
in 1955
Equality of basic
rights for all
Egyptians without
distinction of race,
religion, language
or belief.
PAKISTAN
Republic, democratic
based on the Islamic
principles of social
justice
Belongs to Allah;
delegated authority
exercisable by the
people as a sacred
trust
Vested in the National
and Provincial
Assemblies. No law
to be repugnant to
Islam. National
Advisory Council of
Islam to advise the
legislature on Islamic
questions
President, his
Government, Provincial
Governors and. their
governments
aud.icial powers to
be exercised by
national courts. No
6hariah courts.
All citizens equal
before law without
regard to their
religion or belief.
TURKEY	 EGYPT	 PAKISTAN
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Freedom of expression
association, contro-
versy , rebut and
demonstration
STATE RELIGION
The state policy
completely secular
LANGUAGE
Turkish with Latin
Script
ECONOMY
Etatism, private
ownership and
monopolies
permitted
Freedom of opinion
scientific research
press, printing,
within the limits of
the law
State religion
Islam - freedom
of faith absolute
Arabic with
Arabic Script
Socialist economy
limited private
ownership permitted
National resources
to belong to state
Freedom of expression
association,
unionization, assured
within the lini.its of
morality, decency and
security of the state
State religion Islam.
Muslims to be enabled
to order their lives in
accordance with the
fEndamenta]. tenets of
Islam. Minorities
assured of complete
freedom of faith, worship
as well as equality to
enter public services
Urdu with Persian/Arabic,
and Bengali with
Devnagri script. English
official language
temporarily
Private ownership
permitted
Chapter 5
Modernization with Education
5.1. Liberalism and Modernization of Muslim Education
The first phase of the impact of modernization of Islam, which
appeared in the shape of liberalism, was not strictly speaking
modernizing in its objectives. Normative change did take place among
a tiny section of the societies but the climate in general remained
coloured with scepticism and. mistrust of the modernization movement
as such. The liberalist reformers who acted as the catalyst agents of
modernization, even if they were appreciative of, and inspired by, the
modern European thought and. institutions, had. only partially understood
their inner dynamics. They took modernization only at its face value,
at best as a means to boomerang their co-religionists for their failure
to keep equal place with Europe in the material aspects of their
civi1izatio; and to exhort them to equ.ip themselves with modern
methods to defeat the	 imperiaiistL Their appeal was neither
to the norms of rationality or science as such, nor to the ideals of
modernization. Their reformism, therefore, failed to lift itself off
the ground. remaining tied to parbicu1aritio, affectivity-ridden and.
defensive motives. Most of their zeal for liberalism has been regarded
as apo1ogica1 aimed as Prof. Smith remarks, on the one hand. to win
the respect of the Westerners and the Westernisers for traditional Islamic
values, and on the other, to make 'ideas of the reforms more palatable
I. Sayy-id Jamal al Din Afgbani. is reported to have said, "The 'Oriental
Question' would never have existed had the Ottomans matched the West
in the field of civilization and coupled its material conquests with
scientific power", KHATIRAT, Beirut, 1931, pp.223-4.
2. B. LEWIS, The Middle East and the West, 1964, p.102.
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to the orthodox Mus1ims 3 In fact liberalist reformers wanted to
revive Islam and not to modernize it. But they all avowedly
concerned themselves with the reform of the traditional Muslim
education. They criticised its contents, methods and teachers as well
as the entire educational environment which slavishly inculcated
conservatism and passivity.
Sha.ikh MuhunmM Abduh and his disciples had given education the
key importance in their programme of socio-religious reforms. 4
 As the
editor of the Waqai, the Shaikh wrote copiously criticising the
contemporary Muslim education. He attacked the duality of the educational
structure which had resulted from Pasha Mnhmmad Ali's utilitarian
modernization policies and thereby given rise to artificial divisions
within the society. In his lectures and writings, he was also severely
critical of the foreign missionary schools which, he argued, were
designed to subvert Muslim beliefs and to win sympathies of the people
towards the countries which they represented. He warned Muslim parents
who sent their children to these schools in the sole hope of obtaining
better jobs for them, against the dangers of incursion upon their faith
and loyalties.
It appears that what Shaikh Abduh really detested was not
education in Western sciences, technology or the Western languages;-
these he welcomed and advocated4a_ but he disliked the lopsided way in
which it was imparted so that it failed to penetrate into Muslim life. He
wanted Muslim education so to modernize itself as to instil into the nunds
of all iuslim students a burning desiiie to dig deep into their civilization
3.WC.Sm,th, Islam intlodern Historypfct.Pp.5S_'lZ.
4. see C. C. &flAMS, Islam andModernism in Egypt, 0111?. 1933, op. cit.
pp .46-9 . , 62-3., 195-6.
4a. B. LVIS, The viddle East nu the West, op. cit. p.105 "While rejecting
the excessive subservience to Western Civilization of sone modernists
and reformers, he was perfectly willing to accept modern science and
technology, modern methods of education, and even to take account of
modern thonght as well as knowledge in a reformation of Islamic doctr ne."
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and descry its eternal dynamics. Only then, he ti ought, they w 11 be
able to evolve a sound synthesis of the modern and the traditional, the
'sensate' and tIe 'ideational'. It was in this c ntext that he opposed
purely secular education. His central thesis seems to have b en that
the introduction of bor owed institutions without reference to the
cultural milieu of the Muslims could not produce a htrinoraous development
among them, What was required, fundamentally was an interated
educational system.
Judging by the ideals of science and rationality, as these I've
come to be evolved now, it would epear that liberalists like Shaikh
Abduh, and others, who advocated the introduction of scientific encluiry
to reinvigorate Islam, perhaps did not fully grasp the true nature of
science, cientif c methods or their long-range implications. The
synthesis of science and Islam which they had wanted the Muslim students
to bring about was perhaps desirable; but was it easy to achieve? Could
societies on the ebb of decline and impaired by socio-political and
economic laceration realize such lugh ideals?
To consider furti er Shaikh .Abduh's modernization of Muslim
education, it is significant to note that he put greater emphasis on the
refonn of higher education so that the new education could then filter
downwards. He wanted more teachers to be trained in the new influence
of modern thought so that they ould then promote it among the masse&. he
gave equally great importance to the education of Muslim girls. His life-
long dream, however, remained to o ernize Al-Azhar so that it ii gi t
become 'the intellectual lighthouse (al-Manar) not only for ELypt, but
for the whole Muslim world'. 5
 It was largely due to his influence that
5. £flAMS. op. cit. p.71, HARRIS, op. cit. p.122.
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Khedive Isinail apointed the Administrative Council for Al-Azhar of
which he became a ermanent member. Tins appointment cave Abduh the
golden op ortuna.ty of looking into the whole range of Al-Azhar affairs
viz the ad.nu.nistration, curriculum, methods of teaching, library
facilities awkaf, salaries of teaclers, and the students' bursaries,
their residential facilities, and the medical care, etc. The Shaikh
wrote on all these aspects of A1-Azhar on his own account and ' ith
oti ers end prepared proposals for introducing reforms into them. ilthouh
his dreams of modernizing Al-Azhar did not come true during his life-tine
owing largely to the violent clash that arose over them between the
Khedive and Lord Cromer, the British Con.Dul General, the credit of
pioneership in the modernization of Al-Azhar will always go to Shaikh
Muhamir ad Abdth.6
5.2. Nationalism nd Modernization of Muslim Education
Nationalism has been considered closer to modernization in its
ideals than any ott er movement. Consolidation of the leadership of'
Nationalists in the developing countries has, by and large, depended
on the elite class of modern intellectuals who had the ability to break
out of the rigid specificity of the traditional social order and look
ahead into the future. Kautakey, has defIned modernist leadership as
basically comprising:
"persons with advai c d standing in humanities,
sciences and social sciences, excluding scholars
trained along tradition 1, usually religious
lines in the old society. That is to say, only
those viho have such e'i tion as would qualify them
in the administration of their government whetler
in bureaucracy or anny, end also those wi o have
studied in an industrial Western society." 7.
6. ibid. pp.70-78
7. 3. H. KADTSKE(, Nationalism and Political Chan&e, John 'WILEY,
N.Y. 1967 pp.44-51.
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They rise to ch Uene t,he leadership of the traditional elite",
organize themselves into national st olitica1 parties with declared
progranr es of social-economic modernization. With a clarity of purpose
they are coriirnil ed to the eradication of backwardne s among their
societies and to the building of a strong nationhood. Instead of merely
thinking in terms of a synti esis between tIe higher and the lower
valuations of the normative order of their culture, they seek to develop,
educate and create a n tional consciousness among their peoilea.
Education occupies a central place in the nationalist theory, 8
 but it is
an education that helps to so]ve modern prob)ems, to generate the urge
for a psychic and physical mobilization in individuals as well as
societies, to create empathic awareness among their people and to equip
them with modern technoloy.
5.3.	 Nationalist Parties - the Vanuards of Educational Modernization
5.3.1. Turkey
The Union and Progress
Originally founded in 1889 by a group of the modern Army
Medical School students as the 'Society for Union and Progress' this
organization became the embodiment of modernization in all aspects of the
Ottoman soc ety. In 1889, their leaciers were exijed to various European
capitals such as Paris, London, Naples and Cairo; and from there they
launched their campai for nationalist-constitutionlist government through
a stream of modern literature urging revolutionary methods and using
forbidden slogans of 'fatherland', 'constitution' and 'nation'. In 1908,
they were successful in ending the despotic rule of Sultan Abdul Hanud II
and restored the 1876 Constitution. They then re-orgnized themselves
as the f rat political party in Turkey and opened the new era of
consiitutional rule known as the Mesrutiyet (1908-18).
8. see E. KEEDOURI, Nationalism, Hutchanson University Library, London,
1966, pp.82-4.
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The modernizing ideals of the party were embodied in the very
words 'Union arid Progress'! By 'Union' was envisaged the solidarity
and co-operation between al the nullets, Muslinis and non-Muslims,
under the Ottoman protection. Each rnilJet was to be a cultural unit
and not a political entity. Union also aimed at secularization of all
the millet systems. "Progress" stood for a 'social revolution, through
educational and economic measures". To achieve Progress, it was
necessary, as Burkea has underlined: (a) to be able to mobilize and
develop the educational institutions in such a way as to produce more
men who could, and would be the carriers of Ottoman national progress,
and (b) to regain scope for the utilization of the existing and new
economic forces as levers of social uplift.9
Ziya Gokaip, the father of Turkih nationalism, who joined the
Union and Progress in 1911, was a staunch advocate of a National
education for Turkey. "The aim of national education" he wrote, "is to
build representative personalities, and thus to build national culture
,,lO
as well as the nation.	 Gokaip differentiated between education and
training and defined the roles of both for national reconstruction as
follows:
"Modern education, like modern culture, is a
manifestation of the very life of the nation.
Modern training, on the other hdnd, can be
adopted from a civilization which, like
modern technology, is international. Therefore,
we have to make our education, thoroughly
national. If we achieve this, if our society,
in structure and type, becomes a modern society,
our education in the lone run will acuuire a
modern character. Otherwise, that is, if our
society is still far from being modern, we must
not expect to be able to give our children a
modern education. . ." 11
9. Niyazi BERJCES, he Deveopnent of Secularism in TurkeyL McGill
University Press, Montreal, 1946, p.326.
10. N. BEIK, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, op. cit.
pp.235-247.
11. ibid. p.235.
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5.3.2. Egypt
Al-Hizb and. Al-Wafd
Erpt had a longer familiarity with modern institutions
such as constitutionalisin and parliainentarianiam than other contemporary
Muslim countries. Xhedive Ismail, in keeping with his overall image of
'an impatient Westernizer', along with his imitation and. importation of
European institutions, customs and mannerisms, also instituted a
consultative elected Assembly of Notables somewhat on the lines of a
Western parliament. In the same way, the Erptian political parties
appeared. more in line, at least outwardly, with European counterparts in
their composition, organization and. manifestos. Landau traces three
main factors to account for the rapid rise of political parties in
gypt: the spread of Zmoder7 education; the knowledge that a better
state of things was possible; and suspicion towards foreigners.12
The first national party, the Hizb-al-Watni, that grew up in the
aftenath of the Urabi Rebellion and the British occupation, manifested
these three factors in its making, but national independence and
modernization remained its overriding objectives. Its founder,
Mustafa Kamil, 'a typical example of the polished, highly-educated,
French-oriented gentleman', had, during his studentship in Prance,
acquainted himself with the French literary and political circles.
He was a student of law, but what inspired his mind most in Prance
was the political life, the methods of party organization, taôtics and
propaganda. In his nationalist campaign to win support for the
Egyptian national md ei endence, he employed three powerful modern methods
of influencing public opinion i.e. journalism, lecturing at home and
12. Jacob M. LANDAU, Parliament and Parties in Egypt, Israel Oriental
Society, Tel Aviv, 1953, p.73., also Jamal Muhammad AJThAD,
Intellectual Orps of Egyptian Nationalism, OtJP, 1960, Chapter IV,
Political Parties, pp.58-84.
-164-
abroad, and a demand for increasing educational facilities. In 1900 he
founded the nationalist newspaper Al-Liwa (the Standard) which in time
became the mouthpiece of Egyptian nationalism. The aim of the paper,
declared Kazn.il, was "to serve the Uiumah and Islam in an honour ble
and practical way; to strengthen the relations among Erptians as well
as among Muslims, to demand improvements in education, ec nomy and
industry of the country".13
Considerable space was devoted in the columns of Al-Liwa for
Kainil's articles and speeches on the subject of education, Kainil was
highly critical of the British for their negligence of education in
Egypt. He demanded a national system of education in Egypt with free
education for all. He advocated the extension and differentiation of
modern secondary schools on technical and vocational lines. He himself
opened a national school in which he provided traditional as well as
modern curricula. He was also the first Egyptian leader to advocate the
establishment of a modern Egyptian national universty)4
During the inter-war years, the overwhelming problem that occupied
the en igies and attention of the Erptian leaders was total national
independence. So oppressive and abhorent had the British occupation
proved to the people of Egypt that the entire population down to the
school children, the fellaheen and the womenfolk joined in the movement!15
The leader of the Wafd party Sa.ad Zaghiul had united all sections of the
society, Muslims and. Copts, the traditionalists and the modernists, for
the cause of nationalism. Apart from the fight for national independence,
educational modernization was their major concern. Saad. had himself
worked as the Minister of Education under lord Cromer and in 1906, was
appointed as the President of the Founding Committee of tie prop sed
13. LAEDAU, op. cit. p.110
14. ibid. pp.112-3, also HARRIS, op. cit. pp.68-9.
15. ibid. pp.149-50.
-165-
Egyptian Uriiversity 6 The Wafd Party had also adopted a clause in its
charter committing itself to the modernization of education7
In 1923, when the Wafd won elections, terminating the British
occuation, Saad formed the first democratic government committed to -the
'social and individual welfare.' 18 The 1923 Constitution declared
elementary education to be free incluaing that of the Kuttab schools.
In 1925, compulsory elementary education for all became a law altiough
the target was nowhere near achiever ent for years to cowe, due to the
lack of the necessary building facil t es and of teaching personnel.
Consequently progress remained highly uneven. Eknphasis on literacy
and elementary education created n influx of pupils at secondary schools,
so much so that in 1952-3, the number of pecondary school pupils rose
from 151,000 to 182,000, an increase of 25% in one year 9 In general,
schools catered for literature, languages and humanities; lower levels of
sciences, vocational and higher level professional studies were ignored.
The rate of wastage between elementary and secondary levels, and post
secondary level was high. Two parallel systems of education sti:Il
prevailed in the 1920s and the 1930s° Nevertheless, the greatest credit
th.t goes to the nationalist Vafd Party as Fisler remarks, was for
creating "a national consciousness among ti e middle and upper classes.
Education was helping to make ready the masses for the national
determination and political deriocracy for which Wafd leaders were
,,2lstriving
5.3.3. Pakistan
The	 League
The Muslim community of India, though deposed after the
loss of the luslim rule and beaten into further regression and socio-
16. ibid. , 159. also HOUBANI, Arab Thought,op. cit. pp.210-il
17. ibid. p.155.
18. HOIJRA.NI, Arab Thought, p.2l5.
19. P. J. VATIKIOT.LS , The Modern	 t rr of Eypt, op. cit. Chapter 17,
'Education and Culture'. pp .413-446.
20. ibid.
21. S. N. PISFER, The Middle East, a Fisto 	 op. cit. pp.459-60.
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cultural depression after the 1857 mutiny, was capable, by the last
c1uarter of the 19th century, of producing, thanks to the jihad of Sir
Sayyid Ahmad Than, a new class of intellectual leaders. These
modernist elites were the direct creation of modern education and stood
for Muslim nationalism and modernization. Sir Saryid's efforts to
modernize the Muslim community found their practical expression most
notably in education. Here was a courageous Muslim leader, who perceived
more than anybody else wiong his coreligionists that the only way to lift
Muslims out of their backwardness and disillusionment into a nationhood
once again, was through modern education and the modernization of the
Muslim education. In a statement, Sir Sayyid is recorded to have
asserted:
"There are people who hold the opinion that our
national cause will be ircinoted (in the best
way) by discussing 1olit cl affairs. I do not
agree wit] that, but regard the spread of
education to be the only means 2r the promotion
of the national cause. In these days our nation
should not strive for anything other than the
spread of education. If in our country,
education will be sufficiently spread, then we
shall have sufficient means to arise from our
backward position. 22
He was himsief greatly impressed, during his stay in England, by
Cambrid.ge University aM was detenuined to make it the model institution
for higher learning for the Mus1ixiis, in which they might ac .Lu.lre oder7
English education without 'prejudice to t ir religion' •23. his lluiiaim adan
Anglo-Oriental College, opened at Aligarh in 1877, was already, by the
turn of the century, fulfi'ling his cherished dream. It was already
attracting a large number of students not only among Muslims from all over
India but also from the Is am c world. In 1920 it was raised to the
status of a Lruslim University.
22. J. M. S. BALOJAN, Jr. The Refonis and Ieligious Ideas of Sir Sarid
Lhjnad Khan, E. J. BRILL, Leiden, 1949. p.33.
23. W. C. SMIT , odern Islam in India, A Social Analysis, Victor GOLLACZ,
1946, p.19.
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The influence of the Aligarh Liusliin University went much deeper
than education alone. Aligarh soon became the centre for the Muslim
nationalist mov ment which ev ntually became responsible for the concept
of a separate state of Pakistan.
Sir Sayyid's zeal for the inoderrazation of Muslim education was
not confined to the establishment of the Aligarh College alone. One
college could not ensure modern education for the 60 million Muslims of
India. lie wanted a centralised national Muslim educational system to
take shape in India, and for this purpose, in 1886, he inaugurated the
Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental Educational Conference with the following
main objectives:
i. to try to spread the highest Western education
among Muslims;
11. to enquire into the state of religious instruction
in English schools founded by Muslims, and to conduct
it in the best way possible;
iii. to support the instruction of Eastern learning and
religious subjects which Muslim teachers were giving
everywhere on their own, and make provision for it
so that it could be kept going regularly; and,
iv. to examine the state of instruction of the vernacular
schools, which was given on the old. lines utta7,
and to make for their restoration, if they had.
decayed. 24
In 1906, eight years after Sir Sayyid's death, the Muslim League
was born as a political party composed of the Muslim elite classes. The
annulment of the partition of Bengal forced upon Lord Curzon?s government
by the powerful Rindu community, compelled. the Muslims to seek elsewhere
for the inspiration of their nationalism. The abolition of the Caliphate
by Muatafa Ataturk moved the Muslims of the subcontinent with the same
frustration as their bretheren in the rest of the world. By 1937, the
concept of a separate Muslim nationhood had become a reality in the
subcontinent with the Muslim League as the prominent political party of
24 BALJON. op. cit. p.255.
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the Muslims. In 1940, at Lahore, it resolved to demand the
establishment of Pakistan as the Sovereign state for the Muslims of the
subcontinent a demand first crystalised in the Presidential address
of Sir Muhmn,s.d Iqba]. at the 1930 Muslim League Annual conference.
Pakistani Muslim nationalism was thus the progeny of the
modernists, the class of intellectuals mostly hailing from Aligarh or
other modern educational institutions. Its founders were Sir Sayyid
and. his followers, Iqbal, Jinnah and. Liaqat ali Khan; all
protagonists of modernization in Islam. Equally significant in Muslim
nationalism was the role of the amer ing modernist middle class, the
officers, clerks, teachers and. technicians - men who spread into
government services, and. had. first hand experience of the ostracism
practised against them. It is no exaggeration to say that up until
1940s the Muslims' share in the Central and. the Provincial Civil
Services; education, commerce, industry and other public pursuits was
totally insignificant. The Hindus dominated every field and ensured
that they stayed. that way.
The Muslim League has been criticised for its failure to define
beforehand the details of the prospective ideological, social, economic
and educational orientations of Pakistan 5
 Prof. Smith, for example,
writing in the stormy days of 1945, is, perhaps justifiably, over
critical of the Muslim Leagues inadequate explicitness in these matters6
It is true that the Muslim League leaders had left most of the ideological
questions unexplained before Pakistan became a reality, but, it would be
erroneous to conclude that Pakistani Muslim nationalism was without
a socio-political and economic rationale. The lack of clarity and a
25. See B. ALBIRUNI, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India, Ashraf,
Lahore. 1950.
26. W. C. SMITH, Modern Islam in India, op. cit. pp.260-i.
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prior commitment to prospective policies, as the Muslim League leaders
have explained, was somewhat deliberate; to a larger extent, it rested
on the very creation of Pakistan which itself remained until the last
moment, at the whim of the British and the Hindu majority. As Callard
has aptly pointed out:
"There was no period to argue about the form of
the future State or the policies it would pursue.
The history of the movement toward Pakistan, from
1940-47, was one of increasing momentum toward a
single, fixed goal. Unity was made easier to
preserve, since fear spurred from behind and. a
glorious vision beckoned from ahead. I(o other
loyalty to person or principle was to be allowed
to stand in the way of Pakistan." 27
The conflicts that ensued in Pakistan over the question of the
Constitution, the language problem, the 1954 religious riots about the
Ahmadiyya sect, all proved how difficult it was to resolve and.
delineate the ambiguities of diffuse ideals. Whatever vagueness the
Muslim League might have shown in other aspects of its policies, one
thing stan1s out as highly signigicant: that the makers of Pakistan
never flouired about the objective of educational modernization.
The Anglo-Oriental Educational Conference of Sir Sayyid that later
became the Muslim Educational Conference, had worked in collaboration
with the Muslim League to promote education among the Muslims of the
subcontinent. Its objectives were to 'popularise the odei7
education among the Muzlims and to bring the older education more in
line with the needs of the coimnun.ity. In 1942, a Committee appointed
by the Conference issued its report known as the Kamal Yar Jung
Committee Report. The Report highlighted the inadequacies of the
prevailing educational system for the Muslims, and assigned to
27. Keith CALLABD, Pakistan, A Political Study, George Allen and Unwin,
London, 1957. p.13.
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education the role of an essential vehicle for modernization, and.
ation-building8
28. See I. H. trRESHI, The Muslim Community of Ind.o-Pakistan Subcontinent,
op. cit. pp.242-3. The Committee concluded that 'the present
system of education with all its value and contributions to the
economic, political and. social life of India has had a disintegrating
influence on the culture and social order of the Muslims.' Its
curricula did little justice to Islamic History or Philosophy; there
was either ancient Hindu Philosophy or modern Philosophy, Islamic
philosophy was completely ignored. In history, the Muslim period
was taught with slight value; it was referred in the main, as 'a
narration of wars and conquests, slaughter and carnage, destruction
and demolition of India's past, amidst patricidal and. fratricidal
struggles and disputes'. The Committee found out that the literacy
rate among the Muslims was only 6.4%, the lowest, in comparison.
The Report desired: "Can we have schools and colleges where men will
be trained to be leaders of men, pioneers of industry and dynamic
movers of tiought - men trained for devoted works, unquestioned
sacrifice7iiissionary zeal in the cause of Islam."
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Chapter 6
ITh[E MODENIZAT ION OF MUSLIM EDUCATION IN TURKEY
A CASE bTUDY
"1 flatly refuse to believe that today, in
the luminous presence of science, knowledge
aM civilization in all its aspects, there
exists, in the civilized community of
Tu.rkey, men so primitive as to speak their
material and moral well-being from the
guidance of one or another shaakh.
Gentlemen, you and. the whole nation must
know arid know well, that the Republic of
Turkey can not be the land of Shaikhs,
dervishes, disciples and lay brothers. The
straightest, truest way (tarikat) is the
way of civilization. To be a man, it is
enough to do what civilization requires..."
Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
Speech in the Grand National Assembly.
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Turkey
6.1. National Independence
Modern Turkey energed as a nation-state consequent to the
Treaty of Lausanne signed between the Allies and Ghazi Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk in 1923. The Treaty established the boundaries of the new
State with an area comprising 15 per cent of what had rsmained of
the Ottoman Thipire by the turn of the 19th century. Though reduced
in size, the modern State of Turkey still kept its strategic
importance of being a bridge between the East and the West .
Separated by the narrow straits of the Dardanelles, Bosphorus and
the sea of Marmara which constitute the only waterways between the
Black Sea and the Mediterranean, 97 per cent of the countxy lies in
Asia while only 3 per cent is in Europe. The smaller, European Turkey,
Thrace has a fairly smooth terrain suitable enough for agriculture
and settled living. The larger, Asian Turkey, the .Anatolian peiminsula,
on the other hand, presents a mixture of sharply conflicting features,
ranging from the central basin of about 1,000 meters above sea level
surrounded by mountains of 3,000 meters topped by the summits of Mount
Arrarat of over 5,000 meters. It is mainly Asiatic Turkey that typifies
the Turkish war of life, with a semi-arid terrain, an acient village
culture and an overwhelming population of peasants During the Ottoman
rule the only two urban centres of Istanbul and Iznu.r formed te two
seats of political power and also concentrated between them all the
economic and industrial strength, dominating over the vast hinterland
of some 40,000 peasant villages. It wa in this latter, Asiatic Turkey
in the main, that Mustafa Ataturk wanted to introduce the dynamics of
modernization when in 19.3, he chose Ankara as the new National Capital.
1. See Dudley L. STAMP, Asia, A Regional and Economic Geography,
Methuen, London, 1959, pp.73-lO7.
2. ibid.
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The selection of Ankara symbolised the dominant passion of Ataturk
determined as he was, totally to do away with the least connection
with the traditional Ottcmian past; and to give the new Turks a
capital within their own heartland though with new orientations.3
6.1.2. Ideolo	 and. Identity
With the settlement of the international status of Turkey at
Lausanne, Ataturk and his party set out to establish a modern political
structure for their country. In 1924, a Constitutional Law was
adopted by- the National Assembly giving the new State a modicum of
the Western parliamentary system of democratic rule. Though Ataturkism
had from the very start, been identified by the Republican Peoples'
Party led. by Ataturk himself by the famous six-points viz:
republicanism, secularism, populism, nationalism, statism and reformism
it was not until 1930 that Turkey was proclaimed a Republic and Ataturk
its elected President; while his six-points were formally incorporated
into the party programme at the Party National Congress in l93l.
6.2.1. Political Modernization
Ataturk's potential supporters for modernization policies
consisted of the army and cwil bureaucracy. The intelligentsia and the
peasantry, in spite of their initial acclaim for the charismatic
leadership of Ataturk as'.viourof the nation, did not fully agree with
his highhanded violence to the Muslim institutions. An element which
still supported the liberalism of the Young Turks organised itself into
the Progressive Republican Party in opposition to the radicalism of the
ruling Republican Peoples' Party. The 1925 Kurdish revolt with its
3. For a study of Atataurk's objectives in the development of Ankara as
the nerve centre of the new nation see Malcolm D. RIVIKIN, Area
Developuent for National Growth, Praegar, N.Y./London, 1965. pp.49-65.
4. Encyclopaedia Brittanica. vol. 22, s.v. Turkey, pp.364-398.
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strong Islamic zeal, followed by an attempt on Ataturk's life in
1926 and the widespread anti-government dnonstrations in 1929, all
resulted in turning the Ataturk-Inonu regime into a single-party
dictatorship which Ataturk himself justified on the grounds that
"a strong authoritarian regime must be maintained for a time in order
to set Turkey on the road to modernization and the removal of all
the landmarks of a dead past." 5
 But the plea for authoritarianism
could not overcome the basic dichotomy that became peculiar to the
Turkish society, revealing itself, as Nun Eren has pointed out, 'in
a sy-stem that believed in popular justification but denied diversity-
of opinion....'6
Ataturk's demise in 1938 and the World War II years prevented
internal sooio-political conflicts and saved Turkey from civil strife.
Post war years, however, brought liberal changes into the national
politics. Closer contacts with the West during the War years and the
subsequent desire of the Ruling Turkish leadership to join the United
Nations have been considered mainly responsible for the restoration of
the multi-party system. 7
 In 1945, when the charter of the U.N. came up
for ratification in the National Assembly, Celal Bayar and Adnan
Mendres, who later headed the Democratic Party government, tabled a
motion suggesting that as well as approving the Charter, the Turkish
government and Constitution must in fact put in practice within Turkey
some of the basic principles and liberties vouchsafed in the Charter,
such as the freedom of expression and the right for organization. At
the time, the Government reacted strongly to the motion forcing its
sponsors to leave the party, but public opinion soon caught up with the
5. See C. H. DODD, Politics and Government in Turkey, Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1969. p.22.
6. Nun EREN, Turkey - Today and_Tomorrow; An Experiment in
Westernization. Pall Mall, London and Dunmow, 1963, p.63.
7. Eric. Brit. op. cit.
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idea axid forced the Inonu regime to abandon the single-party system.
In 1946, the Democratic Party was born under the leadership of Celal
Bayar aM Adnan Mendres, as the main opposition party. Later,
numerous other parties, including the National Party which was
reconstituted in 1954 as the Republican National Party, came into
existence. Turkey now was a multi1.party democratic society.
The Democratic Party started from where the earlier Progressive
Republican Party had left off. It represented the larger middle-class
and the foreign peasants whose sentiments had been thrown overboard by
the dictatorial one-party rule of Ataturk and Inonu. The new party
soon became the mouthpiece of liberalism and Islamic revivalism. So
strong became its popularity among the hitherto disenchanted
intelligentsia and the villagers that when in 1950, they unseated the
Republican Peoples Party from power as a result of their overwhelming
victory at the elections, "the whole of Turkey" remarks Eren,
"including the Republicans surged with pride". 8
 The Democrats won 408
seats while the RPP only managed to gain 69 seats. In the 1954
elections they won an even more resounding victory when they gained
503 out of 541 seats in the Parliament. In 1958, however, their
majority was reduced to 58 per cent.9
The Democratic Party achieved its popularity by its promise to
restore some of the potent Muslim symbols and. institutions which had
been recklessly dealt with by Ataturk. Their government encouraged
the building of mosques, reintroduced the call to prayer in Arabic,
permitted the teaching of Islaxniyyat in schools and allowed pilgrimage
to Makka. All these measures were widely acclaimed by the generality
of the people for they stood to re-establish the identity of the
8. ibid. p.94.
9. ibid.
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Turkish nation. as a Muslim people - an identity that had been
set aside since the Revolution. The breakdown of the Democratic
Party government in 1960, resulting in the military take-over, was
due more to the maipractices and intolerance of its leaders, who
coveted a monopoly of power as Ataturk and. Inonu had done before them.
But the desire expressed b the Turkish populace for the recognition
of their Muslim identity, shown in their support for the change of
policy which permitted the revival of Islamic symbols, could riot
easily be dismissed as a reassertion of traditionalism.
Ideologically, Turkey is still in a state of fluidity. The
basic issues that divide the nation are still the six-point ideals
of modernization launched by Kemal Ataturk. About fifty years of
experiment with westernization has not made the Turks a part of the
Western-European civilization. As Prof. Lewis has pointed out, "the
deepest Islamic roots of Turkish life and cu[ure are still alive,
and. the ultimate identity of Turk and Muslim in Turkey is still
,,10
unchallenged.
There are now about ten political parties in the country.
Basically, they are all committed to the creation of a modern,
constitutional, democratic and republican society. But they are
divided on the question of secularism. The Republican Peoples' Party
10. See Bernard LEWIS, The Eknergence of Modern Turkey, op. cit. pp .417-
18. A more detailed and deeper study of the religious life of the
Turkish people has been presented by Howard A. Reed, who has
categorically maintained that:
"Despite the secularization of modern Turkey, most
of her citizens are quick and proud to claim that
they are Muslims. The life of a Muslim Turk
today is still cast in an essentially Islamic
framework from conception to the Mevlid Service of
Remembrance which often commemorates the fortieth
day after death".
See Howard A. REIEID, "The Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslims"
in Richard N. YE, Islam and the West, Proceedings of the Harvard
Summer School Conference on the Middle East, July 25-27, 1955,
Mouton, S Gravenage, 1957, pp.109-148.
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of Ataturk and. its ally, the Reliance Party, are the two main
parties, staunchly committed to the original idea of secularism
as propounded by Ataturk although even they have come a very long way
to accept certain changes in favour of religion. The Justice, the
New Turkey and. the Nation Parties all want the State
	 to repress
religious freedom, belief or practice. They do not want secularism to be
necessarily anti-religious. Both, they argue, function as complements
of one another in the human development. The Justice Party, for
example in its party manifesto declares:
"A secular state does not require that citizens
should cut their ties with religion. Every
citizen is free to worship according to the
requirements of his religion and sect." 11
In the same manner, the manifesto of the Nation Party asserts:
"The Party recognizes the share of faith, morals
and. tradition in the social order. These do
not change often and remain beyond the influence
of the state." 12
The New Turkey Party and Union Party, on the other hand, openly
demand the restoration of Islamic socio-religious practices in order to
generate social harmony among the nation. Turkish society on the whc
is beset by serious cleavages and. extreme view points that mark
ideological confusion. In this state of extremes, the larger Turkish
community, remarks, Eren, remains "unsure, insecure and confused."13
Confusion leads to frustration and frustration to violence.
When the National Unity Committee set up by the Army in 1960
to devise a new constitution and to restore democratic rule, handed over
11. EREN. op. cit. p.92
12. ibid. p.93
±3. ibid.. p.93
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power to the newly elected parties that formed a coalition
government under the premiership of the veteran leader, Isinet Inonu,
the underlying conflicts had not been settled. In 1965, the Justice
Party was returned to power chiefly on its programme which opposed
extremism. But the identity crisis still loomed ominously. Extreme
leftist activities and urban terrorism, including sabotage and.
kidnapping, as well as student agitation were inspired and carried out
by the newly organised militant Turkish Peoples' Liberation Army (TPLA)
whose leaders were finally arrested and sentenced to death in June 1971.
Such anomie and protest only strenghtened the Army's claim that
parliamentary democracy itself was responsible for the disturbances.
With this excuse, the Army poses itself again and again as the main
upholder of the ideals of Ataturk's modernization, ever ready to intervene
and suspend. the democratic system.14
The source of conflict however springs from the reluctance of the
urban 'enlightened.' minority to diffuse popular democracy to the general
electorate. The so c.l1ed 'ignorant' electorate have a permanent majority
in the country. 15
 The army and the civil bureaucracy, by playing
'primordial' politics, refuse to restore populism. It was this 'primordial'
politics that led the Army to restore democratic rule in 1961 only on the
basis of a compromise formula instituted in the 1961 Constitution. This
called for proportional representation instead of the popular vote; set
up a Constitutional Court as the ultimate interpretative authority, and
removed all executive control from the judiciary, the universities and
broadcasting. These measures inevitably boomeranged to disru authority
per se and led to an all out 'authority crisis'. As Mango has recorded,
"Less responsible journalists, defamed, libelled and incited their leaders
to violence at will, secure in the knowledge that according to Article 11
14. See Andrew MANO, The Times, 15th September, 1971.
15. ibid.
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of the Constitution, 'the law shall not infringe the essence of any
right or liberty, not even when it (the law) is applied for the
purpose of upholding public interet, morals and order, social 3ustice
and national securlty.ttl6 It was precisely because of this state of an
authority crisis that the army once again intervened in 1971. Thu.s the
fight between the enlightened elites and the popular electorate goes
on. The strange thing is that it is being carried on in the name of
modernization. It would be wrong to conclude that the popular majority
rule or indeed the resurgence of Islamic revivalism in itself is
tantamount to Turkey's retreat to traditionalism. Even the most
conservative rightest parties who demand the re-establishment of
Islamic symbols and practices, are not opposed to modernization. On
the contrary, they strongly- urge the modernization of the outdated
religious practices and the transformation of Muslim institutions in such
a way that they become viable for present day life. In their view
Ataturk's secularism has been carried too far. .ktaturk only wanted,
as they see it, to separate the religious and the secular functions
of the state which had been haphazardly mixed up during the Ottoman nile
and before. The Justice Party programme for example asserts:
"We deny all political and social concepts that can
pull our country back from the point of progress
she has achieved. To attain the level of contemporary
civilization our people must pursue their forward
march without interruption". 17
"Ataturk's secularism," asserts Eren, "though
increasingly stern toward public manifestations of
piety, never turned anti-Islamic. It is the
failure to salvage Islam from outmoded beliefs and
practices and place it in a meaningful relation to
the contemporary needs of the common man that keeps
secularism controversial". 18
16. ibid. also David BARCUFORD, "Strengthening the Power of the State",
in the Guardian 30th November, 1972.
17. N. EREN. op. cit. p.101.
18. ibid. p.91.
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Political Institutions
The Constitution
Since national independence, Turkey has adopted two
constitutions. The first constitution was promulgated soon after
the declaration of Turkey as a Republic in 1924. With some amendments,
this constitution remained in force until 1960. Based on the ideals of
Ataturkism, viz: "nationalism, secularism, populism, statism,
republicazu.sm and reformism", the Constitution was first amended. in
1928 when the clause stating that 'Islam is the State Religion' was
removed. Then in 1930, the right to vote was extended to women, and in
1934, the minimum age for participation in elections was raised from 18
to 22. In 1937 a one-party system was incorporated into the
Constitution and since then both it and the Government remained the
handmaids of the Republican People's Party which held power until 1950.
In keeping with the wis1of Ataturk, who held both officesPesint of the
Republic and jf the National Assembly, in order to concentrate all powers
in his own hands,certan ProvisiOnswer-e- built into the Constitution so that
Ataturk and. his Party held. all the powers in their tight control:
the Constitution held the National Assembly as the sole executive and
legislative authority. he Assembly was a unicameral institution, and
in its functioning it replaced the nation as sovereign.
A major change was introduced into the constitution in 1946 when
the single party system was abolished and multi-party rule was adopted.
But the loopholes that had. been created in the Constitution nd the style
in which power was first monopolised By Ataturk and his party in turn
tempted their successors, the Democratic party to resort to more
authoritarianismi	 Of course, the Democrats were more blatant in
tampering with the Constitution. They undermined the independence of the
judiciary, the press and the Universities by dismissing judges,
imprisoning j urnalists and. removing professors. The Army therefore ousted
them in the coup of 1960 and abolished the Constitution with a
Proclamation to give the nation a new and more viable one.
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The 1961 Constitution
The present Turkish Constitution was promulgated by the
National Unity Committee set up by the military regime in 1960. It
is the handiwork mainly of the academics: the professors of the
Political Science Departments of the Universities of Ankara and
Istanbul. As experts in the field and representatives of the
modernizing leadership, they were called upon to draw up a draft in
which sufficient checks were provided to secure vital control in the
hands of the 'enlightened' elite, so that no single party could assunie
power solely on the basis of popular vote from the 'ignorant'
majority.
The new Constitution describes Turkey as a 'nationalist,
democratic, secular and 500jt Republic. ThwghJ omits the clause
in the old constitution which made the Grand National Assembly the
highest source of sovereignty instead of the nation intself, it gives
vogue to a bicameral GNA consisting of the National Assembly and the
Senate. Clear distinction has been drawn between the legislature and
the executive, which had been left vague in the old constitution. The
Constitution also strangely fortifies the independence of the
judiciary and the freedom of the Press and broadcasting, as well as the
autonomy of the universities, making it difficult for a recurrence of
the interference with the constitution made by the Democrats. Another
important innovation in the Constitution has been the creation of a
Constitutional Court as the supreme organ to interpret the spirit
of the Constitution.
183..
Poliqy Formulation Function
According to the new Constitution, national policy formulation
is the responsibility of both Chambers of the GNA. Both ChBlubers
normally meet separately, but in an emergency and for certain special
matters including the budget, 3oint sessions are called for. Both
Chambers are also represented on special ad hoc committees. Though
final authority is given to the Assembly, participation of the Senate
is necessary. If a proposal is rejected by the Assembly but accepted
by the Senate, it goes back to the Assembly for review. But if the
Assembly re3ects it again, the proposal falls.
Greater involvement of the 'enlightened' elites in policy
formulation functions is also apparent from the composition, strength
and the qualifications for election for both Chambers. The National
Assembly is composed of 450 deputies elected by direct ballot, while
the Senate of the Republic is formed of 150 members elected by general
ballot and. 15 appointed by the President. The term of office for the
Assembly is four years while the Senate functions for six years. The
Educational qualification for election as an assemblyman is defined as
"literacy", while a senator must have had higher education (Art 72). The
minimum age for an assemblyman is 30 but for the Senator it is 40.
Such measures make the enlightened, urban and secularist elites watch-
dogs of policy formulation functions.
Poliqy Adoption Function
Article 6 of the Constitution states that the executive function
will be carried out by the President of the Republic ard the Council
of Ministers within the framework of the law. A further distinction
has been made between the role of the President as the chief policy
adopter and head of the executive for which he chooses the Prime
Minister and his Cabinet. The President gives the final legitimacy
to the laws which have been formulated by the G.N.A. According to
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article 98, although all poiicy adoption is the President's
pengative, he cannot be held personally responsible.
Strictly speaking in a parliamentary system, the choice of the
Prime Minister is a prerogative of the ruling party, the
proportionate electoral basis of Turkey makes it virtually impossible
for any single party to gain overall supremacy. This is a situation
which leadto successive weak coalition governments. The President,
therefore, wields unchallenged authority. Again, the Constitution
stipulates that the Prime Minster must be a member of the GNA but his
Ministers may not. This, it is believed is designed to make it
possible for the 'enlightened' modernizing leadership to be enlisted
into the government even if they fail to be elected into the Assembly.
The Constitution also allows the army to exercise supervisory
authority over the executive and the legislature by the creation of a
National Security Council composed of the Chief of the General Staff and
the Ministers, under the Chairman of the President.
Policy Adiudication Punctions
Largely as a result of the Democratic Party's capricious
d.ismissal or promotion of judges for political motives, the new
constitution has laid extra stress on the independence and
consolidation of the judiciary. Article 132 of the Section of Judiciary
proclaims:
"No organ, office, agency or individual may give
orders or instructions to courts or judges in
connection with the discharge of their judicial
duties, send them circulars, or make recommendations
or suggestions...Legislature and executive organs
and administrations are under obligation to cctnply
with rulings of the court. Such organs and the
ad.ministration shall in no manner whatsoever alter
court rulings or delay their execution."19
Article 133 further reinforces their independence by
establishing that "Judges may not be dismissed unless they so desire,
19. ibid. p.46.
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they many not 'be retired before the age limit... They many not be
,,20deprived of their salaries.
To consolidate the professional integrity and strength of the
Judicial profession, the new Constitution called for a Supreme Court
of Judges which is alone empowered to deal with all internal affairs
of the ,judiciary.
Courts
The new Constitution has given rise to more differentiated
types of courts, some quite novel to the judicial system of Turkey.
Courts were originally secularised and nationalised by Ataturk in
1926. The present system is as below:
1. The Court of Cassation is the highest court
of review and appeal whose judges are elected
by the supreme Council of Judges.
2. The Military Court of Cassation is a court
of the final resort to review decisions and
verdicts.
3. The Court of Judisdictional Disputes is empowered.
to settle definitive disputes among civil,
administrative and military courts arising from
disagreement on jurisdictional matters and
verdicts.
4. The Constitutional Court is the most important
innovation. It is designed. as the 'guardian
of the basic premises of the constitution' to
review the constitutionality of laws and. the
bylaws of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
Article 152 on the subject states:
"The rulings of the Constitutional Court are
final. The decisions of the Constitutional
Court shall be binding on the legislature,
executive and judicial organs of the state as
well as the administration, real and corporal
persona". 21
The Constitutional Court is further empowered as a High Council
to try the President, the members of the Council of Ministers, the
members of the Courts of Cassation and of the other three highest
21Atribunals.
20. ibid. p.52.
21. ibid. p.54.
21A. ibid.
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Local Administration
The Turkish system of local administration was already, before
the Republic, a copy of the French system and. allowed for a provincial
administration on a centralised structure. Ataturk' a reasons for
retaining this system of centralised. adnu.nistration, have been
sunim vised by Rivikin as below:
1. "It existed. For the revolution to attempt
the creation of a radically new state and a
new form of government simultaneously could
prove too immense a task. Ataturk was a
visionary, but also a pragmatist".
2. "The country was not unified in spirit. Tight
reins were needed over what decisions were
made or not made, and parts of the nation could
not be allowed to 'go it alone', particularly
those where reactionary religious elements
were strong".
3. "Trained talent to carry out modernization was
lacking. Only a few men and women were capable
of producing plans and giving orders (in
education, economic development as well as
administration). They had to be concentrated
at the centre and in easy communication with
each other. Field cadres could be given only
limited responsibility, reporting directly to
the centre, to forestall mistakes about policy
implementation". 22
According to the French model, the country- is divided into 67
Vilayets (provinces), which vary greatly in size and population; the
largest being fourteen times the area of the smallest, and the most
populous having 28 times more inhabitants than the least populous.23
Each vilayet is administered by a Vall (Governor) appointed by the
Ministry of Interior. Each. Vilayet has also an Assembly and a
Municipal Council, whose members are elected by general elections for
a term of four years. The Vilayets are divided into Kazas and each
Kaza is divided into Nahiyas.
The system is beset by an inherent duality that leads to
unco-ordinated control. The Vali of each Vilayet, himself appointed
22. Malcolm D. RIVIKfli, Area Development for National Growth,
PraegerSecialStudies in International Economi. cs and Deve lonent,
Praeger, N/Y, London 1965, p.51.
23. C. H. DODD, Politics and Government in Turkey, Manchester
University Press, Manc ester, 1969. p.22.
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by the Mm stry of Inter or, is handicapped by having virta'ly
no authority, except a nominal one, over the officers of the the
various Ministries who rece ye their instructions direct from their
own Mmnmsters 4 This superior ty of the central governme t also
handicps the Vilayet Assemblies in their function of law making.
Regional level
The desirability of such a large number of provinces and the
disparity in their sizes has been debated, and expert opinion now
seems to favour the creation of sone fox,n of ]a.rger regioncd set-ups.
In fact, the 1961 Constitution itself states (art.115) that "for
certain fux ctins authorities may be set up on a wider than
provincial basis". Regionalism, however, also generates fears of
separatism, particularly in the far off Eastern Kurdish provinces.
Various solutions have been mooted to dec ntralmse and to regional se
control, but t1e irobiem r mains unr so]ved. At the moment, tiere s
no cional system.
Distr ot Level
The Nahiya or bucak (district), which used to he an i ortart
administrative unit during the Ottoman rule, has, since modernization
in the last century, equally suffered at the hand of rigid
centralization. In 1949, attempts were made to revise district level
administration and it was recognised by the Government that each
district should have elected a district council at least for advisory
purposes. But, as Dodd points oux, only 190 out of the 923 districts
of the Republic have, up to now, set up such oounci1a5
24. DODD. op. cit. p.266
25. ibid. p.266.
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Village Level
At the village level, the elected village headman performs
all the functions of administration. He is the local representative
of virtually all the Ministries, and local officials of all
departments exercise authority over him. There is virtually no
community level participation in the administration of the village.
Government officials are dominant masters whom the villagers fear in
the same waj as they did. under the Ottoman rule. Democratic
participation at the grass-root level is therefore non-existent.
This typifies the pyramidical system of administration in Turkey in
which the larger village base which Ataturk so vehemently pledged
himself to iaodernise by adopting Ankara as the new capital is
flagrantly ignored and. remains entrenched in traditionality. To
remedy the situation, if only slightly, the Government has recently
decided to establish a separate Ministry of Village Affairs, mainly
to help 'co-ordinate as well as promote self-help in the villages'.
But as Prof. Dodd. observes:
'There is a strong current of feeling in Turkish
society that the administration often treats the
peasant harshly and unsympathetically and. too
paternalistically. Certainly, it is difficult
for the peasant to think of government as a help-
mate, but as a master more inclined to place 26
limits to his initiative than to encourage it".
Bureaucracy
When Ataturk unleashed his revolution of modernization, ins
corps of modernising leadership came entirely from the civil and
military bureaucratic class. This class then remained the backbone
of modernization all through the single party government system
until 1950. As Chambers has pointed out, 'Civil and military officials
were the largest group among the deputies to the Grand National
Assembly throughout the one-party period, and they accounted for more
26. ibid. p.266
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than one-half of the principal parliamentary leaders and cabinet
ministers. As late as the mid-1950;, though other classes also
started exercising power yet men of bureaucratic background
occupied nearly twenty per cent of all ministerial posts, being
second in numbers only to lawyers." 27 Civil bureaucracy still
remains the largest group of moderniaing leadership in Turkey.
The strength and distribution of the Civil ureaucracy in
Turkey is shown in the table below:
Table VI.1
NUMBER OF CIVIL SERVANTS IN 1961
Actually nployed Number of Posts
1. Central Administration	 290,740	 313,391
2. State Economic Enterprises 	 97,682	 115,582
3. Municipalities	 35,069	 35,069
4. Other	 28,999	 3l,33?
Total	 452,490	 495,374
Source: C. H. DODD. Politics and Government in Turkey. p.269.
Table VI.2
DISTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS BY MAJOR MINISTRIES
Ministry	 Percentage of total
Education	 33.87
Health	 12.45
Interior	 8.51
Justice	 5.68
Finance	 5.50
Agriculture	 4.83
Religious Affairs 	 4.51
Source: C. H. DODD, Politics and. Government in Turkey, p.270
Educationally, the civil servants of Turkey have been
categorized as 8 per cent with no schooling, 26 per cent with only
primary level schooling, 11 per cent of middle school level, 5 per cent
of ),js level, 33 per cent of technical and vocational level and 17
per cent with higher education. 28
 A breakdown of the 47,000 civil
27. H. L. CHAMBERS, "The Civil Bureaucracy in Turkey in Rustuv and
Ward, (Eds), Political Modernization in Turkey and Japan, op. cit.
pp.301-327.
28. ibid. pp.282-3.
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servants 'with higher education of the last group reveals that
13,000 are education.ista, 7,000 lawyers, 5,000 social scientists
and. 4,500 medical and. veterinary surgeons.29
Closer study of the composition and the intergenerational
mobility of the Public Service of Turkey, as Prof. Dodd and others,
have pointed out, suggests 'that recruitment to the Turkish Public
Service has become much less diversified during the past half
century.	 A generation of one-party government has inevitably
entrenched. bureaucracy into the rigidity which characterised the
Ottoman administration. Yet there is little doubt that both Civil
and Military bureaucrats remain strict adherents of Ataturk's ideals
of modernization.
6.2.2. Modernization of the Economy and Industrialisation
The Ottoman economy was mainly agricultural :
 its industry
consisted of only some 269 machinal establishments with a labour force
of 17,000. There were 76 establishments for the food industry and 75
for textile, and. other small scale concerns such as pottery, tanning,
furniture, printing, paper and. chemical products. 31 During the War of
National Independence, the Turkish economy suffered heavily. The
Treaty of Lausanne, with its mass transfer of populations, assignment
of the Mosul oil area to Iraq, and other requirements added. to the
economic rupture of the new State; but, the Treaty also opened up
immense possibilities for planning and. development by removing all
outside controls from Turkey-.32
The Republic was immediately faced with the problems of the
lack of capital and trained personnel necessary for economic
29. ibid. pp.283
30. ibid.
31. Industrial Census of 1913, quoted in Herschlag. op. cit. p.61
32. For the full Economic implications of the Treaty of Lausanne, see
Hershiag. op. cit. Chapter 2, pp.l6-30.
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read3ustment, and industrial growth. Political circumstances
prevented foreign capital from flowing in, while internal capital was
scanty. Modernization of the economy and the society in general were
interlinked problems. Basic changes had to be made and decisions of
great magnitude had to be taken. Ataturk' a policies started with the
declaration of 'ètatisme' (statism) aimed chiefly at the development
of the heavy industry. His opening of the Iz Bank in 1927 for loans,
and the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, helped the country to
make headway. Due largely to these radical policies, the per capita
income of Turkey rose from 73 T.L.in 1927 to 95 T.L. in l939 But
the economic development in Turkey, over a period of a cjuarter of a
century, had lacked co-ordination of the manifold factors necessary
for a modern, self-regulating industrial economy. This was brought
home to the Turkish government in 1951 by the Mission of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Dev lopm nt. In its report
the Mission, for exsmple, asserted that, eager to ind.ustrialiae on
the model of the Western nations and to raise national prestige and
the standard of living, the Turki G vernm t 	 'underestimated
the important relationship of ar c tural development and
industriallsation." 34 The Mission further spotlighted the
ambitiousness of the industriali sing zeal shown by Turkey in the
introduction of various prestigious industrial projects for which there
was no real need or skill available. These, the Mission pointed out,
included the airplane engine factory, the rayon industry and the
woollen textile industry. 35 Among other things, the Mission outlined
the following as the siam problems of Turkish economy and industry:
1. The low level of real increase severely limited the amount
of resources available for investment.
2. Industrial development has been over emphasized at the
expense of agriculture.
33. Hershiag. op. cit. Table XXV. p.164
34. Report of a Mission Sponsored by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, entitled, The Economy of Turkey
John Hopkins Press, 1951, pp.45-55.
35. ibid. p.46.
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3. Turkey has had no adequate mechanism to guide investment
into the most appropriate fields.
4. Government fiscal policies have obstructed the free
circulation and growth of purchasing power.
5. The development of human productivity and efficiency has
not kept pace with the growing requirements of government
administration and of industrial growth. 36
Though the etatism of the l930s and 1930s did contribute a
great deal to lifting the Turkish economy from the debris of the collapse
of the Ottoman Fupire and, according to Prof. Herschlag, "laid the
foundations for progress in the social and economic spheres", it was
only an emergency measure. It helped the economy to develop in the
initial stages by providing 'public overheads'. It also helped
slightly to improve the conditions of the overwhelming peasant majority.
But it also curbed entrepreneurship, thus making the State, as the
Deomocratic Party Programme declared, 'interventionist, capitalistic,
bureaucratic and monopolistic and paralysing business and productive
life'. 37
 It was not until the 1950s, when the Democratic Party
introduced liberalism and encouraged free enterprise, that the economy
began to move ahead. The policy of etatism, however, has remained the
'bone of contention' between the Democratic and the Republican parties
until today.
In the second phase, Turkey has so far had two five-year
development plans: the first, 1963-67, and the second 1968-72. The
first plan aimed at a 7 per cent annual growth. The actual annual
growth between 1963-67 was 6.8 per cent, accompanied by a population
increase of 2.8 per cent' 8
 The second plan also set a target of 7
per cent annual growth with an aggregate growth, for the whole period,
of 24 per cent. Prof. Hershiag maintained that these targets of the
second plan could only be reached if agriculture grew annually at
36. HERSHLAG. op. cit. p.46
37. ibid. p.187
38. See Z. Y. HERSJILkG, The Times, London, September 15th, 1971
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4.1 per cent, industry at 12 per cent and the rest of the economy
at about 6.5 per cent 9 In 1970, the government devalued the
Turkish pound by 66.6 per cent, which has led to some strides in the
economic growth. The Agricultural sector has recorded an annual
growth rate of 95 per cent in 1971. The industrial sector,
however, fluctuated by 10 per cent between 1965-69, falling to 2.5
40per cent in 1970 and. rising again to 8.7 per cent in 1971.
In 1971, 66 per cent of the manpower was still engaged in
agriculture, providing for 28 per cent of the national income as
compared with 11 per cent in industry which accounted for 23 per cent
of the national income. 41 The 1963 agreement with the 0.E.C.D.
countries winch allowed Turkey some tariff reductions on the main
agricultural exports to the Common Market countries, as well as the
credit facilities granted by the Consortium for Aid to Turkey (of the
0.E.C.D.) has helped Turkey to set some higher targets in its
Third Development Plan of 1973-77, by winch it aims at reducing the
agricultural share of the manpower from 66 per cent to 20 per cent,
while raising the manpower in industry to 22 per cent. These
ambitious targets mean, as McDermott concludes, "that Turkey will have
to cover in 20 years the distance which took Western Europe 100-150
,,42years.
6.2.3. Social Modernization
Demographic Features (Population)
The population of Turkey, according to the 1927 Cencus, was
13.6 million of which 24 per cent was urban and 76 per cent rural.
After that it increased at an accelerating rate of about 3 per cent
per year until 1960, when it was calculated to be 27.8 million, i.e.
an overall increase of 104 per cent. Excepting the War years, the
39. ibid.
40. See Anthony McDERWYiT, The Guardian, London, November 30, 1970
also Metin MUNIR, 'New Spirit in Industry" The Times, London
15th September, 1971.
41. Anthony McDEIM0TT. op. cit.
42. ibid.
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annual rate of increase has always been high, while after the
war it assumed an even greater pace of increase than ever 3 Since
1960, however, largely due to the migration of a considerable number
of workers to Western European countries, there has been a
noticeable decrease in the population growth.44
The early legislation passed in 1930, tended for some odd
reasona, to put restraints on any attempt at family planning.
Consequent to these legislative provisions, when the population
growth reached an alarming magnitude, the First Five Year Development
Plan considered population planning as highly vital for development.
It emphasized that all previous laws prohibiting the spreading of
knowledge about contraceptives, and the import and sale of
contraceptives, should be repealed, and that personnel such as doctors,
nurses, mid-wives, etc. employed in the Public Health Service should
be given education in population planning. It also recommended the
import of contraceptives at low prices from abroad and their free
distribution among the needy. 45 In 1965, the Turkish government
accepted help from the United States to combat the rising pace of
population growth, which had by then reached 31 million.
A breakdown of the age group in 1965, ahowed that the
percentage of the 1-14 age group within the total population rose as a
consequence of the high fertility rate. In 1945, it stood at 42 per
cent as compared with about 25-30 per cent of the developed countries.
The Second Five Year Plan envisaged a fall in fertility rate and
estimated the population ko	 gro'l at medium rate, from 31 million
in 1965 to 35 million in 1970, 40.5 million by 1974 and 52 million
43. First Five Year Development Plan. pp.60-61., also Richard 1).
R0BINS0I, High Level Manpower in Economic Deve1onent, The
Turkish Case, Harvard Middle East Monograph, 1967. pp.20-23.
44. ibid.
45. First Five Year Plan. p.65.
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by 1965. The actual population, according to the 1970 cencus, has
been calculated as 35,6 million, which is barely more than the
estimate. According to the Second Plan estimates the ratio of 1-14
age group was to come down from 42 per cent to 38.7 per centi6
This ratio meant that about 15-18 million children of the compulsory
education age would inhabit Turkey in 1970s.
Marriage and Pamily Structure.
Some changes in the family structure and marriage customs had
been attempted even in the Ottoman rule before the Republic. In 1920,
for example, the minimum marriage age was fixed at 17 years instead
of the previously existing 12 years. Similarly Nika (the marriage
contract) was required to be signed and registered at a court instead
of privately. Polygamy and easy, capricious divorce practices were
made difficult. by the imposition of certain preconditions. But, all
these innovations were rescinded by Sultan Vaheditin in 1921, because
of the adjustment problems and the protests made to him.47
The Civil Code adopted by the Republic in 1926, uncompromisingly
prohibited polygamy and laid down equality between man and woman by
law, although, the husband's permission was still considered necessary
in certain matters. The Code made registration of marriages
obligatory both in the Municipal records and on the identity papers
of the parties. It fixed the marriage age at 18. Parity was also
granted by law to both man and woman in divorce if either could prove
valid grounds as described by law such as adultery, desertion,
46. An astounding feature of the population growth in Turkey has been
that even Parliamentary deputies still have exceptionally larger
families. Nicholas LUDI1GTON records that Abdul Bakir Ozman,
deputy from Mardin has 15 children, Hasan Deger, deputy from
Diyarbaker has 13 and Kinyas Kartal from Van Las has 10. See
Turkey, The Times, London, September 15, 1971.
47. A. LFETIRILN, The Eancipation of Turkish Women, UKESCO 1962, pp.5O-1
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insecurity, cruelty, criminal actions, offensive behaviour or
incompatability existed.48 Then, in 1930, the Parliament passed
the Electorate Law giving Turkish women the right to vote.
At present, excepting in the remote rural areas where old
practices still prevail, women in Turkey are generally emancipated,
though they still have a long way to go, as Prof. Sadi Irinck has
pointed out, "to achieve the necessary social and intellectual
standing" .9 This emancipation is clearly visible in matters of
economic freed.on for 19 per cent of all Civil Servants in Turkey are
women. 
50 Of these, the young are particularly increasing their
participation in the civil service and other occupations which makes
it necessary for the educational system to provide opportunities
for vocational training
Ecological Features: Urbanization
Urban population in Turkey has been constantly rising since
the dawii of the modern era. In 1927, the share of the urban
population was estimated as 16.4 per cent rising to about 20 per cent
in 1950. But during the 1950s and after, with a. rapid acceleration
of industrialisation, urbanization has risen sharply. According to
Robinson's study, 'the annual flow may now be 3 per cent of the rural
population which means that the latter has reached a plateau' 52 In
1960, the urban population of Turkey was 28.7 per cent while in 1965, it
was found to be 30 per cent. 53 With this rising trend of movement to
the cities, the Second Five Year Plan has estimated that within the
next twenty years the population of the cities would reach 25-30 million,
and as much as half of the total population of 55 million would live
in cities. 54 This is an alarming rate of geographical mobility whose
economic, s cial and educational implications are obvious.
48. ibid. pp.51-53. also Selma. EKRE1, Turkejy, Old and New, Charles
Scribner, N.Y. 1947 pp.67-82
49. A. AFPIRAN, op. cit. p.59 also N. EVEN, op. cit. p.182
50. C. H. DODD, op. cit. p.282
51. ibid.
52. R. D. ROBINSON. op. cit. pp.25-27
53. Second Five Year Plan. p.293 	 54. ibid.p.295
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6.3.1. Inputs into_the Educat on 1 Sy teni
Nonative Inputs
Modern man, modern society cannot progres',
cannot even defend its existence, without
planned, methodical, systematic and continuous
education.
(Turkish National Coirinussion on Education)
In accordance with t1e objectives of his Revolution, Ataturk
started his educatinal modernization in 1924 by abolishing, at a
single stroke, the kadrassah system and incorporating the Madrassahs
and the Kuttabs into tl-e becular national system under the inistry
of Education. 55 Along with l'e I1ic addrassahs was also abolished
the office of the Shaik.h-ul-Islam. In this way the dichotomy between
the religious and the secular education and multiplicity of control
by different authorities wa Lernoved. In 1928, the rel gious clan e
stating that the religion, of the State was Islam, was abolished from
the Constitution 6 This led. to the abolition in 1935 of all teaching
of religion in the public schools, and in 1932, to the closure of the
Imam Hatib schools originally created by the Republic for the
training of the U1ama 7 The old Suleynianiya Madrassah which had been
reconstituted as the Faculty of Divinity in the University of Istanbul
was likewise abolished in 1930 on the recommendations of its own
alumni, a Committee headed by Prof. Kopriilu. During the nine years
of its existence, the number of students at the Faculty had decreased
from 284 in 1924-5 to 20 in 1930.58
In 1928, Ghazi Ataturk embarked upon yet another role of
educational modernizer, declaring himself as the first 'schoolmaster'
of the nation by carrying the blackboard and easel from village to
village and imparting lessons in the spelling of the Latin script which
55. LEWIS, Emergence. p.407
56. BERKES, The Development of Secularism, op. cit. p.477.
57. LEWIS, ibid. p.4O9
58. ibid. also Maynard. op. cit. pp.71-3.
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was adopted to replace the Arabic and Persian scripts 9
 To make
Turkish a fully modern language, the Ghazi ordered, in 1932, the
formation of the Turkish Linguistic Society to evaluate the means
which could"bring out the genuine beauty and richness of the Turkish
language and to elaborate it to the high rank it deserves among world
ianguages1.60 In his six-day marathon speech 'Message to Youth'
before the Grand National Assembly in 1927, Ataturk dwelt upon mainly
on the reconstruction of the Turkish nation on the basis of modernity
with a modern education as its most powerful vehicle.
Then ensued the series of investigations and expert advice by
various educational Commissions, headed by prominent educationalists,
some of international repute, who were invited to deliberate and
recommend the most suitable means of creating a modern national
education system.
1. The Izmir Economic Conference and Education
In 1923, the Izmir Congress was convened to devise a new
economic policy for the Republic. It gave special importance to
agriculture and the developsent of agricultural education. Among
61
other things, the Congress recommended steps:
to introduce practical industrial and agricultural
courses in all primary and. secondary schools; to
establish in every district of the country boarding
schools that would serve neighbouring villages; to
establish a national agricultural college near
Ankara; to provide each primary school with a plot
of land, a stable with animals, flower garden, a
vegetable and fruit orchard witn a residential
teacher,
59. Selma, EKRAM, Turkey, Old and New, Charles Scribner's, N.Y. 1947,
Chapter IV. "A Nation Goes to School", also LEWIS, The Emergence,
pp.419-430., and U. BETh, Language Reform in Modern Turkey.
60. LEWIS . p.427
61. Ilhan BASGOZ and Howard E. WILSON, Educational Problems in Tur,
l92O-4, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1968, pp.56-.7.
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2. The John Dewe Report
In 1924, the Turkish government invited Prof. John Dewey, the
most eminent progressive educationalist of the time, to visit Turkey
and. to give advice on the development of a modern education system.
What prompted the Turkish government to seek Prof. Dewey's advice was,
over and above his progressivness and pragmatism, the highly
successful experience the Professor had had. in China. Dewey presented
two reports to the government after touring the country and inquiring
into the educational needs of Turkey.
Paradoxically enough, Dewey sounded a note of caution about
the hasty engrafting of imported ideas and systems into the Turkish
society, and insisted that the country's own educational experts should
undertake extensive studies of the problems and formulate realistic
plans. The existing educational system, he advised, should 'be allowed
to function in the meantime. Among the various problems that he
suggested be investigated by expert Commissions were: school buildings,
teacher-training, educational administration, publication of
educational literature, libraries and the role of schools for
agricultural development. He wanted educational planning to be based
upon economic, demographic and educational surveys.
He strongly recommended that in villages, primary and secondary
schools should function as centres of community development, by being
a meeting place for the village people, by being health centres for
the area and even by being the agencies for the compilation of economic ,
agricultural and demographic statistics. Professor Dewey also proposed
that local government councillors should join teachers in paying
visits to the neighbouring Western European countries and. in
participating in the educational activities of the area on the model
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of Denmark's folk schools2
3. The Ruhne Rport
In their quest for a-viable educational system for Turkey,
the Government invited another forei expert - the famous German
educationalist, Kerscsteiner to advise on the question. Ke.r-nsteiner
was indisposed at the time, and so, his assistant, Dr. Kubne, conducted
63
the study. He mostly concerned himself with the school curricula. In
his report, Dr. Kuhne recommended. the abolition of the Arabic script
and the adoption of the Latin characters. He advocated that the
increase of educational facilities be provided for the Turkish girls,
especially in household subjects. He also recommnded the expansion
of vocational schools to train skilled craftsmen and. women in the
trades and industries existing in the area concerned so as to meet
the demands of six expanding national economy. Like Dewey, Kubne also
emphasized the need to raise the teachers' social and. economic status
in order that they become more competent and productive. He noticed
that few students were entering into tertiary education, and to off-set
this imbalance, he recommended a rapid increase in the number of
secondary schools. Dr. Kubrie particularly stressed that Turkey should
place greater reliance in the German educational system, and on the
findings of educational research done in Germany.
4. The Omar Buyse Report
Dr. Buyse, the Director General of Technical and Vocational
Education in Belgium, was invited in 1927 to advise on the best ways of
promoting technical education. Buyse conducted a statistical survey
62. John DLWEY, The John Dewey Report, Ankara, Ministry of Education,
Research and Measurement Bureau, 1960; also KAZAMIAS, op. cit.
pp.141-2, also BASGOZ and WILSON, op. cit. pp.67-9.
63. KtJHNE, Mesliki Terbiyenin Inkisanfina Dair Ra, Istanbul, 1939,
summarised in BASGOZ and WILSON, pp.67-69.
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of all the existing crafts and industries and the total available
labour force as well as the future manpower requirements in
agricultural, commercial and industrial enterprises. Dr. Buyse was
critical of the persisting demand among the Turkish intellectuals
for a liteiry education. He advocated that an elaborate system
of technical education be set up in the country, supported largely
by the industries. One way of doing that, he suggested, was to make
foremen working in a particular industry teach their particular
technolor in the local technical school. He also proposed that the
64
national Armed Forces should work for the educational development.
5. The Kemerrer Group Report
In 1933, a group of American experts headed by W. E. Kemerrer
were invited to advise on the economic development of Turkey. The
Group viewed education as an integral part of national economic
development, and disapproved of all the previous Commission Reports
for their treatment of the subject in isolation. In order for the
Turkish National education to bolster the national economy, the
Group recommended four main training programmes:
the training of i) farmers and agricultural experts;
2) engineers and technicians:
3) industrial workers; and
4) businessmen and traders.
The Group were severally critical of the existing three-year
elementary education programme and called for its immediate extention
to five years. In villages where secondary education was scanty, the
Group recommended that at least bright children must be provided with
secondary school education. The Group also questioned the value of
sending Turkish students to study agriculture to countries like France
and. Germany, where agricultural problems differed from those of Turke3
64. Omar BUYSE, Technik Orgretim Hakkinda Rapor, Istanbul, 1939,
quoted in BASCOG and. WILSON, pp.69-7O.
65. BASCOG and WILSON, op. cit.pp.70-72.
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The Turkish Commission on Education
In July, 1960, Prof. Fehmi Yavuz, Minister of Education,
promulgated the Report of the National Commission on Education which was
headed by Prof .Fab.r Iz. The Commission had been composed on the
recommendations of the Ford Foundation Educational Consultant Committee
in January, 1957 which looked into the subject of teachers' training
in Turkey, and recommended that 'it was desirable to study Turkish
education as a whole". The Commission spent a year in touring the
country, visiting educational institutions of all types, discussing
matters with teachers, Principals, Rectors of Universities,
administrators as well as parents and public representatives. It also
went on study tours of Japan, the U.S.A., France, England, West Germany
and Italy to examine the modern educational systems of these countries.
In its report, the Commission declared the aim of National Education in
Turkey:
"Our aims in educational and instructional life
will be defined In accordance with the historical
necessity for the Turkish nation to incline to the
West at all costs, but without severing itself from
its Eastern roots. Relief from the crises of
cultural transmission in which we find ourselves,
and attaining national and social stability within
the Turkish civilization of tomorrow, which will be
created from the most valuable elements of the
Eastern and Western Civilizations, necessitates
energetic, zealous work. But for this national
zeal to be successful it is essential that it is
based on knowledge..... Therefore, all types of
our educational institutions must above all strive
to instill an attitude of industrious effort, and
a sense of duty and. responsibility. Furthermore,
our educational institutions must create the
scientific attitude so that the national ener-
produced by this sense of duty and responsibility
may be fruitful. In this way, we shall have
entered, as a nation, upon the real road to science,
the true guide, and shall have marched with sure
steps towards that success which we must win: the
ideal of a great Turkey." 66
66. The Report of the Turkish National Commission on Education,
American Board of Publication Department, Istanbul, 1960. pp.39-41.
-2O3.
6.3.2. Political Inputs
True to their unswerving zeal for modernity and i conformity
with their adopted model of complete Westernization as the best mode
for modernization, Ataturk and his successors in the Republican Party
were coinnatted to a toal metamorphosis of the social structure in the
new State of Turkey. Their dominant motive seems to have been the
creation of a new elite who held effective power in administration.
This class was to be the product of selective institutions of the LyceesçL.3e)
and the Universities. Since the early Republican, one-party government,
itself was highly centralised and. city-orientated, its upholders were
also trained in the educational institutions located in cities. Of
these, the Lycees and the Universities, particularly the faculties of
Arts and Political Science were monopolised by the upper ruling class
and the professionals. A degree in the Political Science Faculty of
the Universities of Istanbul and Ankara ranked highest among the
priorities of the modernist elites. According to the OECD Study, in
1962, 'half the total enrolled had fathers who were civil servants, while
19 per cent had parents with a professional background. Thus, nearly
70 per cent of those accepted for the faculty come from upper reaches
of the Turkish social pyramid -- senior members of the faculty contBnd
that this proportion has grown rather than declined in recent years.'
The 'esnaf' (technicians) class accounted for only 9 per cent in 1962.
Labourers' and farmers' Sons accounted for only 6 per cent. Another 7 per
cent of the newly enrolled students had fathemin cominerce".6
University education was therefore, the demand mainly of the
modernists and its diffusion among a cross section of society did not
start until after the 1950s, when liberalism was introduced into
politics. Later the Democrats who came to power on the popular vote,
67. OECD. Education and Development, Country Reports, The Mediterranean
Regional Project, Turkey, Paris, 1965. p.69.
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were determined to reverse this monopolizing of status, power and
education by a self-perpetuating urbanite elite class. Their
policies were devoted to the diffusion of enlightenment to the whole
country and particulary in "improving the lot of those whom the
,,68
Republicans had suppressed or ignored . Since the 1950s, with a
rapid and more evenly spread industry and commerce, with increased
pace of construction of the irifra structure and enlargement of the
services sector, the prestige of bureaucratic career, and with it
the Academic education seem decreasing. Technologists and scientic
experts are becoming more in demand at the higher level. Higher
education is, therefore on the increase than before but its orientations
are changing.
According to the 1960 Census of Population, the number of Class A
manpower was about 199,000 or 2-6% of the total manpower, The Second
Five-year plan, basing its target on the Manpower Study of 1962-67
estimated that by 1977, it would increase to 5.9 per cent, i.e. an
extra 265,000 Class A personnel, comprising an increase of 34,000
engineers and architects, 18,000 doctors and dentists, 57,000 university
and. secondary school teachers, and. 96,000 administrators and executives,
would be needed by the year 1977.69 Considering Higher education as the
standard qualification for Class A personnel, about 50 per cent of the
existing stock were not qualified. To meet the additional demand of
Class A personnel, it was considered that higher education must
increase new enrollments from 31,400 in the period from 1963/67 to
about 58,900 in the five years of the plan period. Since the total
graduate output was estimated to be 272,000 by the year 1977, it was
further required that, in the aggregate, the enrollments should
68. RIVIKIN, Area Development for National Growth, The Turkish
Perspective. op. cit. p.95.
69. OECD. Report. op. cit. p.40
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increase from 75,000 in 1963 to 248,000 in l9770 The most acutely
needed expansion was needed in the scientific, technological and
educational fields.
6.3.3. Economic Iuts ,(Technical and Skilled Manpowe)
The Manpower Study revealed that requirements for Technical,
Class B personnel by 1977 would be 528,000; while skilled Class C
workers will be 4,680,000. The existing capacity of the educational
system was able to supply only 258,000 Class B and. 1,754,000 Class C
personnel. It was highly urgent therefore to raise the capacity of
the educational system at junior high school and senior high school
levels including technical and vocational schooling.
Considering the shortage of teachers, and the inadequacy of
buildings it was realised that the capacity of schooling at these
levels could not be increased as rsoposed. Consequently, the
projected expansion bad. to be restricted.
6.3.4. Social Inputs
Social mobility has increased since the emergence in the 1950s
of a multi-party participative nature of polity and greater economic
development. The neglected villagers who clung to their traditional
ways as a result of one-party city-oeiibred modernization have come to
participate in the educational system at a greater rate than ever
before. The changed policy in the agricultural sector has also helped
the peasants to be more mobile and economically strong. To stress
the new mood, the OECD Report observes:
"As a concomitant to the rise of political parties
in the l950s, the teacher in the village lost the
authority with which he had been vested. before 1950
as a representative of the modernising ideol
	 of
the State. While his status drop ed, that of the
local party official - usually an 'ignorant'
peasant rose." 71
70. 0D. Study . pp.49-53
71. ibid. pp.62-63.
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The study further asserts that the villager's attitude to
education and. mobility does not necessarily depend upon his religious
affinities or his ecological situation, but on the practical
difficulties that he faces e.g. the compulsion to employ children on
the field and sending his children to primary school. On the whole
it has been established that the villages in the Eastern Provinces
are more economically backward, and so unappreciative of education
than those in the Western Provinces.
With growing exposure to urbanization, however, geographical
mobility has set in giving rise to an increasing demand for literacy.
Kazaxnias study reveals that great variations still exist between the
North-Western and the Southern and Eastern provinces in terms of
literacy. Whereas, the Istanbul province shows a literacy rate of
73.4 per cent of the population of 6 years and over, the far-off
province of Hakkari has only 11.5 per cent literacy for the same age
group. 72
 Kazwni.as further observes, that since 1955, only sixteen
provinces out of the 67 provinces have shown increase in literacy
and that the increase has been 'quite insignificant'.73
6.3.5. Cultural Inputs
National Integrative Culture
The Turkish concept of modernization, based on the overthrow
of all religious institutions and symbols envisaged the creation of
national integration on the basis of purely nationalistic ideology.
The existing bonds of unity based. on Islam, its linguistic media of
Arabic and Persian, and life styles, were all swept away. All loyalties
of the nation had from then on to be exclusively given to the Turkish
nation, its language which was Romanized, and its history which
72. A. M. KAZAMTAS, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey
p.173.
73. ibid.
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eschewed ite great Ottoman past.
With these abrupt reorientations, Turkish national education
was required to provide socialisation into a new nationalistic
ideology with a greater emphasis on the national Turkish language
and the Turkish history and with distorted focus on the ethnic
background of the Turks. It is interesting to note that under the
impress of these orientations, some extraordinary notions of the
history of the Turkish race and its glories, its contributions to the
74
world, both in the East and the West, were invented.
But the most crucial strand of Turkish nationalism, both as
an integrative symbol and an innovative ideology-, was secularism,
which demanded that schools and the national educational system should
inculcate values associated with rational, scientific and modern
outlooks.
Innovative Culture.
The declaration of a secularisation-westernization ideology
was in itself not enough. In order to keep the innovative culture
an ongoing concern, the whole emphasis of the social system,
particularly its culture and personality systems, had. to be dedicated
to	 scientific and rational approach to life'.75
Thus, Turkish nationalism as an ideological force for
modernization demanded that its educational system should be devoted
to the understanding, investigation and promotion of the scientific
culture. But until 1960, little or nothing had been done towards
this end. The Report of the Turkish National Commission on
Education (1960) commented on this failure of the educational system
as below:
"Althouh it was recognized that this technical
skill Lthat Turkey wished to adopt from the
Wes	 was based on Western science, it can be
74. See KAZAMIAS, op. cit. pp.186-7.
75. ibid. p.265.
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said that, up to the present day, none of the
Islamic countries have properly understood what
Western science actually is. The scientific
and. technical form: it has been diverted onto
the road of imitation and has been unable to
start out on the road of creation. Ataturk's
dictum 'The truest guide in life is science',
although respected as a great saring, had
remained a mere literary text, like a decoration
on the university walls, and has not seen much
enthusiani in practice. In fact in Turkey and the
other Islamic countries new measures arising out
of personal experiences and abstract logic have
frequent1y been adopted in recent times, and no
need has been seen for scientific research or
for waiting for its results". 76
6 4	 Within Educational System Processesof Modernization
6.4.1. Structural and :F'unctional Modernization
The Republic inherited from the Ottoman Republic an illiterate
population and an educational system limited in size, structure and
function. In 1923, 98 per cent of the villages in Turkey were without
any educational facilities and. 90 per cent of the population were
illiterate. There were some 4,900 primary schools, 72 middle schools and
23 lycees in the country. 77
 According to the Acts of 1910 and 1913, all
public schools, other than the Madrassahs, re financed by the Central
Government Treasury and local taxation (compulsory educational tax).78
But the War of Independence completely shattered the local financing
system and this resulted. in the closure or decline of a great many schools.
Between 1923 and 1926, the Revolutionary government continued to search
for expert advice on the future organisation and development of the
inherited system into a viable modern system, suited to the new Turkey
envisaged by Ataturk's modernization ideals.
The year 1926-27 marked the start of the re-organization of the
structure of the educational system by the Ministry of Education
76. The Report of the Turkish National Commission on Education, op. cit.
p.29
77. I, BASCOG and H. E. WILSON, Educational Problems in Turkey, l920-4QL
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1968. p.39.
78. Richard E. MAYNARD, The Lise and. its Curriculum in the Turkish
Educational System, (unpublished) University of Chicago Thesis, 1961.
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Re-organization Law (Maarif Teshkilatina Dair Kanun) which
consolidated the Department of Training and Pedago- (Talim ye Terbiye),
the Department of School Construction, the Student Health Service and
other sub-systems, into Regional Directorates of Education under the
Central Ministry of Education which had been created in 1924. The
Re-organization Law unified, for the first time in Turkey, a national
educational system and removed the multiplicity of control by various
authorities such as the Awkaf Organizations run by the U1iia and. other
private establishments.
Administrative Modernization
Following the general pattern of its cultural borrowing, the
administrative structure of the Turkish educational system has also
emulated the French model more than any other European country in spite
of strong exhortation from the German educationalist, Dr. Kuhne, to
rely heavily on German experts and to follow Germany's example.79
Before the one-par-by rule was introduced in Turkey, democratic
participation in policy making in education at the local level was
allowed, and local councillors and community leaders were relied on
to participate in modern educational organizations. In cities, for
example, councils with local religious leaders and laymen were req.uired,
by article 27 of the Re-organization Act to participate in the local
Boards of elementary education. But during the eight years that their
participation was enlisted, the Government continued to be inundated
with complaints of educational mismanagement. The majority of the
community leaders were themselves educated in the traditional
Madrassaha and were opposed to the new concepts and methods, and. were
not really used to providing a responsible and creative leadership
in educational matters. Criticising their corrupt demeanou±, the
79. BSCOZ and. WILSON. op. cit. p.68
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Minister of Education in 1927 remarked:
"How can we possibly imagine that these local
notables and landlords, these men of influence
who take away all that the peasant produces with
the sweat of his brow and his labour without
spending any effort themselves, will sincerely
work toward providing education for the people.
The consideration and discussion of our primary
education by these persons brings nothing but
grief to the nation....." 80
With the introduction of centralization of administration in
general, educational administration has been also highly centralized.
The National Ministry of Education controlS all the educational
establishments, public and private, and. all policies are formulated
by the Minister. Community interest is, however, represented at
the national level by the Convention of National Education Called
Shura which is a legal entity that advises the Minister on all matters
related to education. Various private and public institutions are
represented on the Shura which meets every four years and makes
suggestions to the Minister.
To advise the Minister on managerial side of educational policy
there is the Board of Education which is concerned with the
specialised aspects of educational policy such as curricula, textbooks,
examinations and the like. The Board is a permanent organization and
its members are appointed by the Minister. None of these advisory
bodies, neither the Convention or the Board, has any executive
authority. Their recruitment, too, is entirely at the discretion of
the Minister and their suggestions also require his approval before
81they become a policy at all.
In the technical aspect of national policy formulation, the
Minister is assisted by the two Secretariats of the Ministry, one
for the general education and. the other for technical and vocational
80. ibid. p.103.
81. 0.E.C.D. Education and DevelopmentCountry Report: Turk
op. cit. pp.99-100.
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education. Both seoretariats are further assisted by the various
specialist d.epartinents such as higher education, elementary,
secondary and adult education and private schools, health,
libraries, museums, etc.62
Local Level Administration
In 1949, a certain amount of decentralization was introduced
into the educational adam.stration when the Provincial Valis were
nominally made responsible for all education within their
jurisd.iction. In theory, the Vali is assisted in the educational
administration by an Advisory Commission and. by the Regional Directorate
of Education which implements policies. In practice, however, all
policies are directly handed down from the central Ministry of
Education and faithfully implemented by the Maarif Muduru (the
Regional Director). 83
Similarly, at the Kaza level, the Karmakam is assisted by an
Education Officer (masrif memuru.) who is appointed by the Minister
and who is responsible both to the Regional Director and the Minister,
as well as to the Kaymakain. 84 But the Kaymakant, in fact, has no
real say in the administration. The O.E.C.D., concluding the report
on the question of democratisation of educational administration in
Turkey, affirms:
"There is thus, little, if any involvement of
the public in educational matters. The only
public organization may be either the parent-.
teacher association, or some local temporary
'school building committee'; if the people
build their school voluntarily without local
funds. This may be one of the reasons why
the public relations aspect of most of the
educational innovations is often hanging fire." 85
82. O.E.C.D. Report. op. cit. p.102
83. A. M. KAZAMIAS, Education and the Q.uest for Modernity. pp.120-121.
84. ibid.
85. op. cit. p.102.
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Organization of the Educational System
Although a rudimentary differentiation of the educational
system into elementary, secondary and higher stages had taken shape
in the pre-revolutionary Turkey, it was not until 1924 that an
articulated network of a modern national system developed. In the
first place, the Republican government drew a clear line between
primary and secondary education. The hitherto six-year primary
education course was reduced to five years and the secondary course
from seven to six years.86 Secondary education was further
differentiated into two stages: the middle and the high stage. The
new type of middle school, called the Ortaokul, with a three-year
progrwnme was articulated with the three-year ii So to form the new
six-year secondary schooling. 87 A network of technical, vocational
and agricultural schools in place of the different kinds of trade
schools, was instituted under a central organization. Female
education was given special priority, and co-education was legalised
first at the Universities and then at other levels. The modernised
structure of the system now consists of: 5-3-3-6 years.
Primary Stage
Starting at 7 and. ending at 11+, the primary stage is the only
compulsory stage. Attendance at primary school is compulsory by law.
But compulsory attendance in the remote eastern villages is difficult
to ensure. A peculiar feature of compulsory education is that the
7-11 age limit is extended to 14, or even 17, in the case of
failures.88
86. KAZAMIAS. op. cit. pp.121-122.
87. ibid.
88. OECD Report. 9.76.
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The types of primary schools vary from multi-shift schools
in the cities to single-teacher, single-classroom schools in
the villages. Moreover, to enlist the children of the sparsely
populated and remote areas of the country, there are the Regional
boarding schools and. mobile schools which reach out to the very
remote settlements. Regional boarding schools are separately
organised for girls and boys.
Secondary education
The Orta
Ortaoku]. for the 12-14 age group is, in the main, a preparatory
stage for the higher stages of the lycee (Lise in Turkish) and the
university. But, built into it are also vocational and technical
schools, enabling school-leavers to enter the labour market as skilled
labourers. Such schools include technical, agricultural, health and
a variety of vocational schools. The students of these vocational
and technical ortaokuls have also the choice to take admission into
Higher Secondary level technical or vocational institutes. But an
overwhelming majority of parents seems to prefer their sons to remain
in the general ortaokuls and leave specialisation until after the
89
orta.
The Lise
Lises again are differentiated into general and technical-
vocational. General Uses are further divided into scientific and
literary depending on the faculty the students wish to enter at the
university.
Industrial Uses include boys' school for the building trade,
motor mechanics, textiles, printing, railways, industrial training
centres and some multipurpose technical institutes. Vocational Uses
89. O.E.C.D. Report. pp.77-78.
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include the commercial institutes, schools for training for hotel
work and for tourism, finance schools, school of meteorology, schools
of surveying, the police schools, secretarial schools, agricultural
institutes, health schools; some are co-educational, others for girls
separately. 90 The idea of comprehensive schools has often beers mooted
by the Shura, but little progress has been made. Turkish
educationalists seem not to int8fere with the supremacy of the general
lise as an elitist institution.91
Higher Education
The only modern Turkish institute of higher learning, opened
in 1900, the Dar-al Funun (House of Sciences), remained restricted to
its original three faculties of Theology, Mathematics and. Literature
until 1908, when schools of Law and Medicine were also incorporated into
it. The Republic raised it to the standard of a modern university and
gave it autonomous status.
At present there are seven universities, said numerous colleges
and institutes for higher education. The universities include over
30 faculties. All the institutions of higher education are teaching
institutions, while Universities and other Research Establishments
also conduct research. They all cater for the 18-22 age group, although
advanced studies extend to the aces of 26_28.92 All institutions of
higher education are, as a rule, co-educational, but, as the 0.E.C.D.
Study points out, two-thirds of the women students enter the social
science and arts faculties.93
90. ibid. p.81
91. ibid. p.82
92. ibid.
93. ibid. p.82
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Teacher Training
Before 1923, the majority of elementary and secondary school
teachers had no professional standing. Anyone who could open a school
and teach, with only a primary school certificate to his credit,
became a primary school teacher. "In fact," remarks Sassani, "very
few people in the country believed that teaching is an art, that it
is something to be acquired, and that schoolmasters must be trained" .94
The Republic established the first modern teacher-training
institute, the famous Ghazi Egitin Enstitusu, in Ankara mainly for
secondary school teachers and inspectors. But the problem of teacher
shortage was so acute that in 1927 it was found that the total output
of all the training schools, colleges amounted to one-fifth of the
demand. 95 As a solution, lycee graduates were employed to fill the
vacancies. At the same time, the Education Minister, Mustafa Necati,
launched a special plan aimed at raising the capacity of the small
training schools to form ten larger institutes, with a target output
of some 2,000 to 3,000 teachers a year. Ten per cent of the provincial
education budget was specially earmarked for the project, which it was
hoped would be highly effective. But, due to the financial
difficulties of the 1930s, and the death of the Minister, the plan
could not take effect. Subsequently, the Ministry of Education
established the Higher Teachers' Training College, the Ghazi Pedagogic
Institute, the Belikesir Teacher-Training School, the Necati Pedagogic
Institute, the Istanbul Physical Education Teachers' School and the
Hasanogla Village Teachers' Institute. Between 1944 and 1947, two more
training schools were established, in Balikesir and Edirne, especially
to meet the increasing demand for the Ortaokuls and the technical
Ortaokul teachers.96
94. Abdul H. K. SASSANI, Education in Turkey, Bulletin 1952, no. 10.
Education, Federal Security Agency, Washington, 1952. p.46.
95. BASCOZ and WILSON. op. cit. pp.130-31.
96. BASGOZ and WILSON. op. cit. p.164.
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The contemporary organization of teachers' education includes
Primary-Teacher training schools, and. Higher Teacher-Training schools.
Higher Teacher-Training schools are of three types: the General
Higher Teacher-Training Schools, the Technical-Teacher Training
Schools; and the Education Institutes.97
Private Enterprise in Education
In spite of Ataturk's policy of statism, private enterprise
in education, mainly by foreign missions, was permitted to flourish
founded either by the local minority coininun.ities of Armenians, Greek
and Jew, or by the foreign Missionary societies of America, Italy,
France and Holland. These schools operated mainly in towns and
cities; and provided instruction in foreign languages, such as English,
French, German and Italian. They all charged handsome fees and
eventually rose to be prestigious schools drawing their clientele
frciu the rich or influential urban modernists. They paid
attractive salaries to the local teachers, mostly women, who were
happier to work in prestigious urban schools than to move around
in villages.98
6.4.2.pnsion of the Capacity of the System
-	 Pre-primary school stage
Pre-primary schooling at the mosques, mainly I or the teaching
of the Qu.ran and Arabic, was prevalent in Ottoman Turkey, as in all
Muslim countries. Secular infant schools, however, did not develop
considerably until towards the end of the 1940s. In 1950, there were
52 Nursery, Kindergarten and Infant Schools with an enrollment of
1,760. Since then, however, pre-primary schooling seems to be
97. SASSANI. op. cit. pp.47-48
98. OECD Report. op. cit. pp.84-85.
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becoming more pupula 9 and a st'eady expansion in it can be gleaned
from the table below:
Table VI.3.
Expansion in the Pre-Primary Schools
1950-1968
Number of
Year	 Institutions	 Enrollment
1950	 52	 1,760
1955	 56	 2,573
1960	 64	 2,730
1964
	
80	 3,018
1966	 96	 3,633
1967	 97	 3,493
1968	 108	 4,054
Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks 1965-70.
Primary Stage
Two major factors, the Latinization of Turkish language and the
shortage of teachers, affected the expansion of all schooling in the
early years. The Republican government was very keen to raise the
rate of literacy from the very low 10 per cent prevailing at the time
of national independence. As educational vitality started, the number
of schools increased, and more and more children were provided with
schooling facilities. The new Regime put great faith in improving
literacy for its utility value in building up a national consciousness
and an empathetic capacity among the Turkish nation°° The task was
ardous, but happily Ataturk himself saw the rate of literacy doubled
in his lifetime, thongh wide disparities still existed between the
urban and rural, and the male and female population. High emphasis
was placed on the expansion of primary education, and the gradual
99. The Turkish National Commission on Education (19) strongly
stressed the importance of opening pre-primary schools particular
in the industrialised areas but called for private enterprise
under state support to take the initiative. pp.42-43.
100. TC&ZAMTAS, op. cit. p.l74.
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expansion since independence is shown in the table below:
Table VI.4
Expansion of Primary Education in Turkey from 1923-68
Year	 No. of Institutions	 Enrollment
1923
	
4,894	 241,941 a
1930	 6,598	 489,299 a
1940	 9,418	 905,000 a
1950	 17,428	 1,616,626 b
1955	 18,723	 1,981,805 b
1960	 24,323	 2,866,020 b
1966	 31,906	 4,273,870 b
1967	 33,369	 4,509,433 b
1968	 34,907	 4,790,183 b
Sources: (a) BASGOZ and WILSON . (b) UNESCO Statistical
Yearbooks 1965-70.
It appears, from the figures in the table above, that the
effective take-off in the expansion did not start until the 1950s
and then, when the fifteen years planning started to make impact, in
the 1960s. The long-range planning set up a target to provide
primary school education to 100 per cent of the school age population
by 1972. According to this target, in 1967 the estimated
enrollment at primary schools would be 87.9 per cent of the 4,736,000
children. The above table however, indicates that the actual
enrollment in 1967 stood at 4,509,433, leaving a gap of about 230,000.
Again, taking an estimated average annual increase of 251,000 in the
enrollment, the total number of children attending primary schools
in 1968 was supnosed. to be 4,987,000, but the actual enrollment was
4,790,000, leaving a shortfall of 197,000. The OECD Study estimated,
on the basis of the Develonent Plan, that by 1972, all children of
school age would be attending schools.'01
Secondary Education
Table 5 shows the expansion of enrollment capacity of all
101. OECD Report op. cit. p. 108
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types of secondary schools from 1923-1968.
Table VI.5.
Secondary Education in Turkey 1923-1968
ROIl ENT
Year	 ORTA	 LISE	 V0CTI0NAL	 TEA.CI[ER
____	 ____	 ____	 __________	 TRAINING
1923	 5,905	 1,241	 6,547
	
a
1930	 25,398	 5,699	 9,296	 a
1940	 92,308	 24,862	 20,264	 3,877 a
1950	 65,168	 22,169	 52,177	 16,301 b
1960	 253,474
	
58,954
	 69,775	 21,216 b
1962	 317,938	 82,062	 72,241	 26,872 b
1967	 755,671*
	 146,235	 57,788 c
1968	 849,533*	 153,457
	
60,576 c
Sources: (a) BASGOZ and WILSON and KAZM(tAS
(b) ibid.
(c) UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks
(*) indicates the total Second level enrollment.
Next to the task of socialisation in the modernization ideals,
- the new national consciousness and empathy - the Republican
government and Ataturkism in general, were keen to see the new social
order formed by the educational system. As an agency for social
placement, aecond.ary schooling was on the list of their priorities.
Already the Lise had provided Turkey with the bulk of its modernist-
secularist intelligentsia, and the new regime was naturally
interested in its expansion and strengthening as an institution
responsible for the creation of modernising leadership. But equally
important was their desire to expand the capacity of the educational
system to provide manpower demand and skills, without which the
economy of the new order would not progress.
Until 1935, the increase in secondary schooling gradually
increased, the Ortas growing more rapidly than the Lises. The
Ministry of Education decided to open at least one Orta in every
distri.ct°2 Although this was not possible until the 1950s, enrollment
102. KAZAMIAS, op. cit. p.160.
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in all types of secondary schools had steadily expanded all through
the 1940s. The Democratic party regime gave str ng impetus to the
expansion of education in general, and the number of secondary schools,
particularly in the rural areas, multiplied dramatically. Between
1950-60, the number of the Ortas rose from 381 to 713, with an
enrollment increase from 65,168 to 253,474; the number of Lises increased
from 88 to 182, with their enrollment rising from 22,169 to 58,954,
and. the numbeiof technical and vocational schools and enrollment
exceeded those of the general Lises. The next rapid acceleration took
place, though with occasional setbacks, under the impact of the various
Development Plans after 1963. The total enrollment in the Ortas and.
Lises in 1962 stood at 400,000 and in the vocational schools at 72,241.
By 1967, the end-year of the First Five-year Plan, it had increased to
755,671 and 146,235 respectively. 103 The pace of expansion seems then
to have been kept during the years ahead.
Another aspect of the expansion of secondary education to be
guaged is the relative increase in the secondary general and technical
and vocational enrollments. In 1963, the number of pupils in secondary
general (Lise) formed 61.3 per cent of the over-all secondary
enrollment. The long-range plans aimed to increase these numbers by
136 per cent by the year 1977, but the ratio of secondary general (Lise)
enrollment decreased to 53.7 per cent. Correspondingly, the plans
targeted to increase the enrollment in technical and vocational uses
from 29,700 in 1963 to 1,8,600 in 1977: an increase of 266 per cent and
an increase in the ratio from 38.7 per cent to 4 .3 per cent.
103. ibid. p.108
104. ibid.
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Higher Education
The capacity of the Universities and institutions of higher
education did not expand much until in the mid 1940s, when the
students from the newly established secondary- schools and. uses made
a greater demand for further education. University education in the
early stages of the Republican regime was largely restricted to the
education of the high political, administrative and aristocratic
elite class. Again, the liberalisation of policy, after the single-
party system ended, gave rise to greater participation by the rising
generation of ambitious young men and young women to benefit from
higher education. The Democratic Party's economic and development
policies further helped to accelerate expansion. A gradual rise in
enrollment at the higher level is shown in the table below:
Table VI.6
Enrollment at Higher Education Institutions
1923-69
Year	 Enrollment
Male	 Female	 Total
	
1923-24	 2,914 a
	
1930-31
	
4,331 a
	
1934-35	 5,808	 1,082	 6,890 b
	
1939-40	 10,137
	
2,523
	
12,660 b
	
1944-45	 15,850
	
4,161	 20,011 b
	
1949-50	20,363	 4,728	 25,091 b
	
1954-55	 23,220	 4,839
	
28,059 b
	
1959-60	 43,018	 10,466	 53,484 b
	
1964-65
	 73,559	 19,832	 93,491 c
	
1966-67	 101,132	 24,515	 125,647 c
	
1968-69	 130,531	 29,803
	
160,334 c
Sources: (a) BASGOZ and VILS0N. p. Appendex
(b) OEXJD Report 1965. Table 52
(c) UITESC0 Statistical Yearbooks.
A breakdown of the figures in Table6 would indicate that,
whereas enrollment in institutions of higher education increased
about four times during the lifetime of Ghazi Ataturk, the capacity
of higher education institutions expanded constantly during the next
two decades, until after the First Five-year Plan in 1968. The Plan
had linked the development of higher education with the manpower
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demand and a far greater and diversified expansion particularly in
technical, scientific and educational fields. Another significant
increase has been in the enrollment of female students, which rose
dramatically from 4,839 in 1955 to 10,466 in 1960 and then in the
next five years to 19,832 to stand at 29,803 in 1969.
Faculty-wise increase in the expansion of higher education
is shown in tabl&J17 below:
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The most noticeable increase in Turkish higher education seems
to have been in the social sciences which as the OECD report asserts,
has high prestigious value in Turkey. 105 High on the list of
priorities still ranks law, which seems to be particularly attractive
for its traditional reputation of enabling lawyers to enter politics
and bureaucracy or achieving independent professional status. Next to
social sciences, the medical faculty has also registered a rapid
increase, particularly since 1960. Scientific and technological studies
have increased relatively more slowly than the social sciences. The
slowest to grow is the agricultural faculty which, although offered at
four universities: Ankara, Ixnir, Erzurum and the Middle East Technical
University, Ankara1 does not provide enough motivation.
The pattern of growth and expanion in the higher education,
therefore, does not follow the professional manpower demand.106 The
influence of city-orientated.1 earlier policies of modernization seem still
to weigh heavily with the youth whose ideal careers still remain to be
the prestigious rather than the productive professions. 107 The long-range
planning targets, however, visualise the greatest increases in the
medical and engineering faculties in the fifteen years of planning. The
Five-year Plans forecast that in 1977, the number of students in
medical faculties will increase to 45,000 while those in engineering
will increase to 47,800. The least growth, depicted by the Plans, would
be in agricultute where enrollment will increase only by 32,000.
However, it was forecast that even this low rate of increase, will
produce 14,000 professional agriculturalists in the fifteen years.108
105. ibid. 83.
106. ibid.
107. ibid.
108. ibid. p.118
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6.5 . Educational Outputs - Inputs to the Society
6.5.1. Inputs to the Polity
Consonant with the ideological thought of Zia Gokalp, the father
of Turkish nationalism, Ataturk and his Republican Party envisaged the
creation of their fleet of modernizing cities through the highly
selective institutions of the Lise and the University. C-okalp advocated
that the Lise should be an institution for the 'enlightened ... ruling
class'. 109
 In the Turkey of Ataturk and Ismet Inonu, therefore, all
the graduate output of the Lises entered either civil or military
bureaucracy, politics and, later, when the Political Science and Law
faculties of the Universities of Ankara and Istanbul had grown in
capacity, the majority of the modernising elites had come from them.
Ataturk did not believe as Prof. Dodd has remarked,in an open, competitive
polity 0
 So, recruitement into his brand of modernising leadership
had to be restrictive and closed.
The output of graduates from the Lises remained very limited and
only a few Lises in the major cities of Ankara and Istanbul produced
great numbers of leaders. As Kazamias points otit, the famous Istanbul
Erkek Lise was aptly nickamned as the 'Ministers' School'. "It had been
particularly outstanding" notes Kasaixu.as "in the relatively large numbers
not only of cabinet ministers, but also of high political personages
who have received their secondary education in it"11
In the same m-nner, the contribution of the Faculties of Political
Science and Law in the formation of the top modernising leadership is
evident from the following findings of a study conducted by Prof. Frey.
109. See KAZAIiIAS, Education and the Quest for Modernity, op. cit. p.228.
110. 0. H. DODD, Politics and Government in Turkey, op. cit. pp.172-73.
111. ibid. p.214.
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"In the general cateory of civil bureaucrats," maintains Frey,
"many of whom had. reached positions as deputies
and cabinet ministers during the First Turkish
Republic (1923-60), more than half had attended
the Political Science Faculty of Ankara
University, and 23 per cent, the Law Faculty-.
Of the cabinet ministers during the same period,
from 50 to 75 per cent had attended these same
two faculties. It should also be noted that in
Turkey appointment to high civil service posts
(e.g. Valis and Kaymakflms) presupposes attendance
at uxu.versities, especially at the aforementioned
two faculties. It is not surprising, therefore,
that 99 per cent of this branch of the civil
bureaucracy are graduates of the Political Science
and. the Law Faculties of Ankara University". 112
In the 1950s, largely due to economic liberalisation and the
resultant acceleration in all-round aevelopment, a new class of
modernising leadership did emerge in the shape of entrepreieurs, economists
and bankers, who ventured into business and opened up a new avenue of
113influence as against the dominating passion for career in administration.
The high prestige that administration enjoyed in the earlier times was no
longer there, and professional careers as well as business drew a
considerable share of the university output. The comparative share of
all the various faculties in the graduate output did improve
considerably over the decades. But the attraction of social sciences:
114,,law, political science and. education still dominated. Moreover, in a
country, such as Turkey observe the authors of the 0EC Report
where being an engineer has not - as yet - the implication of sullying
one's hands with manual labour, but usually involves directive and
control duties, the role is seen as one of administrative rather than
physical activity. The same is true of architects, doctors and
pharmacists." 115
 So even professional education is sought really for its
112. F. W. FEE!, The Turkish Political Elite, Cambridge, Mass, quoted
in KAZAJIAS, Education and the Quest for Modernitj, op. cit. p.214
113. OECD Report, pp.65-69
114. See Richard D. ROBINSON, High Level Manpower in EC Development -
The Turkish Case -
115. OECD Report, p.69
'-228..
bureaucratic prestige rather than for purely productive purposes.
The graduate output in all the faculties of the Universities and
Institutions of Higher Education is shown in the table below:
Table VI.8.
The Output of Graduates with Faculties in Turkey
1923-1968
-	 FACULTIES
Arts and. Fine Social Medicine Engineering Agriculture Total
ScienceArts Sciences _________ ____________ ____________ ______
1923	 422 a
1928	 636 a
1935	 133	 3	 359	 217	 96	 25	 833 b
1940	 311	 15	 578	 338	 100	 58	 1,400 b
1945	 320	 18	 759	 515	 264	 83	 1,959 b
1950	 384	 14	 1,136	 412	 246	 245	 3,435 b
1960	 540	 42	 1,755	 921	 1,128	 564	 4,950 b
1965	 1,350
	
164
	
6,245	 1,084	 1,129	 639
	
10,611 c
1968	 2,524	 197	 7,718	 1,707	 2,083	 1,025	 16,356 c
Sources: (a) BASGOZ and WILSON, Appendix.
(b) UNESCO Report. pp.154-159
(c) UNESCO Satistical Yearbooks.
Evidently, the largest increase in the output comes from the
faculties of social sciences, which now include education and law. The
6,524 social science graduates in 1965 included 2,457 in Education and
816 in Law, and in 1968, among the 7,718 social scientists, 1,392 were
educationists and 1,326 lawyers. The relatively smaller increase in
the faculties of medicine and engineering indicates that the modernising
leadership in Turkey still does not constitute technocrats but
bureaucrats. The growing increase in the output of agriculturalists
is, in view of the O.E.C.D. R port's observation above, yet another
indication that 	 the students from rural areas who had little or
no chance of entering into the 'elite' faculties and social status, were aI:o
able, through the faculty of agriculture to obtain a degree and a
bureaucratic position in the Ministry of Agriculture.
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6.5.2. Outputs to the Economy
Manpower Supply
Judging by the graduate output of higher education and
secondary schools, it is evident that the educational system has been
acutely deficient in meeting the manpower demands estimated by the
Fifteen-year projections. The Five-year development plans had,
taking into account the present stock in 1963 and the projected expansion
of the capacity of the educational system at all levels, visualised. a
considerable gap in the demand and supply. But judging by the figues
available, it appears that, whereas new enrollment targets are being
approached gradually, the graduate output by the end of the First Five-
year Plan in 1967 fell much short of even the calculated supply target
not to mention the actual manpower requirements. Tables anLl.1O below,
would bear out the shortfalls in the supply of graduates and school
leavers in 1967.
Table VI.9.
Deficiencies in the Supply of High level Manpower
as Measured by the Graduates Output
1963-67	 (in thousandaD
	
Total	 Tech.	 Ar.	 Med.	 Other	 Edn.
First Plan target	 42.7	 6.1	 3.5	 4.3	 17.2	 11.6 a
(in 1967)
Actual Output	 l64	 2.1	 1.0	 9.1	 2.6 b
(in 1967)	 26.3
	
4.0	 2.5	 3.6	 8.1	 9.0
Source: (a) OECD Report, p.51 (b) UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks.
Class B and. C Personnel
The First Five-year Plan had estimated that the capacity of
secondary general and voc&tional education to supply the required number
of Class B and C workers had to increase 427 per cent by the year 1977.
It required the supply of 270,000 Class B and 3,330,000 Class C workers
from an expanded education, over and above the supply of these categories
of employment of the existing capacity. The actual supply included a
degree of expansion in the capacity of secondary education by the end of
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the First Plan year i.e. 1967. This can be seen from the table
below:
Table VI.lO.
Deficiencies in the Supply of Class B and C Workers
as Measured by the Pupils in Secondary- Schools
1967	 (in thousands)
Targeted	 Actual	 Deficiency
Total Orta and.
Lise pupils in:
1967	 1,0211a	 775•6b	 245.5
1968	 1,067.4
	 859.5	 217.9
Sources: (a) OECD Report. (b) UNESCO Statistical
Yearbook 1971.
Teacher Requirements
One of the main causes for educational lags and deficiencies in
Turkey has been the growing shortage of teachers at all levels; a
problem which has persisted ever since national independence. Two
typical causes, i.e. economic and social, have been ascribed to the
continuing failure of the educational system to produce and to maintain
a viable teaching staff. Economically, the teachers' salary structure
does not offer enough attraction for ambitious students to train
themselves as teachers, and drop-out rate from the profession remains
considerable. There are not enough inducements to attract teachers to
work in the rural areas, since the contrasts and differences between the
cities and villages in lifestyles and amenities are sharply
•	 116distinguishable. Socially, a teacher s prestige is not very- high,
particularly in the villages where his influence as a moderniser is
rather suspect. A village ifoja (religious teacher), despite his limited
116. Prof. KLZ.MIAS has pointed out that "in conversation with several
girls in urban uses, he was infomed that, although girls liked
teaching, they did not plan to enter the profession for several
reasons, chief of which seemed to be that they felt they could not
'be safe' outside the big metropolitan centres; and even if they
were prepared. to take up an assignment away from these centres or
from home, their parents would not allow them to do so. The
possibility of being appointed or transferred to a remote tcwn in
Eastern Anatolia also seems to be a factor which discourages many
young men from choosing teaching as a career." op. cit. p.157.
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knowledge, still wields more authority in his surroundings than a
government schoolteacher. Again, social prestige being the highest
attraction for higher education generally, many trained teachers are
prone to resigning their teaching career at the slightest chance of
getting a more prestigious job. 1171n 1962, the existing teaching force,
in both the primary and. secondary schools, was found to be extremely
strained and over-burdened. The pupil-teacher ratio was among the
highest in the world. A primary teacher had. an average of 68 pupils
(72 to each full-time teacher or 63 pupils, if assistant teachers were
included); while a secondary teacher had 66 pupils on average'8
The fifteen-year planning target was set at reducing these intolerable
ratios to 40:1 in the primary school, 23:1 in the Orta, and 15:1 in
the Lise 9 Considering this target and the expected expansion in the
enrollment at these Levels, the Plan estimated that the educational
system must produce 179,000 primary teachers during the fifteen year
period and 49,900 secondary teachers 2° But the existing capacity of
the educational system, taking into account the expansion envisaged,
was quite inadequate to meet these targets. Considerable deficiencies
in the overall supply were, therefore, inevitable. The table.11 below
shows the obvious shortfalls in the supply of teachers during these
years.
117. ibid.
118. 0CD Report. pp.108-123
119. ibid.
120. ibid.
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Table VI.II
TEkCBR-REUIREMENTS, SUPPLY MU) DEPICIENQES BY
UCTI0NAL LEVELS 1963-77
Level and Year	 Requirement Supply	 Deficiency Pup:Teach.ratio
Primary Teachers
1967
1972
1977
Secondary (Orta)
1967
1972
1977
118.4
149.8
170.5
28.0
30.2
34.7
68.1
92.3
114.4
11.7
17.5
22.6
- 50.3
- 57.5
- 56.1
- 16,3
- 12.7
- 12.1
69.5
64.8
59.6
55.1
39.7
35.3
Secondary (Lise
1967	 25.2	 15.3
	 - 9.9	 23.6
1972	 31.3
	
21.6	
- 9.7	 20.9
1977	 35.2	 27.3
	 - 7.9	 18.7
Higher Education (General)	 Additional Supply
1967	 3.2	 1.9	 - 1.3
1972	 3.6	 1.7	 - 1.9	 0.6
1977	 4.0	 1.6	 - 2.4	 2.2
H1E}ler Medical/Technical
1967	 4.6	 1.9
	
- 2.7
1972	 8.8	 2.0	 - 6.8	 0.6
1977	 11.5	 2.1	 - 9.4	 7.1
T eacher-T raining (Primary)
1967	 5.0	 3.8	 - 1.2	 0.1
1972	 5.1	 3.9	 - 1.2	 0.3
1977	 5.0	 3.9	 - 1.1	 0.3
Source: OECD Report Tables 25 and 30. pp.114 and 120.
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6.5.3. Outjuts to Society
Enhancement of npathy throuji Literacy
In spite of the constantly rising rate of literacy in Turkey
since the national independence, as shown in the table below, close
observers have asserted that the country as a whole still remains
•	 121
non-mobilized.
Table VI.l2
Literacy in Turkey
1927-1970
Year	 Percentage of literates
1927	 10.6
1935
	
19.2
1940	 22.5
1945	 29.0
1950	 34.0
1955	 40.9
1960	 48.7
1970	 49.0
Source: BASGOZ and WILSON,
UNESCO Yearbooks.
Literacy in Turkey is calculated on the basis of the answer to
a simple question "Can you read and write?" and, as Kazanaas points out,
"Often a person who is able to scrawl his name is considered literateI22
The 49.0 per cent rate of literacy so measured sheds little light on
the 'glaring disparities' that remain besetting the country in terms of
urban-rural, male-female, and. age-group divisions. The Kazamias study
reveals that the rate of deviation in literacy varies from 73.4 per cent
in the province of Istanbul to only 11.5 per cent in the remote province
of Hakkari. Again the national literacy rate according to the 1960
cen.sus showed 54.5 literate males as against 25.2 females. The same
study maintains that during the five years period between 1955 and 1960,
121. See A. M. KAZAMIAS, Education and the Quest for Modernity, pp.174-177.
122. ibid.
123. ibid.
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there has been a decline in literacy from 48.7 per cent in 1955 to
43.3 per cent in l96O 2 n the most important age group of six to
fourteen years.
These trends and failures of the Turkish educational effort
towards modernization judged by the increase in literacy and by the
creation among the illiterate masses of a lugh rate of empathy, so as to
put them at par with the Western democratic nations, indicate that
during the last forty or fifty years of its modernization, Turkey has
remained highly deficient in attaining its set targets. Uneven progress
remains evident; and it was not until the 1950s that Ataturk's
modernization ideals began to affect the vast rural populations.
Rural Development through Education
The Turkish villager, in spite of the great revolutionary strides
made in the city-world around him, still remains largely isolated and
immobile. The dominating pattern of his culture is characterised by
"exasperating vagueness instead of curiosity, superstition rather than
knowledge that form the perceptive or cognitive qualities of life and
surroundings that he lives in".125
The outlook of the Turkish villager towards the education of
his children is determined mostly, as the O.E.C.D. Report affirms,
by the "barrier encountered in integrating the village personality with
that required for success at school, as well s the absence of immediate
motivation for iiteracy1.126 He could hardly afford to forego the petty
income of his child earrd either in domestic or agricultural labour.127
Furthermore, the intangible rewards of literacy are not particularly
appreciated by the traditional villager. The Kazainias study concludes
that "it is not within the village pattern of behaviour to go into town
124. ibid.
125. D. LERNER, The Passing of the Traditional Society, op. cit. p.192
126. OECD Report, op. cit. pp.62-63.
127e KA7AIIAS, op. cit. p.172.
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for schooling. Normally, the village child graduates from a primary
school in his or a neighbouring village and then reverts to the
traditional pattern of village life. In villag4ye8, he is 'educated.'.
That is enough."28
The problem of rural backwardness and ignorance among villagers
deeply concerned Ataturk and. his party during the formative period of
their government. The famous dictum of Ataturk that 'the real owner
and. master of the country is the peasant' kept reveiating in all
policy statements, speeches and press publications in the 19308.129
In 1929, the National Schools Law was passed to establish centres in
villages to impart literacy in villages. These schools consisted of
two courses: one for the beginners and the other for those who already
knew how to read and write. In 1932, the National schools replaced
the famous Turkish Hearth Clubs introduced by the Young Turks in the
l9lOs and 1920s as centres for the promotion of nationalistic
consciousness. But the National Schools remained inadequate to fight the
battle against colossal ignorance. The attendance ol' village children
in schools remained extremely poor. The villager considered schools
as irrevelant to his lifestyle and was more apDreclative of the Imam, the
Hoja (religious teacher) for his closer ties with the villager and his
service to the community. As one observer noted,
"The teacher sent by the Ministry to the villages
looks down on the villagers. He does not like
children. Moreover, he wears clothes that are
objectionable to the villagers. The village pupil
cannot use the theoretical knowledge that the
teacher gives him. The Imam of the village, on
the other hand, taught the Koran, Ilmihal and
Muaminediye to the village children, led. the
villagers in prayers at the village mosque five
times each day, went to weddings and. funerals and
visited the sick.....Since the Imam also settled
disputes among the villagers, he was held in
higher esteem than the teachers." 130
128. ibid. p.173
129. BASGOZ and WILSON, op. cit. 134
130. BASGOZ and #ILSON, op. cit. pp.130-131.
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In 1933, the new Minister of Education, Resit Galip, showed
his great concern for the immovable traditionalism that beset the
villagers, by appointing a Village Affairs Commission. The Commission
put high uphasis on the foimation of a new type of teacher to supplant
the Hoja. The ideal village teacher, they asserted should be able:
1. "To modify the beliefs of the villagers by
pioneering the principles of refomism,
secularism and. republicanism;
2. to modify the social life of the village by
ensuring the application of Republic's civil
code in the villages, and its introduction
into family life and individual relations,
thus paving the way for the code's essential
aim: the development of a more modern way of
life among the peasants.
3. to modify the material and. economic standards
of the village by introducing advanced
agricultural methods, a wider range of goods
and a&justed. marketing conditions;
4. to be an intellectual, that is, to serve as a
well trained teacher able to keep abreast of
new educational developments." 131.
By 1940, however, the situation of village education had not improved.
It was recorded that 95 per cent of children from villages in the
Eastern and Southeastern provinces had never attended any school. In
the Hakkari and Siirt provinces, the percentage was as high as 90 per
cent while in some Western provinces the percentage for the same year
132
was found to be only 39.6.
The main efforts of the Republican government and Party remained,
in the last years of Ataturk, concentrated on the establishmt and
spreading of the newly conceived People's Houses (Halkevi), modelled
mainly on ideas from the Soviet experience, as the generic centres for
village modernization and the inculcation of the ideals of Ataturkism.
These Peoples' Houses were designed to perform a variety of educational
and cultural activities such as the study of language and literature,
131. ibid. 138.
132. ibid. p.128.
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theatricals, sports, social welfare, as well as reading rooms,
133libraries and publications. Some of these Houses had already assumed
outstanding reputation in the dissemination of national culture during
the lifetime of Ataturk. The one in Ankara boasted of a library with
40,000 volumes and many others in small towns encouraged young writers
to contribute to the House journals on local and national matters.
But, officialdom and formality turned them into superficial
institutions. As BasGoz and Wilson conclude,
"The Peoples' Houses had been principally designed
to fill the gap between educated elite at the top
of Turkish society and the larger uneducated
masses below, through an intensive education
programme. Unfortuantely, the Houses became and
remained centres for bureaucrats and those who
already had an education. From the beginning, all
government officials were instucted to support
the Rouses.... The majority of uneducated people,
on the other hand, did not participate, refusing
to accept the Houses as their activity centres." 134
Again, the earlier emphasis placed by the 1923 Izuar Economic
Congress on the need to open agricultural schools, and to introduce
practical industrial and agricultural courses in all primary and
secondary schools to integrate education with village needs, did not
materialise into an effective programme. A dozen secondary level
agricultural schools that did come into existence as a result of the
proposals were closed in 1927 when the German Committee of Experts
recommended the reversal of the policy in favour of the creation of
Higher Institutions for Agricu tural Education. Consequently, the
Yuksek Ziraat Enstitusu was opened in Ankara in 1933, to house the
schools of Agriculture, Veterinary Iiedicine and Forestry. The Institution
became successful in reviving the dying secondary level agricultural
schools; but, paradoxically, the whole system of agricultural education
once successfully operational was monopolized by the children of the
133. ibid. p.154
134. ibid. p.157
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non-agriculturalist class of merchants, craftsment and government
officials, mainly because it provided free boarding education and a
chance for a prestigious career. So, in agricultural education too,
it was the bureaucratic class that rea ed the benefit while the poor
peasants remained deprived. By 1950, the peasant had started on the
trail 'from farm to the factory' and urbanization was accelerating.
Geographical mobility in turn generated among the villagers the need for
an increase in empathetic capacity and. they came to realise the value
of formal education for their children. This change in the outlook
of the villagers and their rising demand for education ushered in a new
era of village uplift. Between 1950-65, the level of literacy in the
country rose from 34 per cent to 48 per cent. In 1960, the Census
Report confirmed that 70 per cent of the rural population was
illiterate, of which 27 per cent were male and 73 per cent female.135
Between 1960-1966, there was a 42 per cent increase in the total number
of students in primary education and of this increase 45 per cent was
registered in the villages. The number of villages having schools
increased by 24 per cent during this period. The Second Five-Year Plan
was highly consious of the problem of the lack of suitable educational
facilities in the villages. It particularly emphasised that special
efforts should be made to provide courses for girls and women in the
villages to teach them subjects like Home Economics and Hygiene.136
Female Education/Co-education
Female education in modern Turkey received special impetus by
the promulgation in 1926 of the Tur ish Civil Code which established
fundamental equality between the sexes. Ataturk himself was a staunch
supporter of co-education, and the official policy of his government was
135. Second Five-Year Plan. p.268
136. ibid. p.68
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declared by the then Minister of Education as follows:
"The Ministry of Education does not and will not
think of a separate treatment for girls and
boys either in educational institutions or
as youths. Our young iris and boys will be
trained within the same system, and they will
follow the same path". 137
Co-education started, however, with the admission of girl
students into the university faculties of medicine, law, education and
engineering in the session of 1923-24, and only spread later into the
secondary and middle stages, as more new schools with ap ropriate
facilities were opened. At the time of national independence, apart
from the three uses in Istanbul and a few teachers training institutes
in various parts of the country, there hardly existed any schools for
girls in Turkey. %Vhen a legislative proposal was put up in 1927 for the
introduction of co-education, it did not go without vocifercus and
protracted opposition. The Training and Instruction Department itself
vehemently opposed the move. A compromise solution was found by
allowing co-education to extend to the Orta level. The government,
however, showed its determination to introduce it to all levels, and
when in 1930, the Congress of Iiegional Directors called for an end to
co-education, the opposite became a reality and the debate was closed
for ever. Henceforth co-education in Turkey became the law.138
But the acceptance of co-education in principle as a policy did
not in itself result in a breakthrough for female education in Turkey;
nor indeed, did it make the Turkish women into a replica of the Western
woman. Glaring imbalances still remained. The Turkish National
Commission on Education, for example, deliberating on the role of woman
in Turkey and her education, observed:
137. ibid. p.108
138.
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"There exists today in the cities of Turkey, and
particularly in the great cities, a type of modern
woman who differs little in dress and behavious from
her Western counterpart - at least she appears like
this, whatever her intellectual level may be. Some
of these, having a false conception of freedom, and
disliking duty and responsibility, are too inclined
to the pleasures of modern life. But besides these
examples of women who have gone to the extreme in
following a false modernism, there is a group of
valuable and useful women who are well-educated by
our standards and who play an important part in
raising the level of our national culture. At the
same time, in some places in the country, there is,
living in the same town or the same building as
this modern Turkish woman, a type of woman who, in
outlook and personality, closely resembles her
fifteenth century ancestors. Inlàct, Turkish women
can be best understood as cons sting of groups in
varying degrees of development between these two
extremes." 139
The Commission was much concerned with the disharmony and
uneasiness of the Turkish woman in spite of her modern education. It
impressed upon the educational system the need to inculcate among
the young citizens the spirit of mutual respect and a responsible
outlook.
In terms of distribution of students in the educational
institutions according to sex, studies reiterate that it is the already
educated upper and middle classes whose girls are increasingly taking
part in the educational services and rofessions, whereas the girls from
the poorer, workmers homes are fewer. It is true that female enrollments
since national independence have increased steadily at all levels, but
the fact remains that female education, on the whole, lags behind
compared with that of the male. Questioning the exaggerated claims of
success of the Turkish woman in education s advanced by writers like
Nun Eren, Prof. Kazamias has remarked:
"This study casts doubt at such.nncomium of
progress in female education. Althouh today's
uses include more girls than ever before, although
more illiterate parents than before may send their
139. Report of the Turkish National Commission on Education, op. cit.
p.113.
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daughters to 'high school', the fact remains that
in the uses, girls with illiterate parents
represent only a 'trickle' of the total population
even in the urban centres. The more educated the
parents are, the better the girl's chances are for
a lise education and for higher education." 140
6.5.4. Cultural Outputs
Integrative Culture (Religion and Language)
The Turkish Revolution envisaged the transformation of the total
social structure of the modern Turkey by supplanting its centuries old
integrative, religio-linguitic culture by secular nationalism, in winch
a national language, national history and. modern scientific values would
unite its people for an onward march. All religious instruction in
schools was prohibited and the new national language with the Boman
script replaced the Arabic and Persian languages of religion, letters
and culture. Right through the Ataturk regime, these anti-Islamic
policies were imposed with a heavy hand. But, it is significant to
notice, that as soon as liberalism returned to the Turkish scene in the
1940s , widespread demands for the re-introduction of religious studies
in the educational iiistitutions followed. Howsoever this revival of
religious culture has been viewed by various observer of the phenomenon,
it is impossible to deny that the Turks as a people, when their cultural
affinities were ascertained after all the attempts at re-orientations and
indoctrination into non-Islamic values had been made, overwhelmingly
reasserted their identification with Islam.
The Turks, unlike other Muslims, having actually experienced, a
phase of non-Islamic education and social culture, came to realise that
'the moral basis of the society was being corroded and that the youth
were being braught up in a moral vacuum' •141 Like their counterparts
in other modern Muslim societies, the Turkish intellectuals who pressed
140. KA2AMIAS, op. cit. p.237
141. ibid. p.188.
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for the revival of Islamic culture argued, as Kazainias has surmised,
"that Islam was not reactionary, that it was supportive of science and
modern institutions". As a result of a heated debate in the National
Assembly in 1949, Islamic studies were permitted to be introduced in the
fourth and fifth grades of the elementary schools for Muslim children.
Although the course was optional, it is impressive to note that within
the first year, the great majority of primary school children received
religious instruction.142
In the same year, a Faculty of Divinity was organised at the
Ankara University; and Training Schools for the training of religious
teachers (Imams) were re-introduced. By 1961-62, the Kazamias study
reveals, "there were nineteen middle-level religious schools enrolling
4,400 students, seventeen lise-level schools with 1,200 students and. one
Higher IslaLmic institute with 220 students."43
 The Democratic Party
government further extended religious instruction into the first and the
second grades of the Orta and the 'normal schoo1s 144 They also gave
the Islamic basis of the Turkish culture still greater legitimation by
reinstituting the Ezan in Arabic, building more mosques and. permitting
pilgrimage to Makka. The recitation of the QU.ran on the national
radio was permitted and 'Arabic inscriptions from the Prophet's sayings
appeared in shops, cafes, and other places; several religious pamphlets
and books were published; and a greater number of Muslims made the annual
" 1pilgrimage to Makka.
The two major factors that Ataturk considered of great importance
in forming a strong basis for the new national culture were the Turkish
language and history. The absence of a distinctly Turkish culture and a
purely Turkish language created difficulties. Early in 1925, a Language
Committee (Dii Komisyonu) was formed to compile a purely Turkish lexicon
142. ibid. p.189
143. ibid. p.189
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by extracting Arabic, Persian or any other foreign words. In 1933,
the Turkish Language Society (Turk Diii Tetkik Cemiyeti) was established
under the patronage of Ataturk who wanted the question of the creation
of National Language to be actively taken up by all sections of the
educated in Turkey. So urgent was the issue with the nation that the
Cabinet, the Ministry of Education, the Peoples' Houses, teachers and
students were involved in the Language society.146
But the question of the purification of the language from
age-old usage of foreign words, some of which had even become an integral
part of the language, was an uphill task. Extreme viewpoints either
favoured the reintroduction of obsolete Turkish words or of selected
words from other Turkish dialects to replace the commonly used. Arabic
and Persian words. The result was that for a long time, the new
language remained a hotch-potch of ancient and modern words. Instead
of becoming a source of national integration, the new Turkish language
became a source of confusion. Ataturk himself seemed to have noticed
this disintegrative effect of the reform programme and so, at the
Second Language Congress in 1935, a simple formula was adopted with
regard to replacing the Arabic and Persian words:
"The words that had found a place in the everyday
language and use of the people should not be
thrown out even if they have a foreign origin.
When it becomes necessary to create new words,
there is no need to refer to extinct rules or to
the rules of Central Asian Turkish dialects
unknown to the people of Anatolia. Instead, the
new words should be derived by making use of the
word stems, suffixes and. granunatical rules of
contemporary Turkish." 147
In the 1950s, however, the government seemed to have left the
question of linguistic reform to the academics and discouraged the
principle of language innovations at the cost of discord.
146. BASGOZ and WILSON, op. cit. pp.171-73.
147. ibid. p.173.
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The Turkish History society, which was est bushed to r state
the history of the Turkish people, also fell into the deep waters of
extremism. Instead of givng rise to progressive research, it was
dominated by novice historians who essayed only to prove that 'the
European, Asian, North African, Persian and Ancient Greek civilizations
148had all been founded by Turkish migrations from Central Asia.
These false theories and myths were naturally incorporated, in the school
textbooks. Though these eccentricities of racist view of history
disappeared, Turkish historians of the early nationalistic zeal, as
Basgoz and Wilson have pointed out, were quite prone to overplay the
'national anthem' l49
Innovative Culture
In spite of the over-publicised statements of Ataturk that
rationality and scientific thought was the basis of modern civilization,
and was by implication to be that of modern Turkey, research efforts
in Turkey remained rudimentary and sporadic. The Turkish National
Commission on Education, during their visits to the advanced countries,
particularly of Europe and America, found a vast advancement of
scientific and social science research in those countries; whereas in
"150
Turkey, they observed, nothing of that sort was forthcoming.	 It was
not until 1963, that the Scientific and Technical Research Organization
(STRO) was established to develop, sut ort and regulate basic and
applied research in the positive sciences. In 1967, the STRO made
preparations for the establishment of an Industrial Research Institute
in order to conduct basic scientific research and. to train scientists
of high quality. "But the imDortance of research," confiim the authors
148. ibid. p.175
149. ibid. p.175
150. Report of the Turkish Nation 1 Commission on Education, op. cit.
pp.96-102.
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of the Second Five-year Plan, "is, in general, not sufficiently
understood in the organizations to which research units are attached.
There are no special opportunities for training researchers with
high level potential. Most of the research is not implemented and thus
not utilized. The existing research equipment is not being used
effectively." 151 Chart'G'below shows the learned societies au institutes
engaged in research activities in Turkey.
University research activities and organizations also seem to
suffer from the same lack of co-ordination and interest.
In order to invigorate research activities for economic and
social development, the Second Plan recommended vigorous policies to
be followed during the Plan period. It envisaged the allocation of
0.6 per cent of the G.N.P. as against 0.4 per cent of the First Plan,
to the promotion of research; in terms of actual expenditure this meant
an amount of TL.3,215. The Plan aimed. to increase the number of
high-level researchers from 3,500 to 5,000 during the Plan period. 
152
6.6. Conclusions
It transpires from the foregoing case-study that modernization
in Turkey has not progressed in the direction of modern norms of
universalistic, achievement, specificity, fective- -neutrality and
collectivity orientations. Nor indeed have the declared ideological
objectives of Ataturkism, aimed at a thoroughgoing westernization, become
the living faith, institutional guideline or binding force for the
Turkish nation. It remains highly doubtful if, excepting nationalism,
and republicanism, any of the other six-points of Ataturkisin, viz:
secularism, popularism, statism, even democracy as a way of life, has
really become a part of the dominant value-system of 'modern Turks'
151. Second Five-year Plan, op. cit. pp.218-222
152. ibid. pp.222-224
153. The westernization of Turkey as a reality can be gauged from the
fact that none of the international documents such as t e U.N.O.
UNESCO Handbooks enlist Turkey as a Vestern country. If anything,
they would regard the USSR, Israel and Japan, and not Turkey, as
the modern-westernised countries.
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Politically, even if one discounts the high-handed treatment
meted ta Islam and its leadership by the Ataturkrevolution, events since
then, e.g. the one-party dictatorship between 1927-1940, the reactionary
policies of the Democratic Party government in the latter half of their
tenure of ten years, the military coups, the shaky coalitions with the
overhanging threat of military intervention until the present times, all
bear witness to the interplay of ascriptive, particularistic and
factionalistic interests in the body politic. In spite of the relative
political stability that Turkey has enjoyed during past decades as
compared with the rest of the Middle Eastern/Islamic countries, the
record of political modernization in Turkey, judged by the norms
generating equality, capacity and integration, can barely be regarded as
any better than these countries. The end achievements of the Turkish
polity so far seem to have failed to convince the larger Muslim World
community of the iconoclasm which Ataturk thought so compelling to
resort to in order to modernize Turkey.154
Economically, Turkey's progress over the past five decades since
the inauguration of modernization has remained haphazard, and no better
than its counterparts in the region. In fact, as Halpern points out, the
Turkish economy can hardly become self-regulating and prosperous without
foreign credits.155
Socially, the various horizontal and vertical divisions,
inequalities and imbalances within the Turkish society on the urban-rural,
faotory worker-peasant, modernist-traditionalist, secularist-sacred,
enlightened elite-ignorant mass and other polarizations have not been
bridged. On secularisation, for examole, Halpern concludes
"Despite the secularization of most of the Turkish mid. le
class, the majority of the people remain far more faxnUaar
with the habits and outlooks of traditional Islam than
with those of Ataturk".
154. Manfred. HALPEIUi, he Politics of Social Change, op. cit. p.304
155. See Maiyam JAMIVIEELAH, Islam and Jiodernisip, Muhammad Yusuf Khan,
Lahore, 1968. p.99 and pp.110-125.
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Cultural y, the Tur ish model of nioderrazation has not
generated much rationalist, positivist or secularist outlook except
among the very, very thin upper slice of the university professors of
the Political Science faculties or the army officers.
It is apparent then that the role of the educational system in
bringing about normative changes or in the output functions the economic,
political, social and cultural aspects of the modernization programmes
has remained pr000rtionately inadequate, sporadic and intermittent.
As Prof. Kazamias observes,
"commenting on consensus or commitment to a
democratic ideolor unavoidably brings memories
of the recent successful arid unsuccessful
military coups. The question is raised as to
how successful and unsuccessful the various
agencies (including the schools) responsible
for establishing such consensus or commitment
have been. That substantial progress has been
made since the Ottoman days would certainly not
be denied, but the establishment of a viable,
stable and modern democratic polity in Turkey
has yet to be attained." 156
156. A. M. KAZAMIAS, Education and. the Quest for Modernity, op. cit.
p.225.
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CHART 'G'
Tt f Learned Societies and Research nstitutee
Engaged in Innovation and Research
in Turkey
LEARNED SOCIETIES AND
RESEARCH NSTITuT
BRITISH INSTITUT OF ARCHAEOLOGY AT ANKARA: f;1948. Objects to further
archaeological research by British and Commonwealth students or
scholars in Turkey.
CENTRI DI STUDI ITALIANI IN PURCHL&, ANKARA:
OCt1K SALII ENSTITttSU:(Institute of Child Health): Hacettepe University,
Ankara. f. 1958.
GOGRAFYA ENSPITS (GEOGRAPHICAL INSTITUTE). Istanbul. f 1933.
DEUTSCHES ARCHLELOGISCHES INSTITUT: Istanbul.f.1929 conducts research
into pre-nistory ann arcnaogy of Byzantium and Turkey.
HOLANDA TARIH yE ARKEOLOJI ENSTITIISt ( NETHERflANS HISTORICAL AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE 3
 Istanbul. f.1958.
INSTITUT FRANCAIS D'ARCHEOLOGIEz Istanbul. f.1930.
MA.DEN TETXIK YE ARAMA ENSTITUSU C MINERAL RESEARCH AND EXPLORATION INSTITu)
Ankara. f. 1935. Conducts the Geological Survey of Turkey and evaluates
mineral resources.
• Istanbul. f. 1947.
SThEREICHISCHES KULTURRETERAT IN ISTANBUL, Istanbul. f. 1942.
TtYRK CERRAHI CEMIYETI (TURKISH SURGICAL SocIETY), Istanbul. 1931.
TBX DIL KURUMtJ (TURKISH LINGUISTIC SOCIETY).Ankara41932.
TI1RX ECZACILARI BIRLIGI ( TURKISH PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION),Istanbul.
TiRK EKONOMI KtJRUMJ (TURKISH ECONOMIC sOCIETY) ,Ankara. f. 1939.
Tt5RX HALK KURUMU (TURKISH LAW ASSOCIATION), Ankara. f. 1934.
Istanbul. 1.
W JJ UWi '1	
.IJl. .LI.LT	 JL J.	 V V t a.	 _ia.a. V JJ.& VLL	 WIJa.LtVL1 J.i .JL L. .1 V a. La I
Ankara. 1. 1961. Conducts scholarly research into all aspects of Turkish
culture.
TVRK MIKROBIYOLOJI CEMIyEp]: (TURKIsH MICROBIOLOGICAL SOCIETY), Istanbul.f.1932.
TURK N3RO-PSIKIYATRI CEMIYETI (TURKISH NEtJRO-PSYCHIATRIC SOCIETY) ,IstanbulEl9l4.
TtRK ORTOPEDI SIRtYBJISI YE TRAVMATOLOGICEMEYETI. (TURKISH ORTHOPAEDIC SURGE
AND TRAUMATOLOGY socIETY), Istanbul. founded .1939.
TtRK OTO-.RIN. LARANGOLOJI CEMEYETI (TURKISH LARYNGOUICAL SOCIETY),Istanbul.
TiRX SAKATIAR CEMIYETI (TURKISH DISABLED SOCIETY). Istanbul.f.1906.
TURK BIYOLOJI DERNBGI (TURKISH BIOLOGICAL SOCIETY),Istanbul.f.1942.
-249-
OF
Istanbul.
TRK TARIB KURtTMU (TURKISH HISTORICAL socIETY).
TVRK TIBBI ELEKTRO RADIOGRAFI CEMIYETI ( TURKISH ELECTRO-RADIOLOGICAL SOCIETY),
Bursa. 1.1924.
TRX TIBBI RADIOLOJI CEMIYETI (TURKISH MEDICAL RADIOLOGICAL sOCIETY), Iatanbi.1.
T1RK TIB CEMIYETI ( TURKISH IEDICAL socIETY), Istanbul • f. 1856.
TfIRK TIB TABlE iamtrtr ( 'wucIsE IiICAL EISRY soCIETY) ISTANBUL.
TtfRK TUBERKIOZ CEMIYETI (TURKISH TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY).Istanbul. 1. 1937.
TtIRK tJBOLOJI CEMITETI ( PTJPJCISB UROLOGICAL SOCIETY), Istanbul. 1. 1933.
TffRK VETERINER HEKTVL1RI DERNEGI (TURKISH VETERINARY MEDICINE ASSOCIATION),
Ankara. 1. 1930.
TffRXIYE AKIL HIFZISSIBHASI CEMIYETI ( TURKISH SOCIETY OF ME!TAL HYGIENE 1,
Istanbul. 1. 1930.
: Ankara. 1. I
TfIRKIYE JEOLOJI KUBTJMET (TURKISH GEOLOGICAL SOCIETY): ATIkAra. 1.1946.
T13RKIYE KIMYA CEMIYETI C TEE CWTMTCAL SOCIETY OF TURKEY): ANKARA. 1. 1946.
AnkRra. f. 1952.
YENI FELSEFE CEMIYEPI ( PEE NEW TURKISH PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY),Istanbul.f.1943.
SOURCE: THE WORLD OF LEARNING: 1972-73.
EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, LONDON.1972.
CHAPPER 7
THE MODERNIZATION OF MUSLIM EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN
A CASE STUDY
"The phrase 'Islamic way of life' has on many
occasions been misinterpreted by some people. It
has been misconstrued variously as religious
intolerance, theocratic rale, return to medievalisin
and. so on. We believe that our religion has taught
us certain principles of social and economic
justice, and. of human values whose application in
statecraft is bound to promote human welfare.
Than Liaqat Ali Khan,
First Prime Minister of Pakistan.
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Pakistan*
7.1. National Independence.
When the legacy of the British Raj in India eventually came to
be divided between two dominions, Pakistan was treated. as a 'step-
child'. All odds were so pitched against it that when it did emerge,
Jinnah' a Pakistan was small, weak and 'moth-eaten'. "As far as
Pakistan is concerned," the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten is recorded to
have written, "we are putting up a tent. We can do no more." 1 "So
concerned were the British Government and the Viceroy" writes Chadhri
MUhammad Au "over the threat of the Indian Congress Party to opt out
of the British Commonwealth, for the enormous value to the U.K. both in
terms of world prestige and strate, that the injustices to Pakistan
weighed little with them." 2 So when on 14th August, 1947, Pakistan did
emerge as an independent Muslim country, it had to start from scratch
and. against many odds. Its problems were so numerous and. unmanageable
that observers considered its survival almost an impossibility. 3 The
most baffling problem immediately confronted by the new State was the
resettlement of millions of refugees who 'choked the roads and over-
crowded the trains, where they were slaughtered.." 4 While India inherited
the compact, fully functioning administration of the Government of
India, its infrastructure, industry and expertise, Pakistan had
virtually nothing to start from. The initial difficulties as Chand.hri.
Muhammad Au, has recorded,
"arose mostly from deficiencies in staff, accommodation,
records, office-equipment and communications. Hastily
constructed tin sheds provided the bulk of office
accommodation. It was not a rare sight to see five or
six officers, including officers of very high rank,
sittiug in one small room. Housing difficulties were
equally great and caused much inconvenience..... There
1. See Chaj1hri Mijhmimad ALl, The Eknergence of Pakistan, Columbia
University Press, N.Y.7indon, 1967. p.137. Chadhri M. AU. was
the Prime Minister of Pakistan between August 1955 and October l96.
2. ibid.
3. See Keith CALLARD, Pakistan, a Political Study, George Allen & Unwin,
London, 1957, Chapter I, pp.13-14.
4. ibid. p.14.
. N.B. This atudy does not extend beyond the 1971 situation in Pakistan.
East Pakistan ia therefore referred to in the pre-breakup context
aa the eastern winQ of Pk1a+0,
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was no help for it but to requisition houses and to
enlarge the supply by partitioning the houses
wherever feasible. In the process, lugh officials
as well as private citizens suffered considerable
hardship.
The demand. for stenographers and typists was
far greater than supply. Pakistan's share of office
equipnent and. furniture could not be obtained. from
the Government of India by ugust 15, and even what
was obtained could not all be moved to Karachi
because of disturbances that disrupted communications.
Local purchases were made but still there were
great shortages. Typewriters and telephones, and,
at times, even the most ordinary supplies like pens
and. pins were not easily available." 5
The whole system of economic and political institutions had to be set
up afresh and all that with no resources. Until a new constitution was
evolved, the polity had to remain functioning on the Government of
India Act of 1935 and. the Indian Independence Act 1947, which provided.
for the appointment of a Governor General by the British Crown and a
legislature from which a Cabinet was to be selected to carry out
6policies. The economy of Pakistan was extremely backward. As Papanek
has observed, "The Country was among the poorest in the world and had
no industries to speak of, almost no industrial raw materials, no
significant industrial or commercial groups. It was difficult to see
how Pakistan's economy could grow more rapidly than its population.
Economic chaos and political disintegration seemed more likely."7
Pakistan's progress on the road to modernization has obviously to be
seen, apart from its ideological orientatiox in the light of these
legacies and deficiencies.8
5. ibid. pp.247-48
6. See Richard SYMOKDS, The Making of Pakistan L Faber, 1950,
Chapter VII pp.89-104.
7. Gustav F. PAPENEK, Pakistan's Development, Social Goals and Private
Incentives, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1967. pp.1-2.
8. ibid. p.3.
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7.1.2. Ideology and Identity
The quest for the institutionalisation of the national ideolor
demanding the creation of a modern Islamic Society started in
February 1949, when the Prime Minister, Liaqat Au Kiwi, presented
before the Constituent Assembly, the blue prints of the new Constitution
of Pakistan. Known as the 'Objectives Resolution', it laid down that
Pakistan would be an Islamic Democracy. 9 Its other major clauses
were:
'Whereas Sovereignty over the entire universe
belongs to God. Almighty - the State of Pakistan
is a sacred trust,
Therein the principles of democracy, freedom,
equality, tolerance and social justice, as
enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed.
Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order
their lives in the individual and collective
spheres in accord with the teachings and.
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy
Quran and the Sunnah,
Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights
including equality of status, of opportunity and
before law, social, economic and political
justice and freedom of thought, expression,
belief, faith, worship and association, subject
to law and public morality." 10
With some minor modifications, these objectives have ever since remained
the guiding principles of the polity in Pakistan.
7.2.1. Modernization of the Polity
Pakistan's bid to create for itself a viable political system
soon led it to plunge into a variety of failures. For the first fifteen
years, the country remained an arena of conflicts and particularistic
politics. The main parties to the drama, the secularist-modernist ruling
classes of high level civil and military bureaucrats, the influential
9. 0. H. MALTK, Statement maie in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
Debate (March 12, 1949) C.A.P. Debates, vol. V No. 5. p.78.
10. C.A.P. Debates, vol. V, No. I (March 7, 1949) pp.1-2. Also see
L. BThDER, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, University of
California, Los Angeles, 1961. pp.142-43.
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landlords and the religious leaders (Ulania) all gave priority to their
own axe-grinding rather than the national interest. Group interests
in turn gave rise to regional and provincial rivalries, which expressed
themselves, at times, in bitter forms.
Ideological confusion clouded the most urgently soluble questions
such as the enunciation of the nature of Islamic State and Sovereignty,
the evolution of the Constitution and its bases of social and. inter-
provincial justice and relationships, and other institutional
frameworks. Instead every issue became a bone of contention and added
to the confusion and lack of consensus.
East Pakistan leaders, by virtue of the larger population of
their Province, claimed, and insisted upon obtaining a greater
representation in the Central government. They resented that their
language, Berli, must be given a secondary position. Fearing
inequalities in the share of economic development, they pressed for a
greater amount of autonomy.
The bulk of the ruling class in every sector happened to be from
West Pakistan. Their major concern was to see a stronger Central
Government as the best anchorage against the hostile neighbour of India
whose inteference and provocations in the East-Wing were not a fiction.
They, therefore, tried to resolve the problem of inter-provincial
disparities through the consolidation of the smaller Western provinces
in a 'One-Unit' of West Pakistan, equal with East Pakistan. But far
from solving the problem, it aggravated grievances. As Professor
Rushbrook-Williams has surmised.
"Unfortunately, the new arrangement, logical as it
undoubtedly was, did little to curb the self-seeking
of the local political leaders.....Since the stakes
were higher and the prizes larger, competition for
power became fiercer than ever. Adult suffrage,
which increased the influence of quasi-feudal
interests because of the power of a landlord to
dragoon his tenants into voting for his nominee,
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soon made the new West Pakistan legislature a
byword for political intrigue. Nor were things
any better in East Pakistan, where in 1958
partisan fury between rival factions reached
such heights that the speaker of the legislative
assembly was attacked and his Deputy SO badly
beaten up that he afterwards died." lOa
It was in these conditions that the army intervened in 1958.
:But army rule itself then turned into a decade of political turmoil and
instability which on4.y foreshadowed greater disintegrative consequences.
Constitutions
1956 Constitution
The first Constitution of Pakistan came in force with effect
from 23 March 1956, describing Pakistan as an Islamic Republic. It was
based on the Objectives laid down in the Objectives Resolution. One
important clause was that no law in Pakistan should be enacted which is
repugnant to the injunctions of the Q,uran and that the existing law
should be brought into conformity with such injunctions. The modern
norms were safeguarded in the Constitution which proclaimed that
principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice,
as enunciated by Islam, should be fully observed.
The Constitution also proclaimed. full safeguards for the
interests and religious heritage of non-Muslim citizens of the country.
Furthermore, the Constitution, established full parity between its two
11provinces, the East and West Pakistan.
This Constitution, however, was abrogated in 1958 by the Army
which imposed martial law and the Army rule that lasted over ten years.
1962 Constitution
The second Pakistan Constitution proclaimed. by the Army in 1962
made a major departure from the first, in that it designated the Country
lOa. L. F. RtJSHBROOK-WILLIAMS, The State of Pakistan, Faber & Faber,
London, 1966. p.145.
11. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Government of
Pakistan, 1956.
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only as the Republic of Pakistan. A year later, however, under
public pressure this was amended by the National Assembly and the
Country was re-styled as an Islamic Republic. Besides re-affirmation
of the Principles of the Ob3ectives Resolution, the 1962 Constitution
went further than its predecessor in stipulating that there should be
an Advisory Council of Is1axac Ideolor to advise the Central end.
the Provincial legislatures on the question as to whether a proposed.
law disregarded or violated or was otherwise not in accordance with
the principles of Law-making as defined in the Constitution. These
principles included conformity with Islam, equality of citizens and
freedom of expression)2
Basic Democracies
In 1958, when General Ayyub Kahn abrogated the 1956 Constitution,
be maintained that the alien parliamentary model of democracy was not
workable in Pakistan, "The key to democratic goverrunent," said Ayyub
Kahn,
"lies in the effectiveness of institutions that
represent and. include the masses of the people.
Such institutions did exist in Pakistan and had
been there for years, but they were stagnant
from neglect".
"Foremost among these were the Panchayats,
the village councils whose origins were centuries
old. While empires rose and fell, the villagers
paid their taxes, and, in relative isolation,
gogerned themselves through these institutions.
In Pakistan, the panchayats had little opportunity
to perform constructive political work. They were
not integrated into the framework of the
government". 13
Ayyu.b insisted that effective democracy in Pakistan must satisfy the
fol owing basic conditions:
1. Be simple to understand, easy to work and cheap
to run.
2. Put to the voter on y such questions as the voter
can understand without external prompting.
12. Constitution of the Republic of Pakistari Government of Pakistan
Press, 1962.
13. See Richard V. WEEKE, Pakistan, Birth and Growth of a Muslim
Nation, D. Van Nostrand, N.Y./London, 1964, p.113 -cont'd next pace
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3. Ensure the effective participation of all
citizens to their full intellectual capacity, and
4. Produce reasonably strong and. stable
governments. 14
In the light of these objectives, he promulgated his new system of
grassroot democratic institutions called the Basic Democracies. This
was a five-tier council system based on the administrative units of the
colonial times, i.e. the village, the tehsil, the district, the
division and the Province. The primary unit was the rural or urban
constituency of one thousand inhabitants who elected a Basic Democrat.
These Basic Democrats then formed thuon Councils in vi11age and Town
Committees in urban centres. There were 4,000 such primary
constituencies in West Pakistan and 4,200 in East Pakistan.
The next highest unit was the Tehail or Thana Council of about
10 Union Councils. The chairman of the Union Councils was automatically
to be a member of the Tehsil or Thana Councils. But the focal stage
was the District Council which drew half of its membership from among
the Union and Tehsil Councils; the other half comprising officers of
the various departments at district level. The fourth stage, the
Divisional Councils, were merely co-ordinating and advisory bodies, and
finally the Provincial Council was purely to advise on development.15
The Basic Democracies formed the electoral college for the
election of the Provincial and Central legislatures as well as the
President. Elections, on party lines, were to be held every four years.
Functional Differentiation
Policy Formulation function
Under the 1962 Constitution each province was equally represented
in the National Assembly which consisted of a single chamber of 156
13. cont'd. /also Muhammad Ayyab KARN, Friends not Master A Political
Autobiography, O.U.P. Pakistan Branch, Lahore-Karachi--Dacca, 1967
pp.205-207.
14. ibid. p.118
15. The Gazette of Pakistan, "The Basic Democracies Order 1959", Gov't.
of Pakistan Press, Karachi 1959. A framework of the Basic Democracies
also explained in Von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1965. pp.196-207.
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Democrats elected from the electoral Colleges. Three seats ..in each
ProvincP	 were reserved exclusively for women over and above their
elected seats. The National Assembly then formed the policy formulation
body at the national level.
At Provincial level, two Provincial Assemblies each having 155
members, five of whom at least must be women, performed policy making
functions in the areas under provincial jurisdiction. Such areas had
been defined by the 1962 Constitution as agriculture, water and power
16development, health, social welfare and education.
Policy Adoption functions.
tTnder the Basic Democracies system, the President at the National
level was the sole executive authority and national policy was adopted
under his signature. He appointed his own cabinet of ministers who need
not to be members of the National Assembly. If, however, they were, they
had to resign their seats. The President obtained legislative advice from
ehe National Assembly through appointed parliamentary secretaries. He
had the power to veto laws passed by the National Assembly, to dissolve
the assembly and call for new elections, in which case he himself had to
seek re-election. In the case of the National Assembly being out of
session, the President could issue ordinances which were valid only for
six months. But if he declared a state of emergency, his ordinances were
valid indefinitely. Provincial governors performed similar policy
adoption functions at the provincial level.
Policy Ad.iudication
The Constitution provided for a Supreme Court for the nation and
^w High Courts for the Provinces. In tribal areas, however, traditional
jirga courts still function. All judges of the national Supreme High
Courts are appointed by the President. The judiciary according to the
Constitution is perfectly independent of the executive.
16. The Constitution of 1962
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Bureaucracy
The CenLtral Civil Secretariat foned and ad.ministered by the
'Civil Service' of Pakistan (csP) with its twenty or so cadres is a
monolithic and complicated body which implements the national policy in
various departments. Originated in the Moghal Thpire and modernised by
the British Raj, the bureaucratic system that Pakistan inherited had
been renowned as the 'steel frame' of the Government of India, known as
the Indian Civil Service. The Civil Service of Pakistan was reorganised
in 1950 and constitutes the top hierarchy of about five hundred officers
out of a total of about one million public service employees of the
Government. According to Ralph Bra ibanti's study, in 1947, at the time
of the creation of Pakistan, out of a total of 1,157 high ranking
officers in the I.C.S. and. the I.P.S. in the Government of India only
101 or 9 per oent were Muslims and of these only 95 opted for Pakistan.
With 50 British officers and one Pakistani Christian, the total of the
top bureaucrats that Pakistan had, numbered only 157, of whom only 136
actually joined administrative posts; the remainder were posted to the
judicial and diplomatic services7
This was a hopelessly small number of top modernising leaders for
Pakistan to start its natural independence with. Prof. Braibanti asserts:
"It is doubtful if any other nation of Pakistan's
size faced independence with such a shortage of
talent. - This predicament explains much in
Pakistan's administrative history." 18
At the provincial level, two provincial Civil Secretariats with
similar Administrative Services known as the Provincial Civil Service (Pcs)
Cadres, function parallel to the C.S.P. In their roles, status and.
jurisdiction, however, the Provincial Civil Service is restricted to the
Provincial level. The C.S.P. dominates the Centra and the Provincial
administrations.
17. Ralph BRAThM1TI, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, A Critique of
Sources, Conditions and Issues with Appended Documents, Duke University
Commonwealth Studies Centre, Duke University Press, N.C.l966.pp.115-116.
also BRALBANTI, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan" in
Josep La Plalambora (Ed) Bureaucracy and Political Development",
(cont'd)
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Local Government
Thq'classically crucial unit of administration in Pakistan,
which was devised by the British administrative genius, remains the
19district. Under the British Raj, the District Deputy Coinnassioner
was originally the autocratic imperial ruler, although since 1935 District
Boards haw.been instituted with nominated members to share ih the policy-
making functions at the district and local levels. But the official
influeice was too severe for this to offset the rigidity of control.
With the Basic Democracy system it was expected that the elected
District Councils which replaced District Boards would give greater
opportunity for democratic participation, but the appointment of the
officials and the still dominant position of the bureaucrats in general,
failed to produce that result. On the contrary, the Overhead Martial
Law administration reinforced authoritarianism. 20
17. cont'd. /Prinoeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1963.
18. ibid. p.116.
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7.2.2. Modernization of the Economy
GustaV Papanek, who has studied the economic develojmient of
Pakistan up until 1967, asserts that "Any analysis of Pakistan's
development must begin with its initial endowment and the effect of
partition.... in 1947, Pakistan had almost
no natural resources, except agricultural land,
practically no modern industry, or modern banking,
or commercial establishments. Power production
was neglegible. Few technicians, professional
or political leaders existed among Pakistan's
75 million people, because Muslims in the sub-
continent were largely peasants, artisans and
soldiers." 21
The same author goes on to assert that,
"by the middle of 1960s Pakistan's economic growth
came to be regarded as the most outstanding of all
the under-developed countries in the region. The
rate of growth in Pakistan was more than double
the rate of population growth, investment was well
near 20% and savings exceeded ten per cent of
domestic resources". How did. this happen.? 22
The initiators of modernization oolicies certainly were the few,
but very efficient, modernising leadership of the Civil Service. But
the strides that the economy made later on were not entirely their
doing; various policy factors, the sheer necessities that motivated the
impulse, and various sections of the society contributed
towards these achievements.
Economic Policies.
In the first place, it is important to remember that building
up from a scratch gave added impulse to an all round, concerted effort,
both of private and public sectors. Government overhead protection in
the form of loans and credits was essential, but private entrepneurship
was equally encouraged. No ideological extremities were allowed to
21. G. F. PAPAIEK, Pakistan's Deve opment, Social Goals and Private
Incentives, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1967. p.3.
22. ibid.
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stand in the way. 23 Pakistan's economic policies have shown a
remarkable balance of ideas, forces and strategies that all together
contributed to its relative progress.
Because of sheer necessity, priority had bbe given to the
damaged infrastructure, roads, railways, communications and civic
facilities. Then Pakistan had to build itself on whatever meagre
resources that it had. Agriculture for example, could not have been
ignored at the cost of an industrial dream. Repeated food shortages in
the early years demanded agricultural development. Industrial
development had to start from the bottom, i.e. by private enterprise
in smailseale, consumer-goods industries. The Pakistan government's
policy regarding foreign talent and capital seems to have developed on
the principle that as long as the country needed these, it must utlise
and invite them. Largely perhaps because of these 'common-sense'
policies, Pakistan was able to achieve an annual growth rate of little
less than 3 per cent, which was slightly higher than the population
increase. "The rate of increase in manufacturing", asserts Papanek,
remained among the highest in the world . 	 In agriculture, its growth
exceeded the growth rate of population, a phenomenon which made Pakistan
an exceptional case. Pakistani industry grew at a dramatic rate."25
23. This was explicityl stressed in the National Constitutions and
the Five-Year Economic Plan which asserted:
"No doctrinaire assumptions underlie the plan, and neither an
exclusively capitalistic nor an exclusively socialist economy
is postulated. The approach throughout is pragmatic. The
fundamental problem is how under severely limited conditions,
to find some way towards the liberation of the people from
the crushing burden of poverty. Viewed in this context,
economic growth becomes a necessity for sheer survival.....
Second Five-Year Plan (l960-6'5). Government of Pakistan. Planning
Commission. 1960.
24. ibid. p.6.
25. ibid. p.56
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Planning
"National Planning in Pakistan, in the early years started" as
Waterston points out, with a 'project to roject' approach limited to
the public sector toward more comprehensive and. aggregative planning
encompassing the entire economy.26
In 1948, the Development Board and the Planning Advisory Board
were set up to 'co-ordinate development plans, record priorities, watch
progress of development projects and make periodic reports to the
Cabinet on the progress of development projects.' The Board received a
sudden impetus from the Colombo plan in the preparation and co-ordination
of Pakistan's First Six-year Development Programme for 1951-57 which
aimed at rather modest targets, giving special emphasis to agriculture.
The Korean War, however, provided the country with an economic boom, and
the emphases in the Six-year Development targets were modified by an
intervening Two-Year Priority Programme for 1951-53. The Planning
Structure was also reorgnised. The Planning Advisory Board was abolished
and a new Planning Commission was instituted to replace the Planning
Board as well as the Planning Advisory Boards. In addition, an overhead
Economic Council, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, was
set up to implement the Six-year Programme.27
In 1953, however, a Planning Board was again created to prepare
a comprehensive National Development Plan. Since then four Five-year
Development Plans have been launched: the First Five-year Plan 1955-60,
the Second Five-year Plan 1961-65, th Third plan 1966-70 and the Fourth
Plan 1971-75.
Before planning was undertaken, it was estimated that the per
capita income of an average Pakistani was about %50 a year. 28 The Five-
26. Albert WATERSTON, Planning in Pakistan, Organization and Implementation,
The Economic Develooment Institute, International Bank for
Reconstruction & Development, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963,
p.138.
27. WATERSTON, op. cit. pp.13-19.
28. The First Five-year Plan. p.13.
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year Plans aimed at raising this to 0200 by 1985.29To obtain this
target, a cumulative growth of about 8 per cent per annum h to be
achieved during the 25 years of the total planning period. The actual
increase in the GNP during the First Plan period was estimated to have
been 2.5 per cent, which was however offset by a parallel population
growth of 2.3 per cent. 3° But the success of the Second Plan proved
spectacular. By 1965, the annual growth rate was calculated to be
6.2 per cent, whereas the population increse had been only 3.5 per cent
"This rate of increase, particularly with a very large base", asserts
Papanek, "was among the highest in the world" 1 The growth in
agriculture was even exemDlary, in that agricultural production far
exceeded population growth - a phenomenon which was unusual for under
developed countries. 32 The Third Plan, however, envisaged the reduction of
the contribution of the agricultural sector to the GNP from 60 per cent
to 49 per cent and the increase of that of manufacturing from 6 per cent
to 11 per cent.33
Investment and Savings
Starting from a very low level of domestic savings, in the
period between 1947-1950, comprising mainly some foreign exchange reserves,
the rate of savings steadily increased to 8.5 per cent of the GNP in
1964-65. Papar*kre ards this rate of saving as quite surprising for a
very poor country.
But the pace of growth in investment was even higher: from 4.6
per cent in 1949-50 to 15.8 per cent in 1964-65. Consequently a larger
proportion of the development outlay has been spread over the expansion
of the economy, as well as the social infrastructure.
29. WEEKES. op. cit. p.137
30. PAPANEK, op. cit. pp.5-7
31. ibid. p.6.
32. ibid.
33. Third Five-year Plan pp.3-4
34. ih4•
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Industrialisati on
At the time of national independence, the total industrial
establishments of Pakistan amounted to one small oil refinery- near
Rawalpindi, a tiny sugar factory at Gujranwala and a cement factory at
Wah in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan there was no industry worth
mentioning. All the jute mills of Bengal were located in Indian Bengal.
Whatever industrial capacity, resources and skills British India possessed
remained in India. By 1963, however, Pakistan could boast of a dramatic
industrial growth, "Not only did industrial output increase by 200
per cent between 1950 to 1963, but Pakistan," remarks Weekes, "reached
its Plan targets two years ahead of schedule." 35
 In a study on the
acceleration of industrial growth of Pakistan, Chinery found out that:
(a) "The capital goods industries grew at a faster
rate (relative to the consumption goods industries),
than would have been predicted in a 'normal
country', and
(b) the intermediate goods industries grew at about
a 'normally' faster rate than the consumption
goods industries." 36
Entrepreneurship
Much of the success in the industrial progress of Pakistan has
been attributed to Pakistan's encouragement of private enterprise in
industry. As a result, a few wealthy industrialists, most of them
migrated from the Bombay and Gu,jrat Provinces - the Memons, the Bohras
and the Khoja Community took a plunge and started to set up new
industries around cities like Karachi, Lahore, Hyderabad and Lyalipur.
The growth of a class of entrepreneurs in Pakistan is typically
important in that most of the industrial and business private enterorise
there has been pioneered and sustained by the so-called 'traditionalist'
35. WEEICES, op. cit. p.149. For a critical analysis of Pakistan's
industrial Development and Policies, see Stephen R. LEIVIS, Jr.
Pakistan, Industrialisation and Trade P licies, 0.U.P. London/N.Y./
Karachi, 1970.
36. H. B. CHINERY, "Patterns of Industrial Growth" in American Economic
Review, September, 1960.
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religious communities as against the modernist section of the society.
This point has been aptly emphasised by Papenek who observes:
"Industrial entrepreneurs are assumed to be innovators,
promoting change not only in the economic sphere but
also in other areas. The evidence in Pakistan lends
little support to these notions. Many of the
industrial entrepreneurs had no significant formal
education. The great majority were not innovators
in non-economic fields; they were often conservative
and non-Western in religion, dress and social
behaviour. Interestingly, while the entrepreneurs
were mu.ch more traditional than other groups, such
as civil servants, professionals and intellectuals,
the best educated, most westernised minority, the
Parsis, played no significant role in Pakistan's
industry." 37
The only inference that can be drawn from this development in Pakistan is
that when the right challenge and the incentive present themselves, even
traditional Muslims are axnen able to change aM transform themselves.
4gri culture
Nearly 85 per cent of Pakistan's population is engaged in
agriculture and produces 60 per cent of the national income. In West
Pakistan only 17 per cent of the total soil is under cultivation, but in
East Pakistan it was 75 per cent. During the early years, Pakistani
agriculture was stagnant and. primitive. Two successive floods in West
Pakistan further deteriorated agricultural production and caused serious
food shortages. Consequently, between 1955-1966 an average of one
million tons of grain (10 per cent of t e domestic production) had to be
imported. To solve this acute shortage, and also to safeguard the
occupational structure of the peasantry scattered over the vast village
hinterlands, Pakistan gave great importance to the agricultural sector.
As with industry, private ownership was a lowed. to remain,
although by the agrarian reforms of 1959 a ceiling of land holdings was
fixed at 500 acres of irrigated and 1,000 of unirrigated land. 38 The
37. PAPANEEC, op. cit. p.48
38. WEIIW}I, op. cit. p.139
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government, on their part, established the Agr cultural Development
Corporation which provided loans, supplied improved implements and
seeds, and. gave guidance on innovations and experiments to enhance
production. In West Pakistan, for example, where water-b ging was
acute, government agencies helped in installing tube-wells and pumps,
distributed chemical fertilisers and provided credit facilities. In
East Pakistan, the Academy for Village Development made two very
successful experiments to introduce innovations and improvements in
productivity (a) by training representatives of each village in a
selected area in the technique of modern farming and its improvisation
in the local circumstances, in particular in farm saving and investment39
and (b) by organising village co-operatives. These two projects were
pilot programmes in the scheme to start modernization at the bottom,
village level. So successful were the Village AID Projects in East
Pakistan that the President ordered their introduction in seven districts
of West Pakistan and six sub-districts in East Pakistan. By 1960,
records Weekes, "through the Village AID Institutes nearly 5,000 workers
had received training at Comilla and Peshawer. These trainees then had
established 176 development areas of 100,000 people each organised
19,625 village development canals, built 300 miles of dirtroads, and
introduced new farming practices in hundreds of villages".40
The result of all these measures in agriculture was that by 1965,
Pakistan was one of the few underdeveloped Countries whose agricultural
production was higher than the rate of its population growth.
39. See A. Z. M. OBAThULLAi{ JW,AN, The Comilla District Develonment
Project, Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Comilla, East
Pakistan, 1964.
40. ibid. p.145.
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Enployinent and Labour
According to the First Paki tan population Census, carried out
in 1951, the total labour force in Pakistan comprised 24 million, of
which 76.2 per cent was employed in agriculture, 9.5 per cent in industry,
12.5 per cent in services and 1.9 per cent in other activities or
unemployed. 41
 The six Five-year Developnent Plans extending to the
year 1985, projected changes in the employment pattern as in the table
below:
Table I VII.I
Changes in the Eliployment Pattern
Percentage Distribution
Year	 Total	 nplQyment of Labour Force	 Unemployed
Lab our Agriculture Manufacturing Services
Force	 (per cent)	 (per cent)	 (per cent) (per cent)
(millions) ____________ ______________ ___________ ___________
5
6
7
8
10
1951 Census
1955 Pre-plan
1960 First-Plan
1965 Second-
Plan
1970 Third-Plan
1975 Fourth-
24	 58
26.5
	
54
29.2	 50
32.5	 49
36.0	 48
22	 15
22	 18
21	 22
21	 22
23	 19
Plan	 40.6	 46	 12	 25	 17
	
1980 Fifth-Plan 45.2	 43	 14	 28	 15
	
1985 Sixth-Plan 49.5
	
40	 16	 32	 12
Source: Mahbub-u1-Ha, The Strategy of Economic Planning, p.249
41. See Mahbub-ul-Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning; A Case
Study of Pakistan 0.U.P. Karachi, 1966, p.249. Taking 15 per cent
unemployment off, Haq regards the gainfully employed on agriculture
as 58 per cent instead of 76.5 per cent.
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7.2.3. Social odernization
Demographic Features (Population)
Pakistan's population has been constantly rising during the ten
year period of the censuses of 1951 and. 1961, by- an annual rate of
growth of about 1.8 per cent in East and 2.3 per cent in West Pakistan.
In 1951, the Census showed that Pakistan had a population of 75.8 million,
(42.0 million in East Pakistan and 33.8 million in West Pakistan). In
1951, it was 93.8 million of which 50.8 million was in the East and 43.0
million in the West. The long range projection, taking into consideration
the projected decrease in fertility rate as well as the decline in
mortality rate from 29 to 15 shows a slight decrease in the rate of
growth over the period of the Plans but by 1985 the population is
expected to rise 1* times over the 1960 figures. See Tab1eVJL.
Table VII.2
Population Projections
1960-1985
(Millions)
Year	 East	 Percentage	 West	 Percentage	 All	 Percentage
Pakistan increase Pakistan increase Pakistan increase
1960	 50	 -	 42
1965	 55	 10	 47
1970	 61.5
	
12	 51.5
1975
	
69	 12	 56
1980	 76	 10	 61
1985	 84	 10	 66
	
-	 92
	
12	 102
	
10	 113
	
9	 125
	
9	 137
	
8	 150
11
11
11
10
10
Source: Third live-year Plan.
Ecoloicial Features
Urbani sat ion
According to the 1951 Census only 10.4 per cent of the
population lived in urban centres of over 5,000 persons. There was
a clear disparity between the Eastern and the Western wings in
urbanisation: 4.4 per cent in East Pakistan and 17.8 per cent in West
Pakistan. By 1961, urbanisation had. further risen steadily. In West
Pakistan 9.6 million people, or 22.5 per cent, and in East Pakistan
2.6 million, or 5.2 per cent of the people were living in cities.
Again, the 1961 Census showed that the rate of growth in the urban
population was 3 times as against 2.5 per cent in rural population
during the ten year period. The Planning Commission estimated that the
increase of 5.6 per cent per annum was expected to rise to 8.10 per
cent during the Third Plan period (1965-70) and by 1985, the share of
urban population was projected to be 25 per cent in East Pakistan and
45 per cent in West Pakistan. This meant that of the total estimated
population of 150 million in 1985, about 50 million or 33 per cent will
consist of town dwellers, though with the rapid development of
agriculture, it might increase only by 20 per cent.42
The Pakistani flight towards the cities is concentrated into some
16 large cities of 100,000 inhabitants. These 16 cities have grown by
64 per cent compared with other smaller towns whose population grew only
by 46 per cent. between the census years. Thus urbanisation in
Pakistan as in other Asian countries, is frought with problems because
of the wider gulf between the city life and the traditional rural
patterns, as well as by the lack of appropriate facilities in housing,
42. S. H. HASAN and G. N. J0N, (Eds.) Proceedings of the Conference
on Problems of Urbanisation in Pakistan, National Institute of
Public Administration (Oct 31 to Nov. 1966) Karachi, 1967.
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health, job opportunities and education. Migration into cities is due
largely to the subsistence level structure of village life itself,
where traditional forced or caste labour and- joint land holdings do not
offer enough incentives for the tenent peasant or the worker.
Intensive planning and urban developnent to meet this rising 'migration
drift' to cities is needed.
Family Structure
Family structure in Pakistan before independence, had been left
by the British more or less untouched as a topic of the denominational
law, and was based on the traditional interpretations of Islamic law.
President Ayyub's Government attempted to rationalise the system by
regulating some of the malpractices and misuse of the Islamic Family
law, but the reaction from the Ulema was very strong. Commenting on the
protest against the recommendations of the Family Law Commission writes
Ayyub,
"The recommendations of the Commission did not
interfere in anyway with any Islamic injunctions
on the subject; they only provided a procedure
for the proper and judicious implementation of
the Islamic principles relating to marriage. I
decided to implement the procedure recommended by
the Commission because I considered it my duty as
a Muslim and as Head of the State to do what was
necessary to eliminate a grave social malpractice
which was affecting the lives of the people.
Accordingly, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance was
promulgated in 1961. A section of the Ulema
immediately accused me of interjecting with
Islam........' 43
But the extension of education to a larger number of womenfolk,
the resultant increasing mobility in their economic and social status, is
helping towards the change in attitudes.
The family structure on the whole, however, still remains ruled
by traditional pattern. Extended family system in which tne elder
command respect and influence life decisions of the young.
43. Muhaxmna.d Ayy-ub KHAN, Friends Not dlasters, op. cit. p.107.
-272-
73.	 INPUTS INTO TKE EDTJCAT ONAL SYSTEM
7.3.1. Normative Inputs
From the first Educational Conference, convened soon after
independence in 1947, to the latest Commission on National Education,
which reported in 1959, and the subsequent policy proposals, it has been
repeatedly pronounced that education in Pakistan must be based on the
ideals which led to the creation of Pakistan.
Addressing the First All Pakistan Education Conference convened
by him in 1947, the Minister stressed that it was a priority for
Pakistan to devise a national ideology of education. He went on to assert
that education in Pakistan should be inspired by the Islamic ideology,
emphasising among its many characteristics those of universal brotherhood,
social justice and tolerance4
It was surmised that the aims of the inherited system of education
were acutely deficient in scope, depth and width. The system lacked
the qualities essential for a national system and. needed complete
structural, curricular and organizational differentiation and expansion.
Addressing the Conference, the leader of the nation, Qaid-i-Azam,
Mithammad Au Jinnah, highlighted the objectives of a modern national
education for Pakistan:
"The importance of education and the right type of
education, cannot be over-emphasized. Under foreign
rule for over a century, su.fficient attention has not
been paid to the education of our people and if we
are to make a real, speedy and substantial progress,
we must earnestly tackle this question and bring our
educational policy and programme on to the lines
suited to the genius of our people, consonant with
our history and culture and having regard to the
modern cx)ndltions and vast developments that have
taken place all over the world...... There is no
doubt that the future of our state will and must
depend on the type of education we give to our
children and the way in which we bring them up as
44. Faziur RAEMAN, the Hon, New Education in the Making in Pakistan,
Its_Ideology and Basic Problems, Cassell, London, 1952, pp.20-1.
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the future citizens of Pakistan. Education does
not merely mean academic education. There is
immediate and. urgent need for giving scientific and
technical education to our people in order to build
up our future economic life and to see that our
people take to science, commerce, trade and
particularly, well-planned industries. We should
not forget that we have to compete with the world
which is moving very fast in this direction......" 45
In 1951, the Education Minister convened another conference
comoosed of all the Provincial Education Ministers Vice-Chancellors
of Universities and Directors of Public Instruction and called upon it
'to prepare a Six-year Plan for Educational Development, in order to give
the country a modern, integrated and comprehensive system of ed.ucation.6
The 1956 Constitution declaring the country the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, affirmed this vide article 13
No person attending any educational institution shall
be required to receive religious instruction, or
take part in any religious ceremony, or attend
religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or
worship relates to a religion other than his own;
No religious community or denomination shall be
prevented from providing religious instruction for
pupils of that community or denomination in any
educational institution run wholly by that community
or denomination;
No citizen shall be denied admission to any educational
institution maintained by public revenues on the
ground of race, religion, caste or place of birth,
providing that nothing in this article shall prevent
any public authority for making provision for the
advancement of any socially or educationally backward
class of citizens.
The 1962 Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan uoheld these
provisions of the 1956 Constitution but, it also affirmed th&t illiteracy
should be eliminated, and. free and compulsory primary education should be
provided for all, as soon as it was practicable.
45. Proceedings of the Educational Conference, Karachi, 1951, Government
of Pakistan, Education Division, 1956.
46. Six-sear National Plan& Educational Development, Government of
Pakistan, Education Division, 1952.
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Another very significant provision of the Constitution which
aimed at the modernization of Muslim education, was that of Article
207 which re uired the President to o en an Islamic Research Institute
whose functions shall be 'to undertake Islamic research and instruction
in Islam for the purpose of assisting in t e rec nstruction of Muslim
society on a truly Islamic basis...'
The National Education Commission
The National Conmassion on Education ordered by President
Muhanunad Ayub Khan in January 1959, so defined in its report the
objectives of the national education for Pakistan:
Our educational system must play a fundamental part
in the preservation of the ideals which led to the
creation of Pakistan, and. strengthen the concepts
of it as a unified nation. The desire for a homeland
for Muslims on the subcontinent arose out of their
wish to be in a position to govern themselves
according to their own set of values. In other words,
our country arose from the striving to preserve the
Islamic way of life..... . 47
The first consequence which follows from this historical
fact is that we must strive to create a sense of unity
and. of nationhood among the people of Pakistan......
Prom our concept of justice and brotherhood there
derives the desire to create a social welfare state.
Our greatest need as a people is to improve constantly
our standard of living, which at the moment is among the
lowest in the world. We lay stress throughout our
report on the concept of education as a public
investment in economic development.
The concepts of spiritual and moral values of nation-
building, of scientific development, of enlightened
citizenship, and of ublic service should in our view
motivate and guide our educational system. 48
47. Elaborating on the implications of the Islamic ideology, Prime
Minister, Liaqat AU. Kha.n pointed out: "Islamic way of life has on
many occasions been misinterpreted by some people. It has been
misconstrued variously as religious intolerance, theocrat c rule,
return to medievalism and so on. I wish to make it clear, th rexore,
that we have no theocratic state in mind. We have in mind no special
privileges of citizenship for the 1uslims in our country and we
abhor the ideas of applying any religious or cultural coercion to our
non-Muslim nationals. But we firmly believe that our religion has
taught us certain princiDles of social and economic justice, and of
human values, whose application in statecraft is bound to promote
human welfare".
	 Lia at Au KHAN, Pakistan The Heart of sia
Harvard University Press, 1951, address at a luncheon meeting of the
National Press Club in Washington on 4th May 1951, p.11.
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7.3.2. Political Inputs
Modernization of the polity in Pakistan demanded the
recruitment into the elite class of a cross-section of the popu ation.
Universities and institutions of hi her education were the manor sources
of output into the polity as moclernising leadership. There was, therefore,
a demand for a rapid expansion of higher education. The Commission on
National Education specifically stipulated that the institutions of
higher education had. to function as the main producers of leaders. "In
this," asserted the Commission, "we can't be satisfied with less than the
most exacting standards of achievement".
	 But, in fact, the military
and civil bureaucracies in Pakistan became a self-perpetuating class,
recruitment into which was made more on ascriptive ties than on
achievement alone. This was unequivically pointed out by the Pakistan
Pay Commission in 1949, which concluded that the monopolization of a
developing nation's talent in a self-oerpetuating class was bound. to
cause imbalances, deprive the public sector of the economic activity
of entrepreneurs and., most important of all, "Prevent the emergence of a
pluralistic society of competing interests." 50
 Though the introduction
of Basic Democracies could have helped grassroot democratization of the
populace, and though the education system could have become a potent
agency for democratization , the consolidation of the bureaucratic class as
a powerful and self-seeking element in the Society made the educational
system dysfunctional to the polity by disregarding achievement and meiat
alone as the criterion for recruitment into top leadership. The expansion
of the higher education had, therefore, to proceed without planning and
utility, and this led to unemployed graduates.
48. Report of the Commission on National Education, Government of Pakistan,
Ministry of Education, 1959.
49. Report of the National Education Commission, op. cit. p.16.
50. See Ralph BRAIBAFJTI, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op.cit.p.35
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7.3.3. Economic Inputs ( n w r D and)
As has been seen, by the year 1965, Pakistan had achieved
considerable economic growth both in the industrial and agricultural
sectors. It is important to see tot extent the education system
contributed, or was required by the planners to contribute, to the
economy.
Developmental planning in the early stages of Pakistan's economy
was not, it appears, based on the manpower supply through the
educational system. But in 1959, the Commission on National Education
clearly emphasized,
"We stress throughout our report that one of our
greatest national assets is our manpower but that
this asset can only become the creator of national
wealth when its energies have been released and.
enriched with the skills and training necessaiy
in complex modern society..." 51
The Commission further stressed,
"only through vigorous action in training the people
needed for this technological and aricultura1
progress can we escape from the situation in which
our vast manpower, instead of being a source of
national wealth is a. constant drag on our economy.." 52
The overall projections of estimated increase in the G.N.P. and
employment during the plan years itself, had direct implications for the
educational system in providing outputs into the economy, though the plans
based their demand on the educational system for expansion and.
differentiation only on rough estimates on the basis of proposed physical
and investment programmes.53
Each of the Five-year Plans devoted a chapter to education -
the First Plan (1955-60), relying on the interim Manpower Survey report
of the I.L.0. estimated a 4 per cent increase in the Class 'A'
Administrative, managerial and cler cal workers, 8 per cent increase in
51. Report of the Commission on National Education, op. cit. p.12
52. ibid. p.12.
53. Second Five-year Plan, pp.337-355.
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Class 'B' high technical personnel, 19.9 per cent increase in Class 'C'
skilled workers and 6.1 per cent in C ass 'D' unskilled workers in the
5,000 industrial estab1ishments 4 This manpower demand from the
educational system, as exoressed in the First Five-year plan, required
an incr ase in primary school enrollment by one million and secondary
school enrollment by 144,000. The Plan did not envisage any precise
numerical projection on technical and vocational education. It only
stipulated that it was necessary- first to fill up the qualitative gaps
that existed in the present system5
The Second Five-year Plan (1960-65) aimed at raising the
proportion of the 6-11 age group from 42.3 per cent bo 60 per cent by
1965. That meant an increase in the primary school enrollment of 1.2
million in West Pakistan and 1.2 million in East Pakistan, a total of
7.2 million for the whole country. In the secondary education as a result
of the recommendations of the Commission on National Education, the
Second Plan visualised the amalgamation of the intermediate classes,
hitherto administered by the Universities, with the Secondary education
system. The plan proposed an increase of the school level enrollment
by- 430,000, raising the top age of those attending secondary schools from
12 in 1960 to 16 by 1965.56
The Third Plan (1965-70) committed itself strongly to the
achieving of universal primary education within the prospective plan
periods which aimed at an increase in the primary school enrollment of
70 per cent by the year l970.	 The Third Plan also aimed at making the
Junior High School (classes VI, VII aria. VIII) comoulsory- for all children
during the plan periods. 58
Regarding sec ndary education in general, the Third Plan
54. I.L0. Report to the Government of Pakistan on a Manpower Survey,
Geneva, 1956 , ILO/TAP/PAKJRIO)
55. First Five-year Plan, pp.402-3
56. Second Five-year P1a, pp.340-345
57. Third Five-year Plant p.l89
58. ibid. p.l91.
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recoi:nmended that priority should be iven to the training of skills to
meet the immediate and multifarious needs of a rapidly ex anding economy.
"The Countfj- can ill afford", the Plan emDhaslse g "to see secondary school
leavers posing subjects of study for which there is no economic demand,
and thus creating a class of educated unemployed." 59 To this end the Plan
envisaged the introduction of diversified curricula, and. the opening of
comprehensive schools, upgrading and improving of existing secondary
schools and special emphasis on the training of technical teachers.
The Third Plan put special emphasis on the development of
technical/vocational skills and for this purpose it planned to expand the
13 existing technical institutes in East Pakistan as polytechnic
institutes. In West Pakistan, it aimed to complete the eight polytechnic
institutes and one monotechnic institute then being bui.lt and the
construction of 13 new polytechnic institutes. 60 It estimated that the
annual intake capacity of the polytechnic and technical institutes would
increase from 4,100 in 1965 (1,900 in East Pakistan and 2,200 in West
Pakistan) to 14,000 in 1970 (7,000 in East Pakistan and 7,000 in West
Pakistan). The total output of technicians during 1965-70 would be
23,000 (11,000 in East Pakistan and 12,000 in West Pakistan).
Another dimension of the relative order of priorities in raising
the capacity of the educational system can be gleaned from the percentage
of expenditure on various levels and types of education during the three
Five-year Plan periods as shown in the table below:
59. ibid. p.191
60. ibid. p.l9l
70
260
280
93
115
1,102
6
24
25
8.
11
100
138
637
448
198
174
2,730
2
6
26
1
26
100
5
23
15
8
6
100
19 183 17 612 23
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TABLE Vlg:3
Comparative Figures of Expenditure in Various Sub-Sectors
of Education during the Three Plan Periods (Million Rupees)
Sub-Sector	 First Plan	 Second Plan	 Third Plan
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
Primary Edn. 74
	
20	 101	 9	 520	 20
Secondary Edn. 72
Teacher
Training	 9
Technical Edn. 22
Higher Edn. 100
Scholarships	 5
Misc._____	 _____
Source: Third Five-year Plan, p.215
As is shown by these figures the increase in the allocation of
funds to technical education has been greater (6% to 23%) than any other
sub-sector. The share of higher education has relatively decreased from
26 per cent to 15 per cent over the period. Secondary education and
teacher-training have also received increased financial backing, but the
percentage share of primary education has remained constant, although
the net seven-fold increase from 74 million Rupees to 520 million Rupees
over the 15 years period is significant.
7.3.4. Social Inputs
Socialisation and Literacy
At the time of national independence, 86 per cent of Pakistanis
61
were illiterates; and of these the majority were females. The UNESCO
study in 1954 asserted that:
"by far the most difficult social obstacle to be
overcome in any programme of education in Pakistan
61. Muhammad Shamsul HA(. Compulsory E ucation in Pakistan, UNESCO,
Paris, 1954. For the purpose of 1951 Census, literacy was defined as
the ability to read a clear print in any language even without
understanding. Government of Pakistan Census Bulletin 2, p.vii.
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is the prevailing unsympathetic attitude towards
girls' education. Curiously enough, the prejudice
against girls' education is attributed to religion.
Speaking by and large, the common man still believes,
that it would be un-Islamic if a girl were to be
seen in public. Either he is not properly aware of
Islamic teaching that education is also ob'igatory
for women, or he has no occasion for giving any
serious thought to this problem of womens' education" 62
By 1961, the Second Census showed that the national literacy had gone
upto 19.2 per cent of which 33.0 per cent was in the urban and 16.6 per
cent was in the rural areas.
This was a frightening state of affairs for a nation which aimed
to re-state its value systems, as well as economically and socially to
moderrase itself. National policy has therefore, ever since independence,
been committed to introduce compulsory primary education as a process of
socialisation and enlargement of the empathetic capacity of citizens, by
stages of five years in the beginning and then of eight years
The 1959 Commission on National Education even went as far as to
declare "Universal compulsory education would be a part of our national
policy whatever be the difficulties and problems involved."
In 1969, the new Education Minister, Air Marshall Nur Khan, in
his proposals for a New Educational Policy also stressed:
"The importance of literacy in national development
is twofold. Firstly, it helps to bring about
changes in social attitudes, such as contempt for
manual work, submission to authority etc. which
inhibit economic progress. Secondly it raises
labour productivity by facilitating the acquisition
of analytical and technical skills. It is clear
that no real economic progress is possible in an
illiterate society." 66
Regarding the Adult Literacy Progranme, the Proposals recommended that
immediate emphasis should be placed on imparting functional literacy to:
(a) those employed in the urban manufacturing sector,
(b) those living in the vicinity of large upcoming projects; and
(o) the drop-outs of elementary schools. 67
62. ibid. pp.96-97
63. First All Pakistan Educational Conference 1941, also First Piveyyear
plan, pp.95-97
64. Report of the Commission on National Educat on, op. cit. p.120
65. ibid. p.173
66. The New Edatinna1 Policjr, Mm stry of Education & Scientific
Research,	 jv't.o*
	
121 1Lci, 19o3 p.7.
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To th s end, the pro osals aimed to imart literacy to o8 million a ts
by 1980. "If the rograinme is to succeed," diagnosed the Minister,
"it will be necessary to introduce national
service for the country's ed cated youth on
the Iranian model of National Literacy Corps.
Tins, it is recommended should be done." 68
But in spite of these commitments in the National Plans and ministerial
statements, the same Minister records that the overall literacy in the
country in 1969 was no more than 20 per cent winch "is among the lowest
in Asia 69
67. ibid.
68. ibid
69. ibid. p.19.
7.3.5. Cultural Inputs
National Integrative Culture.
(a) Religion.
Pakistan won its national independence on the basis of the
religious affinity that bound its otherwise diverse and far-flung two
wings. Common religion and. sentiments of I1aanc brotherhood inspired
its people both from East and. West Pakistan for a common nationhood.
In all the national documents and policy statements, therefore, there
has been a pronounced emphasis on cultivating national integration
through religion'0
The role of Islam as an integrative force has equally strongly
been visualised in all educational policy statements, both at the level
71
of socialisation and in education in its wider cultural connotations.
Both the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions have laid. down that:
ttAll Muslims in Pakistan should be enabled
individually and collectively to order their
lives in accordance with the teachings and
requirements of Islam, as set out in the
Holy Qu_ran and Sunnah". 72
At socialisation level, these constitutional provisions implied
that Islaznyyat would be made a compulsory suhject for all Muslims in
the Primary and the Secondary schools. It also meant that the
recitation of the Holy Q.uran and the discussion on Islamic injunction
and. the teachings of the Prophet in school assemblies, as well as, the
provision of premises and time for prayers during school hours had to
be provided. At a higher level, this input demand required the
introduction of Islamic Studies as subjects of study both at College and
University stages. Then there was the strong commitment of the
70. M. S. HAQ UNESCO, op. cit. p.11.
71. Address of the Minister of Education delivered at the Second
fll-Pakistan Educat onal Conference, held in 1951 at Karachi,
Government of Pakistan Press (Edn. Division), 1951. p.13.
72. 1956 Constitution, p.2., 1962 Constitution The Preamb1ç.
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modernists to cultivate Islamic Research in order to pr pare the
Mus im youth to see the need. to transform traditional Muslim values
and institutions in the light of modern norms.
(b) Linguist c culture
National integrata. n in Pakistan was also sought through a
common national language on which there seems to have been a general
consensus before and after independence. As an inter provincial common
language, and particularly as a language that developed during the Muslim
rule in India, already before independence, Urdu had been widely
regarded as the languages of all the Muslims of India, in spite of their
provincial or regional dialects. In fact, it may be recalled that Sir
Sayyid Alunad Kha.n and other Muslim leaders became aware of the strong
Hindu op osition to all things Muslim, among other things, when the
Hindu leadership as a whole put up a strong opposition to the
continuation of Urdu as the court ianuageP Since then, linguistically,
Indo-Pakistani nationalisms had diverged apart from the religious
differences, on Hindi-Urdu linguistic alignments. Communal disturbances,
on the Hindi-Urdu controversy between indue and. Muslims flared up on
many occasions'!4 With this background, at the time of partition, no
Pakistani questioned that the national language of Pakistan would be Urdu.
The First All-Pakistan Educational Conference in 1947, the Second
All-Pakistan Educational Conference of 1951 and the Six-year Nation 1
Plan of Educational development all affirmed that Urdu would be the
language of national integration for a 1. Pakistan, East as well as West.
In 1948, when the demand for Bengali as the national language of East
Pakistan was aired by some sections of the Bengali Students, the founder
of the nation reaffirmed that the language for inter-communication and
national integration should be Urdu and none else'!
73. See Al-BERTINI, The Makers_of Pakistan, Muhammad Ashratt , Lahore, p.25
74. ibid.
75. See Quidi-Azan, Mulianunad Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Govnor General of
Pakistan, Gov't. of Pakistan Press, Karachi 1947-48. pp.86-90
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6.5.3. Innovative Culture
Islsxnic Studies and Research
Strong as the vow of the Pakistani nation was to establish a
state on the Islamic principles, stronger still seems to have been their
pledge to re-interpret and purify Islam from its traditionalism and
medieval institutional framework. Both the All-Paki3tan Educational
Conferences in 1947 and 1946 repeated the need to set up institutions
to carry out research aimed at "rediscovering the truth in Islam and
sharing the application of this truth to the solution of our problems."
Research in Islamic studies was considered imperative for its objective
and subjective values.
The 1951 Conference for example recorded:
"The adoption of Islamic ideology as a basis of the
educational system necessar4y involves a thorough
research into Islam's contribution to the various
aspects of life and its bearing on modern problems
in the fields of economics, social and political
relations, etc. During the last four years some
attempts have been made in the provinces to
undertake an intensive study of a research in
Islammiyat. It is proposed to establish a Central
Institute of Islamic Research which, besides
conducting research will be responsible for
suggesting concrete educational projects on the
basis of Islamic ideology and for undertaking the
publication of standard literature on Islainmiyat." 76
Similarly both the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions explicitly called for the
setting up of an organization for Islamic Research "to assist in the
reconstruction of Muslim Society on a truly Islamic basis.77
Scientific Research
It was emphasized at the All-Pakistan Education Conference of
1951 that the University education that Pakistan inherited had no avenues
for research in pure and applied science. The All-India Council of
Scientific and Industrial Research established during the II World War
76. 1956 Constitution Art. 197. 1962 Constitut 4 on articles 207, 208.
77. ibid.
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had barely begun functioning when the sub-continent was divided. Whatever
amount of research there had been rema ned in India witti all the
laboratories of the Council. The Conference therefore, strongly
recommended the estab ishment of a Council of Scientific and. Industrial
Research to develop applied research; and. a similar Council of Social
Science Research to give leadership in the field by assisting and. keeping
abreast of research needs and bringing them to the attention of the
Universities and appropriate government departments.78
74. Within Ediication 1 System Processes of odernization
7.4.1. Administrative Liodernization
Policy Formulation Function:
Education in Pakisiis, in the main,under provincial jurisdiction.
At the centre, however, the overall nation' 1 educational policy is formed
through the National Assembly according
	
to the general national
objectives and policies. In the formation of a national educational policy,
the Central le islature is assisted by advisory boards, representing both
community and technical interests. Draft legislation, before it is
presented for formulation, is screened by the Central Ministry of Law
and other expert bodies. At one time the Government planned to set up
a National Council of Education as its principal advisory body, but the
plan has not materialised.
At the Provincial level, Provincial Legislative Assemblies
formulate policies of more particu r educational questions within the
range of their own provinces. Central policies are kept in view mainly
as guidelines. When, however, the Nabional Assembly or the Provinc al
Assemblies ar not in session, policies are formulated both at the Central
and the Provincial levels by the e ucation Departments in the form of
ordinances which become binding'9
78. First Five . years Plan. pp.439-443.
79. See UNESCO, World Survey of Educa on V, Educational P licy Leg slature
and Assemblies, Paris 1971. p.933-94l.
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Policy A option
The President of the Repub ic and the Provincial Governors and
their cabinets give final ap royal to the policies enacted by the
legislature. The Central and the Provincial Ministers of Education, in
fact,wield unlimited authority both in policy formulation and policy
adoption functions.
Policy Implementation
The Central Directorate of Education has recently assumed
responsibility for the implementation of ed cational policies in the
Federal C pital of Islamabad. Elsewhere, however, the Provincial
Directorates of Education under their Directors of Education and
Parliamentary Secretaries, are resuonsible to the Minister of Education
for the implementation of educational policies.
At the regional level, Regional Directors and Divisional Inspectors
are respectively responsible for the administration, implementation and
supervision of the educational policy. Besides, there are ten regional
Boards of Secondary Eduction mainly concerned with the secondary and
intermediate level educations and a Board of Technical Education in each
province to administer technical education in the Province. All of these
Boards are responsible to the Minister of Education in their res ective
province. Directorates have also a Provincial Bureau of Education whose
job it is to maintain close ].iaison with other countries and to act as
a clearing house for information on all eaucational and other rnatters0
Local Bodies in Education
Participation by local bodies in education had started during the
British period in 1883 when as a result of the Hunter Commission's Report
on education, and Lord Ripon's res lution on Local Self Government, the
80. ibid.
A
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overnment of India had realised the need for public particiation
in the development of education. Local bodies were recpnred to contr bute
from their local rates to the educational budget. The District (Deputy)
Commissioner was to act as the Chief Ad.m nistrator of local bodies. In
1921, more concessions were given to local self rule when the District
Commissioners were replaced by the elected Chairmen. The most important
unit in the urban areas was the District Board, and. in the cities and
tovms municipalities and town conmattees took over the responsibility of
education in their jurisdiction. This system of local bodies had
remained functioning through the national independence and. up to the time
when the Basic Democracies were introduced. Local members, however, had.
failed to operate the system with efficiency. Provincial Governments
were shouldering most of the financial and administrative responsibility
of education as a result of the default of the local bodies. There
was a constant demand from the technical and. managerial sides to transfer
81the control of primary education to the Provincial governments.
The Basic Democracies Law however, still kept the District Councils
involved in the process of educational policy - working through the
District Education Committees. In 1962, however, consequent to the
rising public pressure and teachers' protest ovr the mismanagement of
education by local bod es, the provincial governments took control of al]
District Education Committees although to represent cormnuiuty interest
three Basic Democrats were still kept on the Committees. Subse uent y
however, the Provincial Government had to take the full control of
primary education into their own hands. 82
 Direct government mana ement
of the schools, nevertheless, was far fr a satisfactory solution, and
the problem of democratisation of the administration of education at 11
remained unresolved. In 1969, th Nu.r . KHkN proposals strong y
emphas sed the decentra isation of educational administration and
81. Report of the National Co iss on on Educat on. pp.181-82
82. asudul IiASAN "Ed cat on and Local Bo ies in Pakistan", in
Pakistan Quarterly, Special Education Number, vol.XItI. No.4. 1966
pp.113-122.
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proposed for the creation of autonomous District School Authorities
with well represented membership of the community, mana€erial and
technical interests derived from parents, teachers, laymen and
government officials3
Private Enterprise in Education
Private enterprise in education had been encouraged by the
British Raj by the turn of the present century when the demand for
education started rising rapidly. Local religious organizations and
foreign missions were given grants-in-aid to operate private schools
Early policies of the Government of Pakistan were favourable to the
existence and indeed the progressive development of independent schools4
But soon, these institutions particularly the foreign missionary- schools
came to be seen as vestiges of prestigious schools running counter to
the national ideals of equality and as a 1underance to the national
integration.
Private institutions were also cropping up in increasing numbers,
mostras commercially profiteering organizations whose major contribution
to education was to help stuaents pass examinations and get degrees and
diplomas by cramming 	 with ready made answers. Their management was
often corrupt, and they failed to provide standardised buildings,
equipment and furniture. As a rule they were intolerably over-crowded.
Many did not even pay proper salaries to their teachers. Pressure was,
therefore mounting on the Government to take over the schools and to
put an end to this commercialisation and exploitation of education. The
NtTR Khan proposals stipulated the enactment of legislation, regulating
the working of these institutions; but it seems that public dem nd grew
for the nationalisation of private schools as the best solution.85
84. ort on the Commission on National Education, p.181.
85. Air Marshall Nur IAN, op. cit. Aopendix B.pp.56-65. In fact, the
'New Educational Policy' declared by President Bhuttots government in
1972, has already resolved that " rivate y managed schools will be
nationalised in a phased manner within a period of two years commencing
from Oct. 1972 - without comoensation". See Education for the asses-
The New Policy, Gov't, of Pakistan, Dept. of Films & Pub ications 1972.
83. Air Marshall Nur K1tAt(, PoDosa s of a New Education Policy, op.cit.p.28
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Modernization of the Administrative Structure
of Univers ties.
The adm nistrative structure of the Universit es that Pakistan
inherited took after that of the University of Ca cutta which itse f
was modelled on London University. In their governance, these older
universities had. devised a workable synthesis of the three representative
interests viz the community interest, the managerial interest and the
technical interest. Obviously, Colonial rule kept its mi hty hand
overhead in the form of a larger number of ex-officio and nominated
members than of elected ones.
Policy Formulation
ihe Senate or the Court which cn rised ex-officio and lay
members was the main University governing body with statutory budgetry
and appellate powers. Although a minimum number of 30 fellows had been
laid down, there was no fixed upper limit which gave the Governor General
in Council an absolute liberty to nominate as many fellows above the
minimum required number of 30 as he deemed fit. Consequently, the
University Senates had become unwieldy bodies with a majority of ex-
of ficio fellows.
To modernise the University administration, after independence,
the Panjab Government instituted the Panjab University Commission in 1950
which issued its report in 1952. Its recommendations were incorporated
in the 1954 Act. The Commission was critical of the unnecessarily large
Senate which they observed only restricted decision-making processes
and precluded the Universities from exercising any measure of autonomy.
According to the requirements of the 1954 Act, the re-organized Senate
of the Panjab University was much reduced in size and consisted of the
chancellor, the vice-chancellor, the Ch ef Justice of Lahore Hi h Court,
the Director of Public Instruction, University Professors, Princ pal a
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of Degree Colleges arid the Chairman of the Public Service Commission
as ex-offlcio members. Technical interest was represented by three
University lecturers, three professors and teachers other than Univers ty
teachers, two members ofthe Board of Secondary education. Community
interest was represented by the five members of the Panjab legislative
assembly and pr-rata representatives from other regions. The
Chancellor was empowered to nominate 15 more fellows from the three
groups concerned. 6 Similar changes were introduced in the Dacca and
Rajshabi Universities as a result of the Dacca University Act 1953.
The Nur K1Mi proposals receommended further democritisation of
the Senate by dividing fellowships on a 50-50 basis. It proposed
even to reserve five seats to the students' representatives 'who should
be allowed to attend only the meetings in which matters of their direct
concern are to be discussed.' 87
 But whereas the need is still felt and
proposals are made from time to time to enlist more community interest
groups into the University policy-making body, the technical interest
group, i.e. the academics in fact dominate the scene.
Policy Adoption
The University Syndicate is the chief executive committee of the
Senate. Its members include the V.C. as an ex-officio member, the judge
of the High Court, a member of the Public Service Commission, three (non-
teacher) nominees of the Vice Chancellor, six elected members of the
Senate, a nominee of the principals of the affiliated colleges. Deans
of Faculties can only be co-opted for the meetings on matters concerning
their faculties, but they hay he r1}t to vote. The Syndic te is e
rely administrative body while the academic functions are managed by
the Academ c Council. In 1959 the Commission of National Ed.ucat on
recommended that the Syndicate must be a compact body of com etent ersons
86. The Pan3ab Universiyct, 1954, pp.9-10
87. Air Marshal Nur	 op. cit. p.37.
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perhaps nine to eleven in nunmer, with a small repr sentation of
teaching staff on it." 88 The reor an zed Syndicate in fact consists of
17 members instead of 15 before modernization. On the Acwleinic Council,
the Commission recommended enlisting more professional and academic
specialists such as Professors and Readers as well as foreign experts
so as to raise the academic standards.89
Policy Implementation
The actual administration of the University policy is done by
the Executive Council under the chief authority of the V.C. and
comprises the Registrar, Controller and. Treasurer whose appointments
are made by the Chancellor. Before independence the V.C. was general]y
a prominent personality who was ap ointed. as a part-time supervisor of
the University administration. His oowers were wide extending to the
control of all the technical, institutional and managerial organizations
of the University. The 1950-52 Panjab University Enquiry Committee
recommended that the apuointment of the Chancellor should be for a
longer period and his office be made more effective. But until 1959,
when the Commission on National 4ucation reported, this had not been
done. The Commission was emphatic in pin.pointing that "the powers
of the Chancellor and the Vice Chancellor are not Droperly defined in
the existing acts, and if they are to perform th ir duties effectively,
it is necessary that their Dowers and res onsibilites should be o
defined.. ,,90
The Commission recommended that:
"The Vice-Chanoel or p ointed by the Chancellor,
should have a term of service long enough to allow
him to develop and implement a sign ficant policy
for the University.	 e should be accountable to
88. The Reort of the Nat ona Education Coa.ission. p.48
89. ibid. pp.48-49
90. ibid. p.47.
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the Chancellor for the 3ust and roper performance
of lus functions. The Vice-Chancellor will be the
chief academic and acim nistrative officer of the
institution charged with the resoonsibility of
giving effect to the provi ions of the Un versity
Act and the statutes framed thereunder. He should
be vested with the necessary power to carry out
these rep onsibilities." 91
Up until 1969, however, no substantial change had taken place
in the University administration. The Nur Khan proposals stressed that
the adxairiistrative side of the Universities needs to be thorou hly
streamlined." The proposals ran counter to the Commission on National
Education in under-rating the usefulness of making the Provincial
Governors chancellors of the Universities?2
 The proposals also sought
to introduce a measure of democratic orocedure into the selection of the
V.C. by suggesting that instead of the unualified right given to the
Chancellor to nominate the V.C., selection should be made from amongst
the panel of names submitted by the Senate, by a majority vote of the
Deans of Faculties and Professois of the Departments? 3
 But the
administrative structure still seems deeply entrenched in the inherited
positions where personal power and the political authority of the
Provincial Governor still looms heavy.
Structural Differentiation
In spite of its ideological and functional limitations, the
structure of the educational system inherited by Pakistan did not lack
all the basic elements of a modern framework. 94 Inct, Professor
Poster, dealing main y with Africa, even goes to stress that accepting
the restricted occupational structure of the colonialist period and
the narrow, academic functions of the schools, colonial education was
probably the most suitable for the role it was designed to perform.95
91. ibid. p.48
92. Air Iarshall Nur KHAN, o . cit. 
.37.
93. ibid. p.37
94. Philip 3. FOSTEd, Education and Social Change in Ghana Routledge
& K Paul, London, 1965, pp.133-137.
95. At the First All-Pakistan Educational Conference in 1947, the
Education Minister remarked ab ut the inherited system,
"It has n common faith or body of principles to animate
it and has cons icuously failed to inculcate arid maintain/cont'd..
next page
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The inher ted structure nevertheless, did need struc ura moderruza ion
and reconstruction as an articulat d an uniform national system.
The first defect that seems to have confronted educatio sts
in Pakistan was the lack of uniformity in the e ucat onal structures of
various provinces and regions. The Br tish seem to have allowed each
province to devise its own system o suit its climatic economic an
occupational requirements. Duration of schooling, for example, varied
from one province to another. In Sind, the primary education extended
over four years while in other provinces it was generally five years.
There was inconsistency and overla Ding between the vernacular ,Anglo-
vernacular middle schools and the High Schools. Some middle schools even
included elementary classes. The vernacular middle school was almost
a blind alley whereas the Anglo-Vernacular and High School prepared
pupils for the school Leaving Certificate. Relative to the lack of
uniformity among schools, teachers' training institutions also
lacked articulation. There were institutions for junior vernacular,
senior vernacular, Senior Anglo-Vernacular teachers on the one hand
and the post-graduate teachers, mainly for English teaching, on the
other. High Schools, in theory were to have all post-graduate trained
teachers. The two Universities that Pakistan inherited, Panjab and
Dacca, catered for large areas and diverse functions. They were also
heavily preoccupied with a large part of the secondary and intermed ate
stages.
The Post-War Sargent Reort had snotted all the lacunae of the
structure and made some important su gestions for reforxn. 6
 The R port
95. cont'd. /the stern moral and intel ectual discipline which
is the hal mark of true education. Thus, its
products... . have gone out into the world only to
discover that they are unf tted for the business
of lying".
Proceedin s of the Educa i nel Conference held at Karachi, November
27 to December 1, 1947, pp.1-8.
96. Post War Educational Devéloment in India;Report by the C ntral
Advisory Board of Educat on, New Delhi, Bureau of Education, 1944.
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stressed that the high school should cover six years and that entry
into it should be at 11^ on a selective basis. The Report also sought
to bring about functional differentiation in the high schoo]Sby
suggesting "that they should be of two types (a) academic and (b)
technical, both providing for a good alL..rouxid education combined with
some preparation in the later stages for the careers which pupils will
enter on leaving schools." The Report recommended that "the curricu1wn
in all cases should be as varied as circumstances permit said should
not be undly restricted by the re uirements of Universities or examining
bodies." 97 But concerted structural modernization did not take place
until after the Report of the National Commission in 1959. The present
national educational structure comprises three distinct stages. The
duration of primary education is now uniformly fixed as five grades
beginning at age 6.plus and extending to 11-plus. Secondary education,
now comprises three stages viz, middle school grades 6-8, junior secondary
school grades 9-10, and higher secondary school grades 11-12. Secondary
education, therefore, covers the age group 11-18. Matriculation and
secondary school certificate examination at the end of grade 10 can
enable students to seek a white collar clerical job or admission into
a Higher Secondary School, a polytechnic institute, primary teacher-
training institute, industrial or Arts and. Crafts School, whose courses
vary from two to three years duration. In order, however, to go on to
a University, a student must pass the Higher Secondary Certificate
Examination. In 1963, when, following the proposal of the Commission
on National Education, the G vernment extended the graduation course to
three years, violent students riots ens ed, particular y in East
Pakistan and the much needed charie vas withdrawn. 98 Consequently,
97. World Survey of Education 	 TIffESCO, 1971. pp.933-942
98. See Adam (flJRLE, P1anning_fo ...d cation in Pakistan, A Personal
Case Study, Tavistock Pub ishers, London, Sydney, Wellington,
1966, pp.57-62.
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the B.A. (pass course still reamins unchanged from its pre-indeendence
two-year structure. The B.A. (donours) course lasts three years, with
a masters course lasting tNO years for someone with a B.A. pass and
one year for B.A. Honours. Graduation in specialised courses, e.g.
agriculture, engineering and medicine takes from four to five years.
Degrees are awarded by the Universit es while the actual
teaching at under graduate level goes on in affiliated colleges.
The Universities conduct teaching only at the post graduate level,
except for the Agricultural and Technological Universities which conduct
teaching at all levels. Universities now conduct only graduate and
post-graduate examinations while matriculation and. intermediate
examinations are conducted by the newly established Boards of Education.99
99. See M. S. HUGS, Education and Dev lqpment Strategy in South and
Southeast Asia, East-west Centre Press, donolulu, 1965, pp.165-6.
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THE NEW EDUCATiONAL STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN
(Based on the Recommendations of the Commission on National Education,
2959)
GRADES
XVIII
23 -	 -
--
XVII
22 - - Master's Degree
XVI
21 --	 -	 ,.
xv U
"C,,20- -	
-	 Bachelor's
xlv	 -am
a
t,	 Bachelor's	 Degree
19 -	 -	 Degree	 Honors
XIII	 ,	 Pass Course Course
o u U
18—	 - _____ ____ -
XII	 3<	 I oo,Higher Secondary	 to
11-	 (Intermediate Colleges)	 a	 ____________
	
(Grades XI and XII) I	 u Primary Tea nngXI	 I	 Institutes
16	 --- ___________________ _________
I	 I
x	 I	 I
0	 15
'C	 Schools	 (Grades IX and X)	 I	 Schools
Technical	 Seconthry (High School)	 Vocational
IX	 I14 -
VIII
13 -
vu	 Junior Secondary
(Grades VI-VIJI)12 -
VI
II.
V
IV
Primary
III	 (Grades 1-V)
II
U
6
-297..
7.4.2. Expansion of the Capacity ofte_jyste
Du.r ng the pre-Plan eriod (1947-1954), the ca acity of the
educational system remained very limited. The modest ex an on tnat
did take lace followed a ha hazard course. In the absence of the
needful res urces, improvisat ii was the giudin principle. Pr aiy
education increased by 25 per cent, thile sec ndary education exian ed
relatively slovly, and techracal education was the slowest to ro ress.
At the hi her level, three new niversities, Karachi, Peshawer and
Rajshaiu, were opened.
The First Five-year Plan (1955-1960) stressed the need to "fill
gaps and. maladjustm nts". The plan was critical of the quantitive
expansion while the quality remained poor)°° In Vest Pakistan more
stress was placed on the exoansion of hi her education than of
secondary; while in East Pakistan primary and technical education needed
more expansion. 'This' remarks Adam Curie, "is the expected contrast
between an aristocratic and a more egalitarian Society. !Ol Teacher
shortage remained very acute dur ng this period.
The Second. Five-year Plan, had before it the comprehensive
framework of proposals and policy objectives outlined by the Commission
on National Education in 1959. It, therefore, tackled the problem of
expansion both of cjuantitive and aualitative nature in a balanced
manner. Planned allocation of enrollments was envisa ed. for the
different schools. More technical arid vocational schools were lamed
than before. Yet the expans on in hi her education, on the whole,
outstriDped all the other levels of ea cation.
100. F rst- lve-yIear Plan, p.453
101. Adame CTJRLE, Planning for Educati n in P kistan, o . cit. po.53-54.
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The Third Five- ear Plan further stressed the need to ttaceve
a well-balanced and. integrated dev o nient at all levels of educati n.02
It pledged encouragement for vigorous efforts to improve the uality of
education at all levels. At the same time it put greater emphasis on
widening the base of primary education and on checking the high rate
of drop-out. At the Secondary level, the plan advocated greater
diversification of courses in order to relieve bottlenecks at the higher
eaucation 03
 For this purpose, the plan aimed to improve about 950 high
schools in West Pakistan and 1,000 high schools in East Pakistan, to
introduce technical and. vocational courses and workshops and. to open
10440 corn rehensive schools in each province. 	 Extension of teacher-
training programmes, with particular stress on the research facilities
in education, was also emphasised. At the lugher*education level, the
plan put greater emphasis on expansion of the faculties of science and
of scientific research activities°5
A more detailed analysis of the expansion at each level would shed
more light on the direction of progress and magnitude of the problem.
Primary Education
Pakistan planned to introduce compulsory primary education for
all children in the age group 6-11 by the year 1970, and for age group
11-14 by the year 1975. The rowth of orimary education, however has
developed as shown in Table VII.3.
102. Third Five-year Plan, pp.186-187
103. ibid.
104. ibid. p.194
105. ibid. p.202
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TABLE VII.3
Expans on of Primary &ucation in Pakstan
1947-1966
SCHOOLS	 E	 I4MENT
	
Year	 E.Pak. W.Pak.
	 Total	 E.Pak.	 H.Pak.
	
Total
	
1947-46 29,633	 8,413	 38,406	 2 , 021,702	 544,360 2,566,062
	
1954-55	 26,000	 14,162	 40,162	 2,604,360	 1,604,369 3,878,468
	
1959-60	 26,583
	
17,901	44,484	 3,180,367	 1,547,910 4,728,277
	
1964-65	 27,649	 32,589
	
60,238	 4,044,179	 2,532,324
	
6,516,503
	
1965-66	 27,736	 34,313	 62,049
	
4,236,036	 2,763,670	 6,999,706
Source: Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1965-66.
According to the Karachi Plan it was estimated that by 1965, the
total number of children of rimary school age would be 11.4 million.
The actual enrollment in 1965 only stood at 6.5 million - much below
the target. Dealing with this huge backlog the Tokyo meeting of
Education Ministers suggested that within the broad targets set by the
Karachi Plan, national policies might be varied to suit their special
needs and available resources. It was with this background that the
Third Plan envisaged putting more em hasis on the expansion of or mary
educat ion.
Secondary Education
	 TABLE vII.4.
Expansion of Secondary Education in Pakistan
between 1947-1966
SCHOOLS	 ENROLUVLEWL'
	
Year E.Pak. W.Pak.
	
Total	 .Pak.	 W.Pak.
	
Tota
	
1947-48
	
3,841	 2,598	 6,079	 526,020	 508,039
	 1,034,059
	
1954-55	 3,079	 2,264	 5,343	 457,297	 722,822	 1,180,119
	
1959-60	 3,053	 3,043
	
6,096	 530,485
	
912,383
	
1,442,868
	
1964-65	 3,834
	
4,323	 8,157
	
848,512
	
1,369,416 2,217,928
	
1965-66	 3,964	 4,472	 8,436	 949,486	 1,481,094 2,430,580
Source: Pak tan Statistical Year Book, 1965-66
Secondary School enro iment has exceeded even the targets.
n the First Five-year Plan, for exam1e, the enro iment estimate was
144,000 and the Second Plan, aimed at 430,000. But t e actual enrollm nt
figures at the end of the First P an er od stood at 146,000 and at the
end of the Second at 775,060 resoec vely.
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Intew ng trends in expansion show that whereas the increase
in secondary school enrollin nt in East Pak stan was from 526,020 to
949,48 6 or less than twofold; in west Paki tan it increased from 508,039
to 1,481,094 which is about three-fold. This disparity obviously shows
the relative under development of East Pakistan and a resultant greater
rate of drop-out. As Prof. Curie has pointed out,
"The great majority of East Pakistani children
get no further than Clas I. For every 100 who
enter that class 40 survive to Cass II and
only about 15 to Class V. This, of course,
means that only a small pro ortion receive the
four or five years of schooling considered
essential to impart lasting literacy." 	 106
He goes on to conclude that "East Pakistan's education problems are due
more to accidents of history and geography than any failure of concern
by the authorities or lack of interest among the people". 107
Teachers' Education
Shortage of teachers was a very serious problem faced by the young
Country at its inception, and all the Five-year Development Plans have
given due imnortance to the expansion of the capacity to train more and
better teachers. The growth of teacher-train ng institutions and
enrollment is shown in Table VII.5.
TABLE VII.5
-	 pansion in Teachers Mucation 1947-66
	Number and Level	 Enrollment
Year	 of Institutions
Secondary	 Higher	 Secondary	 Higher
Level	 Lev 1	 evel	 Level
	
1950-51	 114	 6	 6,412	 403
	
1954-55
	 94	 8	 8,248	 908
	
1959-60	 90	 12	 7,836	 1,675
	
1964-65	 156	 18	 18,965	 4,038
	
1965-66	 158	 18	 23,618	 4,303
Source: Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1965-66.
106. ibid. p.76-79.
107. ibid.
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TABLE VII.6
Number of Teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools
l947-1,66
	PRIMARY	 SEC IDARY
Year	 E.Pak.	 W.Pak.	 Total	 E.Pak.	 W.Pak.
	
Total
	
1947-48	 75,624	 17,820	 93,944	 24,362	 18,848	 43,210
	
1954-55
	 71,477	 35,477	 106,954	 22,289	 23,349
	
45,638
	
1959-60 	78,462
	
44,848	 123,310	 23,571
	
31,355
	
54,926
	
1964-65	 95,530	 75,690	 170,490	 33,670	 49,828	 83,498
Source: Pakistan Statistical Year book 1965-66
The First Five-year Plan stipulated that the existing 99 Normal Schools
could only train 34,000 teachers by the end of the Plan period in 1960,
and projected opening new normal schoo1stth an expected capacity of 100
trained teachers per year.	 The total turnover of trained primary
108
school teachers was estimated at 43,500 by that year.	 Similarly for
the secondary school teachers, the First Plan proposed a yield of 800
graduate and 1,800 undergraduate trained teachers annually during the
109
Plan period.
But the actual increase in the number of teachers during the First
Plan period only amounted to 16,356 primary- and 9,288 secondary teachers -
an achievement much less than the envisaged.
The Second Plan aimed at 70,000 additional pr mary school teachers
and 65,000 secondary- school teachers. In 1965, the system had only mtnaged
to produce some 47,000 extra primary teachers and 28,572 secondary school
teachers. These gross failures resulted in the high pupil-teacher ratio
of 36-3 in 1954-55, 38-3 in 1959-60 and 38-6 in 1964-65 in priinry school°
Technical and Vocational Education
VII .7
As Table / shows, greater progress has been achieved in the
technical and vocational education.
108. First Five-year Plan. p.421
109. ibid. p.422
110. Pakistan Statistical Year Bpç p.423
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TABLE VII.
Expansion of Tecim cal and Vocational Education
1947-1966
Technical Education Commercial L ucation Agricultural Education
Insti-	 Enroll- Insti-
	 Enroll-	 Insti-	 Enroll-
tutions ment	 tutions	 inent	 tutions	 ment
1947-50	 121	 7,169	 13	 1,023
	
2	 33
1954-55	 119	 9,535	 11	 946	 1	 112
1959-60	 113	 12,045
	
18	 1,098	 2	 321
1964-66 ( 114
	 7,784 *
	
33	 3,209	 4	 938
( i	 8,181
Source: Pakistan Statistical Year Book.
* Polytechiu.cs.
Higher iducation
Higher Jevel education in Pakistan has developed dlsDroportionate
to the lower levels. By 1969, there were 10 Universities as against
two inherited at the time of independence and 428 colleges as against
90 in 1947. Enrollment in the Universities has multinlied by 10 times
from 2,264 in 1947 to 19,753 in 1965; and co l lege enrollment rose from
36,000 to 267,832 in the same oeriod. The latest figures for the third-
level enrollment in the year 1968 as shown in the IThLSCO Statistical
111Yearbook (1971) stood at 357,675, which is an nninense growth comnared
with that of other levels.
Faculty-wise expansion is shown in Table Vii 8.
TABLE VII.8
Expansion in higher level Enrollment in the Various Faculties
19 54-19 68
Faculties/Year	 1954-55	 1967-68
Humanities	 65,489	 196,985
Natural Science	 86,181
Social Science	 6,292
Fine Arts
	 89	 632
Law	 1,537
	
6,391
Agriculture	 981	 5,675
Engineering	 2,279	 6,945
Medicine	 3,409
	
7,690
Education	 403
	
4,462
Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook and UNESCO Statistical
Yearbook 1971
111. UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1971.
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The greater ace of expans on in enrollment in the facult es of
arts, agricu ture and law is indicative of the fact that higher
education is not correlated with the manpower demands of the economy.
Admission into medical, engine r ng and science faculties in general
are restricted. The influx of higher level students into the facu ties
of arts, law and. education only helps them procure jobs and perha a
prestigious status.
7.5. Outputs of the Educational System as
Inputs into the Society
7.5.1. Political Outputs - (formation of the Elites)
Before independence, the British Raj, had, as prophesied by
Macaulay, given rise to a social stratification based entirely on the
basis of ascriptive criteria with the minimum of achievement, that is,
proficiency in English. Starting in the early nineteenth century with
a restricted participation by the natives as white col]ar workers and
junior executives in the economic and administrative institutions,
the indianisation movement of services gradually gathered momentum.
Avenues of greater participation opened up by the mid-nineteenth century,
when a network of infra-structures: roads, railways, postal and
telegraph services and irrigation projects were constructed. Eknployment
in these services was considered prestigious and offered security of
income. So Universities were opened in 1857 to create a middle-class
from which political, administrative, academic and industrial elites
112
were recruited.	 In 1887, though 10 per cent of the I.C.S. posts were
for the natives, only England returned graduates were enlisted. As
Herinessy points out "both Central and Provincial goverrunents ceased to
112. See Jo sleyn lIEN ESSY, "British Ed cation for an Elite in India
( 1780-1947)", in Rupert Wilkinson (Ed.) Governing Elites; Sudies
in Train ng and Selection, O.U.P. 1 69, pp.l35-l92.
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accept an Indian University d.e ree as an automatic qualification
113for recruitment in the C vii Service.
The gradual process of indianisation in the I,C.S. can be
gleaned from the table below:
TABLE VTI.9.
Participation of the Indians in the I.C.S.
1869-1942
Year	 British	 Indians	 Total
1869	 882	 1	 883
1879	 907	 7	 914
1889	 884	 12	 896
1909	 1,082	 60	 1,142
1919	 1,177
	
78	 1,255
1929	 881	 241	 1,122
1939
	
759	 540	 1,299
1942	 573	 632	 1,205
Source: J. Herinessy, British Education for
Elite in India (1780-1947)
This was the crystallization of the pyramidical social
stratification structure in which a very thin layer of potential
political elite of (Sahibs) was recruited on the basis of their
education in public schools in India and/or higher education in England
while the bulk of the elites who graduated from local higher education
institutions remained, to borrow Abernethy's term, an 'incipient class'4
The seeds for dual standards in recruitment status were planted in the
very creation of the popular Universities whose graduates were not
considered good enough for top positions. But education still being
the major avenue for social, occupational and income mobility, had to
rise in demand. In the absence of a comparative shortage of job
opportunities or entpreneurship, the bulk of the University graduate
output was produced by the faculties of arts, commerce arid law.
Since national indpendence, the trend has changed but very
slowly and relative to the openings or developments in the socio-econ sac
113. ibid.
114. David B. ABER1EPHY, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An
African Case, Stanford University Press, California 1969,
pp.243-244.
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and industrial systems. Education is at 11 ve.lued for prestigious
reasons and for its pass ort value to securing a job - any job.
Recruitment into the higher cadres of the Civil Service still remains
on the ascriptive criteria of the Drimordial groups who have established
themselves in positions of authority. Trends of elite formation as
judged by the University graduate output can be noticed from the table
below:
TABLE VII.l0
Graduates OutDt from l959-l967
Degree:	 959-60	 (a)	 560-6i	 (b)	 1963-64	 (c)	 965-70
	
(d)
B.A.	 5,810	 6,500	 14,500	 22,900
B.Sc.	 2,112	 2,400	 5,400	 6,000
B.Com .	 992	 1,000	 2,500	 3,300
B.Sc. Home Economics	 48	 50	 110	 400
B.Sc. Agriculture	 206	 180	 500	 940
M.BBS.	 679
	
750	 1,000	 840
B.Sc. Engineering	 426	 450	 750	 1,200
Sources: (a) Statistical learbook 1965-66, (b), (c) and (d) W. M. Zeki,
Educational Developuent in Pakistan, The West Pakistan Publishing
Co. 1968, p.68
Tinis modernising leadership in Pakistan is not composed of technocrats or
intellectuals but of civil and m litary bureaucrats. Intellectuals are,
as a rule, the worst hit group in states where armies win power and
continue to rule. Next to the civil and military- bureaucrats in Pakistan
are the newly einer ing class of entrepreneurs, of industrialists and
businessmen, whose status and power stands in inverse proDortion to their
educational achievement. The older eneration of the twe ye notoriously
influential industrialist and business "Big Houses" had little or no
formal education. As Hanna Papanek has pointed out:
"Only five of the major entrepreneurs (i.e. men
primarily responsible for the estab ishment and
growth of the firm after artition) in this
group of twelve, were educated to matriculation
or better, including one B.A. and two B.Scs.
the remaining seven entr reneurs were educated
to levels below matriculation, inc uding instances
where formal education was very rudimentary indeed". 115.
115. Hanna PAPANEK, "Pakistan's Bi Business, Muslim Separatism
Entrepreneurship & Political ]iodernizat ion" in Econoi.ve1oent
arid Cultural Change, vol. 21. No. 1. (Oct. 1972) pp.1-32.
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The younger generations of entrepreneurs are, however, becomin
familiar with modern education, though relat vely slowly. Close-bo k,
ascri five criteria that became entrenc ed n the s c ety ar hard to e
and o create a great dea of fri tr t on amon the young.
7.5.2. Economic utputs:jducation, anower Supply and Economy).
Up until the Third Five-year Plan was launched, recise mannower
demand and projections had not been studied. The plan, highlighting this
d.ilexnma, pointed out:
"The estimation of man ower requirements present
difficulties as emoloyment data by occupations
are scarce specially in the form of staffing
tables and manning tables."
The Plan, therefore, relied on data from other countries at 'com arable
116
stages' of development. The estimated high-level manpower outout
of the educational system during the five-year period was calculated as
below:
TABLE VII.11
High-level anp wer Demand and Educational Supply
Actual
Category	 Demand	 Supply	 Supply	 Deficit
Engineers	 13,100	 6,000	 1,200	 7,100
Scientists	 9,500	 4,000	 6,000	 5,500
A ricultural
Technolo sts	 5,300	 4,700	 940	 600
Doctors
	 4,200	 4,200	 840	 -
University and Sec. 	 20,000	 20,000	 -
Te c ers
Source: Third Five-Year Plan 1965-70. p.221
A glance at the table above shows the glaring shortfa is n all
occup tional cate ones.
The T ird Plan recommended the fol owiig measures for the ualitat ye
imr ye ent of trained man ower:
116. H. S. PABNES, Forecastin 	 ic orial ews for Econom c & oc al
Deveopments, Paris, 0.j.L. . 1962, pD.110-1 3.
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1. '}ore em h sis on ractical training;
2. provision of modern sci n-t fic laboratories;
3. frequent reorganization of curr cula of training iristit tes,
in consu tation with em loyers;
4. systematic in-service and. n the job training in a practical
manner;
5. training of more and. better technical teachers by way of
refresher courses;
6. ex ansion of oro rainnies for foreign technical training;	 117
7. improvement in the terms and conditions of technical nersonnel."
The UNESCO Study on Access to H gher Education", however, put
e ual blame on the policies of ungu d.ed admission into the higher
ed.ucati n institutions and their resultant haphazard choice of subjects
for considerable under-employment that prevails in Pakistan. It,
therefore, recommended, inter alia, for guided and. selective admission
policy 'to meet this situation and educational and vocational guidance
services organised to facilitate a wise choice of academic programmes,
and later, to direct trained persons into ao ropriate channels."118
Another reason for the misfit of the economic system with the
educational output of trained manoower in Pakistan may be ascrioed to
the type of in strial and business entrepreneurs that have emerged
in Pakistan.
As seen above, the Big Businesses are still owned and run by
family firms and their owners are either illiterates or barely literate.
There seems to be a tendency among them to under-rate lugh-ed cati nal
or technical qualificiations.
117. Third Five-year Plan. p.222
118. UNESCO and the International Association of Universities, Access
to igher Education, vol II, 1965, p.213.
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7.5.3. Social Outputs
Pr vi on of Literacy
In spite of the repeatedly ronounced stress placed on it in
all the educational and development plans and programmes since
independence, the literacy rate in Pakistan has not much improved.
The census of 1961, showed that 40.6 million population of 15 years
age and over, which constituted 81.2 er cent of the total population,
were illiterate as against 81.1 per cent in the 1951 census. A
breakdown of these figures shows that 63.3 per cent of the illiterates
are urbanites and 84.2 per cent villagers, and 71.1 per cent illiterates
are males while 92.6 per cent fe ales.
	 Thus the original pattern
of greater village and. female educational and social backwardness
within the overall depressing problem of mass illiteracy, remains
basically unchanged.
The reasons for the failure of the educational system and
literacy campaigns have been ascribed to faulty teaching, scarcity
of adequate and suitable type of reading materials, lack of positive
motivation for participation in the literacy campaigns by the adults
and above all inconsistent and sporadic action in the early years.'2°
To combat the fornu.d.able task of removing ignorance from among
the teeming millions of village masses, the Village Agricultural and
Industrial Development (V.A.I.D.) took initiative in 1956, by
organizing eleven thousand villa e literacy centres with an enrollment
of 90,000 adults in various villages of West Pakistan, and a
corresponding number in East Pakistan. The Lala Musa, Peshawer and
Comilla V.A.I.D. academics started roducing tr med village workers.
119. See UNESCO: Literacy 1969-71, Progress achieved in Literacy
Throughout the #Iorld. Paris, 1972, 4ppendixes P.116
120. See Abdul RALIP, West Pakistan Rural Ed cation and DeveloDment,
Honolulu East-West Centre Pr , 1970, p.61.
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Although a modicum of s cess was achieved by these measures, there
has not be n any r al breakthrough.
The at nal Study Group for Adu t Literacy an Adult Educat n,
Comm ssioned to prepare a 'corn rehens ye and effective plan for literacy'
came to the conclusion that "mass illiteracy puts a stranglehold on
the social and economic development of Pakistan and thus presents a
serious national emergency; that mass illiteracy, therefore, must be
tackled with courage and prudence and without further delay", 121
 The
Study Group recommended a more planned and selective piloting of projects,
by taking urn ted areas as economic and social units designed to
operate as nuclei for a nat on-wide campaign. But no worthwhjle result
appeared.
A more concerted effort was, therefore, made in 1969, by the
vinistry of thucation ana Scientific Research, which set out a target
of imparting literacy to 68 million by 1980. It chose three sectors
considered to offer better chances for enlisting motivation for
literacy, viz:
1. the urban manufactur ng and in ustrial centres employing
3.3 mu ion whose nunber ws expected to rise to 6.7 m 1 ion
by 1980;
2. the large complex projects such as the Tarbela Dam, the Roop
pur Neclear Power Proect, the Fertilizer Factories complex
employing large number of labour; and
3. the rural areas where primary school drop outs below the age
of 20 would be incor orated.	 122.
Literacy centres built & round in these areas would, it was hoDed, impart
not on y iteracy but also civic e ucation, agricu tural training an
improved farming tech.niues. To mn ti se centres it was estimate that
28,000 teachers would be needed by 1 70 and 72,000 by 197523 These
121. Governm nt of Pakistan, Report f the ational Stu y Group on A lt
Literacy an A u t Ed cti n in P.kustan, Karachi, Central i3ureau
of ducation, iunistry of iiaucation & Scientific Research, 1964.
122. RALJT1, op. cit. pp.69-70
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high re u rements could not have be n met by the exis in ed c
in titut ons. I view of the ur ency of t e task and its fr nge
occupational advanta es, the gov rnment proposed to con cr pt all young
men and w men of the 18-22 age rou into the National Literac Corps
to be formed on the model of the Iranian Sipah-e-Danesh (Wisdom Corps).
Higher Secondary Certificate for men and matriculation certif cate for
women were the re uired educ tion and a nanimum of two-year serrice was
124
obligatory. The plan has as yet to be implemented.
7.5.4. Cultural Outputs
Integrative Culture - Islamic Unir
Pakistan's education 1 system was committed by its ideology to
promote national integration on the basis of Islamic identity.
Therefore, every national document has stressed that the educational
system must introduce Islamiyyat and Islamic studies as a source of
socialisation and inspiration. "Indeed, Pakistan to be true to her oul",
declared the Commission on National Education, "should take in piration
from Islam, its rinciples an i eology.?25
As a result of the recomm ndations f the Commission on National
Education, Islanayyat has been made a compulsory subject for all luslim
children for the first eight years of schooling i.e. the primary and
junior high school stages. From ci sa 9 to 12, i.e. the high school and
higher secondary or intermediate levels, it becomes an option 1 subject.
Higher ed cation puts more emphasis on educating the young to underat' d
Islam in a rational manner. The Comm ssion al o stressed the need to
promote Islamic Research in Pakistan in order to "brin together
126know edge of t e fundamental Islam c va ues and of modern sci nce." A
glance at the aims and object yes of Is ammiyyat sy abus g yen below
sheds light on the stress on rationalism.
123. ibid.
124. ibid.
125. R . ort of the Commis ion on Nat onal Education, p.209
12 • ibid. p.211.
..311-
1. o ive an understandin on he basic pr nciples of slam.
2. To inculcate faith in and reverence for God, the QLran
and the Pro het.
3. To incu cate respect for other prophets and the revea'ed Books.
4. To emphasize the Islamic conception of dignity of man,
equality and universal brotherhood.
5. To ins ire the students to achieve hi h standard of indivj. ual
and social virtues and to live a good life, clean in thought
and. correct in action.
6. To inculcate Islamic virtues like truthfulness, justice,
tolerance, forgiveness, mercy, honesty, readiness to enforce
the right and resist the wrong, simplicity-, self-sacrifice,
social service and search for knowledge.
7. To bring out clearly the Islam c criterlonrexcellence as
distinct from birth, wealth, etc.
8. To emphasize the importance of practical goodness in Islam
in preference to dona and superstitions.
9. To present Islam as a progressive social system and. a universal
code of morality which can meet the demands of all times." 127
The stipulation of rationalistic ana progressive aims in religious
and moral education itself is just a part of the task. Much depends on
the outlook of the teachers who are resoonsible for the infusion of
the spirit of rationality. In Muslim countries generally, rationalisticall
orientated and trained teachers of Islainiyyat are almost impossible to
find. Teachers of religion are generally taught in the tradition1
madrassahs, their salaries are among the lowest, their status in the
profession is low and their chance of progress scanty.
The Commission on National Education felt the need for training
teachers of Islamiyyat on modern lines.
"Scholars and teachers of Islainiyyat should develop
an objective outlook and un erstand the spirit and
methods of modern science, natural as well as
social, which should be freely aDplied in the
interpretation of Islam. It wou d be desirable
that teachers of Islamic stuaies, besides having
an adequate know ed e of their subject in its
various aspects, h uld have up-to-date knowled e
of at least one of the social sciences such as
economics, philosoohy, sociology-, psychology or
political science and be able to appreciate the
principles underlying the spirit and methods of
natural sciences." 128
127. R'port on the Curricu urn Commi tee for Secondary Ed. cation (Classes
Vi-xiIi), Ministry of Educat on and Information (Edn.. D Vision),
Government of Pakistan, Rawa mdi, p.517.
128. Reoprt of the Comnusi pn on atio al E ucat on, p.211.
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But the actualisation of these high ideals required tremendous
effort in the establishment of institutions in which Muslim scholars
could train, the building up of incentives for intending scholars to
seek admission into these institutions; end finally the creation of a
mutual trust and co-operation between the political and religious
leadership. But the conflict between the politically powerful elite
and the religiously powerful ulania didn't allow such synthesis to
emerge. The gap that divided the modernist and the traditionalist elites
remained and is widening. The ulama are suspicious of the political
elite when the latter speak of modernising Islam. The so-called
modernists, they argue, do not relly know what Islam means; how could
,129
they be trusted with its modernization.
In 1959, when a Central Institute of Islamic Research was
inaugerated by President Ayy-ub in Karachi for the training of modern
Islamic scholars under Dr. Pazl-u-Rahman, a Harvard modernist scholar,
it came under seere criticism from all sections of the orthodox ulajna.
The modernist political leaders have, on their part, striven
to alienate the religious leaders from all national institutions,
labelling them as communists and imprisoning them even if they speak
against the primdrdial politics and violation of national norms which
the modernists indulge in. It can safely be concluded that in spite
of the great strength and intensity of the sentiments of Islamic
brotherhood among the nation the socio-political divisions, the
imbalances created by a small influential class on the top and an
ignorant, impoverished mass, fail to unite the nation on the basis of
Islam. The Educational System has, therefore, not been able to fulfil
the demands of the creation of a rationalist-positivist spirit among its
literati.
129. See Maulana MkNDtTDI'S views on modernization and Modernists,
Appendix B.
130. See Muhammad Ayyub KUAN, Friends not Masters, op. cit. pp.106-107.
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The Languages
If the ties of Islamic brotherhood hold the people together
in spite of the governments ineptitude and the corruption of politicians
both of whom, nevertheless, have failed to channel these integrative
dynamics, in the case of language, the process has reversed itself.
Linguistic unity in Pakistan did not come about in spite of the
politicians' desire to have a uniform national language. The language
issue kept disrupting the socio-political harmony in the first place
between the East and West wing from 1948 to 1954. East Pakistan with
its internal linguistic unity (98.3 per cent of its population speak
Bengali) and with its overall numerical supremacy over West Pakistan
was fearful of West Pakistans dominance shown by the early decision which
made Urdu the national language. Strong pressure was brought to bear
upon the provincial and national governments by the language campaign
started in 1952 In Dacca which took the inflainatory shape of mass
agitation in 1954. Students clashed with the police arid some deaths
also occured. A compromise formula was, therefore, found by the
adoption in 1954 of both Bengali and Urdu as the two national languages
for Pakistan though English held its supremacy both as an official
language and a compulsory second language at secondary and higher school
levels.
According to the 1961 Census in West Pakistan, linguistically the
one-unit was divided as - Punjabi 66.39 per cent, Sindi 12.59 per cent,
Pashto 8.47 per cent, Urdu 7.58 per cent and B1uchistaxu. as 2.49 uer
131
cent. So the adootion of Urdu for ,Vest Pakistan was also rife with
problems. The Commission on National Education, taking cognizance of
the language problem, maintained:
'	 131. Pormiation Census of Paki'ti. 1961, Vol. 3.IV. pp.36-51.
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"We are firmly convinced that for the sake of
our national unity we must do everything to promote
the linguistic cohesion of West Pakistan by
developing the national language, Urdu, to the
fullest extent.....lJrdu is already the medium of
instruction at the primary stage, and this
arrangement should continue. Urdu in this way
will eventually become the common popular language
of all the people in this area." 132
But disharmony on the language issue is basically tied up with the socio-
economic and political disparities as well as the elite-mc*ss gap.
I.1ultilingaalism does not in itself pose a threat to national integration.
It is only when language becomes a vehicle for the concentration and
perpetuation of status in the hands of the dominant groups that it
disrupts. The Bengali speaking East Pakistanis saw in Urdu, in conjunction
with English, an instrument of power and status in the hands of powerful
civil and military bureaucracy of West Pakistan as a whole, and so they
revolted. Similarly, the Bahuclu's and Sindus entertain a fear of social
and cultural dominance, and the problem is likely to remain smouldering
until linguistic diversity is somehow given equal importance.
Innovative Culture
Traditionalism and Islamic Research
Pakistani educationalists envisaged deminishing religious
anachronism by the cultivation of Islamic research in the Universities
and specially created Research Institutes. So great was the importance
attached to the need for research that the 1962 Constitution required the
President to establish a Central Institute of Islamic Research, and the
Commission on the National Education recommended the opening of an
Institute of Islamic studies in each wing of the country, with its own
up-to-date library, research scholars and arrangements for the publication
of research.133
132. Report of the Commission on N.E.p.284.
133. ibid. p.21l.
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The Central Institute of Islanu.c Research was opened in 1960 with the
following objectives:
1. "To define Islam in terms of the fundamentals in a
rational and. liberal manner and to emphasize among
others, the basic Islamic ideals of Universal
brotherhood, tolerance and. social justice;
2. to interpret the teachings of Islam in such a way
as to bring out its dynamic character in the context
of the intellectual and scientific progress of the
modern world;
3. to determine and demonstrate the contributions of
Islam to thought, science and culture with a view
to enabling the Muslims to recapture an eminent
position in these fields." 134
1he work of the Institute was divided. into four departments of
Research, Publications, Law and. Training. The Institute intended
to imbue the spirit of criticality among its researchers and to train
new types of 'Islainists' who would, as the Institute declared, "be
made abreast of knowledge that man had acquired so far in other
fields of inquiry without which the overall implications of the au_ran
1 3
and Surinah cannot be fully understood.
In its training programme, the Institute envisaged combining
together the Islamic Studies of the uran, the Prophetic Tradition,
Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), Tasawwaff (Islamic philosophy) and. Arabiq
and modern studies such as modern European languages - English, French
and German, modern Law including Roman Law, Principles of Economics,
comparative religion, arts and architecture.
	 -
ltd publication section planned to publish research matters in its
0	 S
four periodicals; two in English: the Islamic Studies and Ummah
one in Urdu known asP5kro-Nazr	 (Thought and Insight), and one in
Bengali called Sauhan. It also honed to publish an Arabic Journal so
as to create an acaderac ha son witI tIne Arab world on food issues
134. TheCentral Institute of Islamic Research, a brochure, Karachi,
I4, p.8.
135. ibid. p.19.
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of Islam so as to elicit coimnonality of viewpoints6
The Institute proposed to recruit its students from amongst
the output of the Universities' Islamic studies Departments as well
as the traditional kadrassahs. It also envisaged enlisting its
teaching staff from both the modernist and the traditionalist sections
of the Ulaa alike, as as to gatner a variety of talent at the
Institute. Judging from the aims of the Institute, its programme of
studies, research, publication and training, it would have appeared
that Pakistan moved in the right direction in the creation of an
institutional setup designed to re-educate the modern scholars of Islam
in a rational and scientific manner.
Although the hoped for synthesis of the orthodox and the modernist
scholars within the Institute has failed to emerge because of mutual
mistrust, yet the Institute has continued to contribute by means of
research, to the inculcation of the spirit of rationalism in the study
and understanding of Islam. Among its major projects, the Institute
has included research into the genesis and. development of Islamic Law;
preparation of a compendium of specialised. and scholarly articles on
Islamic Jurisprudence; translations of outstanding works on Islam
in the various foreign languages, among these the Caetani's
Chronograplua Islazn.ica in collaboration with the Italian Institute for
the Middle East and Far East in Rome37
Other rivate) Institutions of Islamic Research
Important privately run research establishments include the
Madrassah-i-Alia in Dacca, the Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore,
the Shah Wali-Ullah Academy, Hyderabad, the Jamia Islwnia Bahawalrur
and the Islamic Adademy, Dacca.
136. ibid. p.25.
137. See Abdul RAUP, Renaissance of Islamic Culture and Civilization
in Pakistan, Shaikh kuhammad Ashrcf, Lahore, 1965, pp.216-218
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Tne Modrassah-i-Alia is the new name given to the celebrated
Calcutta Madrassah founded by Lord. Warren Hastings in 1785, as it moved
into East Pakistan on the eve of independence. The Madrassah has a
well established department of research in Islamic studies with its own
journal known as Minar (The Tower8
The Institute of Islamic Culture was founded in 1900 as an
autonomous body engaged in the cultural propogation of Islam. Its
publications include standard works in English and Urdu, translation of
Arabic and Persian Classics and a monthly Urdu journal, known as Seqafat
(Culture) 139
It draws many Muslim and non-Muslim scholars from foreign countries
who visit the Institute and attend seminars.
The Shah Wali Ulla.h Academy - established in 1963 by a
philanthropist Muslim lady, the academy purports to carry out research
into the remtory ideals propogated by the great Muslim reformer
Shah Wali Ullah of Delhi, who launched his reform movement in Muslim India
in the 18th century. The Shah holds a prominent position in the rank of
those international Muslim reformers who wished to bring about social
change in the world of Islam by means of a reform of the Muslims from
within, by wider propogation of the Qu .ranic principles through simple
translations and expurgation of the doctrine from the maipractices that
got entrenched into it over centuries of traditionalism.140
The Jamia Islamia. The Jamia was established in 1963 by the Awkaf
Department of the West Pakistan government, basically to trairuitable
teachers of Islaxniyyat at schools and colleges. The Institute also
promotes research in the Islamic studies.
The Islamic Academy. This academy located in Dacca is affiliated
to the Central Institute of Islamic Research. Among its objectives, it
- inc1udes
	
-	 'to adopt appropriate measures for the organisation and
encouragement of research in Islamic history, philosophy, law,
i 141jsprudence, etc.	 --
138, ibid. p.226	 139. ibid. p.228
140. ibid.	 141. ibid.
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Scientific Research
Strong emphasis was placed in the First All-Pakistan Educational
Conference in 1947 on the need to develop fundamental and applied research
in scientific and technological subjects within the Universities and other
specialised Research Institutes. To implement the recommendations of the
conference a Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was established
at the national level in 1953, in order to promote and foster scientific
research, "having a bearing on industrial development and utilisation of
national resources to the best economic advantage".142
In addition, the conference also enjoined upon the Universities
to organise their own research institutes on an inter-departmental
basis. It also recommended the establishment of a Council of Social
Science Research 'to give leadership in the field by assisting and keeping
abreast of research needs and bringing them to the attention of the
Universities and appropriate government departments, by conducting Seminars
in research methods and otherwise increasing the number and cjuality and
research workers, by advising on the framing of research projects; and
above all, by giving encouragement and financial support to individuals
who show competence or promise in the fdd."143
Applied research is a national responsibility and is being conducted
by various autonomous bodies such as the Council of Scientific and
Industrial Research, the Food and. Agricultural Council, the Medical
Research Council, the Central Cotton Committee, The Central Jute Board and
the Atomic Enerr Commiss1o4 ChartH t shows the list of various learned
societies and institutes engaged in innovation and research in Pakistan,
142. The First Five-year Plan, p.439
143. ibid. p.443
144. Commission on I\ptlonal Education. p.28
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CHART 'H'
List of Learned Societies and Research Institutes
Engaged in innovation and Research
in Pakistan
ACADEMY
Pakistan Academy of Sciences: Rawalpindi. f.1953; to promote research
in pure and applied sciences.
LEARNED SOCIETIES
PAKISTAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: Lahore.f.I95I
promotes science in all its branches, including its application
to practical problems and research; organizes national and
international conferences.
ALL PAKISTAN EDUCATIONAL CONFERENCE' Karachi.; 1.1947. Promotes education
at all levels.
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS SOCIETY OF PAKISTAN:Karachi. f.1958.
ALL PAKISTAN HOMOEPATHIC SOCIETY OF PAKISTAN: Karachi. 1.1949.
ANJUM&N TARAQQI- E-URDU PAKISTAN. Karachi. f.1903.
THE ARTS COUNCIL OF PAKISTAN: Karachi. 1.1956 to foster the development
of fine arts and crafts, drama dance, music and to promote the
study and appreciation thereof by sponsoring exhibitions, lectures
etc.
Centre.]. TJRDU DEVELOPMENT BOARD: LA.HORE. f. 1962; aims to promote Urdu as the
common language of Pakistan.
INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC CULTURE: Lahore; 1. 1909. over 100 Publications on
Islamic subjects in English and Urdu.
IQ.BAL ACADEMY: Karachi. 1.1951; publishes books and paniphalets on Iqbal
and his thought.
IRRIGATION 1
 DRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL RESEARCH COUNCIL. RAWALPINDI. 1. 1964;
aims to promote research in the fields of hydralics, irrigation,
drainage, reclamation, tubewells and flood control.
JAMIYATUL FALAE: Karachi: 1.1960; to encourage the study of the Quran and
to set up and maintain Islamic Missions.
KARACHI THEOSOPHICAL SOCIETY. Karachi. f.1896. Its activites include
study of UN and its work, and discussions on problems of
education and social selfare in Pakistan.
MEBRAII LIBRARY ASSOCIATION: Hyderabad. 1.1966. enhances the cause of
the library profession through syn4osia, seminars etc.
MUSIC FOUNDATION OF PAKISTAN: Karachi. f.I964 to serve the cause of classical
Pakistani music through academic instruction, concerts and
visists abroad.
NATIONAL BOOK CENTRE OF PAKISTAR.Karachi.f.1965; to promote the study and
production of books through book festivals and exhibitions and
advice.
NATIONAL SCIENCE COUNCIL, Karachi. 1.1961; Aims to co-ordinate the activities
of various Research Councils in the country and advises the
government on the development of scientific research.
-20..
PAKISTAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY: KARACHI F. 1950. conducts historical studies
and research particularly in the History of Islam and of the
Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.
PAKISTAN INSTITUE OF INDUSTRIAL ACCOUNTANTS.Karachi.1963.
PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF INTEFNATIONAL ARRAIRS. Karachi, 1947 to study the
international politics and to encourage international understanding.
PAKISTAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION. Karachi: to advance the cause of library
movement throught Pakistan.
PAKISTAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Karachi.
PAKISTAN MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. Karachi.f.I953. to promote research in
field8 of medicine and public health, to disseminate and arrange
for medical research and to maintain liaison with national and
international organizations.
PAKISTAN MUSEUM ASSOCIATION. Peshawer.f. 1949; aims to advance and improve
the work of museums in Pakistan, establish close contact with
universities, educational and services institutns,open new
museums in towns in Pakistan etc.
PAKISTAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS. Lahore. f.I954. for the promotion of
philosophical studies.
PIJNJAB ADEBI ACADEMY. Iahore.f; 1957; for the promotion of literary,
scientific works concerned with Punjab.
PUNJAB UNIVERSITY HISTORICAL SOCIETY, Lahore. f. ? for the historical research
concerning the Punjab.
Pun.lab Bureau of Education. Lahore. f, 1958, acts as a clearing house
for information on education of all aspects and levels at home
and abroad. Documentation section, statistical aection,publication
section and research sections engaged in their reipective activities.
URDU DEVELOPMENT BOARD.Lahore. f. 1959. promotes the development of Urdu
and publahes lexicography of Urdu.
RESEARCH INSTITUTES
ASTRONECAL OBSERVATORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB.
CANCER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Karachi.
DEPARTMENT OF PLANT PROTECTION. KARACHI.
FAZI-XOMAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Rabwah.
HISTORICAL RECORDS AN]) ARCHIVES COMMISSION FOR PAKISTAN, Karachi
IRRIGATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE • LA}IORE.
ISLAMIC RESEARCH INSTITITE, ISLAMABAD.
PAKISTAN ANIMAL HUSBANDRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. KARACHI
PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN]) TECHNOLOGY (PINSTECH),Islamabad.
ATCIC ENERGY CENTRE. LABORE.
ATOMIC ENERGY AGRICULTURAL BESEARCH CENTRE. TANDOJAM.
ATOMIC ENERGY MEDICAL CENTRE, KARACHI/LAHORE.
RADIOLOGICAL GENETICS INSTITUTE, LYALLPtJR.	 SOURCE: THE WORLD OP LEARNING:
EUROPA PUBLICATIOT9O
-321-
7.6. Conclusions
Pakistan's record in the evolution of an integrative network of
viable political institutions over a period of 25 years hs been marked
with patent failures. Its inability in the first place to formulate a
national constitution for 9 years; its failure then to hold general
elections to win legitimacy from the populace, arid finally the breakdown
of its democratic-.parliainentary systems in 1958 and the imposition of
Martial Law and then a backdoor coup d'etat leading into 10 years of anny
rule, all testify to the self-seeking policies of its ruling classes.
It is not within the scope of this study to dwell at length u'on
the causes of the political instability that Irns beset Pakistan over the
years. Nevertheless, the most obvious and commonly agreed ones can be
summarised thus:
1. The initial lack of a clearly defined and cogent
framework of socio-political institutions in the
minds of the 'founding fathers' of Pakistan that
led to ambiguities and contradictory view-points
in the early years;
2. the various regional arid provincial rivalries and
their resultant fear of dominance that beset the
different sections of the society;
3. the pronounced monopolisation of power in the hands
of the landed aristocratic class who between them
appropriated all civil and. military bureaucratic
control and corrupted the entire fabric of society.
As GunnarMyrdal, has depicted them:
"This group had fewer inhibitions about using power in its
own interests, particularly as the masses were even less
activated to defend tttt
Acute incompetence arid corruution of the political system was,
therefore, the inevitable result of all these ascriptive, primordial -
group policies. To quote Professor Myrdal again:
145. Gunnar MYRI)JJL Asian Drama Iniuiinto the Poverty of Nations,
Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, London, 1968, p.319
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"Prom the onset, politics in Pakistan was
characterised. by factional manoeuvering
chicanry, coercion and widespread corruption,
all of which were so much part of the moves
as hardly to need concealing. Not alone
idealism - but even public decency was at a
discount. Prom this low level of behaviour
economic as well as political chaos quickly
followed.
The mass of Pakistanis or even the larger part of
the educated class were not really involved in
the game of politics except intermittently and
haphazardly, as voters to be bribed or intimidated,
or as mobs to be swayed. Political elections were
farce. Prime Ministers and Cabinets at the
Centre rose and fell in rapid succession. The
Constituent Assembly functioned at the sufferance
of the executive instead of as a check upon it.
It did not make or break governments, or educate
the public on national issues......A very few
people made all important political decisions at
every- level of Government...." 146
These mighty few played primordial, ascriptive politics to further their
group interests rather than the universalistio interests of the community.
Not to mention the evolution of viable concepts from Islam, they were
not even willing to create a coherent, integrated society in Pakistan.
Consequently, disparaties, inequalities and polarities of outlook became
widespread, and their by-products; the corruption, nepotism and red-tapism
and various other social evils plagued the society. Therefore, right from
its infancy, the new state fell prey to administrative, constitutional,
economic and social setbacks.
Ideoiical confusions and extreme viewpoints on the nature of
society militated against the evolution of a national constitution in the
country for eight years. Powerful families monopolised high strategic
positions in the various organizations and cared little for the national
interest. Backward provinces, regions or groups were badly neglected.
Basic liberties of the people at large were curbed for long intervals
under martial law. Education was equally used to further these class
146. ibid.
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-	 interests and remained highly elitist.
The reaction to all these injustices was bound to take the shane
of a holocast. In 1971, Pakistan which had risen with high ideological
fervour and great expectations of the Muslims of the subcontinent,
collapsed due to the divisiie and. selfish policies and political as well as
moral incompetence of its self-imposed civil and military bureaucratic
leadership. The lofty ideals of Islamic modernization as conceived by
Sir Sayyid. Abmad Than, Dr. Muhammad Icjbal and Muhammad AU. Jinnah had
the most shattering setback.
The new Pakistan that emerged in 1972, had to rediscover its vision
for the future. Its commitment to the Islamic modernization had to
be re-stated.
The role of the educational system in the modernization programmes
of Pakistan remained manifestly related to the regressive and divisive
practices that characterised Pakistani Society from its genesis to its
break up into Bangladesh and Pakistan.147
147. See KaLim SIDDIQ,UI, Conflict, Crisis and. War in Pakistan,
Macmillan, London, 1972.
CHAPIER 8
TIU MODERNIZATION OF MUSLIM UCATION IN 03YF2
A CASE STUDY
The injunctions of the Qitran have as much
meaning in Erpt today as they ever did
provided they are interpreted with due regard
to the great changes that have occured in
human society since the Prophet preached his
message.
General MUhammad Negu.ib.
-325.-
8.	 YPI'
8.1. National Indeendence
Egypt was in reality liberated from foreign domination by the
Free Officers' Revolution in 1952 which ousted the nominally independent
rule of King Farouq. On paper the King ruled'democratically' on the
basis of the 1923 Constitution which provided for a representative
legislature and. public participation in administration. In practice
he governed capriciously only to obey the foreign 'masters'.
The 1923 Constitution itself had been so designed as to give rise
to anamolies and obstructions. On the one hand it gave the King a
suspensory veto, on the other it also allowed for an overriding power
of a two-thirds majority to the Parliament. The King, predictably
violated the Constitution flagrantly on many occasions, throwing the
country into decades of misrule and. corruption
Egypt before 1952 was not nationally independent in the true
sense of the term. In practice its millions of people had no say in the
running of the national affairs. For these poor, forgotten and
disfranchised millions life revolved round their traditional environient
ruled by traditional customs and dominated by the authority of the 'Pashas'.
1. Manfred HALPN commenting on the development of constitutionalism in
Egypt during the British Presidency concludes, "The constitution of
1923 opened an era that might have been more liberal --- twa-thirds
of the parliament could now override the King's veto--- had that cons-
titution also marked a willingness on the part of the King and the
British to accommodate themselves to major changes in Egyptian political,
economic and social relationships. This was not the case and
consequently a structure suited to bargaining and compromise was
destroyed both by outright battles among irreconcilable forces and the
means used to avoid such battles. As parties inside and outside
parliament strove for fundamental alterations in the system--- at
least in ending British influence and curbing the Kings---, the King
reacted by revising the liberal constitution, or ruling without
constitutions, rigging elections, curbing the freedom of the Press,
Assembly and speech; and with his resources as the largest landowner
in the nation, bribing party factions and parliamentarians."
Manfred HALPER.N, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East,
op. cit. pp.305-306.
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In their objective of achieving a true national independence,
the Free Officers aimed at, what President Nasser has described as, two
revolutions: the termination of the foreign domination, and the
socialistic revolution. Modernization, they believed, could only begin
after these revolutions had been achieved. But to carry the modernising
ideals out, consolidation of leadership had still to go on. For over
two years the struggle for modernising leadership continued, until all
traces of traditionalism, and groups aligned with it, either actually
or possibly, such as the Wafd Party, the Muslim Bretheren and President
Najib himself had been removed from the position of power. Gamal Abdul
Nasser then emerged as the unchallenged nation-builder, a charismatic
leader in the style of Ghazi Kemal Ataturk, which Najib had apparently
failed to be.2
8.1.1. Ideologr and Identity
Egypt's model of Arab-nationalism, the ideological motive force
behind the revolution was, explained by President Nasser, in his
'Philosophy of the Revolution', in terms of three circles: Arab,
African and Islamic. 3 Of these three, the Arab circle seems to have
overshadowed the other two. Egyptians began seeking for socio-political
and cultural unity, not only within the confines of Egypt but within
a broader, regional community of the 'greater Arab nation'. This
assertion of identity manifested itself not only in the mobilization of
nationalistic sentiments among the youth and students of other Arab
countries, but also in the various attempts at political unification
with Egypt by sister Arab States; the 1958-1961 Union of Egypt and. Syria
2. "The real reason", remarks Peter ILkNSFIELD, "why the General (Najib)
never came over to emulating the Grey Wolf of Anatolia (Keinal Ataturk)
lay in his character. He had nothing to compare with Ataturk's vision,
ferocious energy or ruthlessness. He was just too nice."	 Peter
I.ANSFIELD, Nasser's Egypt, Penguine Books, 1965, p.48.
3. Gamal Abdul NASSER, Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the
Revolution, Public Affairs Press, washington, D.C. 1955.
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into a United Arab Republic; the unsuccessful attempt in 1964 of
Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan and Syria to form an Arab Common Market, and the
1971 federation between Egypt, Libya and Syria, with the Sudan expected
to join.
The appeal for a wider Arab unity, judging strictly by the norms
of modernity, could be construed to mean a leaning towards irrational,
diffuse and affectivity-orientated tendencies. But ideology must
seek, as Binder has pointed out, to satisfy both rational and irrational
needs to maintain a stable polityi The failure of various projects of
Arabization nevertheless does indicate a regressive trend in the
otherwise highly modernization drive of the Egyptian Revolution.
Political unifications apart, the ideological orientations of Egypt
have clearly leaned heavily towards Arabization of the national culture,
subordinating in the process the Islamic element to the position of a
sub.culture. This has obvious implications for Muslim education in
Egypt.
8.2.1. Iiodernization of the Polity
Norms: Constitutionalism, Capacity and Eqality
The first national constitution, declared in January 1956, was
regarded as a 'synthesis of a reformist ideas-- in the direction of a
welfare state, with Islamic and nationalist concepts'. 5
 It defined the
Egyptian State as:
an independent and sovereign Arab state;
a democratic Republic;
an integral part of the Arab Nation;
a Muslim state with Islam as its State Religion
and Arabic its official language.
4. Leanard BINDER, "Ideological Foundation of Egyptian-Arab Nationalism"
in Ideology & Discontent, (Ed) David Apter, Free Press, LY. 1964.
p.128-154.
5. See C. F. JONES, "The New Egyptian Constitution", in the Middle
East Journal, (10) (3), 1956, pp.300-306.
Other norms of modernity were incorporated into the constitution
by guaranteeing the basic rights of equality of citizens before law,
in rights and duties, irrespective of race, language, religion or
belief (art. 3); the right to state financial assistance in case of old
age, sickness or disability (art. 21); the right to education (art. 49);
the right to work (art. 52), and the right to unionization (art. 55).
The first general elections held under this constitution in
1957 were also exemplary- in that Egyptiar vomen were allowed, for the
first time, to vote and to stand for candidacy.
The 1962 National Charter
Tins document, designed to be the	 covenant', was a
further commitment on the part of the leadership to define and set out
clearer political, economic and social guidelines for the modernization
of Egypt. The ethos of capacity and equality were further embedded in
the National policy by the adoption of national socialism within the
framework of a democratic society. The Charter declared:
1. "Political democracy cannot be separated from social
democracy. No citizen can be regarded as truly free
to vote until and unless he has secured three
guarantees:
He should be completely free from exploitation.
He should have an equal opportunity for a just
share of the national wealth.
He should be free of all anxieties that undermine
the security of Ins future.
2. "Political democracy cannot exist under the domination
of any one class. Democracy means literally, the
domination and sovereignty of the people --- the whole
people".
To ensure capacity of the polity for economic and social
modernization, the Charter envisaged three dynamic principles:
(a) the accumulation of national wealth by the state to
increase the national production to the maximum;
(b) increasing employmit of science and technology to
raise national production; and.
(c) the formulation of progressive national planning to
return the benefits of economic action to the masses.
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The 1964 Constitution
To give the ideals of the Charter a national legitimacy, the
Constitution of 1964 expressly described the United Arab Republic as
a Democratic, Socialist and Co-operative society
Structural Differentiation
The 1956 Constitution had defined the lines of differentiation
between the legislature, executive and judiciary. But at that time,
the Revolutionary Command Council controlled all the institutions, and
hence a strict differentiation between functions of policy making,
policy adoption and policy implementation based on the Constitution was
not observed. The Free Officers held key positions in almost all
institutions. However, after national integration was secured, and.
elections held, institutional differentiation seems to have crystalised.
The Presidential Council and the Executive Councils instituted under
the R.C.C. were abolished and the arrangement that emerged was, to use
Leonard Binder's framework, not perhaps a truly 'constitutional system'
but a 'rational system', whereby the basic objectives of 'independence
and modernization' of the Regime remained constant, only the modes of
implementation of these objectives varying in view of the economic and
foreign policy constraints.7
Policy Adoption
The President of the Republic, as head of the State and the
Chief Executive, is responsible in the final analysis for the adoption
and implementation of the national Dolicy in all political, social and
economic affairs. He has the powers to initiate and draft national
policies and laws.
6. In his apDralsal of the validity of tnese concepts O'Brian has pointed
out that they should essentially be interpreted in the context of
Egyptian society and not in their Vestern European connotations. See
Patrick O'BRIM, The Revolution 1nE!Economic System, from
Primitive_Enterse to Socialism., 1952-65, O.U.P. 1966. p.282
7. See kaxime RODISON, "The Political 3ystem" in Egypt Since the
Revolution, ed. P.J.Vatikiotis, George Allen & IJnwin, London, 1968,
chapter 5. pp.87-113.
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Policy Formulation
All Policy drafts initiated either by the Executive or by
private members must be passed by the National Assembly by a two-third
majority. A draft law opoosed by the President automatically becomes
a law if the National Assembly passes it a second time by a two-third
majority. The President can also promulgate laws by decree if the
Assembly is not in session, but such laws must be referred back to the
Assembly within fifteen days of its re-opening. 1he Assembly has the
right to withdraw confidence from the Government or any of its members,
in which case the Government, or the member in question, must resign.
The President can dissolve the Assembly, but he must call for fresh
elections within 60 days.
The most striking feature of the National Assembly in Egypt is that,
according to the 1964 Constitution, 50 per cent of its members must be
represented by workers and farmers. Contrasting this with the traditional
system before national independence Wilber remarks:
"Thus the peasants and workers who throughout the
recorded history of Erpt have been exploited,
trodden on and disfranchised now receive the lion's
share of representation in the Legislative Assembly'. 8
Policy Adjudication
Erpt now has an articulated hierarchy of National Courts, and
all the traditional Sharia courts for the Muslims and the Milliya courts
for the non-Muslims that had. been functioning in the country since the
Ottoman Rule were abolished in 1955 by Law No. 472. The Judiciary now
remains perfectly independent of the Executive?
]ci Implementation
Implementation of the national policy is entrusted to the
Government headed by a Prime Minister and consisting of a Cabinet of
8. D. N. WILBER, United Arab Reublic, Egypt, its People, its_Society,
its Culture L ERAF Press, New Haven, 1969, p.160.
9. See G. N. S1.EJR, "The Abolition of Confessional Jurisdiction in Egypt",
in the Middle East Journal, vol.10, No.3. 1956, pp.248-256.
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Ministers. With the centralization of many economic and political
activities within the State control and because of the groping
differentiation of institutions, the Cabinet now consists of some ti-arty
Liinistries, two concerned with education: the Ministry of Education and
the Ministry of Higher Education.
The Bureaucracy
To administer the vastly expanding functions that modernizing
leaderthip took over for the State, especially with the nationalisation
of industrial and commercial establishments, it was necessary to raise
an efficient and. expanding bureaucracy. Egyptian bureaucracy has a long
- history going back to the French occupation and the Pasha's era when
it was first established. The British Rule under Lord Cromer turned it
into a highly efficient and modern organization. But corruption arid
nepotism crept into it during the anomolous period of the 1918 and 1923
Constitutions. Recruitment to the bureaucracy was more on the bases of
age, class and hereditary positions than on qualificiations. Traditional
bureaucrats therefore became unproductive, prestigious 'white elephants'.
Their main function was -to carry out the governmental duties to the
letter of the law, to ensure obedience by inspiring awe among people.1°
The Revolutionary leaders found this class of bureaucracy unsuitable and
unwilling to support their radical policies. They recruited
comparatively younger and. more forward-looking young men from among the
University students for the new military and civil bureaucracy)1
Local Administration
Before national independence, Egypt had been divided into about
25 Governates, mainly for administrative expediency. Each Governate
had a Council formed of the local prominent leaders: notables and landlords
10. See H. A1/IMAR, Growin g Ui in an Er-tian Village-Si]wa Province of
Aswan, Routledge and Kega.n Paul, London, 1954, p.47.
11. See Morove BERGER, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, A Study
of the Higher Civil Service, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
1957 . Cf Galal Amin on the question of Bureaucracy in Egypt.
cont'd.. next page.
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and the high level bureaucrats annointed by the Government. But the
Councils had no say in the highly centralised authority of the Government,
and, even at local level, bureaucrats held the control in their own
hands. To change this top-heavy system, the R.C.C., vide their law Io.124
of 1960 and. its subsequent amendments, de'ised a three-level local
administration system: the Governate (al Iuha.faza), the town (al kadinth)
and the village (al Qaryah). Administrative Councils at these three
levels have been set up to perfon the dual functions of local level
administration of the central Government and local-self government units
in municipat, health, social, educational and cultural matters. It is
not, however, clear as to what extent these councils can initiate
policies. Understandably, a decade or so of freedom to participate in
local self administration is too short to expect truly responsible and
responsive functioning of the local level Councils, but the creation of
a decentralized institutional structure is in itself a positive step.
Transfonnation of the institutional structure from the traditional to the
new was given five years by the 1960 Law to take shape.
11. cont'd..
Amin Asserts, "It is perhaps not surprising to find that the
outstanding administrative successes of the Suez Canal Company or
the High Dam have been due to the formation of completely new bodies
of administrators who had never been part of the traditional
bureaucracy. One of the main challenges now facing the Government
is not only to deal with the old bureaucratic tendencies and to
attack the new problems of organization, but also to discover and
make the utmost use of persons combining ability with belief in the
new system. Galal .Amin, 'The Egyptian Economy and. the Revolution',
in V. J. Vatikiotis (ed) Egypt Since the Revolution, op. cit.
Chapter 2, pp.40-49.
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8.2.2. Modernization of the Economy
Before national independence, the Eimtian economy was guided by
an inconsistent Laissez-faire arrangement. A tiny minority of landlords,
Pasha's, industrialists and businessmen monopolized the vital productive
resources and enjoyed major economic roles ascriptively. The Government
on their part, saddled by the buraen of foreign loans, intervened in the
economy to the extent mainly of collecting taxes for its military and
bureaucratic ex-nenditures. So constrained, the pre-independence rulers
were unable to strike a breakthrough towards a sustained economic growth.
In his penetrating study of the economic modernization of Erpt, O'Brian
remarks:
'tFaced with growing and vociferous demands for
the amelioration of poverty, and during its
latter years with a serious population explosion
when all the qualifications have been offered,
Erpt's former rulers cannot be excused from
the charge of having displayed an incapacity to
act and an unrealistic faith in the virtues of
laissez-faire. It probably needed a profound
change in the political system to push the state
farther and faster along the path towards positive
and far-reaching intervention in the economic
affairs of the nation." 12
It was with this background that the Revolutionary Command Council
set about moderru sing the national economy. Consonant with the ideals
of their revolution: 'Political democracy cannot be separated from
social democracy 1 , their economic policy was geared in the early years
of the Revolution, towards (a) mobilization of national savings; (b) the
use of modern scientific techniques to exploit these savings, and (c) the
drafting of a complete Plan for production.13
From these earlier, rather modest premises, there emerged in 1957,
a more coherent outlook and policy under which National Socialism was
adopted as the fundamental component of the economic policy. It was at
12. Patrick O'BRIAN, The Revolution in Egy-pt's Economic System, from
Primitive Enterprise to Socialism 1952-1965, 0.U.P. London, 1965.
p.
13. See President Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, 1958,
Government of the UAR, Information Department, also in Patrick 0'BRDJ,
The Revolution_in Ej-pt's Economic SystemL op. cit. p.102.
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the Third Co-operative Congress in 1957, that President Nasser
highlighted Egypt's prospective society as 	 'Socialist, Democratic
and Co-operative'. In abstract, these were high ideals for any
society to adopt, particularly for one like Egypt. How the economic
system was transformed structurally to enable it achieve these ideals
is seen below.
In the first place, it is clear that rationalisation of the
economy was aimed through the ideological motif that inspired policy
statements both of the 1956 Constitution and the 1962 National Charter
and pledged itself to the eradication of social inequalities reinforced
by the Imperial Rule; the liquidation of the monopoly system, and
nationalization of the productive organizations of the country in order
to give the nation as a whole a better standard of living and social
equality. To quote from the Charter:
Socialism is the way to soci-'l freedom.
Social freedom cannot be realized except through an equal
opportunity for every- citizen to obtain a fair share of
the national wealth.
This is not confined to the mere redistribution of the
national wealth among the citizens but foremost and above
all it requires expanding the base of this national wealth,
to accede to the lawful rights of the working masses.
This means that socialism, with its two supports, sufficiency
and justice, is the way to social freedom. 	 14
This is not the place to argue the validity of the choice of the
Socialist solution; it is sufficient to recognise that the Revolutionary
leadership seriously adopted it , as they described it, as 'a historical
inevitability imposed by reality...... ,•15
14. U.A.R. Information Department, TI-tECHKEPER, Cairo, 1962. p.57
15. ibid. p.57.
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Planning
Magdi El Kainmash has divided the economic developnent in Egypt
since 1952 into two eras: the Develonent period from 1952-60, and the
16Planning period from 1960-70. The first period, characterised by
some uncoordinated measures, only made a slight impact on the economic
develorinent, although Galal Anan traces a continuity of the radical
steps that followed the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, the
sequestration of British, French and Belgian property in the earlier
nationalisation of the Abboud Sugar Mills and Misr Bank Companies and
also the stricter governmental control since 1958 in private building
and industrial activity 7 The turning point was nevertheless reached in
1956 by the nationalisation of Suez.
In 1957, the Presidential decree No. 78 instituted a National
Planning Committee in order to 'prepare a long-term Plan for social and
economic development which would mobilize public and private effort.'18
Then in 1960, the First Comprehensive Five-year Plan was launched to
be followed in 1965 by the Second Five-year Plan of 1965-70. In actual
19fact, the first 'comprehensive' plan was an dverall ten-year plan.
The Plan aimed at an overall target of doubling the national
income in 1970, to be phased by a 40 per cent increase during the first
plan period. The targets for various sectors are given in Table VlJij
16. iIagdi El KAiASH, Ec21omicDeveloment and Planni_inE,
Praeger, N.Y. 1968. p.279.
17. Galal IIN, "The Erotian Economy and the Revolution", op. cit. p.41.
18. See Charles ISSAWI, Et in Revolution, An Economic Analysis,
0.U.P. London, 1963, jrn. 75.
19. See Bent HANSEN, "Planrung and. Economic Growth in the UAR (ErDt),"
1960-65 in P. J. VATIKIOTIS (ed), ErptSinceRvolution,
op. cit. pp.19.39.
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TABLE VIII.1
Estimated Increase in the G.N.P.
CBase year 1959-60 100)
Sector	 First Plan	 Second Plan
Heavy industry	 310	 445
Light industry	 137	 185
Services	 128	 213
Commerce	 128
	 196
Transport, Housing,
Public Utilities,
Security and Defence	 122	 160
Agriculture	 128	 159
Source: National Bank of E,rpt, Economic Bulletin,
XIV (I) Cairo, 1961.
Industrial production was planned to rise from 6 to 19 per cent towards
the end of the Plan period. Employment was estimated to rise by
1,026,000 jobs by the year 1965, i.e. an increase of 22.1 per cent.
The nationalisation mentioned above brought the major productive
organizations under government control, thereby curbing the role of
entrepreneurship, and consecuent1y 75 per cent of the total investment
of the Plan was provided by the Public sector. The heaviest
concentration of investment was to be in industry, electricity, transport,
drainage and dwellings. The share of agriculture was relatively smaller.
The rate of growth in the G1TP was, however, not matched by the rate of
saving. As Galal Anu.n has pointed out, "While the average percentage
of gross investment in the GNP roGe from 14 per cent between 1955-56 and
1959-60 to 17.6 per c'nt during the plan years, the average percentage
of gross domestic savings remained more or less constant.J Between
1952-53 and 1960-61, it was in the range of 10-13 per cent of GNP and
during the five-year plan it averaged no more than 12.7 per cent."2°
20. Galal AMIN, The Egyptian Econopy and Revolution, op. cit. p.45.
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Indusfrialisation and Agriculture
Accoi.ing to the National Plan, the target set for the
development of heavy industries was a three-fold increase by 1964-65
and over four-fold increase by 1969-70. The production of light
industries, services and commerce was estimated to rise only by less
than twice, while agricultural productivity was to rise only by 1.6 times.
In spite of the decline in the contribution of agriculture to
the domestic product, however, agriculture in another way remained still
the leading sector of the economy. It employed 60 per cent of country's
labour force. It also earned the country its major share of foreign
exchange through the export of its long-staple cotton of which 40 per
cent of the world crop alone is grown in Eg .y-pt. 21 The traditional
creator of Egypt's wealth, the Fellah was not to be excluded suniinarily
from the modernization programme. To remove the poverty of the Pellahin,
the Regime considered it prior to destroy feudalism and. gross inequalities
of land holdings. The Agrarian Reforms Programme, which imposed an
upper limit of 200 feddans on individual ownership in 1952, then reduced
this to 100 feddans in 1961, and finally to 50 feddans in 1969. This
has gone a long way to reducing gross inequalities and improving land
productivity. Among other measures envisaged for increasing efficiency
in agricultural output was included the reclamation of land, rent
control, the consolidation of fragmented holdings and the drive to
organize co-operatives. As a result, as much as 144,000 fedd.ans were
reclaimed annually between 1960-65 and 1.2 milliors were aimed at
between 1956-72. The Aswan High Dam, completed in 1964, has been notably
responsible for these reclamations.
21. See Peter MANSFILD, Nasser's Egypt, op. cit. Chap. 10 "The Land
and the Fellah", pp.168-19l.
Sector
Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Supporting Ec
Structure
Commerce
Services
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Emplqyinent and Labour
The number of employed workers at the time of the First Plan
was about six million. The Plan envisaged to increase this to about
nine millions by the end of the ten year plan period ending 1969-70.
In 1964, the Prime Minister declared tht over seven million people
had already found employment. The per cent distribution of employment,
sector-wise, during the two plans was estimated as in Table V11L2'.
Table VIII.2.
Distribution of nployment 1259-1970. (Percentage)
	
1959-60	 64-65
	
1969-70
	
54.3	 54.3	 49.9
	
10.6	 12.1	 11.7
	
2.8	 2.3
	
2.5
	
8.4
	 7.9	 7.9
	
10.6	 10.4
	
11.9
	
13.3
	 13.0	 16.1
	100.0	 100.0	 100.0
Source: National Planning Committee, Five-Year Plan
To appraise the success of the new economic system in Erpt one
can only underline the dynamic trends. Galal Amin concludes:
"It is very tempting to argue that, when, after
twenty or thirty years, economists will look at
the long-term growth of the Erptian economy,
the turning point will probably coincide with
the conversion of Egypt to Socialism." 22
O'Brian, in his penetrating study, suggt' that allocations of
economic resources as a result of the Democratic, Socialist and
Co-operative' ideology- and the nationalisation of private productive
resources have definitely shown universaJistic and achievement criteria.
The Monopoly of 5,000 feudal lords on land ownership has been broken
22. op. cit.
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down and. their lands have been distributed among 372,000 families of
actual cultivators. The G.N.P. has risen from 984 in 1950 to 1,363
in 1960-61, 1,739.6 in 1963-64 and to 2,193.5 in 1966-67. This increase
has enabled the Government to spend more on social services which have
increased from 8.1 per cent of the G.N.P. in 1950-51 to 12.5 per cent
in 1962_63.23
Since 1967, Egrpt's economy has been functioning under War
conditions. without the Arab-Israeli Conflict, it was expected, to
quote the Europa Year Book, that tithe Eyptian economy would have come
very near to reaching self-sustained growth by the end of the present
24decade •"
8.2.3. Modernization of the Social Order
Demograjphc Features (Population)
Erpt's population has been steadily rising every- decade since
the first censuses were taken during the French occupation in 1882, when
the total population was found to be 6.8 millions. Since then it has
multiplied five times to become 31.7 million in 1968 with an annual
rate of increase of 2.38 per cent between 1952-60 and of 2.54 between
1960-68. With an estimated rate of increase of 2.5 per cent which
discounts the projected decline in fertility rate and the birth control
measures, the population in 1985 will rise, as Hansen and Marzouk have
forecast, to 48.5 millions. 25
 These estimates also show that children
under 15 years will form around 45.3 per cent of the total population
in 1985. According to the 1966 Census, the male-female ratio of
26population was calculated as 15.1 to 14.9 millions.
23. See Statistical Handbook, 1951-52 to 1967-68, Cairo 1969. p.169
24. Europa Year Book 1 idd1e East and lTorth Africa. 1970-71. p.815
25. Bent HA1'SEN and Girgis A. IvLARZOUK, Development and Economic Poliç
in the UAR (Ei'	 North Holland, Amsterdam, 1965. p.29.
26. Statistical Abstract of the U.h.R. 1951-52 to 1967-68, on. cit.
pp.l2.-l3.
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To check this traditional trend of uooulation increase, the
Erptian Government in 1962 started its pronoganda campaign for birth
control. It is recorded that even religious leaders approved of the
campaign, Drovided scriptural evidence in its supDort and publicly
advocated it during the Friday Mosque sermons. 27
 The National Charter
categorically declared:
"Population increase constitutes the most dangerous
obstacle that faces the Erptian people in their
drive towards raising the levels of income and
production in an effective and efficient way...
family planning deserves the most sincere efforts
supported by modern scientific efforts.. .regardless
of the efforts which may result from the experiment.' 28
Consequently, in 1960 the Ministry of Social Affairs decided
to open Family Planning Clinics in urban and rural areas, where advice
and contraceptive devices were made available.
Marriage and Family Structure
Modernization of the family structure and marriage in Erpt has
slowly but surely followed the political and economic changes. Although
the extended family still remains the general pattern, occupational
mobility, particularly in the urban areas, has led to a marked trend
towards the appearance of the nuclear family. The National Charter
unequivocally declared that "women must be regarded equal to man and
must, therefore, shed the remaining shackles that impede her free
movement so that she might take a constructive and profound part in
shaping life. The family is the first cell in a society and it must
,, 29
therefore, be afforded all means of protection.....
Legislative changes for social reforms, such as raising the
marriage age, making polygamy illegal, except in cases of necessity,
ecualization of occupational and educational oprorturnties for women,
27. BENT and MARZOUK, op. cit. p.40, also MJdSPIELD, op. cit. p.114.
28. The National Ch2rtr,. op. cit. P
29. ibid. pp.84-85.
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have all enhanced the status of women from whicn their emancipation
is gradually, manifesting first in towns and then spreading into the
villages. It must be stressed that, although the policies of the
Revolutionary Regime in matters of social reforms such as the
traditional family and marriage structures have shown a relative caution,
the progress in these very areas has not been urumpressive.3°
Ecological Features - Urbanization
Since the 1930's the rate of migration from rural to urban areas
has been constantly increasing as shown in the table below:
Table VIII.3.
Urbanization in Egypt
Year	 Percentage of Urban
____	
Population
1882	 19
1907	 19
1927	 23
1937
	
23
1947
	
31
1960	 38
1966	 42
Urbanization has accelerated particularly with the rapid industrialization
in the post-revolutionary era. The 1966 ratio of 42 per cent clearly
shows, as Magdi El Kammash has pointed out, that at the present level
of its development, Egypt is already 'over-urbanised' compared with
other countries at the same stage. 31 Two main centres, Cairo and
Alexandria, between thencomprise almost half of the total urban population
of the country-: Cairo 4.2 and Alexandria 1.9 millions, a total of 12.3
millions. 32
 This uneven and outpaced urbanization obviously presents
great problems for the social services, particularly education. El
Kammash asserts that both capital and human resources move towards these
30. Cf P. MMSFIE1D, "While there has been nothing comparable to the
drastic laws to emancipate women of Kemalist Turkey, it is quite
probable that Egypt's more gradualist approach will achieve more
permanent results", op. cit. p.115.
31. Magdi El KAMASH, op. cit. p.99.
32. tistical Abstract, op. cit. pp.14-15.
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two citie8 leaving the other areas without potential growth. 33 Tne
Egyptian government seems to have taken cognizance of this uneven
situation and to have already started to redistribute industries to
other towns all over the country, so as to effect a harmonious
urbanization conducive to the modernization ideals.34
33. ibid. p.lOO
34. For a criticiue on urbanization in Epypt and its social problems
see Janet J. Abou-Laghod, "vLgrants' Adjustment to City Life;
The Erptian Case, " in American Journal of Sociolqgy, LXVII,
July, 1961, pp.22-32.
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8.3. pputs into the Education System
8.3.l..Normative Inputs
Education in pre-independent Eoy-ot had not been emDloyecI as an
instrument of national integration nor indeed was it based on rational
norms. National coherence was not its objective. Ever since Pasha
Muhammad All initiated duality in education, the gap between the
traditionalist and. modernist classes, had successively grown wider and
wider. The British occupation of th country in turn only strengthened
class divisions though it did raise standards of efficiency in
administration and eradicated social evils such as nepotism and
corruption.
The 1952 Revolution, while declaring Egyot as an Arab-Socialist
state envisaged in the first place to eradicate disparities and
inequalities that had been manifest in education and then to give rise
to a truly national educational system designed to integrate the
nation and. to inculcate modern, rationalist values.35
In order to create a 'Democratic, Socialist and Co-operative
Society' in Egypt, the revolution set out the following educational
objectives:
the elimination of imperialism and its traitorous
Egyptian agents;
the eradication of feudalism;
the destruction of monopoly and of the domination of
capital over the goverrunent;
the establishment of social justice;
the establishment of a strong national army; and
36
the establishment of a sound democracy.
The social implications of these objectives have been explained
in the following guidelines:
35. Gsmal Abdel Nasser, The Principles that Guide Egypt's Political
Life, Speech before the National Assibly, in K. H. Karpat, op.
cit. pp.198-204. Also Wilber, p.145.
36. ibid.
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the creation of a conscious, enlightened and
democratic society; free from fear, anxiety and
want;
a society that believes in God, and the fatherland,
with unshakable faith in itself and its people;
a society that follows lofty ideals in individual
and collective behaviour alike, and holds to the
principles of right and of cood;
a society that feels itself an integral and responsive
part of the larger Arab structure;
a society that has the determination for joint
struggle and power for positive action supported by
science and strong character for the consolidation
of the noble Arab nation's prestige and safeguarding
its rights to liberty, security and honourable life;
a society that is alive to the responsibilites of its
historic mission of erecting high the structure of
civilization, and. of serving humanity. 37
The National Charter of 1962, further endorsed these objectives.
The Revolution gave education a central role in the realization of these
objectives and considered the modernization of education highly necessary
to give it a sound ideological basis in order that it should
38
adequately meet the country t s social, intellectual and economic demand.
Rational normative demands of national equality and capacity for the
fullest possible personal development through the educational system
had. been vouchsafed in the Constitution itself. The Constitution
vide its article 48 affirmed that:
Education is the right of all Erptians to be guarded
by the State through the establishment and the gradual
expansion of all types of schools and other cultural
and educational institutions. The State further takes
special care of the physical, mental and moral
development of the youth.
Purthermore, Article 51 declared:
Elementary education is free and cnoulsory in state
schools.
The 1964 Constitution restated all these educational provisions of the
1956 Constitution.
Iiu.hamnad Khayri HkBY and El Sayed. I uhaznmad El AllAWI, Educati on in
rjTJAR), in the 20th Century, U.A.R. Ministry of Mucation,
1960, p.53.
38. ibid. pp.54-56.
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Historically, because of the uatchy developments in education,
there existed five different systems of schools in Ept, i.e. The
Al-Azher and. its subsidiary Maddrassah and Kuttab schools; the fee
charging schools teaching foreign lan uages; the free Arabic schools;
the free compulsory state schools and the foreign schools with their
own curricula.
The first task for the creation of a national system of education
was to unify these various systems, and so the government started
their modernization policies by enacting various acts through the
National Assembly for the re-organisation of schools into a single,
coherent system. 39 These comprised:
• Act 213 of 1956 for the re-organization of primary
schools;
• Act 55 of 1957 for general Dreparatory schools;
• Act 211 of 1953 for general secondary schools;
• Act 22 of 1956 for industrial schools;
• Act 261 of 1956 for commercial schools;
• Act 262 of 1956 for Agricultural schools;
• Act 75 of 1957 for higher institutes and colleges;
• Act 160 of 1958 for private schools;
Act 1911 of 1959 for the Universities;
Act 103 of 1961 for the modernization of A1-Azhar.
Of these, particularly revolutionary was the one dealing with the
modernization of Al Azhar. The Act nationalised the centuries-old
independent University with all its administrative, academic and financial
to
functions as well as the institutions affiliated/or controlled by it.
The main purpose of the Act was so to modernize the Jami that "it keeps N
its traditional status and urestige as the largest Muslim university in
the world providing higher education in Islamic Studies and. producing
39. Education in the ilAB, vanistrv of Eaucation, Documentation Centre
for Education, Cairo, 1962, po.vii-ix, also Dr. I. HAFJZ,
Education in the UAR, an Outline, Ministry of Education, Cairo, 1964.
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teachers, religious leaders (ulama), judges (Qazi) and research
scholars of Islam, as well as enabling it to rise up to the standards
of a modern university. For this DurDose secular faculties of
medicine, agriculture, business administration, engineering and
industries have been set up in the University along with Lts classical
religious studies and JurisDrudence.
-347-
8.3.2. Political Inputs
iiodern political norms of equalization of opportunity and
maximization of capacity as were structured into the National Charter
and the Constitutions of 1956 and 1964 put heavy demands on the
educational system to provide basic elementary- education for all,
vocational and technical training and skills for those wanting jobs
in industries and commerce and professional education for the elites.
National independence in itself is not enough. The polity
requires a class of modernising leadersiup, innovating elites to sustain
and carry- out the impulse to modernization to the point of a self-
sustaining success. In Egypt, before the national independence, this
class of elites used to be recruited from among the older class of
aristocrats. The modern.ising revolutionary Regime planned to recruit
their corp of elites from the younger generation of professionals, /
technocrats and specialists. This was even more necessary after the
nationalisation of the Suez Canal and other major industrial and
economic enterprises.
A survey made in 1960 revealed that out of a total working force
of high-class manpower of 701,851, the managerial and high
professionals amounted to 14,912 or 2.1 per cent, and 2.3 per cent in
the other economic sectors. The National Plan projected to increase this
percentage gradually over a period of 25 years to about 6 per cent.
Table VIII.4.
High Level Managerial Elites Requirements
between 1960-.85
Year	 1965	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1985
Numbers	 205,536	 31 5,416 436,082	 601,572	 840,270
Percentage of
Total Lanpower	 2.6	 3.41	 4.02	 4.81	 5.69
Source: Mustafa Haindy, Mannower Renuirements for the UAR (1960-85
UAR Institute of National Planning, Memo: 431. 1964.
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These reouirements put an unprecedented demand on the educational
system for expansion at the University and Higher Institute levels
in the various faculties, Darticularly the sciences.
Institutional differentiation of the polity under modernization
demanded a similar differentiation in the educational system, both
verticaLIy and horizontally. In a participant society, the educational
system is a publicinterest sub-system of the society and public
particiDation at all levels of educational policy through proper
interest articulation groups becomes a tathlic right.
8.3.3. Economic Inputs
Industrial and economic mobilization ushered in by the
Revolutionary regime demanded a supporting mobilization of human
resources in the shape of a catalysing, problem-solving manpower mainly
through the educational system. The two Five-year plans cumulatively
set up high targets of growth in employment. Calculated on the basis
of the National Plan targets, the manpower requirements of technical,
clerical, skilled and unskilled labour for the period between 19&J-85
were estimated as shown in table 5 below:
leVill 
.5.
Occupational
Category	 1965	 l9'O	 1975
	
1380	 l_985
Managers and High
Professionals	 205,536	 315,416	 436,082	 601,572
	
840,270
Technicians	 380,752
	
604,402
	
872,180 1,228,649	 1,790,430
Clerks	 235,775
	 344,486	 490,052	 699,716	 926,680
Skilled Labour	 1,061,654 1,481,191
	
1,987,790	 2,620,840
	
3,627,710
	Unskilled Labour 6,116,113 6,905,477
	 7,288,917 7,796,223 8j50,720
Total	 7,999,830 9, 6 50 ,990 11,075, 020 12,917,000 15,335,810
To meet these manpower demands, the educational system had to be
completely re-organized especially at the secondary stage which provides
for technical, vocational and clerical skills.
-349-
8.3.4. Social Order Inputs
Modernizing social order demands the creation of emDathetic
nersonalities among a mobile population. Enpathetic personalities are
created, among other things such as communications, urbanization, etc.,
by the provision of literacy° Demand for universal literacy also ,
satisfies modern norms of equality and canacity. Basic education is
considered as a fundamental right and is, therefore, provided for
in the national constitutions. Inspired by the norms of modernity:
democracy, socialism and co-operation, Erpt declared and. affirmed, in
both the Constitution of 1956 and of 1964, the universalization of
primary education for all Erptian children between the ages of 6 and 12.
A survey carried out by UNESCO in 1952 revealect that there were
3,354,000 children of school age out of which 1,750,000 were without any
schooling facilities	 With the estimated population increase of
2.5 per cent, the demand on the educational system for the provision of
universal literacy was a stuDendous task. It was also affirmed that,
pressed by the choice of priorites between the conflicting demands of
equality-capicity, and quality-quantity, the Revolutionary Regime in the
early years clearly gave preference to the maximization of primary
education. To cope with this heavy demand the Ministry of Education
plaimed to open 400 primary schools a year, each for 600 children, for
the next ten years.42
Particularly important was the demand for girls' education, since
in the pre-independence period it had been grossly neglected. In 1954
it was found that at the primary stage 40 per cent of the total
enrollment belonged to girls; but this percentage droDped considerably
going up the school ladder. Economic limitations as well as traditional
40. Daniel LERNER, The Passing of Trad'tiontl Society, op. cit. pD.47-52.
41. See Comnulsory Education in the_Arab States with special Reference
to the Caaro Conference, 1954, UNI.SCO, 1956.
42. ibid. p.35.
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customs of purdah, and early marriages were responsible for the
high rate of withdrawal. In some cases 75 per cent of girls withdrew
from schools in the latter years. F\irthenore, a great number of
women who had acauired literacy by attending schools for durations
varying between two to six years reverted to complete illiteracy3
Here again, it was the educational system that had to remedy these
disparities and transfomm traditional attitudes.
Mobility from villages to cities equally placed a high demand
on the educational system for the extension of schooling facilities
in the urban centres. Greater exposure to the mass-media in the
citie 4
 --- the introduction of the television in 1960 facilitated the
enlargement of empathy among urban children. The use of the radio and
television for educational purposes and. the establishment of HIV systems
was among the other demands on the educational system.
8.3.5. Cultural Inputs
Integrative Role: Egypt chose to give more importance to its
'Arab Circle', as against the 'Islamic' and the 'African' originally
proclaimed by the Revolutionary leaders. The National Charter has
been vociferous in declaring that Egypt is a part of the 'Arab Nation',
committed to the strengthening and consolidating of the unity of the
'Arab Nation' and. to the promotion of its cultural heritage 5 The
'Islamic Circle' seems to have been taken as a corollary of the 'Arab
Nation' concept, a sub-culture whose reforem was necessary to
contribute to the modernization impulse.
Innovative Role:
1.	 On the modernization of traditional value systems, the Charter
asserts:
43. ibid. p.68.
44. The total broadcasting hours increased from 32 in 1952 to 394
in 1964. See P. MANSFIELD, op. cit. p.124.
45. The National Charter, pp.105-110.
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"The welfare society is able to formulate new
moral values, not subject to the influence of the
remaining pressures left from our ailments, from
which our society has suffered so long.
In their turn these new values must be reflected in
a free national culture which awakens the sense of
beauty in the life of free individual ... The
freedom of religious belief must be regarded as
sacred in our new life.
The eternal spiritual values derived from religions
are capable of guiding man, of lighting the candle
of faith in his life and of bestowing on him
unlimited capacities for serving truth, good arid
love.......
The essence of religious messages does not conflict
with the facts of our life, the conflict arises
only in certain situations as a result of attempts
made by reactionary elements to exploit religion -
against its nature and spirit - with a view to -
impeding progress. These elements fabricate f.aJse
interpretations of religion in flagrant
contradiction with its noble and divine wisdom. 46
2. On the quest for scientific culture, the Charter is even more
sanguine. It declares:
"Revolutionary action should be scientific .....
Science is the true weapon for revolutionary will.
Here emerges the great role to be undertaken by
the Universities ansi educational centres on various
levels...
The responsibilities of the universities and. scientific
research centres in shaping the future is not less
important than responsibility of the various popuiar
authorities.... Therefore, the universities are not
ivory towers but rather forerunners discovering a
mode of life for the people......
The major economic and social problems confronting our
people, at present, must be resolved on a scientific
basis.
The scientific research centres are required at this
stage of the struggle to develop themselves so that
science would be in the service of society....Therefore,
science for society should be the motto of the
cultural revolution at the uresent stage......" 47
46. ibid. p.85
47. ibid. pp.101-102.
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8.4. Within Educational System Processes
6.4.1. Adixanistrativeiiodernization
Policy Formulation and Adoption
The national educational policy is formulated by the Executive
through the Ministry- of Education. Before national indeoendence, there
was a central Ministry of Public Instruction which, in keeping with the
rigid administrative framework of the time, was considered as a top-heavy
system of control' 8 It lacked a proper articulation of community,
professional and. managerial interests in its operation. In 1953, the
Revolutionary Regime re-shaped the Ministry to become the Ministry of
Education and Instruction. Then in 1961, when accelerated growth was
planned, it was considered necessary to institute two separate -
ministries of education: The Ministry of Higher Education was given
separate status in view of, the urgent demand for the creation of
modernising leadership; while the Ministry of Education was to administer
all education below the tertiary level. Both Ministries are the chief
national policy-formulation agencies in their respective jurisdictions.
For oolicy adoption each Ministry is now resDonsible to the National
Assembly through the Under-Secretary of Parliament who answers all
questions concerning education in the Parliament.
To advise the Ministers in the formulation of policies there are
certain advisory councils viz: the Central Advisory Council of
Education, the Supreme Council of the Universities, the Higher Council
for the Encouragement of Art, Literature and Science; the Higher Council
of Science; the Higher Council of Youth Welfare and the Higher Committees
of Cultural Affairs and. Missions.
48. See TaM BUSSAIN, The Puture of Culture in Epypt, tran. S. Glazer,
Washington, D.C. 1954, p.48. Dr. TaM Hussain the renowned literary
figure of Egypt was the ianister of Public Instruction between 1941-45
and 1950-52. After national independence, he was apoointed the
Director General of Cultural Affairs. As a Minister of Public
Instruction, he was highly critical of the administrative rigidity
of the Ministry- and advocated its total overhaul.
49. See Amir B0}20R, The Develo ,ment&Exansion of Education in the U.A.R.
American University of Cairo, Cairo, U.A.R.pI7.23.
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To reDresent community interest in the formulation of educational
policy there is a special deDartment of Pub'ic Relations. Among
other things, this department is concerned with the aggregation of
community interest through various media the A.S.TJ., arid the Pressure
Groups and with informing the Ministers concerned. It also feeds ck
information to the public through the same media and the information
bureaux.
Technical interest is represented in the policy making by the
General Assembly of the Teachers' Syndicate whose aims have been
described by Law 219 of 1951 as below:
to promote the professional standard of teaching
to safeguard the interests of its members, and
to advise the Minister of Education on teachers' interests.
egional Level
At the regional level, the country is divided into 25 Education
Zones (known as A1.Manatiq al Ta'liminiyyah), parallel to the Governates.
In the metropolitan Governate of Cairo, however, there are four such
Zones. Each Education Zone is headed by a Director of Education
(Mudir al Ta'lim) who is responsible to the Central Ministry of Education.
To represent coinnunity interest in the educational policies at
this level, the Mudir is assisted by an Advisory Council which is presided
over by the Mudir. The majority of its membership is, however, formed
of the community leaders and. members of the Regional Congress of the
A.S.U. These councils advise the Mudir in policy matters at the
Regional level. Their role in the adoption of policy is however, limited
as this is mainly done at the top.
Town and Vil1ge
At the local level these functions are very much restricted to
the village Advisory Councils appointed by the Ministry of Local
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Administration. Each school is to have a P.T.A. and local members
of the A.S.U. take part in the school committees. But their actual
participation is still minimal, as traditional attitudes of dependence
on the governmental agencies are still persistent.
Policy Impleméntat ion - National Level
The Central Ministry of Education is divided into various
secretariats, each concerned with a distinct aspect of educational policy.
Important secretariat s are: Administrative Affi srs; Financial Affairs,
Central Services, Follow-up and Evaluation and Planning.
Regional Level
The Directors of Education are primarily concerned with the
implementation of policy within their Education Zones. In tins they are
assisted by various experts and advisers and Inspectors who visit
schools and assess their standards. They also at as 'eyes and ears' of
the government and it is their duty to see that the amount of
ec1uilibrium allowed by the Centre between the community interest,
managerial and technical aspects of policy implementation is properly
maintained.
Ministry of Higher Education
Policy formulation and implementation with regard to the
Institutions of Higher Education and Universities devolve upon the
Minister of Higher Education, who is advised by the Supreme Council of
Universities. The Council is constituted of the Rectors, the Vice-Rectors
and one renresentative from the academic staff and three notable figures
exnerienced in University education who are appointed by the Presidential
decree. The Council is also entitled to amploy foreign experts for
consultation and advice. The main functions of the Council have been
listed as below:
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1. "planning the general policy of University
education;
2. keeping the Universities in contact with national
needs in order that they may contribute to
national progress;
3. harmonizing the nolicies of the various universities
in matters related to academic courses, degrees
and the apuointment of members of staff for each
university;
4. considering all affairs and making approoriate
decisions as renuested by the inister of Higher
Education of any single University." 	 50
For managerial functions, the ]\anistry is divided into the Planning
Board for Higher Education, the Organization Board and the various
departmental secretariats.
Within University Administration
The modernized structure of each University consists of a Senate
and a Faculty Council. The Senate is concerned with the managerial
aspect of policy administration, while the Faculty Council is concerned
with the technical aspect.
Structural Differentiation of the Eductional System
Structural Organization
The contemporary educationl ladder became stabllisedbetweenj953-60
by virtue of various National Laws aimed at integrating and consolidating
the various autonomous school systems into a unified national system.
Accordingly, the new school system begins with a pre-school stage of
nurseries arid Kindergartens, a six-year primary stage, a three-year
preparatory, a three-year secondary and a four-year University stage
covering altogether 16 years of education beginning at the age of six
51
and terminating at twentytwo.
	 A two-year intervening stage was
provided for special teacher-training schools and other vocational
schools such as commerce, communications and public health after the
completion of the secondary stage2
50. BOOR, on. cit. pp.100-105
51. See Chart opposite.
52. ibid. p.22.
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Primary Stare
Having considered the fact that before the national inde endence,
12.5 per cent of the total number of pupils who entered schools
managed to stay on to the end but that an over-whelming 87.5 ner cent
dropped out, the Revolutionary government by Act 210 of 1953 declared
primary education between the ages of 6 and 12 to be compulsory and
free. All fee charring private schools were incorporated into the
National rstem, fees were abolished and all examinations at the
termination of the primary- schooling, except an enrollment test for
entry into the preparatory school, were cancelled, and foreign
languages were removed from the primary school curriculum.53
The new law also declared that primary schools as a mie should be
co-educational (art. 21)
Preparatory Stage
Secondary education was reorganized by the 1953 Act No. 211 to
form a three-year differentiated system which replaced the existing two-
tier schooling of five years called A1-Kafaa and. Bacealaureat. The
modernized system now consists of one-year general schooling and then
a two year branching off into scientific and literary studies, paralleled
by similar technical, vocational agricultural courses for boys, and
Home economics, health and fine arts for gir]s in the technical and
vocational secondary schools.55
rEd9at ion
The institutions for the Higher Education in Erpt are now
differentiated. into four secular Universities, various colleges and
Institutes administered directly by the Linistry of Higher Education
and. Al-Azhar, the oldest Alma Later of Islamic learning.
The first secular university was established in Cairo in 1908,
mainly through private efforts of modernist intellectuals who held high
53. HARi3Y and AllAWI, op. cit. pp.59-67
54. ibid. p.62
55. ibid. pp.71-72.
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offices; many of them had ventured from education in Ekirope and wished
tohaveani1ern Egyptian University for their sons t education. By 1925,
the Cairo University comprised four Faculties in Erot and. there was
an affiliated branch of three Faculties in Khartoum in the Sudan. Later,
two more universities were established one at Alexandra in 1942, and
the Em Shams University in 1950. Each of these two now has nine
faculties. In 1957-58, a new university was established in Assuit,
main.y to cater for the needs of Uprer Egypt, and it only has two faculties,
of Science and. Engineering.
The Higher Institutes
These were designed baaically to divert the flood tide of students
from the universities, and to provide education in teacher-training,
agriculture, commerce, fine arts, music and drama. Though in theory
these institutes are supposed to give training in practical skills,
leaving theoretical courses to the universities, in practice, however,
this distinction is not maintained.5
8.4.2. Expansion of the Capacity of Educational Facilities
In order to raise the capacity of the educational system, as
demanded by the various inputs into it, the Revolutionary government
in the beginning drew up ambitious plans for expansion. Unlimited
education was promised to all. But by the year 1960, when planning was
undertaken, it was discovered that a replacement of emphasis was needed
in order to achieve a balanced progress of the various sectors of the
economy and society. The Institute of National Planning, for example,
surmised that "a rapid expansion of primary education at the expense of
secondary and higher levels may lead to unskilled unemployment on one
side and shortages in high technical personnel on the other... .Therefore,
56. H. QUBAIN,Higher Education in the Arab Countries, op. cit
pp.61-84, also B0I0R op. cit. pp.lOO-lol.
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the adoption of a policy of universal literacy cannot be eiven the
highest priority especially in the earlies stages of economic
develorinent at the expense of skills at the secondary and higher
levels"
The original target of 100 per cent literacy by the years
1964-65 and the related impractical pledge of opening 400 schools
every year had to be abandoned. The date of universal literacy was
therefore postponed to the year 1970.
To guage the expansion in primary school enrollments between the
years 1954-68, see the figures in Table below%
Table V$IJP
Expansion in Primary Education between
1955-68
Number of	 Enrollment
Year	 Schools	 Male	 Female	 Total
1954-55
	
7,152	 984,415	 595,676	 1,580,089
1959-60	 7,213
	
1,524,514	 927,863
	
2,452,377
1964-65	 7,698	 2,009,824	 1,285,008	 3,294,832
1967-68	 7,771	 2,129,884	 1,341,450	 3,471,334
1968	 7,816	 2,189,002	 1,361,460	 3,550,462
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the UAR, 1951/52 - 1967/68. For the
year 1968 only UNESCO Year Book 1971.
These figures show a steady increase in the number of primary
schools inErpt since 1955, but the demand for primary education far
exceeded the surrnly of facilities. Even the revised target of the
1960-65 National Plan to open 130 schools a year instead of the 400
envisaged earlier, had not been met by the year 1965 when only 546 out
of the proposed 650 schools had been built. Bottlenecks were, therefore,
imminent. To relieve these the !iinitry of Education proposed to
emDloy some crash measures e.g. the ooeration of a two-shift system at
primary schools, the use of post-oriraary schools for primary education
in some areas, and permitting an increase of pupil-teacher ratio in
others 8
 Originally a statutory limit of 48 Dupils to a class had been
57. B0R0R, ibid. p.12.
58. International Year Book of Eiiietion, UNESCO, 1968, p.500, also
BOKTOR, op. cit. p.28.
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fixed by the Law 213 of 1956, but this had been allowed to extend as
far as 60 or even 70 pipils.59
PreDaratorySchool Enrollment
The importance of Dreparatory schools has grown considerably
with their reorganization into a three-year system and the upgrading
of the technical and vocational rrenarator3r schools to the secondary-
level. Obviously the number of technical preparatory schools and
their enrollment have shown a steep decline but the general Dreparatory
school and its enrollment have increased considerably as is evident
from the Table below:
1aL._V111.7.
Expansion in Preparatory Education
- between l9 55-56 -1161-68
Year	 Number of Schools	 Number of Pupils
General____ Technical	 G.Total
Total General Tech	 hale Female Male Fem1e
1955-56	 810	 758	 52	 255.1	 73.2	 7.8	 0.44	 336.6
1959-60	 9l..	 807	 104	 181.7	 69.1 27.0	 7.56	 285.5
1965-66 1,149 1,127	 22	 400.6	 173.8 22.6	 3.9	 600.9
1966-67 1,195 1,178	 17	 463.1	 202.1 13.2	 3.4	 681.9
1967-68 1,270 1,255	 15	 508.1	 228.6	 5.2	 2.6	 744.6
Source: Statistical Abstract of the UAR.
Secondary School Enrollment
Expansion and diversification of secondary education was considered
especially important for manpower su1y, The upgrading of technical
schools from preparatory to secondary level also gave the new secondary
school increasing functional importance. It was esti-ted that only
40 per cent of preparatory- school leavers would seek admission into
secondary schools. Of t}ese the folio iin DroDortlon of ciistribution
into different types of secondary- schools would be kept as a gaideline:
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40 per cent into general secondary schools
30 per cent into technical schools
11 per cent into teacher-training schools
4 per cent into female culture schools
15 per cent into the various training centres in
industry and comrierce.
100
TableVflrecords the rate of expansion at the secondary school
level:
Table VIII.8.
Expansion in Secondary Education
-_____________
	
Number of Schools 	 ollmentin9___
Year	 General	 Tech Tot	 General__— Technical Total
1 ale Female Male Female
1955-56	 208	 87	 295	 90.6	 17.0	 17.5
	
4.9 130.1
1959-60	 211	 92	 303	 97.3	 23.5
	
47.8	 12.5 181.1
1965-66	 263
	
196 459
	
149.7	 59.3	 79.0	 22.1 310.2
1966-67	 272	 198 470	 166.1	 68.5	 91.0	 28.9 354.4
1967-68	 309	 198	 507	 179.3
	
80.5 112.0	 41.1 412.9
Sources: Statistical Abstract and Boktor op. cit.
These statistics show that in the thirteen-year period there
has been an aliround. increase in the number of secondary schools, but
technical schools have multiDlied 2.25 times. Similarly enrollment
in the technical secondary- schools has increased seven times in the
same period. This fits well with the orojected manpower demand and.
the stress on the supply of technical manDower. According to the
National Plan, full manoower will only be met by the years 1984_85.60
Of narticular significance were the five Hieher Commercial
Institutes opened between 1957-58 atTanta, Zagazig, Assuit, Liansurah
and Port Said; five Agricultural Higher Institutes at Mirua, Kafr el
Sahikh, Lushtuhr, Shebin el Kom and Zagazig; four Industrial Higher
Institutes opened at Jeiwan, Mansurah, Liinia and Shaben and three iaore
60. Institute of National Planninp , Leno. No. 4U. Lanoower Reuirement
for the lIAR, pp.96-99.
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61projected to be opened bejore 1970.
Teachers' Education
The achievement of the educational targets set by various national
Plans all had, in the last analysis, to deDend. upon the huge number of
teachers reauired to operate the various schools. To meet this
enormous demand, the Revolutionary regime started in the initial years
with emergency courses condensed into one-year day and evening classes
and with apnointing surplus graduates to teach in primary schools.62
But by the time the National Plan was announced, these emergency courses
had been discontinued and an lnteFrated. system of teachers' education
was set up. This is shown in the diagram opposite.
Under the modernised Teachers' education system, there are
basically two major categories of teachers' training institutions:
Teachers Training Schools and Higher Teacher Training Institutions; the
former preparing teachers mainly for primary and preparatory schools,
and the latter for secondary schools, in general subjects as well as
special subjects.
The Five-year Nationf Plan envisaged a demand of a total number
of some 40,000 teachers by the year 1964-65. The number of students
in all the various institutions had already exceeded this target by the
same years by about 18.65 per cent. Shortage of teachers, however,
remained acute, particularly in subjects like science, mathematics,
English and music. In spite of the shortage at home, Egypt offered to
provide less cieveloDed sister Arab and African countries with trained
teachers. During the year 1963-64, sone 5,000 trained teachers, both
men and wcinen, were seconded for such serv-ice. The general expansion
61. Amin BOKLOR, op. cit. p.64.
62. HABBY and AllAWI, op. cit. p.187, also UNESCO Report on Compulsory
Education in the Arab States, oo. cit. p.63.
-363-
of enrollment in teacher-training institutes is shown in the table
below:
Table VIII.9.
Expansion in Teacher-training Institutions
1955-56 to 1967-68
Year	 Institutions	 Enrollment
Male	 Female	 Total
1955-56	 74	 16,606	 11.940
	 28,546
1959-60	60	 7,267	 8,162	 15,429
1964-65	 71	 23,527
	
17,732	 41,259
1965-66	 72	 28,896	 20,552
	
49,448
1967-68	 67	 19,290	 15,604	 34,894
Sources: Boktor, op. cit. and Statistical Abstracts.
* Decline in the number of institutions arid enrollment in
1967-68 is due to the fact that in 1966-67 certain
emergency type institutes e.g. the special departments
in General Teachers Training Institutions were abolished.
Higher Education
Following from the expansion at lower levels, dramatic expansion
has been registered in the institutions of higher education, both in
the number of students enrolled and in the structural differentiation
within the institutions and, especially in the universities.
The causes of this rapid increase have been the various input demands
for the political, economic, social and cultural mobilizations, spurred
by the modernization programme.
To take the structural differentiation first, this has been
manifested not only in the establishment of more institutions and
faculties in the universities but also in the introduction of newer
branches and types of specializations within the various faculties.
Each university has been expdnded in the number of faculties and tyues
of research units as well as soecii1ising institutes. There has been
a narallel increase in the number and diversity of Higher Institutes
sponsered by the Ministiy of Higher Education.°3
63. SeeMustafa El-Said, The Exnan1on of Higher Education in the TJAR,
Cairo University Press, Cairo, 1960, also F. ubain, Education
and Science in the Arab World, John hopkins Press, Baltimore,
1966, Chapter 6, pu.6l-84.
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Exnansion in enrollment, ho,ever, has been astounding. Since
national indenendence, the number of students at al] universities, other
than Al-Azhar, as is shown in Tab1e0, increased from 15,781 in 1953-54
to 124,308 in 1967-68 i.e. a 2.5 tines increase.
Table VI1I.l0
Ecpansion of Student-enrollment in the State Universities
and Higher Institutes 1953-54 to 1967-68
Year	 Universities	 Higher Inst]tutes - Grand Total
Total	 Female	 Total Female	 Total	 Fenale
1953-54
	
51,781	 4,829	 5,285
	
1,392
	
56,966	 6,121
1955-56	 59,550	 7,201	 7,059	 2,284	 66,609	 9,485
1957-58	 73,124	 9,333	 9,699	 2,814	 82,823	 12,147
1959- 60	83,141	 11,666	 13,555	 3,452	 96,696	 15,118
1960-61	 88,709	 13,781	 19,850	 4,340	 106,830	 18,121
1961-62	 94,857
	
15,014	 22,711	 4,748	 114,619	 19,762
1962-63
	
98,537
	
17,617	 22,200	 n.a.	 120,737
	
n.a.
1963-64	 109,682	 21,932	 25,780	 n.a.	 135,462	 n.a.
1964-65
	
119,041	 24,132	 27,377
	
n.a.	 146,418
	
n.a.
1965-66	 126,838	 27,951	 32,283	 n.a.	 159,121	 n.a.
1966-67	 127,864	 29,456	 29,026	 n.a.	 156,890
	
n.a.
1967-68	 124,308	 31,158
	
29,973	 n.a.	 154,281	 n.a.
Source: F. Qubain, op. cit. p. 71 adjusted with figures from The
Statistical Abstract.
Exnansion in enrollment at the Higher Institutes was even more impressive
i.e. from 5,285 in 1953-54 to 29,973 in 1967-68, or a six-fold increase.
Another noteworthy feature of exDarwlon in the higher education was the
accelerating increase every year in the numbers of girls in all tyDes
of institutions. Between 1953-54 and 1961-62, their numbers increased
on the average by four times, which at Alexandria University now
including the Higher Institute of Nursing as well, was an increase from
744 girl students in 1953-54 to 6,994 in 1967-68 - about ten-fold.
This increasing participation of girls in higher education of all types
is even more significant for the emancination of women and the
modernization of the Egyptian society, considering the fact that until
independence very few, even among the	 lioeral parents, would have
willingly allowed education for their daughters beyond the secondary stage.
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Before 1950, Universities only contained the faculties of Arts,
Law and Commerce and Dar-al-Ulam (Teacher-Training Institute) in the
Humanities. In 1950, two more faculties i.e. education end the Girls'
Couege were introduced. The Faculty of Sciences included general
science, medicine, Dentistry-, Pharmacy, Engineering, Agriculture and
Veterinary- Medicine. Under modernization now, the main faculties in
the Humanities are divided into Arts, Commerce, Law, Education, Girls'
Education, Dar-al-Ulazn, Economics and Political Science, Islamic
Jurisprudence, Islamic Theology, Arabic Studies, Business and Adnanistration
and Islamic Studies for Girls. In the Sciences, they now form the
faculties of ILedicine, Pharmacology, Enc ineering, Agriculture, General
Science, Dentistry and Veterinary Liedicine. The following Graph shows
the Expansion in Enrollment in the Humanities and Sciences during
1950-68.
-366-
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1951/1952--1967/6e, Central Agency for Public
Nobilisation and Statistics, Cajro, June, 1969
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As the graoh indicates, until the year 1960, there was an
acceleration of enrollment in the Huinenities while the Sciences laged
almost ha1f-ay behind. Then in 1960-61, enrollment in the scientific
and technological sub3ects started to 'take off' and by 1967-68, it
overtook Humanities. The fi oures for 1967-68 are: Humanities 68,573;
Sciences 70,045	 This is a tremendous turning of the tide from Arts
to Sciences and should have far-reaching consequences for Egyptian
economy, industry and indeed for the modernization of Egyptian society.
But, at the same time, this rapid and bulging expansion of
higher education is not without problems. The rising unemp1oment
among B.As., the shortage of teaching staff, particularly scientific
and technical, and the decline of academic standards are only the
obvious problems faced by the Egyptian educational system. According to
Professor Ginsburg, however, even in this, "Egypt has been no more and
no les/siccessfu1 than most other governments of developing nations
with sinular oroblems." 6
 Another grave problem of higher education
in Egypt manifests itself in the over-concentration of higher education
institutions in the metropolis - there are four universities in Cairo.
This corresoonds to the trends in the urbanization of Egypt in general,
and. indicates an imbalance of educational development among the regions.
8.5. Educational Outputs
8.5.1. Political Outputs
lodernising Leadership
Revolution in Egypt was ushered in by the 'Free Officers' whose
rationale for the modernization of their country included such radical
measures as the absolute overthrow of foreign domination, and the
complete over-hauling of their unjust socio-economic and political
order. These measures and their inherent difficulties demanded the
64. Statistical Abstract, p.152.
65. Eli GINSBUG, op. cit. p.188.
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creation of a class of moderrusin leadersiuD which, considering the
conditions of the Egyptian society of the time, Only the ainy could
provide. As Halpern has remarked:
"as a ruling power, an army has several extra-ordinary
advantages. Middle Eastern armies tend to produce
more able, hoiiest and decisive leadership than any
other institutions." 66
And the longer the struggle, the longer the concentration of
ruling power in the hands of the army. Therefore, inevitably, for a
generation at least, the mainstay of the innovating leadership had to
comeifrom the cadre of army officers and their catalysing comrades,
the younger generation of bureaucrats and technocrats. Intellectuals,
who used to dominate the elite class in the past, were, as Professor
Kerr has pointed out, obviously left out of the top leadership.6
But it would be wrong to see education only as a tool that the army
used to fortify themselves and perpetuate their hierarchy. The output
function of the Egyptian educational system since national independence
in its role of elite formation, must be viewed in the light of a
colossal transformation of the whole occupational structure that has
emerged as a result of changes introduced by the regime; and its over-
throw of the traditional elite system.
Educational development in Egypt since national independence, as
has been seen above, took place more under the impulse of national socIaIism
democratisation and equalization of education. Education was seen as
a basic right and not just as a privelege of the upper class, as in the
past. The regime for its own part, deemed it fit to encourage for its
political and economic policies, the spread of demand for education at all
levels, in order to draw legitimation and support. But this was also the
66. Iianfred HAIIPERN, in The Role of iilitar in Underdeveloped Counties
(Ed.) John J. Johnson, John Hopkins Press, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, N.J. 1967, p.310
67. Malcolm KERR, in Education and olitical Development, (ed) J. S.
Coleman, op. cit. p.193. "Since the orthodox intelligentsia often
will not and cannot fill this (modernization) role, revolutionary
leadership usually turns to the secular intellectuals located at more
mobile positions in the universities or mass media".
D. Lerner, ThE Pesin? of Tradtionl Society, op. cit. p.246.
first time since Liuhammad Au Pasha that talent for leadership was
sought from all strata of society rather than from the established
hierarchy. By the time, however, that planning was undertaken, and
economic control had been established, limits had to be set on the
basis of demands in the various occupational categories and in the
types and stages of educational provisions.
The entire corps of modernising leadership in Egypt is now
recruited from the University graduates. Lerner's study shows that
77 per cent of the top leadership class in his sample, had. university
and college education, 22 per cent secondary school education, and
1 per cent only elementar3r.68
Similarly Berger's study of the Bureaucracy in 1957 revealed
that, out of the 249 high level bureaucrat respondents in his samDle,
192 or 77.1 per cent had a B.A. Degree; 10.9 per cent had higher than
a B.A.; and, 29 per cent had secondary education. In other words,
88 per cent of the modernizing elite come from the Universities and
institutions of higher education. But, whereas before the Revolution
recruitment into the toD Bureaucracy was only a orivilege of the
aristocracy, now it is well diffused among all the classes. Already
in 1957, showed the Berger study, that 76.4 per cent of bureaucrats
listed the occupation of their fathers as other than 'landlord', and,
16.1 per cent as oeasants. The ositon since 1957 has even further
changed more in favour of he oeasants and white collar workers. So
it can be safely concluded that modernised education in Egypt is now
acting as a multiplier of norizontal class mobility, whereas traditional
education was restricted to the landed aristocracy. But imbaLmces
and maladjustments are still ranmant. Commenting on the role of Higher
Education general l y in trinin of modernising leadershi p, Dr. Fahmy
-	 68. D. LERNER, The Passin' of Tradition'1 Society, op. cit. p.222
69. BEIiGER, 00. cit. p.45.
-370-
of the Institute of Planning observed, in his 'Tentative Plant that:
1. universities have failed to train the
reouired number of enineers, doctors, research
workers and many other s ecialists.... Although,
recent organization of university education has
aimed to double the outrut of high scientific
and technical Dersonriel in the shortest time by
making the study on t.ro shifts. It is important
however, to ensure that such measures must not
lower the Quality of University education by
increasing the burden on the teaching staff."
He continues:
2. "The distinction drawn between the function of the
Higher Technical Institutes sponsored by the
Ministry of Higher Education and the Universities
whereby the Universities emphasize the academic
and theoretical branches of studies, Higher
Institutes the nractical, is unsound and. unuseful.
It is obvious that the purpose of the higher
technical institutes is essential to the national
economy exactly as the University. The two types
of institutes are supplementing each other. It
would be most unwise to assign the training of
high technical personnel to one type of institution.
The country needs hands and brains trained in
different ways to fill the varied technological
posts in the spheres of production, invention, design
research and management. There is no single way
leading to the highest technological posts in industry,
and if industry were to select for these nosts only
those individuals trained in one type of institution,
there is no guarantee that such selection would secure
the best high technical Dersonnel for the whole
field available". 70
The projected demand arid sun ply of modernizing elites, measured by
the graduate outnut of the Universities and Higher Institutes, was
estimated by the National Plan as below:
Table VIII.11.
Proect ed Demand and Suply of UniversityGraduates
Five Years	 Projected Demand.	 Projected Supply	 Balance
Ena ing:
1964-65	 205,536	 215,238	 + 9,702
1969-70
	 315,416	 278,368	 - 37,048
70. $. S. FABIX, A Tent ative Plan for the iture DeveloDinent of the
Educational System in the UAR, Institute of National Planning,
1964, pp.20-24.
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The enrollment figures in 1967-68 show that the projected
s'u.pDly is much lower than the Plan had expected i.e. 154,281 as
against the stipulated 278,368 (1969-70). To conclude, therefore,
although recruitment into the elite status is now diffueed among
all sections of the society and on achievement rather than on
ascriptive criteria; although the capacity of the educational system
has been enhanced., eouality and. democratisation of education is more
noticeable, more women are now participating in the education
services at all levels and more development and. progress in the
scientific and technological fields has to be achieved than before,
nevertheless attrition, imbalances and maladjustments still remain
rampant.
8
.5 .2 . Outputs to the Econo
Catalysing Manpower
In the early years of the Egyptian Revolution, educational
modernization was not designed in the light of manpower requirements
formulated from explicit national educational planning. Motivated
by their desire to democratise education, those responsible for the
educational policies of the regime in the early stages, worked towards
the universalization of elementary education. To quote Harby and
Azzawi, the main stress was on the human-right idea of education.
"A human consideration related to the right of the
individual, namely that every citizen should be
afforded full opportunity to achieve the largest
possible measure of spiritual and intellectual
development, and to realize the greatest success
possible within the limits of his capacities.
This is the root of true democratic life." 71
An underlying assumption in this approach seems to have been
that maximization of educational facilities to the limits of individual
capabilities is in itself instrumental to the acceleration of
modernization. EgyDtian educationalists of the time considered
71. HARBY and AllAWI, op. cit. p.56.
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schooling mainly in very broad terms, that is to say, 'preparing
students for life..., to use leisure more usefully..., to develop
students' talents, help discover their skills and provide oportimity
for a beneficial employment of their leisure time", hence the
importance of including hobbies in the curricula.72
It was not until near the end of the 1960-65 National Plan, in
fact in 1964, that studies of manpower demands were undertaken in order
to bring about co-ordination between schooling and. manpower requirements.
Preparatory arid secondary schools had expanded haphazardly and been
so organized as to accommodate all the primary school graduates into
post-primary schools. In 1964, the National Institute of National
Planning, divided the total national manpower into various occupational
categories and planned the related educational requirements to produce
them. Leaving the higher profe n1 categories for the universities
and the higher institutes, middle technical personnel, white-collar
co-ordinating staff, and skilled lebour were envisaged as a manpower
demand on the orearatory and secondary schools, general as well ms
technical. 73
 The Plan aimed at achieving a comolete co-ordination
between the manpower demand and the educational supply only by the
twentyfive -years period in 1985. The gaps still existing in the
intervening period were envisaged as shown in Tabl 	 below:
72. See the Ministry- of Education UAR, Statistics of Education l96,
p.21.
73. FAHMY, op. cit. Iemo. 398, chapter III, po.17-49.
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Table VIII.12
Projected Manoower Demand and Supply during Two Five-year
- Plan Periods 196l-6jnd 1966-70
Occuoational Educational
Category	 level	 1st Plan	 2nd. Plan
Year ending 1965
	
Year ending 1970
___________ __________ Demand
	 Supoly Balance Demand Supply Bal'nce
Technicians Secondary
T echru. cal
and
Trairung
Centres
Clerks	 Secondary
General
Commercial
schools
	
380.8	 192.2 -188.5
	 604.4	 383.1 -221.2
	
235.8	 190.1 - 45.5	 344.5	 250.5 - 93.3
Skilled
Labour
Training
Centres
Post Prep
Schools
and
Apprentice
ships
Unskilled Primary
Labour	 Schools
1,061.6	 658.5 -403.1 1,481.1	 919.8 -561.5
6,116.1 6 ,850.9 +734.8 6 ,905.5 7,831.2 +925.8
Graduate outputs at primary, prenaratory and. secondary levels all
show a considerable gap between demand and supply and reveal a persistent
failure of the educational systen to oroduce the forecasted manpower.
In 1967, the total number of students who passed the preparatory general
school examination was only 190,470; secondary general 23,772; secondary
scientific 51,325. All of these figures were considerably lower than
the estimates. This indicates a serious faiJure on the oart of the
educational system to produce the required manpower.
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The mannower study of the Institute of National Planning was
highly critical of some of the educational policies and practices that
led to this failure. In particular it criticised the introduction at
the orenaratory level, of technical schools which turned out skilled
pupils at the age of 15, which they stressed, was too early for the
young to bear the responsibilities imposed upon them by- their position
in industry or business as skilled workers. 74 The study also argued
that modern industry- requires from the skilled worker a high degree of
general education; and primary education alone did not provide them
with sufficient background on which to base technical and vocational
education.
In the same mariner, the study was highly critical of the general
secondary school system for its continued academic imprint. It ar°ued
that the secondary school, on the whole, continued to exhibit the main
features and spirit of the old traditional secondary education, and
prepared students, as did the traditional system, mostly for white-
collar, clerical (muazif) 3obs. 75 Secondary education, the study
emphasized must be diversified into general and technical according to
the future careers of the students. After a general course of one-year,
soecialisation should start for the second year then the curriculum
should be divided into an equal number of general and scientific subjects''6
The study recommended that technicians should be trained at technical
schools and that vocational training for skilled labour should be
provided at post-preparatory vocational training centres. General
secondary schools should prenare students only for entry into Higher
Institutes and. Universities.
74. ibid. p.23
75. ibid. pp.24-25
76. ibid. p.35.
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8.5.4. Cultural Outuuts
Integrative Culture: (a) The Language
The Arabic language has, since the rise of Islam, always rem'ined
as the pre-eminent comDonent of the Arab culture. Arab nationalism
and Arab unity without the classical Arabic language are inconceivable.
As the language of the Quran, it is a sacred heritage and an a priori
standard of perfection held even by non-Arab uslims. So strong is
the emphasis on its preservation and primacy as an integrative symbol,
that any move by the modern linguists to have the colloquial language
introduced into the educational system for reasons of scholastic
expediency, has been vehemently rejected. Wilber in i-as study of the
Egyttlan People, Society and Culture has observed:
"Colloquial Arabic is popularly disparaged. English
speaking Egyptians refer to it as 'slang' and the
term 'Arabic' unless explicitly qualified otherwise,
means classical Arabic." 77
Arabic has always occupied, and still occupies, the highest place
in the curriculum of Muslim education. With the modernization of
Muslim education its place within the compulsory education curriculum
is still predom.inaant as an instrument of socialisation into the
cultural heritage and national unity. The Cairo Conference on
Compulsory Education of 1954 stressed that compulsory education in all
Arab countries should instil in the child the principles of Islam, and
develop a pride in the Arab homeland and Arab cultural heritageY8
At the primary school stage 66 lessons out of a total weekly
time-table of 208 lessons are devoted to the teaching of Arabic, and
if some of the 18 more periods alloted for the reading of the Qtican
77. WILBER, op. cit. p.57.
78. tJINESCO, Compulsory Education in the Arab States, op. cit. p.48. In
Jordan the foremost objective of education has been written down as
"to prepare the student to be fond and proud of his/her Arabic
language". See Aiian F. MALHAS, "National Aims in Using the Mother
Tongue", in Kurt Opitz (Ed), Mother Tongue Practice in Schools,
UNESCO, Institute of Education, 1972, pp.181-198.
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and religion are also included, the time allocation becomes much
higher. At the preparatory and secondary levels though, the time
allocated to the teaching of Arabic is reduced to accommodate foreign
languages such as English and French, yet, except at the secondary
literary stage where 21 lessons are devoted to foreign languages as
againsi 18 to Arabic, out of a 90 lessons weekly time-table, the latter
still dominates. At the higher education level, the universities of
Cairo, Alexandria and Em-Shams all have departments of Arabic language
and literature, while As-Azhar university has a separate college for
Arabic language. In these institutions an average of 14 out of 17 weekly
lessons is devoted to the study of Arabic language and literature.
This rmmacy of classical Jrabic does, however, account for the
deficiency of standards in achievement in all examinations, and
particularly in foreign languages and mathematics as well as scientific
subjects. So low is the standard of achievement in foreign languages
that students are promoted to mnsttutions of higher studies with low
passing marks, even with failuresl 9 According to Professor Boktor, low
standard in achievement in English and French has affected the Faculties
of medicine arid science where English is the medium of instruction and
of law in which French is largely used. 80
lthough Erpt doesn't face the uroblen of conflict between the
national language and regional lanpuaes or the mother tongue, yet the
language difficulty is aggravated by a growin demand among sone
nat'onalist groups, under the unoress of national integration, to teach
the scientific subjects in Arabic instead of English. Aoart from the
material difficulties of t 1-ie lack of text books, and the absence of
lexicons of technical and scientific tenas, this demand is seen by
79. Amir Boktor, 00. cit. p.l63.
80. ibid.
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educational exnerts as a further lowering of standards in these very
81
subjects.
But, viewed from another angle, the Egyotian educational system,
in keening with the greater 'Arab-nation' conceot of Egyptian-
nationalism, has taken a leading role in 'national' integration by
training brother Arab students in its educational institutions, and
also by seconding Egyptian teachers for service in sister Arab states.
In 1966-67, for example, the number of students from the Arab World
on roll in the Egyptian institutions of Higher and Technical education
was 23,434 out of a total of 34,516 foreign students, that is to say
67.9 per cent. 82 Similarly, out of 4,615 teachers seconded for foreign
service 4,908, or 94.2 per cent, were sent to Arab countries, mainly
83Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan.
Innovative Culture
(b) Religion
The compelling commitments made in the National Charter, aiming
at the expurgation of obstructionist forces and attitudes that had.
taken hold of Islam, impinged upon the educational system in a number
of ways. In the first place, the historically derived duality of the
system in which the Kuttabs, Madrassahs and Al-Azhar existed side by
side with the state system, had to be abolished. The regime saw no
justification for the separate existence of the specifically religious
institutions like Al Azhar to continue in the country. The reasons
given by the Regime for ending this hegemony of Muslim educational
institutions were founded on the historical role of these institutions
themsleves. They argued that Muslim educational institutions in their
classical era produced scholars as well as scientists, physicians and
other specialists as well as judges, jurisconsuls, teachers and.
administrators. So, as the largest and the oldest university of the
81. F. QITBAIN, op. cit. pp.87-89
82. Statistioal Abstrae,op. cit. p.152.
83. UBAIN, op. cit. p.200.
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Muslim world, A1-Azhar must play its true role of a disseminator
of all sciences, not just the religious ones." 84
The modernization of Al-Azhar has been regarded as the most
outstanding achievement of the Revolutionary Regime in its overall bid
to eradicate all types of traditionalism from Muslim education--- a
change which had become overdue, and the one which, it can safely be
argued, could not have been attempted, or carried out, effectively,
by non-revolutionary methods. Although attempts at reform in the old
university had been made earlier at the beginning of this century, they
barely went beyond the acceptance in principle of foreign languages,
such as French and English, Hebrew, Persian, Chinese and Turkish as
subjects of study. So strong was the resistance of the Ulaina and the
Shaikhs of the university to the introduction of any innovation and
particularly to any sponsored by the government, that even though the
teaching of these foreign languages had been approved in 1901, only
the teaching of English actually did start, and even that not until 1958.
Law 103 of 1961, which modernised Al-Azhar, basically aimed at
the following objectives:
1. "to maintain Al-Azhar's position as the largest and the
oldest Muslim university in the East and West;
2. to maintain its position as the stronghold of religion
and Arabic from which Islam will be renewed in its
true substance to all levels and every locality in
society;
3. to graduate scholars who bev a knowledge and exnerience
'so that religion will no longer be their only craft or
profession';
4. to destroy a13 barriers betieen A1-Azhar and other
universities so that Azhar graduates may enjoy equal
opportunity in the spheres of knowledge and work;
84. For a penetrating study of the Reform of il-Azhar see Daniel
CRECELIUS, "Al-Azhar in the Revolution", in the Yiddle East Journal,
vol. 20 (1), 1966, also in Schools_in Transi ion Essays in
Comparative Education, eds. A. i. Kazaznias and B. H. Enstein,
Allyn and Bacon, i3oston, 1968, n.335-352.
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5. to give a common account of knowledge and experience
to all Azharies so that t ey may be intellectually
and psychologically eaual vith all other Sons of
the Fatherland;
6. to standardise school and university certificates
in all TJ.A.R. universities and schools,"
	 85
To bring it on a level with other state universities, the
administrative structure of A1-Azhar is now divided into the following
departments:
Suoreme Council,
Muslim Research Acad.eny
Mu q li.m Cultural and Missions Department
Al-Azhar University,
Al-Azhar Institutes.
Al-Azhar education is organised now on a four-stage basis:
1. The pre-school Quaranic memorization class;
2. The four-year primary stage;
3. The five-year secondary stage, and
4. The four-year Higher stare. 86
Transfer of students into the secular system is made easy at all
the various stages. Graduates of the secondary stage, for example, can
enter the Dar al Ulum CoLlege of Cairo University for teacher..- t'"ining.
In place of the three traditional faculties of Islamic
Jurisprudence, Theolor and Arabic, the new Al-Azhar University consists
of the following different colleges:
1. College of Islamic Studies;
2. College of Arabic Studies;
3. College of Business and. Administration;
4. College of Engineering and Industries;
5. College of Agriculture;
6. College of Medicine, and
7. College for Girls' Education.
Two fundamental conditions have, however, been kept intact in the
modernization Act: (1) "Arabic is the language to be used in Al-Azhar
University exclusively, unless the Council of the University decides
that a foreign language be adooted on specific occasions; (art.37),
and (2) it is implied by articles 38 and 39, that only Luslims would be
85. ibid. p.343
86. BORTOR, op. cit. p.153.
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on the teaching staff, and only luuslim students adnatted.87
A particularly siiuficant innovation in Al-Azhar University
has been introcuced with the establihment, by Art. 15, of the
Islnic Research Council as the hihest body to conduct research in
the area of relnterDretatlon of Islamic doctrines in the lirht of
present day circumstances. As the Article concerned stinulates,
its objectives are:
"to undertake the study of all matters related
to such research, and works towards the renewal
of Wuslim culture, its liberation from intrusive
vestiges and traces of political and ideological
fanaticism, its demonstration in its Dure and
original substance, promoting knowledge of it at
every level and in every locality, the expression
of opinion and new ideological or social
problems affecting the creed, and assuming the
resnonsibilities of the call for the sake of
religion with wisdom and good counsel", 88
The opening of the gates of Al-Azhar to girl students since
1962-63 can equally be regarded unquestionably as another successful
achievement of modernization, and has further demonstrated. the value
attached to the universalistic, rather than the traditional ascriptive
criteria on which the modernized A1-Azhar should operate. The
exnansion of enrollment at the Azhar can be gleaned from the table
below:
Table VIII.13
ExDansion of Enrollment at the Azhar University
between l959-1968
Year	 Number of Students
____	 Li ale	 Female	 Total
1959-60	 4,970
	
-	 4,970
1960-61	 5,753	 -	 5,753
1961-62	 6,108	 -	 6,108
1962-63	 7,275	 153	 7,428
1963-64	 6,649	 202	 6,851
1964-6 5	 9,842	 318	 10,160
1965-66	 12,616	 689	 13,305
1966-67	 15,751	 1,366	 17,117
1967-68	 - 15,644	 1,208	 16,852
Source: Statistical Abstract. 1. D. Crecelius, op. cit.p.347
88. ibid.
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To sum up, the modernization of Al-Lihar has made a tremendous
Lmpact on Muslim education, both witlun Egypt and abroad. More Ibluslim
students of the Iiddle Eastern and other Asian countries and Africa,
even from other continents come to 'oin the university than ever before.
Traditional attitudes among the Azhari Shaikhs are disappearing fast,
and slowly but surely, a consciousness is emerging among the ulama in
general of the need for them to participate in and extend the boundaries
of knowledge that had been rigidly fixed during the Middle Ages,
including the modern socio-cultural systems of the Muslim instead of
narrowly constrained spiritutal and. religious interests alone. Tins,
one hones, will lead to the greater rationalization of Islamic beliefs
and practices. This is highly important because effective modernization
in all the layers of a Muslim society will be easier to implement if the
Ulaina begin to, or are so trained as to, appreciate the norms of
modernity.89
(c) Scientific Culture
As has been seen above, enrollment at secondary and higher
institutions and universities in the scientific studies has increased
considerably in Egypt since the 1961 'take-off'. At the higher level,
by 1967, the enrollment in sciences even exceeded that in the humanities.
Another way of guaging the progress of the quest for the scientific
culture would be to note the increase in the output of science
graduates. The Table below shows tins output with the subjects in which
qualifications were achieved.
89. ibid.
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Taole V1.l4
University Graduates in Science and Applied Sciences
between 1354_and 1367-68
Subject	 Year: 1953-54
	
1951-60	 1364-65
Science
Engineering
Medicine
Pharmacy
Dentistry
Nursing
Veterinary Liiedicine
Agriculture
Total
Overall total
University
Graduates
302
515
489
77
37
37
_ -3--
1,820
4,949
383
377
826
180
95
15
68
852
3,303
10,079
1,227
2,027
902
299
140
43
333
1,774
6,745
16,273
1,576
2,620
1,117
406
173
57
234
2 L60 8
8,791
21,111
Source: Statistical Abstract cncl Nader and Zahlan.
Again, TableVlHJ5indicates the number and tyDes of degrees obtained
in the Sdientific subjects during the years 1953-54 and 1963-64.
eX.III. 15
Number and Types of Degrees in the Sciences
_______	 l953-5j34
Year	 B.Sc.	 Dioloma M.Sc.	 Ph.D. Total
1953-54
	
303
	
3	 59	 20	 385
1955-56	 356	 16	 33	 13	 414
1959-60	 384
	
19	 41	 26	 470
1962 -63	 992	 n.a.	 n.a.	 n.a.
1963-64	 1,207	 n.a.	 n.a.	 n.a.
(d) Scientific Research
In order to oromote scientfic research in the country, the
National Research Centre was created in 1956 as an autonomous agency
attached to the Presidential Secretariat. Its aims were registered as:
"the oromotion of scientific research, both basic
and anolied, esecia1]v in the fields of industry,
agriculture, medicine and all other matters
related to the national economy". 90
90. UBAIN, p.171, Also Adel A. Sabet, "UAR Commitments to Seience and
Technolor in Developing Countries,"Pr pceedings of the Intrnationa1
Conference held at the American University of i3eirut, ed. . iader
and A. B. Zahian, C.U.P. 1969, rrn.l87,239.
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The N.C.R. is authorised to gr nt scnolarhips for research, in the
U.A.R. or abroad, to establish centres for documentation and to
disseminate scientific i iformation? 1
 It has four main departments:
Chemistry and Chemical Technology; Physics and Engineering Physics;
Agriculture Research and iiedical Research. Each department is further
sectionalised into various sub-divisions and research um.ts.
The IThTESCO International Conference on the Organization of
Research and Training held in Lagos in 196/1, established that in a
developing country, a minimum of 200 research workers to a million heads
of ponulation shouJd be reached by 1980 to attain a minimum level of
achievement in science and technology-. The U.A.R. Ministry of Scientific
Research in its 1965 Renort estimated that in the U.A.R. (Egypt) 300
research workers to a million of population would be produced by the
year 1970. In view of this Renort, asserts Sabet, the UNESCO Conference's
target needs further investigation, both in its definition of a research
worker and the scone of his work?2
Apart from the various research institutions, research units and
laboratories now functioning under the N.C.R. there are about 35 learned
societies and 45 scientific periodicals that encourage publication of
the results of various research organizations, as well as promoting
research undertakings. A list of these organizations and neriodicals
is given in Chart 'i,.' below.
8.6. Conclusions
Egypt's nrogress in socio-econonnc and political modernization
since its national indenendence and its time scale have, considering the
stunendous poverty and backwardness orevalent in the country, been
r1ative1y imoressive though various oroblems still remain obtrusively
91. IIBAIN, ibid. p.171.
92. Adel A. SABET, op. cit.
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Dersistent. An apt and balanced assessment of the degree and lmDact
of modernization in Egypt has been given in a critical and. penetrative
study of the country's develooment by Patrick O'Brian in 1966, who
asserts:
"Egypt's ruling elite is attempting to build
a 'Socialist, Democratic and Co-operative
society'. Its achievements since the coup d'etat
of 1952 and more obviously since the proclamation
of these goals in 1957, are not unimpressive.
Few would deny that progress has been made,
particularly in the sphere of social justice;
but its extent should not be exaggerated....
Through the Arab Socialist Union the Free Officers
hope to encourage more participation in politics
and. are seeking to establish a viable set of
political institutions. Gross inequalities in
income and wealth have been eradicated but
redistribution has so far done little to alleviate
the material conditions for the mass of poverty-
stricken E'yptians.
If new priveleged groups have emerged in
Egypt, it is not really among the ruling elite
and their entourage, as some writers suggest, but
among factory workers, median peasants, beneficiaries
of land reform, and the urban middle class. Until
the effects of social and economic policy are more
diffused, the regime's dedication to socialism
will remain mainly ideological". 93
Educational modernization in Egypt has also relatively kept pace
with that of ideological, economic, political and social aspects of
modernization, and even contributed to the sustenance of the overall
modernization effort. To quote O'Brian again:
"With a limited natural endowment Egypt is devoting
resources towards the improvement of her most
abundant resource, manpower ... Education is not
simply an agent for economic development but also
the most important vehicle for social mobility
now operating in Egypt. The status and material
standards of poor and illiterate families will rise
with their childrens' advancement up the educational
ladder".	 94
93. P. O'BRIAN, The Revolution in Ert's Economic System, op. cit. p.301
94. ibid. p.298.
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The most remarkable achievement has surely been in the
modernization of the historical Islamic University of Al-Azhar where
changes have been introduced without resort to extremity, as in
Turkey, or mistrust, as in Pakistan, but by striking a willing concord
between the religious classes and the modernists. Consequently, the
great institution of Al-Azhar has gained new dimensions of scholarship
as the grat Muslim university of the world.
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CHART sL'
List of Learned Societies and Research Institutes
Engaged in Innovation and Research
in Egypt
ACADEMIES
ACADEMY OF TEE ARABIC LANGUAGE: CAIRO.
INSTITUT D' EGYPTE: Cairo. f.1e59. Considers literary, artistic and
scientific questions relating to Egypt and neighbouring countries.
LEARNED SOCIETIES AND
RESEARCH INSTITUTES
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CENTRE: CAIRO: f.1947; fosters and carries out research
into pure and applied sciences.
EGYPTIAN AGRICULTtJRAL ORGANIZATION: CAIRO; f.1898. Acts as an information
centre for farmers, and its activities include seed selection,
importation of fertilizers, periodic agricultural and industrial
exhibitions etc.
EGYPTIAN DESERT INSTITUTE: CAIRO.f.1950. A Scientific institute for the
study and development of desert areas; carries out research into
various aspects of the desert economy and life; maintains field
stations and laboratories.
EGYPTIAN HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY. Cairo. founded 1915.
BUILDING RESEARCH INSTITUTE:GIZA, Carries out basic and applied research
work on building materials and means of construction, provides
technical information and acts as consultant.
ARMENIAN ARTISTIC UNION: CAIRO. f.1920. Aims to promote Armenian and Arabic
culture.
ATELIER. Alexandria. Scety of artists and writers.
Ejrptian Concert Society, Alexandria.
HELLENIC ARTISTIC UNION. ALEXANDRIA.
HIGH COUNCIL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE. CAIRO. f. 1956.
INSTITUTE OF ARAB MUSIC: ALEXANDRIA.
INSTITUTE OF ARAB MUSIC: CAIRO.
TEE MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE: Alexandria. ; carries out basic and applied
research in the field of medicine.
NUTRITION RESEARCH INSTITUTE
OTBALMOLOGICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
MEMORIAL INSTITUTE FOR OPHTHALMIC RESEARCH:CAIRO. f. 1925.
OPHTEALMOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF EGYPT. CAIRO. f.19o2.
PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES: MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HELLTH.CAIRO.f. 1885.
RESEARCH INSTITUTE AND HOSPITAL FOR TROPICAL DISEASES: CAIRO. f.1932.
ALEXANDRIA INSTITUTE OF OCEANOGRAPHY AND FISBERIES:ALEXANDRIA. f.1931.
ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISEMENT • CAIRO.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY AND MINERAL RESEARCH DEPARTMENT. MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY.f.1898.
INSTITUTE OF ASTRONOMY AND GEOPHYSICS: EGYPTIAN OBSERVATORIES. CAIRO.f. 1903.
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INSTITUTE OF FRESHWATER BIOLOGY: CAIRO.
NATIONAL CW1MTCAL RESEARCH CENTRE : CAIRO.
NATIONAL INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION CENTRE: CAIRO. 1. 1955.
Accumulates and disseminates information in all languages and in all
branches of science and technology.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STAR]ARDS CAIRO.
NATIONAL LABORATORY FOR METROLOGY AN]) MATERIAL TESTING.
RED SEA. INSTITUTE OF OCEANOGRAPHY AND FISHERIES: AL)GHARDLQA.f.1929.
SOCIETE ENTOMOLOGIQUE D'EGYPTE: CAIRO.f.19o7.
EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH: CAIRO.f. 1948.
EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES: FACULTY EDUCATION, AIR SHAMS
UNIVERSITY, CAIRO. 1.1948.
SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION OF EGYPT: CAIRO.f 1957
EGYPTIAN SOCIETY OF ENGINEERS, CAIRO. 1.1920.
HIGHER INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTE: Aswan. f. 1962.
HYDROLOGICAL RESEARCH STATION, Cairo. 1. 1902.
MET iIJLURGICAL RESEARCH INSTITum, RELWAN.
MIDDLE EASTERN REGIONAL RADIOISOTOPE CENTRE FOR TEE ARAB COUNTRIES: CARO.P.1963.
EGYPTIAJI ASSOCIATION FOR ARCHIVES AND LIBRARIANSHIP: CAIRO. f. 1956.
EGYPTIAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: CAIRO.f.I945.
EGYPTIAN SOCIETY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,STATISTICS AND LEGISLA.TION.CAIRO1. 1909.
INSTITUTE OF ARAB RESEARCH AND STDDIES.CAIRO. f.1953.
INSTITUTE OF NATIONAL PLANNING.CAIRO. f.1960.
EDUCATION DOCUMENTATION CENTRE FOR EGYPT: CENTRAL MINISTRY OP EDUCATION:CAIRO.
DEUTCHES ARCHAOLOGISCHES INSTITUT (GERMAN ARCHAEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE) sCairo. I9.6.
EY9Tr..LAN geographical society: Cairo. f.1876: REORGANISED. 1917.
HELLENIC SOCIETY OF PTOLEMA.IC EGYPT.ALEXANDRIA. 1.1908.
INSTITUTE DOMINICAN D'ETUDES ORIENTALES: PRIORY OF TEE DOMINICAN FATHERS.CAIRO.
OF
ARCHAEOLOGY) :CAIROf.
OFFICE OF THE PRESERVATION OF ARABIC MONUMENTS:CAIRO. 1.1882.
SOCIETE ARCHEOLOGIQUE D 'ALEXANDRIE: ALEXLNDRIA.1. 1893.
SOCIETY FOR COPTIC ARtHAELOGY:CAIRO. f.1934.
ALEXANDRIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION.ALEXANDRIA. f.192I.
CAIRO ODONTOLOGICAL SOC IETY:CAIRO.
EGYPTIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION. CLRO.f. 1919.
EGYPTIAN SOCIJi OF MEDICINE AND TROPICAL HYGIENE:ALEXA.NDRIA. f.I927.
HIGHER INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC HEALTH: UNIVERSITY OF ALEXANDRIA.
MEDICAL RESEARCH EFTIVE ORGANIZAPION:CAIRO.
BILHARZIASIS RESEARCH INSTITUTE: GIZA.
DRUG RESEARCH INSTITum: CAIRO.
INDUSTRIAL HEALTH RESEARCH INSTITuTE.
SOURCE: PEE WORLD OF LEARNING: 1972-73.
EUROPA PUBLICATIONS. London. 1972.
PART IV
CO!IPARiTIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
From the viewpoint of social planning
and cultural borrowing a most important
type of study is that which endeavours
to anticipate and. compare events in a
number of given situations. It is
perfectly possible to make international
comparisons of education achievements
using certain criteria of success.
Brian Kolmes.
Problems in Education
A Comparative Approach
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CHAPTER 9.
UAwrIrICAPION A1D COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF MODERNIZATION
9.1 A QUA.NTIPIVE TAXONOMY OF MODERNIZATION
Sophisticated, attempts have been made in recent years, following
planning and prediction techniques used at UNESCO, to chart out
multivariate data in order to gauge the level of modernization of
various countries. The latest of these, and the most comprehensive
so far, is the Harbison et al study entitled, "Quantitative Analyses
of Modernization and Development" (1970) which corroborates the
Harbison and Myers' earlier "Composite Index on Human Resources
Development" study (1964). The later study devises a multivariate
taxonomy based upon the 1968 UNESCO 'Taxonomic Method' developed by
Professor Zygmunt Heilvig, for the purpose of ranking, classification
of countries and areas with respect to their levels of modernization.
Originally, this taxonomy, remark Professor Earbison et al,"was
designed - in 1952 - in order to obtain
"a statistical method of determining homogeneous units
or 'types of things' in an n-dimensional vectoral
space, without the use of regression, variance or
correlation analysis'
and was envisaged to serve as a useful methodology for a comparative
analysis at international level.1
Using the numerical values assigned to some eight commonly
accepted, multiple indicators of modernization namely: economic
manpower development, demographic mobilization, cultural development,
1. Frederick H. BARBISON et al, Quantitative Analysis of Modernization
and Development, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton Uni.versity,
1970 , pp.15-29
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health services provisions and educational effort, the Harbison study
arrives at a standardized value ranked as '0' which is assigned to
an 'ideal-type' model country, and then ranks 112 countries of the
world on that standardized value index. Two types of rank orders have
been drawn to mark the level of modernization as measured from the
'ideal-type', viz: (i) the 'Pattern of Development' which marks the
distance of each country to the 'ideal-type', and (2) the Measure of
Development' which has been defined as Wa method of simulating the
percentage of development and the critical distance from the so-called
'ideal' country. 2 Both the ranks are so constructed that the closer
they are to '0', the more modernized is the country.3
To take one example, on the Economic Development Index, in the
matrix of 'developed countries', the U.S.A. has been shown as the
'ideal' country having '0' as its Pattern of Development and '0' as its
Measure of Development; and, within the same matrix, Portugal with
6.3968 as its Pattern of Development and 0.9134 as its Measure of
Development would be considered the least economically modernized.
country within the 'developed countries' matrix.
The Harbison taxonomy seems quite useful for constructing a
matrix of modernization comprising selected Muslim countries, and.
particularly to gauge the comparative level of modernization vis-a-vis
educational modernization of the countries under study: Egypt, Pakistan an
and Turkey.
2. ibid. p.
3. ibid. p.
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It must be stated here that this study does not itself attempt
to process the raw data which alone would be a stupendous task. But,
with the permission to reproduce the processed data granted kindly by
the Princeton University, Industrial Relations section and the authors
4
of the study, it only utilizes the processed. values of the Earbison et al
study, both for the Pattern of Development and the Measure of Development
indexes in respect of some 15 selected Muslim countries from within the
grand matrix of some 112 countries of the World. Certain rather atypical
countries within the Muslim matrix e.g. BMwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and
some Gulf Sultanates, are not included because of their asymetrical
modernization resulting from their extra-ordinary oil finances. One such
oil-rich country, Libya has, however, been included because until 1965,
its development was not too inconsistent with the rest of the countries
in the matrix. The three countries under this study have been specifically
brought under focus on the Comprehensive Data Matrix and the various other
indexes. The comparative picture that emerges is found to be significantly
supportive of the findings of the case studies.
Table IX.I shows the Comprehensive Data Matrix for 15 Muslim
countries on some 4o variables/indicators of modernization that are listed
in Qhart 1L2. Table IX.3 shows the Composite Index of Modernization of
these 15 Muslim countries, while Table IX.4 shows the Index of their
Educational Modernization. In Table IX.5, Comparative trends and rate
of Change in Modernization of these countries between the years 1960-1965
have been shown. Graph 'J1' shows the comparative trends in the educational
modernization of the three countries under study between years 1960-69.
4. See Appendix 'A'.
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CHART iX.2.
INDICATORS OF MODERNIZATION
(r io	 I&IoNs)
DEMOGRAPHIC
BKTHRATE	 Number of births per 1,000 population.
2. DTHRLTE	 Number of deaths per 1,000 population.
3. LIFZ1XP	 Life expectancy at birth (in years)
4. DEPRAIO	 Dependency Batio (0-14 and. 65 plus population aS percent of
15-65 population).
5. GrvRLTE	 PPULA.TI0N Growth Rate
6. POP/SQBX Population density per
7. UBBPOP	 Percent of population
!FIkLTH
(average percent (1963-67)
square kilometer.
living in cities of 20,000 and. over.
8. DOC/DENT
9. PHARX
lo. NURSES
II. HOSPBKDS
12. GNPROT
'3. NIMAL
14. CALORIES
15. STARCH
Docore and Dentists per 10,000 population.
Pharmiciets per 10,000 population.
Nurmes per 10,000 population.
Hospital Beds per 10,000 population.
Daily grams protein consumed per capita.
Daily *nimql protein as proportion of total
Daily calories consumed per capita.
Daily cereals and starches as proportion of
COIINUNICATIONS AND CULTURE
16. NEWSPAPER Newspaper circulation per 1,000 poptlation.
17. RaDIOS	 Radio receivers per 1,000 population.
18. TELEPHS	 TElephones in use per 1,000 population.
19. CINEMA.	 Yearly cinema attendance per capita.
20. MOTOitvI	 Passenger cars and. commercial vehicles excluding Military and.
Police, per 1,000 population.
EONONIC
21. PCGNP	 Per capita Gross National Product at factor Cost (in 1964U3 ^/)
22. ENERUY	 Per Capita Ener	 Consumption (in Kg of Coal Ton Equivalents)
EDUCATIONAL MODERNIZATION
LITERACY Literacy Bate of Adult population (15 Plus).
ENROL I	 First-level enrolment Ratio (adjusted for 5.14 population)
ENROL II	 Second-level enrolment ration (adjusted for 15-19 population)
ENROL III Thirdlevel enrolment ratio (adjusted for 20-24 population)
PEACE I	 First level Teachers per 10,000 population.
TEACH li/ill Second and Third evel Teachers per 10,000 population.
%FEM I
	
Percent female rnrolment in First level education.
%FEM II Percent female enrolment in Second level education.
%FEM III Percent female enrolment in Third level education.
%LGRENROL Proportion of Phird-level enrolment in Agriculture courees}
*tEDENROL Proportion of Third-level enrolment in Medical Courses.
S/ENGENR0L Proportion of Third-level enrolment in Science and Engineering.
PCRECX$	 Per Capita public recurrent expenditures on Education in US /
RECUMIT I Recurrent Cost of education per unit at First Level.
RECIThIT II Recurrent cost of education per unit at second Level.
REUUNIT III Recurrent cost of education per unit at Third level.
CAPTOP	 Public Capital edpenditure on education as percent of total
public expenditure on education.
RECX5GNP Per Capita public recurrent expenditures on education as
percent of per capita Gross National Product.
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TABLE IX.3
COMPOSITE INDEX OF MODERNIZATION OF 15 MUSLIM COUNTRIES
FROM TEE RANK-ORDER OF 112 WORLD COUNmIES
Pattern of	 Meami.re of
Country	 Modernization	 Modernization	 Rank-Order
Afghanistan
Sudan
Pakistan
Indonesia
Morocco
Algeria
Iran
Turkey
Tunisia
Egypt (UAR)
Libya
Malaysia
Jordan
Syria
Iraq
20.3605
19 .7014
19.4164
19 . 3906
18.9621
18.8911
18.5964
18. 3004
18.2970
18.0667
17.8236
17.6937
17.4849
17.3885
17.0618
0.8775
0.8491
0.8368
0.8354
0.8173
0.8142
0.8015
0.7887
0.7886
0.7788
0.7682
0.7626
0.7536
0.7494
0.7354
2
18
25
26
34
36
42
44
45
47
54
55
59
61
62
Japan
USSR
U.K.
U.S.A.
Some Highly Modernized Countries
	13. 1245	 0.5657
	
11.8905
	 0.5125
	
11.1773
	 0.4817
	
3.6254	 0.1563
92
99
104
112
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TABLE IX.4
C1P0SITE INDEX OF EDUCATIONAL MODERNIZATION OF
MUSLIM COUNTRIES FROM THE BARK-ORDER OF 112 COIThTKIES
Pattern of	 Measure of
Country	 )loderni zati on	 Modernization	 Rank-Order
Afghanistan	 9.4434	 0.8859	 6
Sudan	 9.2288	 0.8658	 10
Morocco	 8.7421	 0.8201	 26
Indonesia	 8.6344	 0.8100	 30
Algeria	 8.5842	 9.8053
	 35
Pakistan	 8.5547	 0.8025	 36
Iran	 8.3950	 0.7875	 40
Libya	 8.0998	 0.7599	 48
Turkey	 7.9930	 0.7498	 53
Tunisia	 7.9891	 0.74995	 54
Malaysia	 7.9794	 0.7486	 56
Egypt (UAR)	 7.6355	 0.7163	 64
Syria	 7.2541	 0.6805
	
71
Iraq	 7.1690	 0.6725	 74
Jordan	 7.1469	 0.6705	 75
Some Highly Modernized Countries
Japan	 5.9825
	 0.5612	 90
U.K.	 5.6417
	
0.5293
	
97
USSR	 4.4700	 0.4193
	
109
U.S.A.	 1.1071
	
0.1039
	
112
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TABLE IX.5
CONPARATIVE ThEIDS AD RATE OF CHANGE
IN MODERNIZATION OF MUSLIM COUNTRIES
(Selections from the Rank Order of 73 Countries)
Composite Composite Percentage Ranking Ranking
Country	 Index	 Index	 Change	 1960	 1965
	
1960	 1965
Afghanistan	 1.9
	
4.0	 106.3
	
6	 6
Algeria
Indonesia	 11.2	 20.3	 81.5	 18	 19
Iran
	 29.9	 38.3	 28 • 1	 33	 34
Iraq
	 41.4	 73.6
	
77.9	 39	 48
Jordan
Libya	 15.8	 25.6
	 62.2	 20	 21
Malaysia	 20.7	 34.5	 66.9	 25	 30
Morocco
Sndan	 5.8	 7.5	 31.0	 13	 12
Tunisia	 19 . 4	 32.4
	 67 . 0	 21	 28
Pakistan	 20.5
	 35.1	 61.4	 24	 29
Turkey	 31.6	 37.5	 18.7	 35	 32
U.A.R.(Egypt)	 55.7	 66.6	 19.5	 50	 42
Some Comparative Figures from the
Developed Countries
U.S.A.	 202.4	 325.0	 60.6	 73	 73
U.K.	 139.4
	
136.2	 - 2.3	 70	 61
USSR	 96.4
	
199.2	 106.8	 61	 71
Japan	 125.0	 146.2	 16.9
	
68	 68
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9, 2 CONPARATIVE ARALYSIS
A scrutiny of the foregoing tables clearly shows that within a
matrix of fifteen selected Muslim countries, the three countries under
study are so placed that Egypt ranks higher than Turkey as well as
Pakistan, both on the Composite Index of overall modernization and
the index of educational modernization. Again, the gap between the
ranking of Egypt and Turkey on the index of Educational Modernization
is wider than that on the Composite Index of Modernization. Pakistan
obviously remains more backward than both Egypt and Turkey on both the
indexes, though its rate of change during the period from 1960-65, as
shown in Table 'D', has been 61.4 per cent as compared with 19.5 per
cent of Egypt and. 18.7 per cent of Turkey.
The higher ranking of Egypt on both the indexes is unquestionably
significant, considering the fact that chronologically it was the last
of the three countries to achieve its national independence; and that
it has suffered serious setbacks consequent to its continuing involvement
in the Arab-Israel conflict. Turkey's progress In modernization, on the
other hand., remained.,until 1965, rather slow, intermittent and
inconsistent with its declared ideals.
Taking the rank-order of some 112 countries of the world, whereas
Pakistan ranks 25, Turkey 44 and Egypt 47 on the Composite Index of
Modernization; on the Index of Educational Modernization, the lead taken
by Egypt has been greater, though the order of rnkfng has remained
unchanged. Here Egypt stood at 64, Turkey at 53 and Pakistan at 36.
A fuzther breakdown of the Educational Index indicates that Turkey
has achieved the highest rate of literacy, 38.l,while Egypt remains at
19 . 5 and Pakistan at 15.8. But Turkey's lead on this score is offset by
the difference of the time-scale of modernization, i.e. about 50 years
for Turkey, 12 years for Egypt and 15 years for Pakistan.
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The comparative figures for enrolment show that although in
Turkey 90.8 per cent of school age children were enrolled in primary
schools as compared with 52.4 in Pakistan and 74.3 in Egypt, at the
secondary and higher level enrolment Egypt has taken the lead • The
second level enrolment in Egypt was 28.7. per cent, in Turkey l8.l
per cent and In Pakistan 17.9 per cent. But the third level enrolment
figures stood 9.5 per cent for Egypt, 4.93 per cent for Turkey and
3 . 38 for PakIstaa.
On the supply and training of teachers, Egypt again has kept the
lead over both Turkey and Pakistan. The differential for second and
third level teachers is considerable viz. 9.0 per cent for Pakistan,
11.0 per cent for Turkey and 20.2. per cent for Egypt.
Taking yet another significant variable of educational modernization,
i.e. the percentage of females enrolled at the various levels, the
comparison is even more striking. Whereas in Pakistan the percentage
of females enrolled in the first level education was 29 per cent, in
Turkey it was 40 per cent and in Egypt it was 39 per cent. In second
level education, however, the trend was reversed. In Pakistan the
percentage stood at 32 per cent, while In Turkey it was 26 per cent
and in Egypt, 28 per cent. For the third level, the picture did not
change much, Egypt's percentage was equal to Turkey's;and both much
higher than Pakistan's. This clearly shows that the Egyptian woman is
more emancipated and educationally ahead of her counterpart in Turkey
and Pakistan.
The promotion of science and technology in the three countries
under study also shows Egypt in the lead while Turkey and Pakistan lag
behind. An additional significant point in favour of Egypt's
technological progress appears in the fact that in Egypt the lead in
enrolment in scientific and technological subjects has been coupled
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with a relative increase in enrolment in Agricultural Subjects.
Whereas both in Pakistan and Turkey enrolment in the higher level
Agricultural Courses was 3.2 per cent, in Egypt it was 10.7 per cent.
)loreover in 1965, Egypt spent 5.4 per cent of its G.N.P.
on education as compared with .1.1 per cent in Pakistan and 3.1 per
cent in Turkey.
These comparisons quite manifestly testify that Egypt, by
following a middle path and a socialist nationalism, has marched ahead
in a much shorter period of time than Pakistan and Turkey, where
higher ideological commitments and practices inconsistent with ideology
still Persist;an'd the resultant divisions, disparities and imbalances
have turned modernization into an uneven, city-centered, bureaucratic
and elitist force running counter to modern norms of equality and
integration. Whereas, in Egypt, the tensions between the traditional
and the modern, the secular and the religious, the peasant and the
factory worker and other division within the society have been relatively
balanced out, both in Pakistan and Turkey these polarities have
increased. Hence, education too has failed relatively to provide the
source of national and societal integration so necessary for an
effective modernization which demand norms of equality, capacity and
the criteria of achievement, universalism and affectivity-neutrality.
The contrary has been truer in Pakistan and in Turkey.
Future trends of modernization obviously flow from past perform-
ances as well as from recent political and economic crises or develop-
ments of the three countries. Whereas Turkey's participation in the
European Common Market, and in the 0.E.C.D. is bound to rectify its
previous lags in all aspects of modernization, the political situation
in both Pakistan and Egypt is more likely to remain,unchanged and
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detrimental to all aspects of modernization, until stability there
is assured; material as wel]. as ideological,quantitative as well as
qualitative.
As can be seen from the Graph Chart OtT par398,already the trends
of change between the years 1965-69 have considerably moved away from
the pre 1965 performance of the three countries. Turkey is rapidly
taking lead. in the development of scientific and. technological
education and in the provision of literacy, while female education
there has remained as slow as before. In Egypt, scientific and
technological education has made steady progress but enrolment in the
Arts and the Humanities has showed a. decline since 1965. Female
education in Pakistan and Egypt has been progressing rather more
dramatically than in Turkey. The supply of teachers in all the three
countries, however, has remained relatively low, although the rate of'
progress in this respect remains higher in Pakistan than in Egypt and
Turkey.
CHAPTER 10.
CONCLUSIONS
10.1. ISLAM, MODERNIZATION AND EDUCATION
Hardly less than a quarter of a century baa elapsed since the
Muslim World, taken as a whole, has emerged independent of the
colonial rule. Judging by every indicator of modernization, it is
already moving decisively on the highway to modernization. Any
sojourner through the Muslim capitals or researcher in the literature
of the Muslim countries could hardly deny the tremendous changes that
immediately strike him both in the ecological and demographic features,
and the domain of ideas, of the Muslim societies. Even the most
isolated lands of Islam that had, for centuries, remained aloof and
unaffected by the changes outside their immediate environment, e.g. the
very heartland of Islam, the Arabian peninsula, have emerged, uninhibited
by any let or hindrance, to devise and to carry out programmes of
modernization. Many a Muslim land, which only some two decades ago did
not comprise more than a few traditional townships with a vast hinter-
land of pastoral villages, can now boast of some of the most up-to-date
network of urban centres, communication systems and modern institutions,
such as the parliament, universities and. colleges, a fairly differentiated
system of first, second and third level educational institutions,
hospitals, airports, highways, telephone exchanges, radio and television
stations, foreign exchanges, banks and super-markets; flats and sky-
scrapers.
Modernization appears not only to be accepted, desired for, and
clamorously indulged in pursuit; but one wonders, if it does create
any apparent problem for an average Muslim man or woman of today to
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be modern. A contemporary sight of the rows of mosque-goers - men 1
 and
unveiling women shoppers In the streets, many of whom look too modern
by their appearance and dress, strikes the observer, who would recall
that hardly half a century ago, a Muslim man could not enter a mosque
with a Western styled garment to join in the prayer, and a Muslim lady
was not to be seen without purdah outside home, as a great attitudinal
change. A large section of the hundreds of thousandpilgrims who
flock to the Holy cities of Makka and Medina, fly in the most modern
jetliners of their national airlines. Most of these pilgrims are
educated not in the traditional Muslim Naictabs and Nadrassahs but in the
modern national schools, colleges and universities, and speak English,
French or Dutch after their national or mother tongues. Furthermore
modern normative outlooks are also considerably discernible from their
thoughts and. behaviour.
On the outside, therefore, one sees no tension or protest against
modernization from an average Muslim of today. Like all peoples used
to living for centuries with their traditions with little change, a
Muslim too has caveats and fears against change per se but he seems
to have no qualms of conscience against modernization Itself. On the
contrary, modernization has equipped him to play multiple effective
roles in all, aspects of his society over and above his primary positions.
Re is now a voter, a councillor, a technician, a salaried wage-earner
or a professional man, a consumer, and an industrialist - even a
politician. As a result of the communication revolution and spread of
modern education, his cognitive horizon has widened. Re is more informed
of the local, national and Internation events than his forefathers. His
empathetic capacity has, therefore, been enhanced,
1. For example J.B.PBIEST1 writing about the "English"asserts,
"Furthermore, while Englishness is not hostile to change, it is
suspicious of change for change's sake rejecting the Idea that we
are now committed to some inevitable mechanical progress"
The English, op.cit. p.242
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His children receive an education which is more systematic,
articulated, wider in scope and dimensions, and more rewarding, at
least, in this-worldly life. The chances of his children's socio-
economic mobility are far greater than his own. And so, he is
receptive, even appreciative of all what modernization has yielded to
him. His sensibility is, however, struck suddenly when the traditional
community leader, the Imam (preacher) of the mosque warns him that his
faith, his culture and his 'aqbat' (life in the hereafter) are in danger
as he is moving away from the Islamic path - the path trodden by the
asla.t (ancestors) for centuries. He is obviously bewildered and looks
askance. Little does he know as to how and where to stop the change;
and what to accept; what not. Himself not too well educated and
sophisticated enough to know for sure the advantages and disadvantages,
or the choices available to him in the face of modernization, if any,
he is unable to rationalise the dilemma. He is modernizing but without
convictions. The strongest hold upon his beliefs and psyche remains in
the hands of the traditionalist Islamic intellectuals - the ulama, the
'guardians of the Faith' who, as a class, stand opposed to modernization.
It is pertinent, therefore, to analyse how the ulama view modernization
of the Muslim societies and the Muslim education. In this respect, it
should be observed, the cases of Pakistan and Erpt are more relevant
while the situation in Turkey varies because of the liquidation of the
influence of the ulama by Mustafa Ataturk.
10.2. THE ULAMA AND MODERNIZATION
Pakistan
During the long years of the controversies over the creation of
Pakistan as an independent Islamic state, the ulama of the subcontinent,
on the whole, had remained opposed to the concept of Pakistan mainly
because they regarded nationalism as a weStern concept, anti-Islamic
and designed to weaken the World Muslim Community via-a-via the Muslims
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in the subcontinent. As a corollary of the same, the ulama were
sceptical of the desigus of the modernlst-westernised leadership of
the Muslim League, Muhammad iii Jinnah, and Liaquat All Ihan, and others,
who, they argued, knew little what Islam really stands for. After
Pakistan, however, became a reality, ulama became the most formidable
advocates of making it an Islamic state. 2 The most organised and
progressive among the Pakistani ulama is the Jamait-i-Islanui (Islamic
Community) Party convened, by Maulan Abu'al AaJ,a Maududi, who remains,
though he has explained Islam in a more rationalist manner than the
rest of the ulama class, and has made a greater approach to the more
educated Muslims, strictly adherent and arch-supportive of the
traditionalist interpretations of Islam.3
The Maulana is highly critical of the apologetic approach of the
Modernists, which he believes started as a result of the Western
domination over the Muslim Societies during the colonial rule, with men
like Sir Sayyid. AbmAd Ihan, Sayyid Amir All, Sayyid Jamal a]. Din A! ghaxl,
Shikh Muhammad Abduh and others. "Islam", he asserts, "needs no
apology."4 Maududi sees modernization together with the different
character traits and norms aBsociated with it, e.g. rationalism,
2. See Leonard BINDER, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, University
of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1960, p.22. also cf.
Kaliin Siddique, Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan, )Tacm.tllan,
London, 1972, op.cit. pp 109-110. Siddiqul remarks, "A regular
feature of Pakistani politics ever since independent has been the
running confrontation between the Mullah party lam7and the ruling
elite. The first round was won by the latter under Jinnah's
leadership. The Mullah (this is a nickname given to the ulaina by
the modernists) had followed Jinnah to Pakistan to challeng, the
Pakka Sahib's authority. Be had kept up constant pressure fer Pakistan
to be made into an Islamic State ..."
3. For Mau]ana Maududi 'a views on modernization and modernization of
the Muslim Education, see Appendix B. PPt422_28 being the
excerpts from this reader's lengthy interview with the Maui,ana
during his visit to Makka to attend the annual meeting of the World
Islamic League, in November 1968, where this reader was working under
the Ministry of Education.
4. See Appendix 'B'
5. Maryam JAMEEL&B, Islam and Modernism, op.cit. pp.116-17.
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positivism, nationalism, and scientism, essentially as a deeply-rooted
desire of man to dominate man by the ever-shifting ideological concepts.
Summing up his views, writes Jameelah,
"111 modernist ideologies are characterised by man
worship. Man worship most often appears under the
guise of science. Modernists are convinced that
progress in scientific knowledge will eventuall
confer upon them all the powers of Divinity" (5
Maududi declares that Islam stands in absolute opposition to all
these ideologies since in Islam man Is taught, as his priormost article or
confession, to submit only to God and to discard all other masters.
"To dominate is to play God, and to accept domination is to worship a
Golden Calf", insists Maududi. "Whenever, man finds himself in a
position from which he can dominate, tyranny, excess, intemperance,
unlawful exploitation and inequality reign supreme." 6
Modernism, therefore, appears to Maududi as an ideology of
domination by the scientifically and technologically advanced nations
of the world of the rest of mankind; and so he stands vehemently opposed
to it. In his view, God's revelation is essential as the highest normatiye,
universalistic link between mankind. On the question of the need to
transform the traditional Islamic interpretations, the }laulana insists
that Islam is a perfect religion and a way of life which must be re-lived
rather than re-stated. 7 Fanciful reinterpretation of the Revelation, he
warns, is misleading. According to Naududi Muslims are weak and
backward because they have strayed from Islam. Be, therefore, staunchly
and sincerely preaches for the true understanding and application of
Islamic concepts in individual and social life today not only for the
Muslims but also for the Westerners.
5. Maryam JA14Tk1r, Islam and Modernism, op. cit. pj.1l6-l7
6. Freeland £BBOT, Islam and Pakistan, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, N.Y. 1968 , pp.175-76
7. Appendix B.
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"If the West had ever to face true Islam,
the Westerners rather than the Muslims
would have been conquered to it." (8)
The Maulana 18 equally strongly critical of the traditionalist
Muslim theologicians for their aloofness, inward looking and blind
attachment to the past in every detail. He chastises theni for their
failure to study the Western society first hand to propagate Islam
using the modern publicity techniques. He only wishes, and sees no
harm for the Muslims, to borrow western technology and machines but
not the western cultural influences, and he is sanguine that such a
selective borrowing is possible.9
But he severely repriniands those Moderm.st Muslim scholars who
he believes wish to see Islam ref orined,as misguided and bewitched by
the 'materialist'civilization of the West, whose system of life he
remarks, Is "entirely devoid of piety, truthfulness, virtue, chastity
and modesty."1° The only reform that Naududi deems necessary in the
body politic of the Islamic world is the replacement of the vesternised
elites by the truly Islaznicised ones through a political change. Muslim
education, in his view can only be successfully organised, re-oriented
and made effective when all the societal features, in particular the
Muslim polity, are also Islamicised. All the efforts to modernize Muslim
education until that time are futile and self-defeatin and
misleading.
EGYPT
Many of Maulana Maududi's ideas and. reasonings resemble that of,
if not actually inspired by, the founder of the famous Ikhwan a].
Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), Shaiich Hasan a]. Banna of Egrpt. Shaikh
a]. Banna was tooth and. nail opposed to modernization, secularism and
material progress. His 'Muslim Brotherhood' party emerged
8. ABBOTT. op.cit. p.180
9. Appendix 'B'
10. ABBOTT. p.180
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highly activist in their effort to reverse all the non-Islamic social,
economic, political and ethical practices that had crept into the body
social of Islam, particularly in Egypt, consequent to the
superimposition of modernization.
Shaikh al Baxma was convinced that modernism was ini'ical to
what Islam stands for. He preached for world Muslim unity to
"strengthen the Islamic world and to re-establish the principles and.
practices of Islam in their purest form; that is, to strengthen Islam
11
against encroachments of materialism."
Shaikh al Banna too saw Islam as a complete guidance, in no need
of any borrowing from outside) 2 He rejected all foreign inspired
ethno-centric concepts of modernism as devious attempts to confuse the
Muslim intellectuals. In h.i view, the only reform needed in the body
social of Islam was the eradication of 'extravagant and traditional social
ceremonies such as the spend-all marriages, as well as social evils
like bribery, nepotism and favouritism etc.' Other than that, he
13insisted, Muslims needed only to put Islam into practice.
As a political party, the Ikhwan too put top priority on the
restoration of an Islamic polity, that is, the establishment of the
Khilifah.'4 But they also believed that before the Khilifah was
established, there must be thorough preparation in the Islamicization of
the educational, social, economic and other aspects of the Muslim life.
Complete Islam.ization of the individuals and organizations such as
the Civil Service, the army, the universities, schools and colleges, etc.
was a pre-requisite to the rehabilitation of the Islamic society and
the Islamic way of life.'5
11. See Christina Phelps 111?RTS, Nationalism and Revolution in Erpt:
The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hoover Institution
Publications, Mouton and Co, The Ha
€ue/London/Paris , 1964.
pp.160-61.
12. ibid. p.162
13. ibid. pp.172-32
14. ibid. p.166
15. ibid. p.167
-410-
The Ikhwan were opposed in principle to the secular education as
obtaining in the contemporary institutions of the country; they aimed
in the event at Islamicising all Muslim education, religious as well as
secular. But during this preparatory period they also advocated a
fuller participation into the present system of education, and the
learning of at least one foreign European language as highly vital by
all 'Brothers' and 'Sisters.' 16
These uncompromisingly particularistic ideological strands of the
ul&na both in Pakistan and Egypt, obviously allow for no contemporary
normative influences to affect the Islamic psyche. Whereas, the
colonial rule has withdrawn from all Muslim lands leaving behind traces
of influences and forces that were, to be sure, uncongenial to the
Islamic culture and, as pointed out by Professor Adam Curie, impeded the
17
development of the colonised people in general. But, now that that phase
has passed, it would certainly be more harmful to the development of
the Muslim countries, if the ulama should fail to grasp the positive and
elevating forces of modernization. The ulama apparently, have not
forgiven the bygone event of the colonization of the Muslim societies, and
remain, in their attitudes, close to the eighteenth century defensive
response. What they fail to acknowledge is the fact that the greatest
share of the blame for the Muslims' backwardness that led to their
domination by foreigners fell upon their own shoulders. As intellectuals
of Islam, they have been stressing in the past, and to a great extent do
even now, the other-worldly interests of the Muslims as against their
this-worldly affairs, though they still insist that Islam cares for all
aspects of life. A rather caustic criticism of the attitudes of the
Ulama as a class towards the soeio-econoznic and political uplift of their
16. ibid. pp. L7-170.
17. See Adam CURIE, Educational Strategy for Developing Societiesf
A Study of Education and Social Factors in Relation to Economic
Growth, Tavistock Publications, London, 1963. pp.44-47.
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of their co-religionists in the present times has been presented by
Kalim Siddique, as below:
"The self-appointed custodians of Islam in India had
become so alienated from the Islam of the Prophet that
they began to equate freedom to worshi with freedeom of
pplitical action...Islam, they argue( was a universal
religion which could not be contained or defined in terms
of a territorial nationalisam... The Mullah conveniently
forgot that even in its early days Islam made little
headway until the Prophet had acquired a territorial
foothold in ?Ledina"
Siddique goes on,
"In the Islam of the Hullah, political power and Muslim
domination in a territorial state were not relevant to
the Muslims' overriding concern in life - to achieve
personal piety and salvation in the Hereafter. He held
up the corrupt rich as example of what would happen if
'the world' was pursued. 'The poorer are closer to God'
became a standard Mul].ah doctrine. Because he was in no
position to help his flock out of the abyss of poverty, (18)
he converted poverty into a permanent and abiding virtue.."
Ulama's rigidly unbending approach to the idea of change per se,
and trepidation of any outside influence into the body social of Islam
has led to the inculcation, whether deliberately or otherwise, of a
rather xenophobio mentality among the Muslims. Xenophobia obviously
cannot make a community that has become backward and desolate into a
viable, upright and forward-looking people. Again, xenophobia has no
place in Islam of the uran and the Prophet who exhorted the Muslim
even to travel to China in search of knowledge, as indeed a great Muslim
scholar like Ibn Batuta in fact did in the thirteenth century. What,
one might question the Ulama, did the Prophet want the Muslim to learn
from China: definitely not Islam, if anything, some foreign socio-economic
and. political concept or practice. But the Prophet exhorted the Muslims
for it, still the same.
It was these traditionalist tendenices and trapping of the
traditionalist school of the iJlama in Turzey which perhaps led )lustafa
Kemal Atatuzk to strike a severe blow at all the vestiges of
18. K.SIDDIUE, op. cit. p.69
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traditionalism, sweeping in the process even the great integrative
past traditions. In Egypt, in spite of the increasing adherence of the
mss and the educated Nuslinis to the ideals of the Okhwan, their various
contradictory standpoints, their vague conceptualizations of the present
day conditions failed to make them suitable for 'delivering the goods'.
In the event, their resort to violence and. terrorist methods brought
them in direct conflict with the Revolutionary Command Council in 1954,
when about five hundred of their members and. all the leadership were
arrested, the leading 'Brothers' and the 'Guide' were executed, and.
19
Ikhwan as a party, was outlawed.
In Pakistan too, in spite of the sophisticated methods of
canvassing and publication of its programmes, the Jamaiti-Islami has
failed in all elections held so far to gain any worthwhile strength in
the national policy-making organisation - the parliament. Even allowing
for the malpractices that the more powerful political parties of the
developing countries, particularly the one a1rIdy in power can manage
with impunity to resort to, a clear verdict of the Pakistani people as
a whole, as gleaned from the election results, has been against the
traditionalist versions of life and idealogies presented by the tJlama.
10 . 3 . CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions drawn from these events and facts are clear. Muslim
societies all over the world are all out for modernization -
modernization of their socio, economic and political conditions.
Realistic Muslim scholars regard re-interpreatation of the Shariah as
fundamental. The clearest proof of this can be found in the following
dissertation of Ahmad Zaki Yaman.t, a Cabinet Minister in Saudi Arabia
which is unquestionably the most orthodox Muslim society. Yainani
asserts:
19. HARRIS, op.cit. pp.212-237
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"I think one ought to look at the Shariah
metaphorically as an organic creature, growing,
developing and evolving; attached with a strong
link of interdependence to its society, adapting
to its needs, and changing with different
circumstances. The Shariah must be viewed as an
adequate system meeting the needs of society at
any particular interval in history. However, its
intrinsic value is not in this momentary adequacy,
but in its capability to satisfy the requirements
of an ever-changing society" (20)
uestion arises: is Islam, as a normative and. institutional
system, amenable to absorbing in itself the essential norms of
modernity and to emerge successfully as a living guidance for its
adherents or is it, like religion in general, endangered as
modernization progresses in Muslim societies?
Answer to this rather unponderable question as provided by the
functionalists like Parsons, Halpern and others who base their judge-
ment mainly on the decline of Christianity in the West as a result of
modernization, indicates a clear verdict on the inability of any
religious vision - Islam included - to withstand the encroachments
unleashed by modern science and technolo r as well as the persuasive
norms of modernity. Yet, Muslims themselves and those non-Muslim
scholars who search deeper into the dynamic of the religious vision
vis a via the Islamic vision and reject modernization and its norms
as the ultimate ends, do not envisage an eclipse of the Islamic appeal
of universalism, simplicity and egalitarianism in the teeth of
modernization. Professor Montgomery Watt, for example, sees Islam as
a religious vision which provides a dynamic model of a living
2l"I]. "h
'charismatic community' which men today are looking for"
asserts "is certainly a strong contender for the supplying of the basic
20. Ahmad Zaki YAMANI "Islamic Law and Contemporary Issues" in
Charles Malik (Ed5 God and Man in Contemporary Islamic Thought:
Proceedings of the Philosophy Symposium, held at the American
Uru.versity of Beirut, February 6-10,1967. AUB Press,1972. pp.48-92
21. W. Montgomery WATT, What is Islam, op.cit. p.234
...414-.
framework of the one religion of the future" 2
 In his view, 121am is
to play a vital role as a 'mighty force' in the world affairs in the
years to come. But he insists that to be so, its rational reappraisal
would devolve on those Muslims "who believe that their faith can be
stated in modern terms to work for the realization of such a programme."23
A similar optimistic view is held by Professor I8I1 -al Faruqi,
who has critically examined the position of Islam with regard to
modern scientific and rational norms. Al-Faruqi concludes:
"While the secularist may rest assured that science
will triumph in Islamic society, it is equally
certain that he will never see the fulfilment of his
wish for the dipation of Islam. The capacity to
adapt to new challenges, and to absorb and digest
them, is innate to Islam. Furthermore, Islamic
modernism has identified itself, not without reason,
with the progressive forces that count on science and
research to secure a brighter future. In fact, in
modern Islamic terminology, progress, science, well-
being, power, liberty and dignity have become equiv-
alent to and interchangeable with piety, the Will of Cod,
and the will to a space-time in which "God's word is
the higher" (uran 9:41). It is unlikely, therefore,
that the future in Muslim society will be anything
but Islamic." (24)
The case of Turkey itself where Islamic systems and traditions
were severely undermined in the wake of a supposed assault on
traditionalism of the Ottoman society has clearly demonstrated. the
fact that after fifty years of forced westernization, the Turks have,
save a very negligible minority, adroitly and over-whelmingly remained
faithful to Islam. Observers and scholars like Reed, Kazanaas, Eren
and others bear witness to this fact. In fact, as one observer has
remarked, even the athi.est-secularist Turks are more religious in their
25
outlooks than a believing religious man in the west. 	 npirical
22. W. )Iontgoinery WA?J, Islamic Revelation in the Modern World,
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1969, p.128
23. ibid. What is Islam, pp.225-26
24. Ismail R.AL-'fARUQI, "Science and Traditional Values in Islamic Society"
ixiW.MOREHOUSE (Ed). Human Condition in India and Pakistan. op. cit. p.24.
25. or a detailed first-hand study on thie ruriusn lviusil.ms zeal Tor
Islam, both in belief and observance, see Howard A Reed,
"The Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslims" in Richard N. Frye,
Islam and the West, op.cit. pp.108148. Drawing conclusion for the
(contd.)
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TABLE X.I
PILGBIMAGE TO NAA
NUMBER OF PILGRIMS BY COIJNThIES
1967-72
NUNBER OF PILGRIMS
Population
Country (Millions) 1967
	 1968	 1969	 1970	 1971	 1972
Turkey	 36	 49,998 51,055 56,576 13,269 23,922 27,235
Pakistan	 117
	
25,052 27,402 28,535 38,256 23,344 95,968+
EGYPT	 34	 7,143 12,413 10,875 11,490 29,171 39,606
Iraq	 9	 19,475 24,875 24,902 19,482 17,628 24,681
Jordan	 2	 4,449	 5,179	 6,376 10,909 15,933 25,819
Syria	 6	 14,521 12,814 22,383 42,329 27,045 31,777
Libya	 2	 10,444 16,656 13,547 11,835 16,861 23,774
Ilorocco	 16	 8,208	 9,449 10,943 10,640 15,463 22,425
Sudan	 15	 18,035 21,649 20,495 14,865 29,004 29,506
Iran	 30	 22,903 13,642 15,132 48,367 30,299 45,298
Indonesia	 1.23	 17,569 17,062 10,615 14,633 22,753 22,659
Malaysia	 11	 6,236	 6,591	 8,353 10,361 10,650 10,395
Afghanistan 17	 5,841	 8,744	 9,125 13, 663 10,744 17,447
Source. EUROPA YEARBOOK: WORLD SURVEY, VOL.11, 1973, p.1312
+ including 6,595 pilgrim8 from Bangladesh
evidence supportive of this claim can also be gleaned from the increasing
number of pilgrims who travel to Makka from Turkey every year. It is
significant to note that since the 1940's when pilgrimage was re-allowed
to the Turkish Nuslima by their government, the number of Turkish
pilgrims has been constantly rising until in the later half of the
when
1960's/Turks continuously formed the highest national group at the
pilgrimage. Table X.1 shows the number of pilgrims from different
Muslim countries between the years 1967-72.
This study shares Professor Watt's and Al-Faruqi's optimism for a
future role of Islam as a religious vision in the evolution of an
international religious belief crystallization. But it also stressed
that to play such a vital role the more rationalist, collectivity-
orientated and. universa].istic concepts in Islam will have to be made
explicit and put into practice.
This huge task, particularly the change in norms and value-systems,
insists Dr. Tibawi, cannot be achieved except by the co-operation of
the Ulama, who, arg.ies Tibawi,
"in all ages possess that collective instinct
which indicates to them how far to go, what
compromises to accept and where to stand firm in
upholding the system..." (26)
This study supplements Tibawi's argument with the assertion that
the Ulama themselves cannot successfully perform this task unless they
come out of the cocoon of traditionalism. Hitherto they have been taking
refuge in the lofty effort made by the aslaf in the interpretation of
25. Contd.
future, Reed remarks, "It is my opinion that there is now a definite
resurgence of Islamic sentiments and insight in Turkey. Earlier
carelessness and past ignorance of religious precepts and Allah's
guidance as provided in the uran are being generally recognised...
Searching educated men and women who cherish Islam, are certainly
apprehending it in many newer, more personal ways. They are recover-
ing and re-appraising their Islamic heritage...Out of the current
efforts to re-appraise this issue the Turks may evolve a clearer and.
more viable understanding of the relation between human rights,
secularism and Islam." pp.144-148
26. A.L.TIBAWI, English Speaking Orientalists: A critique of their Approach
to Islam and Arab Nationalism. Islamic Cultural Centre, Luzac,
London, 1964, p.22.
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Islam, and have themselves failed to put up a parallel effort. It is
vital that they must 'go round the world' and have a clearer view of
modern conditions of life so that they could then look back into the
uran and Sunna.b to search for the dynamics that must be re-introduced
among Muslims of today. At the same time it may be asserted that it
is vital for the modernist ruling classes of the Muslim countries to
secure the involvement of the ulaina into the process of modernization of
their societies. Hitherto they have only striven to keep them at bay
with the resultant lopsided modernization. Having traditionally assumed
the role of the 'guardians of the Faith' and watchdogs of the interests
of the Ummah, the ulama have a genuine and vital stake in the modern-
ization process. Although they fail to put it in clear terms because
of their political involvement, their primary concern seems to be that
the equilibrium so essential for stability and a harmonious growth of the
Ummah should not be sacrificed for any set of new values. However, they
must realise that the traditional equilibrium (which the aslaf ancestors
had. achieved in the past) to which the ulama still remain faithfully
attached, could be regarded only as an ad hoc compromise solution; it
was not binding for eternity and it did not result in a rational growth
of the community. As time went on it only helped to establish
traditionalism firmly in the body politic of Islam. Any new equilibrium
between the changeless and the changing, or between the ideal and actual
verities of the Islamic vision that should crystallise in the modern times
must essentially be based on rational grounds.
Again as an all-permeating group that successfully achieved
integration of the total Muslim community, the ulama also have a greater
advantage over the modernist classes in their perennial readiness and
ability to identify themselves and make direct personal affiliation with
the mass of their poor co-religionists - an advantage which is by no
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accidental but forms a part of the social norms and the egalitarian
spirit of Islam.
The modernists on the contrary still remain seated in the ivory
tower of power and. prestige. They approach the masses and their
traditional leaders, the ulaina, in an authoritarian manner so
reminiscent of the 'pakka sahib' attitude of the colonial rule. Hence
the impact of their modernization on the perceptions and. loyalties of
the Muslim populace, who by habitud.e still look up to the elite and
the rulix2g classes as their guides, remains largely superficial. It is
true that a Muslim when required to do so, largely supports and votes for
modernization and the leadersh.i.p that promises more of it, but he still
suspects the modernist class as a self-seeking and self-imposed group
whose loyalties are neither to the norms of Islam nor to the interests
of the masses. The modernists have yet to learn to associate themselves,
howsoever they manage to do so, with the larger Muslim maa in order
to diffuse their message of modernization among them in such a way that
they assimilate it and make it a part of their thinking. They have also
to understand the dynamic of fostering change while still keeping the
essential equilibrium intact. Unless they do these, their strate of
modernization will remain suspect. Hitherto they seem mainly engaged in
depicting the orthodox ulama as an obstructionist class whose only
interest is supposed to be to seek authority in the Muslim societies
through religious backdoor. 27
 They fail to appreciate the basic concern
of the ulania, i.e. the evolution of an equilibrium within the Muslim
societies on the basis of the normative essentials of Islam.
Both groups, the modernists and. the traditionalists, remain in
their contending positions and fail to evolve a common, integrative via
media basically because of the widespread ignorance among their people
as a whole. Once education is extended to the larger section of the
27. See Aziz ABMAD, "The Activism of Ulama in Pakistan", in Nik.ki H.
Keddie, Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Substitutions
in the Middle East, op.cit. pp.257-72.
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Muslims, the polaric postures adopted by the modernist and the
traditional elites of their societies will lose appeal. Until then the
traditional ulama will keep their hold on the loyalties of the masses
as 'guardians of the Faith' and remain posing modernization or change
as anti-Islamic.
To sum upthen,the response of Islam to modernity so far has been
in two phases, viz. the phase of apprehensive-defensive modernization,
and the phase of experimental-disintegrative modernization; the first
rnanifestinbe ore and the second after the achievement of national
independence of the Muslim countries. The result of these two phases
has been that the Muslims on the whole have achieved only a superficial,
imitative capacity in ideas, appearances and articrafts. Out of these
phases must come an assimilative-integrative phase when modernization
becomes a living and dynamic force; assimilated; not imitated.
Viewing this as the final phase of modernization, Black reiterates
its characteristics as below:
"A Society that teaches this stage of integration
can make much more efficient use of its human
resources - if one may refer to human being in
such an impersonal manner. It has consumer
production for a mass market, high per capita
national income, a high level of general and
specialised education, widely available social-
security and adequate organization for leisure." (28)
It is here in the bringing about of an integrated, viable, empathetic
and participant Muslim society that modern Muslim education has a decisive
role to play. At present, the over-whelming majority of the Muslims, all
over the world vie a vie in the three countries in this study is ignorant.
Their true perception of the essential values and. qualities of life today
is extremely limited. Their cognitive map is almost blurred. Their
effective participation in the economic, political and social aspects of
society is not proper without a proper cognition of its verities.
28. C.E. BLCX, op.cit. p.81
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Even if they do make some economic progress, whether in agriculture
or industry, their value-system is still entrenched in traditionalism.
It is a truism that whatever degree of empathetic capacity, normative
change there is among the Muslims in every Muslim society, is to be found
among the educated Muslims. The more therefore, the spread of
education and the more the expansion or the educational capacity of the
Muslim peoples, whether it be in the socialisation, in schooling and
in the higher cultural function of education the more chances of their
subscribing to the 'rationalist-positivist' norms; the more their chances
to evolve 'self-regulating' economies, and the more their chances of
participation in and demand for the benefits yielded by modernization.
Education, therefore, is certainly the key to the modernization of Muslim
societies. This study would conclude by quoting two exhortive
traditions of the Prophet of Islam who draws no barriers in the search
for knowledge for the Muslims: and has undoubtedly assigued key position
to education for the growth and strength of the Muslims:-
The Prophet has said:
1. Valueless is the Muslim who is not a teacher or student.
2. Seeking knowledge is as blessed as worship and any
trouble in acq.uiring it is considered a jihad. (28)
28. See Abmad SHALkBY, History of Muslim Education, Dar al Kashshaf,
Beirut, 1954, p.62.
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APPE1wIX B
EXCERPT of an interview given by Maulana Sayyid. Abu'l A'la
Maudoodi, .Ainir Jamait-i-Islaini of Pakistan, 	 to this reader on
4th November, 1968 at Makka a]. Nukarmah on Modernization and. Muslim
Education. *
MODERNIZATION
Reader. Maulana, as you know many Muslim scholars of our time seem to
feel convinced that traditional social systems and. institutions
of Islam which were crystallised in the medieval conditions,
can and should be transformed. To such scholars Islam is a
dynamic system in which sufficient scope and elasticity has
been embedded to assimilate and sustain changes in time and space,
and yet still able to keep its axiological bases intact. What
is your view on this question?
Maulana. My dear, Islam has furnished key answers to all the problems of
human and social life in such a way that they are perfectly
practicable today and ever in future. They do not need any
fundamental change. The problem today is that either one should.
accept Islam and then act upon its tenets and. requirements, or
one should expressly denounce It. The trouble is that most of
these Muslims who want to see Islam reformed or modernized follow
a hypocritical path. On the one hand they claim to be true
Muslims, and on the other, they want to follow their own whims
about Islam. This ambivalence is highly dangerous. What is
needed is the implementation of Islam in our societies, not the
modernization of it.
* The Aaulana is the founder of the Jamait-i-Islami (The Community of
Islam), an Opposition Party in Pakistan whose programme calls for
the establishment of an Islamic State based on the Shariah and the
Islamic Law. Born in 1903 in the town of .Lurangabad, Central India,
the Maulaiia was educated in the traditional Muslim values at home by
his father. From the very early age of sixteen, he entered into
journalism arid showed command in his persuasive writin( on Islamic
topics. He later moved to Pathankot (Punjab) and published his
writings. When Pathankot went to India in the partition, he moved to
Pakistan and organised his party. Arrested by various central and
provincial governments of Pakistan, he was sentenced to death by the
Martial Law regime of Ayyub Than - a sentence not carried out because
of strong pressure from within Pakistan and from other Muslim countries.
As distinct from the other Ulama of Pakistan, Maulana !4audoodi
appeals to the educated Muslims.
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Reader. But, Naulana, changes do take place and have been taking place
within Islam all the time. If you allow me I can quote one
aspect,viz. the political policies and. programme of your own
Party, where even you have justified some innovations. For
example, the very parliamentary party system, under which your
Party functions and has contested elections, is an alien
concept. Then your support of Miss Fatimah Jinnah during the
recent elections itself is a deviation from the orthodox
position on the political role of women in Islam. How can these
innovations be legitimised?
Mau3ana. Here you must distinguish between the means and the ends. At
the present juncture, when the political system imposed upon us
in Pakistan and other Muslim countries is a foreign imposition,
the only method by which we can change it and rehabilitate
Islamic systems is by participating in it as a means. We do not
accept it as an end. But we have no alternative except to work
within the legal framework of the prevalent system for its
eventual transformation. When a truly Islamic polity comes into
effect, a party system would have no place in it. Other forms
of democratic participation as vouchsafed in Islam would be put
into practice.
Similarly our support of Miss Jinnah was an expedient move, that
is, the lesser of the two evils. The immediate aim was to
join those who wanted to oust the despotic, debauched and corrupt
regime of Ayyub Khan. Miss Jinnah herself had agreed to step
in simply to help Pakistan get rid of an illicit regime. Once
Ayyub Than had been defeated, and democracy restored, she had
no ambition to keep power in her own hands. It was agreed that
she would make way for those who really wanted to introduce
Islamic systems in Pakistan.
Reader. Speaking historically, which period of Islamic history leaving
the Kh.tlifah-i-Rashidun out, would you regard has been based
on a truly Islamic system of state and society, the Abbasid
Caliphate, or the }lughal Empire, f or example
Maulana. Even the Mughal Empire was more acceptable as an Islamic polity,
because it did mot disregard Shariah and it protected the Ummah
under a Muslim Sultan.
Reader. Is not the demand for an Islamic polity in Pakistan then a
latent attempt by the Illama at gaining the strategic control
of high advisory or legislative offices in their own hands at
the exclusion of those educated in modern institutions?
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Maulana. No, tJlama do not want to gain control of any office. At
the present moment, there are many Muslim leaders who have
been educated in the modern institutions and. yet can be the
legislators in an Islamic polity.
Reader. Could you name any of the contemporary or past Pakistani leaders
who would be fit to hold the highest office in an Islamic
Pakistan?
Maulana. Yes, Thawja Nazim-ud-din, the Second Governor General and
Prime Minister of Pakistan, was one; Chaudry Muhammad All is
another.
Reader. To revert to the q.uestion of the need for and form of changes
in the traditional interpretations of Islam, some scholars seem
to suggest that certain traditional practices can so be reformed
that their symbolical and not literal meaning Is given
prominence. For example, Chaudhry Muhammad Zafrullah Than, in
a recent address at the University of London, School of
Oriental and African Studies, while replying to a question on
the principle of reform in the (hudud) punishments of Islam
for certain offences, such as the amputation of the hands in the
case of theft, argued that 'cutting off the hands' could
symbolically be interpreted to mean gaoling the offender instead
of an actual operation on his hands. Can such an interpretation
of the established Islamic practices be allowed in your view?
Maulana. One should ask Chaudhri Zafr ti llah Than why he does not
suggest any novel formula for the cutting of an apple But the
crucial point is that, if the Prophet himself interpreted the
(uranic injunction in the actual physical and not the so-called
symbolical sense, then no room whatsoever, is left for any other
reinterpretation. We have to put the law into practice first
arid see its deterrant effect and benefits. I am sure that if
Islamic punishments are restored, the crime of theft would be
reduced to the bare minimum and. the cases of amputations would
also remain very few indeed. Even today Saudi Arabia is the
most secure country in the world as far as thefts are
concerned, and yet how many hands are cut every year Contrast
this with the manifold loss of life in armed robberies in some
of the most modern countries of the world.
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Gb)	 The thesis that the spirit and not the actual words of the
Quran should form the basis of conformity with the Qurazi, is
also highly misleading. What I want to know is what sort of
Islam would these people envisage where he revealed words of
the Quran, which has been regarded as the only miracle given to
the Prophet, would not be followed. And, then wio on earth
would decide what did and what did not constitute the true
spirit of the c'.uran other than the words of the Quran
themselves?
MUSLIN DUCATION
	
Reader.	 Naulana, how can we educate the young in Pakistan so that they
are deeply socialised in Islam as well as equipped with the
modern scientific education so necessary for life today?
Maulana. We can only do this by changing the present un-Islamic system
of education, and by removing from office all those
administrators who themselves lack insight into the ideals of
Muslim education.
Reader.	 This would mean that the system must first be changed and
administrators removed. But that Is a political action which
would take long time to carry out and is likely to give rise to
strife and. instability. Isn't it possible that the Ulazua or
the religious organizations should endeavour to establish model
Islamic institutions in which they impart true Islamic and
useful education for life today and then to bring about a change
from the bottom?
Maulana. This would be a very difficult process In the conditions of
today. It would involve huge fiscal and. other material require-
ments which only governments could effectively meet. Then,
the output of such proposed institutions would fail to find a
proper placement in the society since its orientations are at
variance with an Islamic society, as for example happens in the
case of the Azharite graduates. Only an Islamic society would
place the proper input-output demands on the truly Islamic
educational institutions.
We did inaugurate in Lahore an institution on the lines
suggested in your question. But we would only find some 15
students whose parents were ready to have them admitted. Then,
not only did they want scholarships but also financial assance
for their parents. Obviously we have no taxes or grants from
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where such demands could be met. But the Jamait has neverthe-
less opened a few schools and colleges in which sound Muslim
education is being given.
Reader. Don't you think that the institutions like the Central Institute
of Islamic Research which was set up by President Ayyub and
vouchsafed in the Constitution, in order to conduct research
on the reform of Islamic thought and institutions as well as to
raise good modern scholars, could fulfil this objective?
Naulana. This Institute is the most 'Satanic organizations created in
Pakistan at the instigation of foreign scholars to disfigure
the understanding of Islam. Its Director, Faziur Rebman wants
to see Islam completely changed. He has even legitimised the
forbidden alcholic drinks like beer. What does he know of
Islam, and how can one trust such people?
Reader. I have gone through your books dealing with Muslim education
in which you advocate that Western cultural importations have
had a corrupting influence on the Muslims, and that such
foreign cultural systems, including sports like cricket, must
be banned from our educational system. I wonder how far is
this possible or even desirable when modern gadgets and
scientific technology-, mostly invented in the West, such as
radios, television, cars, aeroplanes, machines etc. have become
so widespread and taken for granted in our society and culture?
Maulana. Yes, I do insist that all such sports and practices which form
an integral part of a superimposed foreign culture upon us
must be banned. Cars, radios and technology we can use as we
desire and choose to use without undermining our culture, but
playing cricket definitely orientates us to a foreign culture.
Reader. Then, what sort of games, sports or pastimes would you regard
as suitable for Muslims today; or, do you propose that Muslim
education today should still remain academic and theoretical
on the traditional pattern?
Maulana. Not at all. Our youth can play games like Rabbadi, polo,
wrestling and many others that used to be played in the Muslim
countries in the past.
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Reader. An important question that follows from the above: is it really
possible for us to be selective in borrowing and if so, how?
Naulana. Yes, as in the past, we can take only those concepts, ideas and
systems that are culturally either neutral or contributory to
Islamic concepts. Ideas and concepts that run counter to
Islamic concepts are not acceptable to us.
Reader. Finally, Maulana, I believe every ideology, movement, even
religion emerges to bring about change and make life easier
and progressive. In its initial impact, it is dynamic and
problem-solving and not surrounded by a sacred halo. In the
event, however, it becomes rigid, particularistic and
affectivity oriented. Isn't this true of the traditional view
of Islam as well? Isn't there a need to rehabilitate the
Islamic way of life in such a way that it becomes dynamic once
again?
Maulana. The only way to rehabilitate Islam is to practise it entirely,
to study it thoroughly and to defend it staunchly. The only
people who can infuse a new spirit in any vision are those who
investigate it deeply, and who live it. Regeneration cannot
come from exercises in apologetics or by the introduction of
alien notions and concepts.
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GLOSSARY
Ahl-a].-Kitab	 Lits 'People of the Book'; designation given
in Islam to the Christian and Jewiah peoples
because of their faith, in common with the Muslims,
in the Divine Revelation, the Kitab.
Aeabiyya.	 Lits 'tribal consanguinity'. The term was used
by Ibn Khaldun in the interpretation of history
to denote the fundamental urge in human society
which impels groups of human beings to assemble
themsleves, define and struggle for common social
and political goals.
Ayans.
Bida'a /Bida.
Caliph/Caliphate.
Dar-al-Harb.
Dar-al-Is lam.
Dar-al-Ulum.
Fatima / Fatimah.
Fatwa /Purkish.Fetva.
Fikh / Fish.
Ghazi.
The landed aristocrats of the Ottoman Empire.
Opposite of sunnah or the known traditions. The
term is applied to any dogmatic innovation that
contradicts the orthodox doctrines of Islam.
See Khalifa/Khilafah.
The World of War or the country against which the
Muslims are at war.
The World of Islam; Islamdom.
The House of Learning; Academy.
Daughter of Prophet Muhammad; wife of All, the
fourth Caliph, and mother of Hasan and Hussain.
A formal legal opinion given by a Mu!ti on a
point of the Islamic Law.
Lit 'intelligence, knowledge'. The term denotes
the science of jurisprudence in Islam.
The honorary Muslim title for one who diitinguishes
himself in war against Islam e.g. Ghazi Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, Ghazi Salah-ud-din Ayyubi.
Eadith.	 Tradition. The term is used to cover all the
sayings, actions and teachings of Prophet
Muhammad on matters of religious doctrine or
conduct and forms the second source of Islamic
law after the Quran.
Hadd (pl.fluddud).	 Boundry or limit. The term implies the limits
imposed by the Divine Law or the sanctions
based upon it either as commands or prohibitions.
Haj, /Hajj or /Hadj. 	 The annual pilgrimage to Mkkp, a tuty for
every Muslim with proper fiscal means and in
good health once in life. Hence Haji/Albaj
the pilgrim.
Hi ira/Hegira.	 Migration. The migration of Prophet Mtih*mnid
from Makka to Yathrib or Medina. The Islamic era
starts from the Hijra of the Prophet.
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Ijuia /Idjina.	 Lit: Coneeneuc. Ijma forms the third source of
the Islamlo law. The consensus of the Muslim
Utnmah directly or through the consensus of the
learned in Islam on a point of law also determines
law after the two primary sources of the Q,uran
and the Hadith.
Ijtihad./Idjtihad.	 Lit, the exerting of one's eel! to the utmost
degree. In Islamic Theology and Law, the term
is used to demote the utmost endeavour of human
reason and understanding to ascertain the best
interpretation and application of the Islamic
doctrine to a particular situation arising at the
time. Ijtihad is now being accepted as the
positivistic strand of law-making in Islam though
the orthodox scholars have always restricted it
to the ijtihad of the 10th century jurists. They
still hold it binding today.
urn. (pl.Ulum).
Ikhwan-al-Musalemun,
Jamait-i.'-Islami.
Jami/Djami.
knowledge.
The Muslim Brotherhood Party of Egypt led by
Imam Hasan al Barina.
Litz one who leads the caravan, hence a guide.
Commonly used to designate the leader of thd
congregation in prayer, or the leader of the
Muslim community. In the Shia sect, Imam is
taken to mean the sole, faultless and charismatic
leader and descendent of Caliph Au. Hence the
Shia conception of'Imm ns'te' to denote the
hereditary charismatic leadership or polity.
The religio-political party of Maulana Abu al Ala
Maududi of Pakistan.
The Islamic university e.g. Jami Al-Azhar,
Janissaries (Tur.Yefiiceri). Lit. 	 Troops'. The name given to the regular
infantry created by the Ottoman Sultans In the
fourteenth century which became their principal
force.
Ka'aba / Kaba.	 The Cubicle stone-walled building in the centre
of the Holy Mospie in 4kkp considered by Muslims
as the House of Allah to which Muslims anywhere
in the world face when praying.
Kadi/Kazi/Qazi.	 Judge in Islamic Law.
Khalifáh/Khilafah.	 Caliph/successor or vicergent of the Prophet of
Islam. Title of the supreme head of the Muslim
community in religious and political affairs.
Caliphate/Khilafah denotes the elected/selected
institution of succession to the Prophet or
leadership of the Ummah according to the Suimi sect.
Koran/ al-Koran/Quran.	 The Holy Quran.
Madina/Medina	 Originally the town of Yathrib in Uijaz, north of
)&ckRL which later became the residence and abode
of the Prophet and capital of the Islamic Khilafah.
The eoond holy city of Islam.
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Madrassah. (Turk: 11edrese)	 A Muslim School or College for higher studies.
First founded in Baghdad in 1067.A.D.
I(kka/Mecca.
	 The first holy city of Islam, repository of the
Kaaba, sanctuary of the Muslims and the birthplace
of Prophet Muh4-mnii.d and the nucleda of Hajj.
This study eschews the spelling 'Mecca' for it
unholy usage in the Western world for Dancing
Halls, Gambling Clubs etc., and prefers Makka.
Maularia /Maulvi.
Maulud/Turk s Meviud.
Mi. ilet.
Mufti.
Muhtasib.
Lit: Benifactor. The title given to a learned,
wiseman in Islam or the one dedicated to the
truly Islazn.ic way of life.
The celebration of the birth of anyone especially
the Prophet or the meeting of rememberance held
after prayers.
Community. The institution of religious communities
as allowed under the Ottoman Sultans.
The juris-consult in Islamic Law; the highest
office for the interpretation of law in Islam.
Censothr the officer appointed by the Khalifah
or Sultan to see that the religious and moral
order of the Muslims is preserved.
Nizam-i-jid (Turk : Cedid) Lit. The New Order. The name given to the
modernization policies of Sultans Selim and MahmudO
in the Ottoman Turkey.
Pasha.	 The highest official title of honour in the Ottoman
Society.
Qiyas.	 Ana.lor: the fourth source of Islamic Law.
Shaikh-al-Islam or	 The highest official title of religious and moral
Sadr-us-Sadur.	 authority in Islam, the pontiff of Islam.
Shariah/Shariat/Tu.rk.Serlat The Rule of Law in Islam. The collection of all
religious and socio-political laws of Islam as
derived from the four sources of the Quran, Hadith,
Ijina and Q1yas. The axiological core of Islamic
norms.
Sunnah.	 Custom, use, tradition. The way of the Prophet
of Islam.
Sunni.	 People of the Sunnah. The greater majority of the
Muslims in the world who consider themselves to be
the true followers of the Sunnah and who vouchsafe
the consensus of the Umms-h as the next best guide.
Shia.
Tanziniat.
Tawhid.
Ulama/tTlenia.
Ummi'h.
Zakat.
Lit: scission, split. The second large sect in
Islam who consider following of the Tininrni-te as
the best guide.
The series of institutional modernization laws
introduced by the Ottoman Sultans.
The concept of Unity of God as in Islam.
Plural of Aiim: one who is learned. The class of
the orthodox lented doctors in Shariat.
The Muslim Community.at large.
The Islamic pority tax being 2% of aliwlth
owned continuously for a year.
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